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Abstract 
How can we pursue egalitarian distributive justice?  Starting from the assumption that 
an egalitarian distribution of advantage is one in which no one is worse off than anyone 
else as a matter of luck, this thesis examines how such a distribution might be brought 
about.  It begins with an investigation of how the luck egalitarian ideal should be 
interpreted, advancing a critique of the ‘attributivist’ approach to conceptualizing luck 
developed by Andrew Mason and a (limited) defence of the ‘metaphysical’ approach 
favoured by G. A. Cohen and others.  It then turns to the question of what can be done 
about the inegalitarian influence of luck on people’s levels of advantage, proposing a 
pluralist approach to the regulatory strategies of luck egalitarian distributive justice.  It 
argues that, in addition to ‘redistributive compensation’, strategies of ‘levelling’ and 
‘direct structural regulation’ should be included in the luck egalitarian armoury.  The 
thesis then applies these arguments to a case study of contemporary internships in the 
UK.  While internships have become a crucial route into employment within many 
professional sectors, they have yet to receive any sustained critical attention from 
egalitarian political philosophers.  The thesis demonstrates how the distribution of 
internships contributes to distributive injustice and then examines the various regulatory 
actions luck egalitarians might endorse in response to that injustice.  The ways in which 
contemporary injustice is produced are many and varied: the pluralist approach to luck 
egalitarian regulatory strategies provides a useful and clear framework within which to 
identify and evaluate the many and varied ways in which we might respond. 
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Introduction 
 
How can we pursue egalitarian distributive justice?  Although egalitarians disagree over 
what it means to live in a society of equals, there is little divergence from the consensus 
that the distribution of benefits and burdens in contemporary society does not accord 
with any plausible ideal of equality.  Inequalities of outcome have reached astonishing 
levels and, to many minds, the bases on which those inequalities are produced and 
maintained are manifestly objectionable.  Extreme and inherited wealth persists in the 
face of dire poverty.  Fortunes are spent to secure the most advantageous schooling for 
some children while others are denied a proper chance to fulfil their developmental 
potential.  Sexist, racist, ableist, heteronormative and cisnormative social norms work to 
prevent many from living the lives they would choose.  The material environments in 
which we live range from the sublime, secure and uplifting to the depressingly barren, 
dangerous and inaccessible.  The road to well-paid and fulfilling work has long been 
paved with barriers only the ‘lucky few’ can surmount and recent trends have introduced 
further obstacles: while internships are becoming an increasingly important route into 
the professions, they are monopolized by the wealthy and well-connected.  If we know 
we cannot accept things as they are, what are we to do?  In short, we must identify goals 
that are worth pursuing and work out how best to pursue them.  For the egalitarians to 
whom this thesis is addressed, that enterprise involves determining, first, what kind of 
egalitarian justice is morally valuable and, second, how we might bring it about.  The 
work I present here is the outcome of my attempts to make a contribution to our 
understanding of these complex issues.   
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My ambitions are limited in the sense that I do not seek to persuade those who reject 
the value of egalitarian justice that some kind of equality is morally valuable.  I also assume, 
without attempting to provide thoroughgoing justification of my assumption, that luck 
egalitarian distributive justice constitutes an important part of the egalitarian ideal.  The 
claim that luck egalitarian distributive justice is partially constitutive of the ideal of 
equality is a normative claim about the principle to which the distribution of benefits 
and burdens – or, advantage – should conform.  In brief, luck egalitarians hold that all 
should enjoy equal opportunity for advantage: the distribution of advantage should be 
insensitive to matters of luck, but (in some way) sensitive to the choices people make.1  
The underlying intuition that motivates this position is expressed by Larry Temkin as 
follows: ‘it is morally bad – because unjust and unfair – if someone is made worse-off 
than others through no choice of their own’ (Temkin 1993: 13).  In practical terms, this 
means that people should be relieved of responsibility for unchosen costs and benefits 
that accrue to them as a matter of luck, but may be held responsible for the just 
distributive consequences of their choices.  I seek to defend luck egalitarianism against 
some objections raised by egalitarians who doubt that egalitarian justice is a property of 
distributions, but the majority of my work is intended to appeal to those who share the 
basic luck egalitarian intuition.  My central aim is to present an attractive interpretation 
of the luck egalitarian ideal and persuade luck egalitarians against less attractive 
                                              
1 I examine two very different luck egalitarian approaches to the issue of choice-sensitivity in 
section 1.1.3. 
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interpretations, and to enhance analytical clarity regarding the variety of regulatory 
strategies through which we might strive to implement that ideal in our social 
arrangements.  I defend a pluralist approach to the regulatory strategies of luck egalitarian 
distributive justice and, in order to illustrate some of the concrete implications and 
demonstrate the usefulness of that approach, I also offer an in-depth case study of 
internships in the UK.  I present a luck egalitarian analysis of internship-related injustice 
and discuss the range of regulatory actions that might be adopted in response to that 
injustice.   
Research Questions 
The four key research questions that motivate my discussions can be summarized as 
follows:  
(1)  What version of the distinction between luck and choice should luck egalitarians 
favour?   
(2)  What regulatory strategies can be employed in pursuit of luck egalitarian distributive 
justice?   
(3)  How do internships and their distribution currently contribute to distributive 
injustice in the UK?   
(4)  What regulation might luck egalitarians endorse in response to the distributive 
injustice produced by internship distribution? 
13 
 
Theoretical Preliminaries 
Before describing in more detail the central topics and structure of this thesis, it will be 
useful to first outline some of the central methodological assumptions and limitations of 
my work. 
First, the questions I have just outlined are, as I approach them, questions of domestic 
justice.  The majority of the luck egalitarian literature presents luck egalitarianism as a 
theory of domestic justice and this thesis is no exception.  My discussion therefore sets 
to one side the important but complex debates regarding the scope of distributive justice 
and, in particular, questions regarding the nature and regulatory requirements of global 
justice.2   
I also share with other luck egalitarians the assumption that individuals are the basic 
concern of distributive justice.3  My outlook is specifically humanist in the sense that the 
individuals with whom I suppose distributive justice is concerned are human individuals: 
non-human animals and the habitats we share we them are treated as valuable only 
inasmuch as they have instrumental value to humans.  Of course, this is not to say that 
                                              
2 For a defence and a critique of luck egalitarianism as an ideal of global distributive justice, see, 
for example, Kok-Chor Tan (2011) and Christian Schemmel (2007), respectively. 
3 See, for example, John Roemer (1996: 148), G. A. Cohen (1997: 12) and Carl Knight (2009a: 
5) for similar statements. 
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non-human animals and the natural environment have no intrinsic value but, rather, that 
the question of their intrinsic value is not a question of distributive justice. 
Next, I assume that luck equality is but one important value among others.  As Temkin 
observes: 
any reasonable egalitarian will be a pluralist.  Equality is not the 
only thing that matters to the egalitarian (Temkin 2003: 63) 
As a value-pluralist, I endorse what has been termed moderate luck egalitarianism.4  Luck 
equality is important, but it is not the only value worth pursuing in our social 
arrangements.  Accordingly, whatever its demands consist in, they must be balanced 
against the demands of other important values.  Thus, my claims regarding what luck 
egalitarian distributive justice demands are defeasible or, in Cohen’s terms, ‘weak’ and 
‘subject to whatever limitations need to be imposed in deference to other values’ (Cohen 
1989: 908).  I do not seek to determine how competing demands should be balanced 
against each other, but I do hope to show that the pluralist approach to luck egalitarian 
regulatory strategies that I advocate provides luck egalitarians with the best hope of 
minimizing value conflict.  Luck egalitarian ends may only be pursued as far as is 
permitted in light of the properly balanced demands of all relevant values but, given that 
                                              
4 See, for example, Richard Arneson (2004: 15), Alexander Brown (2005b: 297) and Knight 
(2005: 55). 
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restriction, some regulatory strategies enable us to pursue those ends more successfully 
than others.   
One of the central foci of luck egalitarian debates concerns what Cohen (1989) terms 
the ‘currency’ of egalitarian distributive justice.  As luck egalitarianism holds that people 
should have equal opportunity for advantage, it requires a meaningful conception of 
advantage.  In order to determine what people should have equal opportunities for – 
what aspect of their outcomes should be luck-insensitive and (in some way) choice-
sensitive – we need to determine what it is about people’s lives that makes them go well 
in the sense that matters to distributive justice.  Luck egalitarian theorists tend to favour 
one of three conceptions: resources, welfare or advantage broadly conceived. 
Ronald Dworkin and Eric Rakowski both favour a conception of advantage as resources.  
This includes a person’s ‘personal resources’ including ‘physical and mental health and 
ability’, as well as ‘impersonal resources’ including wealth and property, which (unlike 
personal resources) ‘can be reassigned from one person to another’ (Dworkin 2000: 322-
323).  Alternative approaches conceive advantage in terms of welfare, and the concept 
of welfare has itself been understood in different ways by different theorists.  Cohen 
(1989) notes a distinction between hedonic and preference-satisfaction views of welfare.  
Arneson’s earlier work, and particularly his influential article of 1989, is often cited as 
exemplifying the preference-satisfaction view.  When welfare is conceived in terms of 
preference satisfaction, the ‘more an individuals’ preferences are satisfied, as weighted 
by their importance to that very individual, the higher her welfare’ (Arneson 1989: 82).  
While this may seem at first glance and has sometimes been interpreted to indicate a 
subjectivist understanding of preference satisfaction, Arneson specifies that the 
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preferences with which he is concerned are not necessarily those the individual 
recognizes herself as having.  Rather, he is concerned with the satisfaction of ‘rational’ 
or ‘ideally considered’ preferences, which are those the individual would have were she 
to engage in calm, clear and informed deliberation (Arneson 1989: 83).  In his later work, 
Arneson (1997) further clarifies that he favours an objectivist conception of welfare 
according to which there are certain goods that are objectively constitutive of the good 
life.  A person’s welfare follows from her possession of those goods, rather than from 
her subjective feelings and judgements regarding the extent to which her preferences are 
satisfied.  Nicholas Barry (2006) favours a similar objectivist version of the welfarist 
account of advantage.  On Knight’s alternative account of welfare, what matters about 
a person’s outcome is how happy she is in her ‘present mood’: according to this account, 
the measure of a person’s welfare is how she is currently feeling, or, her current ‘affective 
state’ (Knight 2009a: 71).  Finally, Cohen presents a view of advantage broadly 
conceived.  For Cohen, advantage is reducible to neither resources nor welfare but, 
rather, references both.  A person’s level of resources matters to distributive justice quite 
apart from its impact on her welfare and her welfare matters quite apart from its impact 
on her resources.  In addition, his concept of advantage references (though differs in 
several key respects from) Amartya Sen’s (1980) work on capabilities: it also matters to 
distributive justice what a person is able to do, which is not reducible to the level of 
resources she has or to her level of welfare.  Similarly, John Roemer (1995a) favours a 
broad conception of advantage on which several aspects of a person’s outcome 
(including, for example, her income, life satisfaction and educational achievements) are 
all relevant to distributive justice.   
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The central arguments of this thesis are neutral with regard to the currency of egalitarian 
distributive justice.  That is, the arguments I make concerning the distinction between 
luck and choice and the pluralist approach to luck egalitarian regulatory strategies 
generally hold regardless of which currency is favoured and I therefore take no stand 
here as to which should be favoured.  There are, however, points at which I address how 
the pluralist approach plays out and, at those points, where adopting alternative 
currencies has different implications I explicitly address those differences.   
My approach to normative theorizing about principles of justice borrows heavily from 
Cohen’s foundationalist approach.  In particular, I follow Cohen in drawing a distinction 
between fact-insensitive fundamental principles that express values and regulatory 
principles that serve values (Cohen 2003: 240).  Thus, the fundamental principle of luck 
egalitarianism expresses the luck egalitarian ideal and can be formulated as follows: a just 
distribution of advantage is one in which each individual’s level of advantage is 
insensitive to her luck but (in some way) sensitive to her choices.  To clarify, the claim 
that fundamental normative principles are fact-insensitive does not imply that we can or 
should develop belief in those principles without reference to our experience of the 
world.  Rather, it means that we must believe that the fundamental principles we endorse 
hold regardless of our personal experiences.  In Cohen’s terms, fundamental principles 
express ‘a value-judgment that remains the same, for the judger, under any and all 
assumptions about the facts’ (Cohen, 2003: 214).  With regard to the genesis of ideals, 
my view reflects that of Iris Marion Young.  She writes that ‘Normative reflection must 
begin from historically specific circumstances because there is nothing but what is, the 
given, the situated interest in injustice, from which to start’ (Young 1990: 5).  Our ideals 
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arise from our experience of and reflection on the world around us.  Cohen echoes this 
sentiment when he writes, in reaction to misunderstanding and misrepresentation of his 
view, that people ‘are misled by the truth that it is (of course) in the wake of our experience 
of life that we adopt the principles that we do into denying my claim that we are 
committed to some fact-insensitive principle whenever we adopt a principle in light of, 
and, therefore, sensitively to, the facts’ (Cohen 2003: 232-233, original emphasis).  But 
how does experience yield ideals and principles?  I share Young’s view that: 
ideals arise from the yearning that is an expression of freedom: it 
does not have to be this way, it could be otherwise.  Imagination 
is the faculty of transforming the experience of what is into a 
projection of what could be, the faculty that frees thought to form 
ideals and norms’  (Young 1990: 6) 
It is through experience of and reflection on the gap between what is and what is hoped 
for that I have come to endorse the ideals and principles I favour.  Put differently, the 
‘genesis of ideals [results] from an experience of the possibilities desired but unrealized 
in the given’ (Young 1990: 6).  On my view, then, as the fundamental principle of luck 
egalitarian distributive justice expresses (part of) what justice is, it corresponds to 
convictions about the character of a just, hoped-for, future state of social life.  Although 
Cohen is a moral objectivist (of the sort Young condemns), he emphasizes that the 
foundationalist method he espouses and which I employ is ‘neutral on that central 
question of meta-ethics, which concerns the objectivity or subjectivity of normative 
principles’ (2003: 234).  If my project were concerned with justifying the fundamental 
luck egalitarian principle, my arguments would doubtless have to endorse either moral 
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objectivism or moral subjectivism.  That is not, however, the purpose of my research.  
As I seek to defend an interpretation of the content and regulatory implications of the 
luck egalitarian ideal, I remain neutral on the question of its meta-ethical status. 
Cohen (2003) uses the technical terms ‘principles of regulation’ and ‘rules of regulation’ 
to describe statements about the kind of regulation that we should actually adopt in our 
social arrangements on the balance of reasons and in light of all relevant facts, including 
feasibility constraints.  However, I think additional clarity is achieved by distinguishing 
between what principles, actions and strategies our fundamental values require at the 
regulatory level absent various considerations, and what regulatory principles, actions 
and strategies are justified all things considered.  The regulatory principle that serves the 
value of luck equality considered in isolation from other values can be formulated as 
follows: people should be relieved of responsibility for the inegalitarian consequences of 
luck, but may be held responsible for the just consequences of their choices.  I term this 
principle the luck egalitarian principle of consequential responsibility.  (The principle 
might also be formulated in terms of the neutralization of luck: the inegalitarian influence 
of luck on outcomes should be neutralized, while the just inegalitarian influence of 
choice may be permitted.)  However, given value-pluralism, we may find that the 
properly balanced demands of other values constrain the extent to which it is desirable 
on the balance of reasons to relieve responsibility for luck and impose responsibility for 
choice.  Moreover, it may not be practically feasible to fully neutralize luck.  Thus, the 
principle we actually adopt to govern our social arrangements all things considered might 
merely extenuate the inegalitarian influence of luck on outcomes to some extent, rather 
than fully neutralizing it: people should, as far as possible and desirable on the balance 
20 
 
of reasons, be relieved of responsibility for the inegalitarian consequences of luck and 
held responsible for the just consequences of their choices.  I also draw distinctions 
between regulatory principles, actions and strategies.  Regulatory actions comprise the 
concrete laws, policies and procedures that a regulatory agency might implement.  The 
regulatory strategies of luck egalitarian distributive justice are the subject of chapter 2.  I 
argue there that all luck egalitarian regulatory action can be taxonomized into three 
categories of regulatory strategy, depending on its strategic rationale and target.  Again, 
my discussions distinguish between the regulatory actions and strategies that luck 
egalitarians might recommend, absent various considerations (including feasibility 
constraints and values other than luck equality), and the actions and strategies that it is 
desirable to implement on the balance of reasons and in light of all the facts.   
Finally, I should explain my position on feasibility.  As fundamental principles are 
insensitive to facts, including facts about what it is feasible to actually achieve, feasibility 
is not a constraint on fundamental principles.  As Cohen writes, ‘If justice is, as Justinian 
said, each person getting her due, then justice is her due irrespective of the constraints 
that might make it impossible to give it to her’ (Cohen 2008: 252-3, see also 2008: 7 and 
Arneson 1997: 240).  However, facts about what is possible do, of course, constrain what 
we are able to do in practice to promote distributive justice.  If the regulatory actions 
that we seek to implement here and now are not to be futile they must be feasible and 
what is feasible depends on the facts (Cohen 2008: 253).  But not all normative theorizing 
regarding proposals for regulatory action is limited to ‘the here and now’: my discussion 
of proposals for the normative regulation of internships ranges from the more to the 
less ideal.  I employ the account of more and less ideal theory developed by Zofia 
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Stemplowska (2008) and Alan Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska (2012), which states that 
proposals for normative regulation must take account of the relevant facts and 
circumstances, but that some of these may be idealized.  Non-ideal theorizing makes no 
idealizing assumptions about the facts but, rather, tells us which regulatory options from 
among the feasible set are desirable to implement here and now.  Theorizing about 
regulation may also be more or less ideal, depending on the extent to which it idealizes 
pertinent facts: the more facts are idealized, the more ideal the theoretical proposals are.5  
More or less ideal theorizing about regulatory proposals may, then, absent certain 
feasibility constraints by idealizing certain facts in order to identify ‘reforms that become 
relevant if feasibility constraints relax’ or, in other words, if the facts change (Hamlin 
and Stemplowska 2012: 59).  I also draw a distinction between deep (or ‘possible worlds’) 
and sociological (or ‘panglossian’) feasibility (Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012: 60).  
Implementation of deeply infeasible proposals would require, in terms Stemplowska 
(2008) borrows from Derek Parfit, ‘a major change in the laws of nature, including the 
laws of human nature’ (Parfit 1984: 388).  Sociological feasibility constraints, on the other 
hand, concern those contingent and at least potentially changeable constraints on what 
may be practically achieved, starting from the social, cultural, economic and 
technological status quo.  What is sociologically infeasible today may become practically 
achievable tomorrow.  Thus, where I make reference to feasibility, I refer explicitly to 
either deep or sociological feasibility.   
                                              
5 See, in particular, Stemplowska (2008: 326-329), and Hamlin and Stemplowska (2012:52-58). 
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Thesis Outline 
The thesis is divided into two parts, with each part consisting in two chapters.  The first 
chapter of Part I is concerned with interpreting a part of the luck egalitarian ideal, namely, 
the distinction between luck and choice that gives substance to luck egalitarian principles.  
The second chapter proposes and defends an analytical framework for understanding 
the regulatory strategies of luck egalitarian distributive justice.  Part II of the thesis then 
applies these arguments to the problem of internships in contemporary Britain.  Chapter 
3 presents a critical analysis of internship-related injustice, while the final chapter of the 
thesis employs the framework developed in chapter 2 to examine the various regulatory 
actions that might be implemented in response to that injustice.   
Chapter 1 presents my contribution to the debates regarding what kind of equality is 
morally valuable.  Starting from the assumption that the luck egalitarian ideal constitutes 
part of egalitarian justice, I examine how that ideal should be interpreted.  Specifically, I 
ask what version of the distinction between luck and choice luck egalitarians should 
favour.  What way of drawing that distinction is most appropriate to a theory of 
distributive justice that condemns the inegalitarian influence of luck on life outcomes, 
but permits the just inegalitarian influence of choice?  First, I interrogate Andrew 
Mason’s (2006) approach to drawing the distinction, which I term the ‘attributivist’ 
approach.  On Mason’s view, people attract responsibility for the consequences of 
choices for which, in our ordinary moral experience, we judge them attributively 
responsible.  He then claims that T. M. Scanlon’s ‘responsiveness to reason’ conception 
of attributive responsibility provides the best explanation of our ordinary moral 
experience of assigning attributive responsibility.  I set out a new critical analysis of the 
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attributivist approach, raising various objections against it that I hope constitute 
convincing grounds for its rejection.  I then outline in some detail the central features of 
the ‘metaphysical’ approach to the distinction between luck and choice, which I employ 
throughout the thesis.  I briefly consider some convincing reasons to dismiss two 
criticisms that have been raised against that approach, but do not provide a 
thoroughgoing defense against all potential objections to it.  While my view that the 
metaphysical approach is the most appropriate for luck egalitarians to adopt therefore 
constitutes an incompletely defended assumption, many of the arguments I propose in 
subsequent chapters do not depend on the truth of that assumption.  Nonetheless, my 
arguments do, at times, require me to adopt some version of the distinction and the 
exposition I provide in chapter 1 is therefore intended to clearly set out the contours of 
the version I adopt.   
In chapter 2, I turn from the question of how luck should be conceptualized to the 
question of what can be done about its inegalitarian influence on levels of advantage, 
examining the variety of regulatory strategies that luck egalitarians might endorse.  I 
present a critique of the tendency within much of the luck egalitarian literature to 
conceive of regulation in terms of redistributive compensation and urge luck egalitarians 
to adopt a pluralist approach to the regulatory strategies of luck egalitarian distributive 
justice.  The new framework I develop draws on Jonathan Wolff’s model of 
opportunities to demonstrate that, in addition to redistributive compensation, strategies 
of ‘levelling’ and ‘direct structural regulation’ should also be included in the luck 
egalitarian armoury.  On the approach I propose, regulatory action falling within the 
category of redistributive compensation redresses unjust inequalities of outcome by 
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adjusting people’s levels of advantage to offset any overall luck-based advantage and 
disadvantage.  Levelling and direct structural regulation, on the other hand, function to 
prevent luck-based inequalities of outcome from arising in the first place by equalizing 
opportunities for advantage ex ante redistributive compensation.  In the sense that the 
purpose and effect of both of these strategies is to prevent the inegalitarian influence of 
luck from playing out, rather than to redress it, they stay the hand of fortune.  While some 
defenders and critics of luck egalitarianism appear to assume that compensation, as I 
have just defined it, is the sole regulatory strategy of luck egalitarianism, others use the 
term compensation to indicate regulatory action that is best conceived as falling within 
the categories of levelling or direct structural regulation.  I hope to demonstrate in my 
analysis not only that the strategies of luck egalitarian distributive justice are not 
exhausted by compensation, but also that adopting the pluralist approach I propose 
enhances theoretical clarity and brings a number of other very significant benefits. 
In Part II, I apply these theoretical arguments to a case study of internships.  There is a 
tradition within the luck egalitarian literature of applying theory to case studies.  For 
example, a number of theorists have closely examined how luck egalitarian principles 
apply within the sphere of health.6  Some have also focused on equality of opportunity 
for work-related advantage.7  However, while in recent years internships in the UK have 
                                              
6 See, for example, Roemer (1998: chapter 8), Dworkin (2000: chapter 8) and Shlomi Segall 
(2010).   
7 See, for example, Roemer (1998: chapter 14), Dworkin (2000: chapter 12) and Segall (2012a). 
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come to play a crucial role in the production and maintenance of contemporary 
inequalities of opportunity in the sphere of employment, they have yet to receive any 
sustained critical attention from luck egalitarian theorists.  This case study is intended to 
address that gap in the literature.  Moreover, case studies can be used to illustrate in 
precise terms how a theoretical approach can be applied to a particular problem and to 
defend that theoretical approach by demonstrating its benefits.  The case study of 
internships I present is intended both to illuminate how the pluralist approach to luck 
egalitarian regulatory strategies I defend in chapter 2 can be applied to the problem of 
internship-related injustice and to clearly demonstrate the usefulness of that approach.   
In chapter 3, I offer a luck egalitarian critique of contemporary internships in the UK.  I 
examine some of the available data on paid and unpaid internships and, on the basis of 
that examination, identify five mechanisms through which internships are distributed.  I 
then present an analysis of the various ways in which luck influences access to 
internships.  I argue that contemporary internships in the UK can be categorized into 
ten types according to their distributive mechanism and whether or not they are 
remunerated, and that access to each type is delineated on the basis of various forms of 
luck.  (For example, access to all unpaid types of internship is delineated on the basis of 
luck-based differences in the levels of wealth people have at their disposal.)  Luck-based 
inequalities of access to internships are relevant to distributive justice because internships 
are a crucial route into employment in many professional sectors: those inequalities are 
a significant factor in the production and maintenance of inequalities of opportunity for 
work-related advantage.  Those who, as a matter of luck, are unable to undertake an 
internship may as a consequence face unchosen disadvantage in the sphere of 
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employment that sets their overall outcome at an unjust disadvantage.  The purpose of 
the critique is, then, to illuminate how the distribution of internships contributes to 
distributive injustice and to motivate the arguments of chapter 4. 
In chapter 4, I discuss the range of regulatory responses to internship-related injustice 
that luck egalitarians might endorse.  Of course, luck egalitarians might respond to 
unchosen advantage and disadvantage – including that which is a function of luck-based 
inequalities of access to internships – by recommending the provision of redistributive 
compensation to offset any unjust inequalities of outcome.  But, on the pluralist 
approach I endorse, they might also recommend levelling or direct structural regulatory 
action to reduce luck-based inequalities of access to internships.  I hope to establish that 
it would be a mistake to assume that luck egalitarian regulatory strategies are exhausted 
by redistributive compensation, to illustrate how the pluralist approach can be employed 
to frame discussion of alternative regulatory options, and to demonstrate the benefits of 
that approach.  The pluralist approach prompts us to consider the various ways in which 
luck influences outcomes and the variety of possible regulatory responses.  Of course, 
the regulatory action we endorse on the balance of all relevant considerations will 
neutralize the inegalitarian influence of luck only as far as is possible and permissible in 
light of the properly balanced demands of other values.  But if we acknowledge the range 
of potential regulatory responses to injustice it becomes clear that, given that constraint, 
some strategies may be more effective than others at mitigating injustice.  For example, 
where the properly balanced demands of all values other than luck equality tell against 
the provision of compensation for disadvantage, they might yet permit some forms of 
levelling or direct structural regulation.  The ways in which contemporary injustice is 
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produced are many and varied: the pluralist approach to the regulatory strategies of luck 
egalitarian distributive justice provides a useful and clear framework within which to 
identify and evaluate the many and varied ways in which we might respond.  
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PART I 
LUCK EGALITARIAN THEORY 
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1 
 
Luck, Choice, and Responsibility: 
Attributivist and Metaphysical Approaches 
 
 
Introduction 
For luck egalitarians, the distinction between luck and choice could hardly hold greater 
normative significance.  It is the cornerstone of luck egalitarian thought.  How, then, is 
it best conceptualized?  What way of drawing the distinction between luck and choice is 
most appropriate to a theory of distributive justice that condemns the inegalitarian 
influence of luck on life outcomes, but permits the just inegalitarian influence of choice?  
This chapter examines two (rival) candidate approaches to drawing the central luck 
egalitarian distinction: the ‘attributivist’ approach and the ‘metaphysical’ approach.  The 
former has not, as yet, received as much critical attention as the latter, but is sufficiently 
interesting, prima facie plausible and, I think, problematic to warrant some sustained 
assessment.  The metaphysical approach is endorsed by some of the most prominent 
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luck egalitarians and is the one I favour throughout this thesis, and so is worth outlining 
here in detail in order to ensure clarity of meaning in subsequent chapters.8 
Section 1.1 outlines some preliminary thoughts regarding the distinction between luck 
and choice, and the luck egalitarian principle of consequential responsibility to which it 
gives substance.  Section 1.2 provides a concise exposition of the attributivist approach 
to drawing the distinction between luck and choice.  It then goes on to present a critical 
analysis of that approach, raising various objections against it that I hope constitute 
convincing grounds for its rejection.  Section 1.3 canvasses, in some detail, the central 
features of the metaphysical approach I favour.  While I do not provide a comprehensive 
defence of that approach, I do briefly consider some convincing reasons to dismiss two 
criticisms that have been raised against it.9   
                                              
8 I do not attempt to provide an exhaustive account of all distinctions that have received favour 
from luck egalitarians.  Other notable approaches to drawing the distinction include Roemer’s 
political approach and Dworkin’s identificationist approach.  Although both of these are 
mentioned where relevant, neither receives any thoroughgoing exposition or analysis.  I do, 
however, make clear some of my reasons for rejecting each in my critique of the attributivist 
approach: some of the objections I raise against that view apply also to the views of Roemer 
and Dworkin.   
9 Although the lack of a full defence of my view that the metaphysical approach is the best one 
for luck egalitarians to adopt renders that view an incompletely defended assumption of this 
thesis, many of the arguments I propose in later chapters are neutral with regard to the 
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1.1  Luck, Choice, and Responsibility 
1.1.1  The Distinction between Luck and Choice 
Luck egalitarianism is a theory of distributive justice expressing the fundamental 
conviction that the inegalitarian influence of luck on individual’s life outcomes is unjust, 
where luck is understood in terms of unchosen circumstance.  As Samuel Scheffler (a 
critic) comments, the ‘core idea is that […] inequalities deriving from unchosen features 
of people’s circumstances are unjust’ (Scheffler 2003a: 5 and 2003b: 199).  On the luck 
egalitarian view, justice demands that people’s relative outcomes are insensitive to the 
vagaries of chance or, put differently, that they are luck-neutral.  For luck egalitarians, 
some conception of ‘luck’ is therefore necessarily partially constitutive of distributive 
justice in the sense that it specifies the sorts of inegalitarian influence on outcomes that 
justice condemns, such that justice itself cannot be specified without reference to a 
particular conception of luck.  Luck egalitarians contrast luck with choice, insisting that 
everything that influences a person’s outcome is either a matter of luck or of choice, or 
a mix of both.  That is, luck-based and choice-based influences on outcomes are taken 
                                              
distinction employed.  Thus, regardless of which distinction between luck and choice is 
favoured, key arguments presented for a pluralist approach to luck egalitarian regulatory 
strategies that includes ‘direct structural regulation’ and ‘levelling’ as well as redistributive 
compensation, much of the critique of internships, and many of the proposals for internship 
regulation hold.   
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to be exhaustive of all possible influences on outcomes.  Roemer, for example, claims 
that a person’s actions and outcomes ‘are determined by two kinds of cause: 
circumstances beyond her control, and autonomous choices within her control’ (Roemer 
1995b: 4).  Cohen makes a similar claim: ‘the relevant opposite of an unlucky fate is a 
fate traceable to its victim’s control’ (that is, to her choices) (Cohen 1989: 922).  And, 
more recently: ‘Since luck egalitarianism accounts it an unfairness when some are better 
off than others through no fault or choice of their own, the relevant contrast with “luck” 
is “choice”, complexly understood’ (Cohen 2006: 442).  While luck egalitarian 
distributive justice condemns the inegalitarian influence on outcomes of the former, it 
permits the just inegalitarian influence of the latter.  This means that people may be 
required to bear (certain) costs and permitted to retain (certain) benefits that accrue to 
them as a consequence of the choices they make, and the resulting inequalities of 
outcome are just inasmuch as they are a function of those choices.10  Accordingly, the 
central luck egalitarian conviction can also be expressed in terms of a commitment to 
equality of opportunity for advantage: people enjoy equality of opportunity for 
advantage when their level of advantage is a function of their choices and is unaffected 
                                              
10 I say that people may be required to bear certain costs and permitted to retain certain benefits 
because, as we will see in section 1.1.3 below, while some luck egalitarians hold that whatever the 
costs and benefits of choice amount to, the fact of their being chosen entails that it is just to 
impose them on the chooser, others hold that additional considerations bear on the justice of 
permitting or requiring people to bear the consequences of their choices, including, for example, 
considerations regarding the magnitude of the consequences. 
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by ‘lucky’ or ‘unlucky’ circumstance.  Rebutting Susan Hurley’s contention that luck does 
not ‘contribute to identifying and specifying what egalitarianism is’ (Hurley 2003: 147), 
Cohen writes that luck egalitarians: 
object to all and only those inequalities that do not appropriately 
reflect choice.  They object to inequalities that are caused by 
(brute) luck not merely because they are inequalities (since they 
accept inequalities that reflect choice), nor merely because they are 
effects of luck (since they would accept some equalities – and, as 
it were, all non-inequalities – that are caused by luck).  So – it bears 
repeating – they object to the inequalities to which they object 
because they are inequalities caused by luck: that it is caused by 
luck specifies the inequality to which they object (Cohen 2006: 
439) 
Crucial to how plausible luck egalitarianism is as a theory of distributive justice, then, is 
whether the distinction between luck and choice it adopts accurately reflects what, for 
reasons of justice, should and should not unequally influence people’s relative outcomes.   
Hillel Steiner provides a further refinement of the twofold distinction between luck and 
choice, adding a third element that is implicit within the original formulation.  He writes 
that it is ‘indisputable […] that the causal factors contributing to a person’s incurring 
adverse (or benign) consequences can be exhaustively consigned to a threefold 
classification: (1) her own doings; (2) the doings of others; and (3) the doings of nature’ 
(Steiner 1998: 102-103).  While the distinction between our own doings and the doings 
of others and of nature does not map precisely onto the distinction between choice and 
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luck (because our own doings may not be fully chosen and because our choices may 
affect the doings of others and our own exposure to the doings of nature), Steiner’s 
inclusion of ‘the doings of others’ among the factors that influence outcomes is 
important because it illuminates a potential paradox in luck egalitarian theory.  Namely, 
a person’s outcome may be influenced by the choices of others, which influence is 
unchosen by and thus a matter of luck from the perspective of the affected person.  The 
claim that luck and choice exhaust the factors that influence people’s outcomes can 
sometimes obscure the fact that one person’s choice may be another’s (good or bad) 
luck, where it has a positive or negative influence on the other’s outcome that the other 
did not choose.  I return to this issue of ‘other-affecting choice’ or, more precisely, choice 
that creates luck-based inequality for others in later chapters but, for now, set it to one 
side.  Thus, where I refer to ‘unchosen’ or ‘luck-based’ costs and benefits, I mean those 
costs and benefits that are unchosen by the person on which they fall, whether or not 
they follow from others’ choices.  
1.1.2  The Principle of Consequential Responsibility  
The regulatory principle of luck egalitarianism can be expressed in terms of a principle 
of consequential responsibility: on the luck egalitarian approach to distributive justice, 
individuals’ responsibility for the costs and benefits that accrue to them as a matter of 
luck should be alleviated, while (full or partial) responsibility for the costly or beneficial 
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consequences of their choices should be imposed.11  The notion of consequential 
responsibility is captured by Dworkin as follows: 
                                              
11 Of course, feasibility constraints and the demands of values other than luck equality may 
restrict the extent to which it is possible or desirable on the balance of reasons to regulate our 
social arrangements in accordance with the luck egalitarian principle of consequential 
responsibility.  However, as the discussion in this chapter is concerned with interpreting the 
content of the luck egalitarian ideal, in what follows I set aside considerations that are external 
to luck egalitarian distributive justice.  In chapters 2 and 4, much of the discussion centres 
around luck egalitarian regulation and so I consider the relevance of some feasibility constraints 
and other values there, but one important issue that does not arise is that, on the balance of 
reasons, it may be the case that luck egalitarian principles should only be applied above a level 
of sufficiency.  A number of luck egalitarians have proposed that other values set a lower limit 
on the permissible level of advantage.  Any disadvantage below that level is impermissible in 
light of the demands of those values, even if it is just.  Cohen (1989: 920, 940) argues that the 
value of charity or benevolence compels us not to permit people to fall below a threshold of 
advantage.  Barry takes a social contractarian view according to which ‘each person is equally 
guaranteed the capabilities needed to participate fully in a democratic society, in return for the 
freedom that they have lost in the state of nature’ (Barry 2006: 100).  And Segall (2010: 63) 
claims that, below a threshold of advantage, people may be incapable of autonomous, 
responsible choice.  If so, luck egalitarianism would not hold them responsible for the costs of 
any of their actions and, Segall suggests, meeting the ongoing costs of alleviating their unchosen 
disadvantage would be far less efficient than ensuring that no one fell below the threshold of 
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When and how far is it right that individuals bear the 
disadvantages or misfortunes of their own situations themselves, 
and when is it right, on the contrary, that others – other members 
of the community in which they live, for example – relieve them 
from or mitigate the consequences of these disadvantages?  
(Dworkin 2000: 287) 
Similarly, Mason writes that consequential responsibility concerns when ‘people can 
legitimately be required to bear the costs of their behaviour or aspects of their condition’ 
(Mason 2006: 168).12  Neither of these formulations, however, express that while the 
issue of responsibility for costs and disadvantages is central to luck egalitarian theory, 
the issue of responsibility for benefits and advantages is equally relevant.  The injunction 
to alleviate or impose responsibility for consequences according to whether they are a 
                                              
advantage that is required for responsible choice.  Thus, on his view, luck egalitarians have a 
reason of efficiency to set a lower limit on the absolute level of advantage that is permitted.   
12 Mason terms this ‘substantive’ responsibility, claiming that he follows Scanlon’s definition 
thereof.  However, I would clarify that consequential responsibility as it is defined above is not 
continuous with but, rather, fits into a broader category of Scanlonian substantive responsibility.  
The latter is defined by Scanlon as concerning ‘what people are required (or […] not required) 
to do for each other’ (Scanlon 1998: 248).  Providing for the alleviation of responsibility 
constitutes only one of the things we may be required to do for each other, albeit a very 
important one. 
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matter of luck or chosen is neutral with regard to whether the consequences are costly 
or beneficial.  As Stemplowska writes, to be consequentially ‘responsible for X [means 
...] that the burdens (or benefits) that come with or constitute X are justly one’s to bear (or 
to enjoy)’ (Stemplowska 2009: 239, my emphasis).  Thus, to relieve a person of 
consequential responsibility for luck is to ensure she accrues neither its costs nor its 
benefits.  To impose consequential responsibility for choice is to require that both the 
costs and the benefits of a choice be borne by the chooser.   
1.1.3  Luck Egalitarian Asymmetry 
The luck egalitarian principle of consequential responsibility is, then, dualistic in the 
sense that it alleviates responsibility for luck on the one hand and imposes responsibility 
for choice on the other.  I would suggest, however, that the two seemingly 
complimentary injunctions may be asymmetrical in two senses.  The forms of asymmetry 
I identify here should be distinguished from the asymmetry Jonathon Wolff and Avner 
de-Shalit (2011) claim is present with regard to responsibility for choice.  They argue that 
the question of whether or not to hold people consequentially responsible for choice is 
sensitive to whether the consequences of choice are positive or negative.  There are more 
and better reasons, they argue, to hold people responsible for choice when the 
consequences are good than when the consequences are bad.  My concern here, 
however, is with the asymmetry between the first luck egalitarian demand to alleviate 
responsibility for luck and the second luck egalitarian demand to impose responsibility 
for choice.   
Firstly, the two demands may be asymmetrical in the sense of being unequally weighty.  
In other words, it may be possible that, from the point of view of distributive justice, it 
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is more important to relieve responsibility for the costs and benefits of luck than to 
impose responsibility for the costs and benefits of choice.  This amounts to a general 
claim that egalitarian distributive justice counts just equalities as better (and more 
important to uphold) than just inequalities, and unjust inequalities as worse (and more 
important to expunge) than unjust equalities.  Given the egalitarianism of this approach 
to distributive justice, such a claim would not seem entirely without basis or intuitive 
appeal.  Cohen notes that luck egalitarianism (and – less successfully, he thinks – 
Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources) incorporates ‘the most powerful idea in the 
arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility’ (Cohen 1989: 933, 
my emphasis).  Knight also notes that ‘Part of the attraction of luck egalitarianism may 
be the way it apparently combines a left-wing concern with equality with a right-wing 
respect for individual choice’ (Knight 2012: 553).  This underscores the possibility that 
a left-wing luck egalitarian may be more strongly committed to ensuring equality than to 
respecting choice.  Accordingly, left-wing luck egalitarians might well be expected to 
judge the first (traditionally left-wing) demand as pro tanto weightier than the second 
(traditionally right-wing) demand.13 
                                              
13 Knight’s position on gambles suggests that he would support this view of the asymmetry of 
the luck egalitarian principle of consequential responsibility.  He notes that gambles can involve 
both genuine choice (the choice to gamble) and luck (the luck of how the gamble plays out).  
Imposing responsibility for the consequences of genuinely chosen gambles – that is, allowing 
the results of gambles to stand – therefore amounts to imposing responsibility for luck as well 
as choice.  Conversely, alleviating responsibility for the consequences amounts to alleviating 
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Regardless of whether or not that claim is convincing, however, there is another, 
different sense in which the two sides of the luck egalitarian principle of consequential 
responsibility may be considered asymmetrical.  It is possible to hold that the 
inegalitarian influence of luck on outcomes is always unjust, without implying that the 
influence of choice on outcomes is always just regardless of what the influence of the latter 
amounts to.  That implication is certainly entailed by statements that an outcome is unjust 
if and only if it is a function of luck.  Consider once again Cohen’s statement, above, that 
luck egalitarians object to ‘all and only those inequalities that do not appropriately reflect 
choice’ (Cohen 2006: 439, my emphasis).  Luck egalitarians might omit this ‘and only’ 
clause, instead leaving room for arguments that the inegalitarian influence of choice may, 
sometimes, also be unjust.  It is possible, without incoherence, for luck egalitarians to 
judge some of the inegalitarian distributive implications of some choices as unjust.  An 
accurate expression of the dual demands of luck egalitarian distributive justice might, 
                                              
responsibility for choice as well as luck.  Knight’s view is that although, in these cases, a ‘position 
that refused to allow the results of individuals’ choices to stand might seem to have given up 
too much ground to the old left’, if prohibiting gambles or waiving responsibility for their 
consequences were the only way to achieve equality, egalitarians should take such a position, 
‘even if it did make their position less attractive to those with weaker commitments to equality’ 
(Knight 2012: 553).  That, given the conflict between the two luck egalitarian demands, Knight 
would rather waive than impose responsibility for both luck and choice suggests that he views 
the demand to waive responsibility for luck as weightier than the demand to impose 
responsibility for choice.  I return to this aspect of Knight’s thought in section 1.3.2. 
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then, emphasize that the demand to hold people responsible for their choices is – in 
contrast to the demand to neutralize the inegalitarian influence of luck on outcomes – 
provisory in a particular sense.  The second part of the dualistic luck egalitarian principle 
of consequential responsibility is provisory because it may require to be further specified 
and qualified in a way that the first does not.  The first part says, whatever the costs and 
benefits of luck amount to, it is unjust to require or permit people to bear or accrue 
them.  That is, regardless of how costly or beneficial luck is in terms of its influence on 
outcomes, justice requires the inegalitarian influence of luck to be expunged.  The second 
part may also seem to imply that whatever the costs and benefits of choice – however 
elevating or disastrous they may be – the fact of their being chosen entails that it is just 
to impose them on the chooser.  But it is implausible that egalitarian distributive justice 
is silent on what costs and benefits consequent on choice it is fair for people to accrue.  
In support of this view, Peter Vallentyne writes: 
For brute luck egalitarians, […] there should be no equalization 
that is not required for brute luck equalization.  This principle, 
however, is implausible.  There is no reason to treat the pre-
coercive-redistribution – or “natural” – payoff structure as 
privileged’ (Vallentyne 2002: 550)   
This important insight has formed the basis of Serena Olsaretti’s work on just stakes.  
Olsaretti observes that ‘when we endorse the principle of responsibility, it is not enough 
to hold that a person who is responsible for her actions should bear the consequences 
of her actions: we need to ask what those consequences justifiably include, and why’ 
(Olsaretti 2009: 76).  If this is correct, luck egalitarianism is in need of a complementary 
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theory that determines what costs and benefits consequent on choice responsibility may 
be imposed for.14  While, absent considerations from without distributive justice, the 
                                              
14 Clarifying this additional theoretical requirement, she writes: 
A theory of responsibility that can generate determinate judgments of 
responsibility must include both what I call a principle of attribution 
and a principle of stakes.  A principle of attribution answers a question 
about the grounds of responsibility: ‘What factors determine whether 
actions or choices are attributable to individuals in a way that justifies 
making them internalise the costs of their actions or choices?’.  A 
principle of stakes, by contrast, answers a question about the 
consequences of choice: ‘Assuming that individuals are responsible for 
their actions or conduct in a sense that justifies, other things being 
equal, making them pick up some costs, just what costs should they 
bear?’.  Now, while virtually all discussions of justice and responsibility 
focus on formulating and defending an answer to the first question, few 
raise and explicitly address the question of stakes at all.  […]  hardly any 
defence is ever offered of why, when the conditions for holding people 
responsible for their actions or choices are met, they should be held 
responsible for some rather than other consequences that those actions 
or choices could generate.  (Olsaretti 2009: 75-76) 
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luck egalitarian injunction to relieve responsibility for the costs and benefits of luck holds 
regardless of what those costs and benefits are, the injunction to impose responsibility 
for the costs and benefits of choice may thus require further specification of just costs 
and benefits.  This lends further support to the idea that the two luck egalitarian demands 
for luck neutrality on the one hand and choice sensitivity on the other are asymmetrical 
in the sense that the first demand is absolute or non-provisory and insensitive to the 
magnitude of luck-based costs and benefits, while the second demand is provisory and 
sensitive to the magnitude of choice-based costs and benefits.15   
                                              
Knight (2013b) also offers a luck egalitarian proposal regarding precisely what consequences of 
choice it is just to impose on the chooser.  On his view, individuals should receive the warranted 
expected value of their choices, accounting for non-culpable incapacity.  He writes: 
The core idea is that individuals should receive the outcomes they are 
warranted in expecting from the choices they make.  An assessment of 
probabilities is warranted if, overall, the evidence available to the 
individual points towards that assessment.  (Knight 2013b: 1067) 
Knight also recognizes that different individuals may be more or less capable of evaluating the 
evidence available to them and argues that, if a person lacks the relevant capacities through no 
choice of her own, consequential responsibility for choice should be alleviated (see, in particular, 
Knight 2013b: 1067-1068).   
15 As I am concerned here with what Olsaretti terms the question of the grounds of 
responsibility, rather than the question of stakes, I bracket the question of what consequences 
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1.1.4  The Status of Children in Luck Egalitarian Theory 
One issue that cuts across different distinctions between luck and choice concerns the 
determination of how or at what point people become capable of responsible choice.  It 
is a complex matter whether, and if so when and how, children might be held 
consequentially responsible for their actions when those actions exhibit (some of) the 
characteristics standardly (that is, in adults) indicative of responsible choice.  Luck 
egalitarians have tended to follow the well-established theoretical practice of refraining 
from attempts to resolve or engage in these issues, instead employing a working 
assumption that children are not at all capable of responsible choice or that, regardless 
of whether they are so capable, they are not counted among the people who may be held 
responsible for choice.  On this assumption, the luck egalitarian principle of 
consequential responsibility recommends holding only those who have reached their 
majority consequentially responsible for their choices.16  Observing the difficulties of 
determining the point or age of majority, Steiner writes: 
                                              
should be imposed.  Where I refer to imposing responsibility for choice, I mean imposing 
responsibility for the just consequences of choice in accordance with a plausible theory of just 
stakes but, from now on, omit this caveat.   
16 Relatedly, Olsaretti (2009) questions whether it should be parents or all members of society 
who bear the costs of raising children: children themselves bear no consequential responsibility 
for these costs.   
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Children have always posed a big problem for political philosophy 
in general and theories of justice in particular.  Just when – at what 
age – a person’s minority ends, will presumably remain a perennial 
subject of legal and political debate.  But we can all agree that 
persons below some age or other are definitely minors.  (Steiner 
2002: 183, original emphasis) 
Fundamentally, of course, the notion that all children reach their majority at a certain 
age, after which point they may be held responsible for their choices, constitutes a 
simplifying assumption that may be problematic, particularly if people might reasonably 
be thought generally to become more capable of responsible choice as they grow up.  It 
is perhaps, however, less problematic as a working assumption employed in determining 
what regulatory actions justice recommends, for which purpose proxies and cut off 
points might be justified in terms of expediency or in light of other considerations.  As 
subsequent chapters of this thesis focus primarily on issues of regulation, I refrain from 
attempting to identify and justify in any fundamental sense a particular point or age of 
majority and, instead, acknowledge my employment of the simplifying assumption that 
there is such a point, before which people count as children and should be relieved of 
all consequential responsibility.  More specifically, I assume that children’s outcomes 
may be conceived as a function of what Steiner terms, in a related discussion of the 
development of ability, ‘initial genetic endowment and an enormous variety of post-
conception inputs’, and that these are factors that children do not choose to be affected 
by (Steiner 2002: 186).  Given the assumption that children do not make responsibility-
attracting choices that might justify inequalities between them and that the determinants 
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of children’s outcomes are not chosen by them, luck egalitarianism demands equal 
outcomes for children.   
With these general points regarding the distinction between luck and choice and the 
principle of consequential responsibility to which it gives substance in mind, we can turn 
now to the question of which distinction is most appropriate to a luck egalitarian theory 
of distributive justice that condemns the inegalitarian influence of luck on life outcomes, 
but permits the inegalitarian influence of choice. 
1.2  The Attributivist Approach 
1.2.1  Masonian Distributive Justice   
Mason proposes an attributivist distinction between luck and choice that forms the basis 
of his principle of consequential responsibility.  He argues that, on that principle, 
consequential responsibility should be relieved for the consequences of luck and 
imposed for the consequences of choice, with three qualifications.  However, it is 
important to be clear that Mason does not ultimately recommend the principle of 
consequential responsibility he defends as the central principle of distributive justice.  
That is, the status of the principle is not such that distributive justice demands fully luck-
neutral and choice-sensitive outcomes.  Instead, Mason proposes a more ‘complex’ and 
‘messy’ approach to determining principles of distributive justice (Mason 2006: 7, 156).  
He develops a variety of principles that apply not to the overall distribution of advantage 
but, instead, to the discrete distributions of particular goods (including jobs, university 
places, leisure, wealth, and so on).  His strategy ‘is to work from the bottom up: to seek 
defensible principles to govern specific goods or specific aspects of people’s 
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circumstances, and then to see whether they can be grounded in more abstract principles’ 
(Mason 2006: 134).  The principle of responsibility serves as one of the ‘more abstract 
principles’ in which some of his goods-governing principles may be grounded.  Notably, 
each of the applied principles is either quasi-egalitarian, sufficientarian, or prioritarian, 
and taken together they neither fully relieve consequential responsibility for luck, nor 
hold people consequentially responsible for all of their responsible choices.17  Mason 
writes: 
The version of the mitigation approach I have defended gives no 
simple answer to the question: when are the effects of differences 
in […] circumstances on access to advantage just and when are 
they unjust?  […] according to the mitigation approach I favour, 
justice requires that these differences should not unduly affect 
access to advantage, then there are various principles governing 
access to different goods or different aspects of people’s 
                                              
17  To Mason’s contention that he focuses on ‘differences in people’s circumstances, exploring 
in what way justice requires us to counteract the effects of those differences’ (Mason 2006: 158), 
I would therefore add the qualification that he focuses on only some of the effects of some of 
those differences.  He readily acknowledges this elsewhere: for example, when he writes that 
‘the principles I have described do not imply […] we should systematically prevent differences 
in social circumstances from having an effect on people’s chances of occupying advantaged 
social positions’ (Mason 2006: 144). 
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circumstances which, combined, spell out what it is for that to be 
the case.  The particular version of the mitigation approach I have 
defended also gives a complex answer to the question: when is it 
just and when is it unjust to require a person to bear the costs of 
his behaviour?  It maintains that a variety of different factors may 
affect the justice of requiring people to bear the costs of their 
choices (Mason 2006: 220) 
In short, for Mason, the fact of someone having made a choice in such a way as to render 
imposition of consequential responsibility for the consequences appropriate (according 
to his abstract principle of responsibility) does not mean that justice recommends 
imposing consequential responsibility for those consequences (according to his applied 
principles of distributive justice).  Conversely, if costs and benefits accrue to a person as 
a matter of luck, such that the responsibility principle deems it inappropriate to impose 
on the person consequential responsibility for those costs and benefits, justice may yet 
require her to bear them.  The roles luck and choice play in determining people’s 
outcomes constitute only one among a number of considerations that inform the 
judgement of the justice of those outcomes.18  In what follows, I set aside consideration 
                                              
18 There might, then, seem to be a tension between Mason’s work on the principle of 
consequential responsibility on the one hand, and his work on goods-governing principles of 
justice on the other.  If the former is convincing, the latter may be untenable to the extent it 
fails to conform to the former’s prescriptions.  The plausibility of his eclectic mix of principles 
of justice would then be undermined to the extent that they permit people to accrue the very 
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luck-based costs and benefits condemned by the responsibility principle, and fail to impose on 
people the consequences of choices for which the responsibility principle imposes consequential 
responsibility.  That is, if Mason’s arguments regarding the responsibility principle are successful 
in establishing that consequential responsibility should be relieved for luck and imposed for 
choice (as the two concepts are defined by Mason), his other arguments that, depending on the 
good to be distributed, consequential responsibility should sometimes be imposed for luck and 
should not always be imposed for choice may be undermotivated at the fundamental level.  
Likewise, if the various principles he suggests should govern the distribution of particular goods 
are correct, that undermines his formulation of the responsibility principle in terms of the 
distinction between luck and choice.  In other words, if it is demonstrated that the 
recommendations of the responsibility principle are at odds with the requirements of justice 
when it comes to the distribution of various goods, such that responsibility should not, after all, 
be imposed in the way his responsibility principle recommends, it would seem the principle 
must be incorrect.  It may, however, be possible for Mason to avoid the charge of incoherence 
on this score.  The responsibility principle might be understood as one of a number of 
grounding principles of justice, the imperatives of which may sometimes conflict with one 
another and should therefore be understood as provisional.  If that approach is successful, 
Mason must then demonstrate for each case (that is, for each distribution of a good to which 
principles of justice apply) in which the responsibility principle is overruled that the conflicting 
demands of other grounding principles really are demands of justice and that they really do 
outweigh the demands of the responsibility principle.   
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of Mason’s eclectic goods-governing principles of justice in order to examine whether 
his version of the responsibility principle is a viable candidate for the central luck 
egalitarian regulatory principle.  That is, I ask whether the distinction between luck and 
choice on which Mason’s responsibility principle is based might be an appropriate one 
for luck egalitarian theory that recommends luck-neutral and choice-sensitive outcomes.   
1.2.2  Consequential Responsibility and Attributive Responsibility 
1.2.2.1  The Space of Rational Agency 
Mason draws the distinction between luck (or, circumstance) and choice as follows: 
I suppose that a person’s circumstances are what happens to him 
‘outside the space of his rational agency’, whereas a person’s 
choices pertain to what takes place within that space.  An aspect 
of a person’s condition lies within the space of his rational agency 
if and only if it is intelligible, at least in principle, to ask him to 
justify it or evaluate it in terms of his reasons either because it is 
something he could have influenced or prevented or because, 
even though he could not influence it, it falls within the space of 
his reasons because it is governed by relations of consistency, 
coherence, and the like.  The class, family, or culture into which a 
person is born, and his race and sex, are clearly part of his 
circumstances.  So too is the potential with which a person is born, 
that is, his natural endowment.  Behaviour – what a person does 
or fails to do, and the foreseeable consequences of his actions and 
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omissions – generally falls into the category of choice because it is 
intelligible to ask a person to give his reasons for behaving as he 
did, except in extreme cases, for instance, when he is sleepwalking 
or hypnotized.  A person’s beliefs also fall into the category of 
choice.  They lie within the space of his reasons for we may 
sensibly ask a person to give his reasons for holding some 
particular belief; so too his desires and preferences fall within this 
space if it makes sense to ask him to give his reasons for why he 
desires what he does, or why he prefers one thing to another.  
Indeed, it may be intelligible to ask someone to give his reasons 
why he has some particular desire or preference even if it is not 
under his control: even if someone has been brought up in such a 
way that he cannot help having expensive tastes, we can 
nevertheless intelligibly ask him to give his reasons why (say) he 
prefers some particular claret to another, or indeed why he prefers 
good wine to good beer, and he  may be able to give reasons in 
response that appeal to some aspect or other of its flavour.  When 
a person would rather not have a particular desire, it may also 
make sense to ask him why he would rather not have it, and 
thereby invite him to evaluate it.  So preferences that are beyond 
a person’s control may nevertheless lie within the space of his 
rational agency and hence be included as choices according to my 
stipulated definition.  (Mason 2006: 93-94) 
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To be clear, then, a person’s ability to prevent or influence some aspect of her outcome, 
and that aspect of her outcome being governed by relations of consistency and 
coherence with her reasons, are each sufficient conditions for that aspect falling within 
the space of rational agency and therefore counting as a matter of choice.  But what 
actually matters in Mason’s distinction is whether a person can intelligibly be asked to 
evaluate or justify an aspect of an outcome: this is the necessary condition for choice, 
the presence of which either of the sufficient conditions is supposed to indicate.  While 
the references to agency, influence and prevention might, at first glance, seem to connote 
some substantive role for metaphysical control in the distinction, this is not the case.  
Metaphysical agency is not relevant except inasmuch as metaphysical control indicates the 
presence of reasons; lack of control does not in itself tell us anything about whether an 
aspect of an outcome falls inside or outside the space of rational agency.  Mason writes 
that his egalitarianism maintains ‘a person’s circumstances are constituted by what lies 
outside the sphere of his rational agency, that is, what is beyond his control and does not 
lie within the space of his reasons’ (Mason 2006: 174, original emphasis).  But I would 
argue that the first ‘condition’ is in fact implicit in the second.  If some aspect of an 
outcome is inside the space of rational agency, it counts as choice regardless of whether 
or not it was under the individual’s control in the sense of being influenceable or 
preventable.  If some aspect of an outcome is outside the space of rational agency in the 
sense that it cannot be explained, evaluated or justified in terms of the individual’s own 
reasons, it cannot be under the individual’s control because, as stated above, being able 
to influence or prevent it is a sufficient condition for it to fall inside space of rational 
agency.  Mason uses the terms ‘space of rational agency’ and ‘space of reasons’ 
interchangeably.  However, given that agency, in the sense of control, plays no 
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substantive role in this distinction and, rather, merely indicates the presence of the 
substantive condition of choice – ability to evaluate or justify – it may be that the latter 
is a more appropriate term for the necessary condition of Masonian choice than the 
former. 
1.2.2.2  Attributive Responsibility as Responsiveness to Reason 
So, the distinction Mason draws between luck and choice (and the principle of 
responsibility to which it gives substance) is not grounded in metaphysics.  Instead, 
Mason’s justification for his view of consequential responsibility appeals to the notion 
that it reflects and is grounded in ‘our ordinary moral practices of praising, blaming, and 
excusing’ (Mason 2006: 174).  In one respect, this approach to consequential 
responsibility is similar to Dworkin’s.  Dworkin claims that a just principle of 
consequential responsibility should be continuous with ordinary ethical and moral 
experience and practice.  Explaining the difference between continuous and 
discontinuous approaches, he writes: 
Ethically sensitive (or “continuous”) theories grow out of our 
internal lives because they base their judgements about the justice 
or injustice of any distribution of impersonal resources on 
assignments of responsibility drawn from ethics […]  Ethically 
insensitive (“discontinuous”) political theories, on the other hand, 
deploy standards of just distribution that are special to politics and 
that do not reflect the distinctions and assignments of 
responsibility we make leading our lives from the inside.  
(Dworkin 2000: 323-324) 
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Mason’s principle of consequential responsibility is, like Dworkin’s, continuous because 
it reflects and is grounded in ordinary moral experience and practice regarding a 
particular kind of responsibility.  The approaches of Mason and Dworkin are, however, 
substantively different, as each focuses on a different aspect of ordinary experience of 
responsibility.  Dworkin thinks ordinary ethical experience is to identify with features of 
our personalities (including preferences and ambitions), but not with our circumstances 
(including native endowments and impersonal resources) (Dworkin 1981: 303; 2000: 
289-90, 293).  Because we identify with our personalities but not with our circumstances, 
he argues, we expect to take and to have imposed on us consequential responsibility for 
our personalities but not our circumstances (Dworkin 2000: 290, 294).  Finally, because 
principles of distributive justice should be continuous with ordinary ethical experience, 
they should recommend holding people responsible for the consequences of choices 
that flow from their personalities but not for the advantages and disadvantages that flow 
from their circumstances (Dworkin 2000: 294-6, 323-4).  Thus, Dworkin grounds his 
principle of consequential responsibility in (what he argues is) our ordinary ethical 
experience of taking consequential responsibility. 
Mason, on the other hand, grounds his principle of consequential responsibility in (what 
he argues is) our ordinary moral experience of assigning attributive responsibility.  Attributive 
responsibility concerns when it is appropriate for a person to attract moral praise or 
blame.  On this view, people should be held consequentially responsible for (only) those 
actions and preferences for which we ordinarily think they may be praised or blamed.  
Mason then claims that Scanlon’s responsiveness to reason account of attributive 
responsibility makes the best sense and provides the best explanation of our ordinary 
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moral experience of praising, blaming and excusing (see, in particular, Mason 2006: 162, 
164-170, 172).19  According to Scanlon’s account, a person attracts attributive 
responsibility for an action when it is ‘responsive to reason’, and it is responsive to reason 
if it is connected to her judgements and character in the sense that it comes out of a 
process of self-government.  Scanlon writes: 
A person governs herself in the sense required if she is sensitive 
to the force of reasons and to the distinctions and relations 
                                              
19 Mason clarifies that what Scanlon calls attributive responsibility, he terms moral responsibility, 
and that Scanlon uses the term substantive responsibility to indicate what I have been calling 
consequential responsibility: 
In Scanlon’s terms I am using ‘moral responsibility’ in the sense of 
responsibility as attributability. The question which motivates the 
current chapter, viz., ‘when is it fair to require a person to bear the costs 
of their behaviour?’, addresses what Scanlon calls ‘substantive 
responsibility’  (Mason 2006: 162) 
Mason does not, however, make any reference to one of Scanlon’s central claims, namely, the 
claim that attributive responsibility and consequential responsibility have entirely different 
grounds and should be imposed for entirely different reasons.  The two types of responsibility 
as set forth by Scanlon should not be conflated and the former cannot plausibly serve as grounds 
for the latter.  I return to this issue, which I will argue has problematic implications for Mason’s 
work, in section 1.2.4. 
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between them and if her response to these reasons generally 
determines her subsequent attitudes and actions.  (Scanlon 1998: 
281) 
For Scanlon and Mason, then, ‘moral criticism [or appraisal] of a person’s action remains 
appropriate as long as it is true that the process of self-governance that led to this action 
was correctly attributable to the agent’ (Scanlon 1998: 287).20  Hence, on the attributivist 
approach, a person’s choices pertain to what falls inside the space of her rational agency 
(or, more accurately, the space of her reasons).  To fall inside the space of her rational 
agency, the choice must be responsive to reason in Scanlon’s sense.  A choice being 
responsive to reason entails that it is appropriate, according to our ordinary moral 
experience, to assign attributive responsibility for that choice, which in turn justifies the 
imposition of consequential responsibility for the costs and benefits of the choice.  
Mason summarizes his position as follows: 
In cases where we blame a person (or hold that it is fair to require 
him to bear the costs of his behaviour or preferences), we do so 
because we think his behaviour and preferences are appropriately 
                                              
20 The attributivist approach holds that people should be held consequentially responsible for 
actions for which they are attributively responsible, but is silent on whether it is moral blame or 
moral praise that is appropriate: an assignation of attributive responsibility does not entail any 
particular judgement of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness, but merely indicates that a moral 
judgement (of either blame or praise) can be made.   
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connected to his reason and no excusing conditions apply  (Mason 
2006: 172) 
From this quotation, we can see that Mason thinks our ordinary moral experience is to 
assign (to some third person) both attributive responsibility and consequential 
responsibility for the same reasons, namely, that the person’s actions were responsive to 
reason in Scanlon’s sense.  However, there are some ambiguities here.  It remains 
unclarified in Mason’s work whether or not he thinks people ordinarily regard 
themselves as attributively responsible on the same basis as that on which they regard 
others as attributively responsible.  Two questions therefore arise.  First, do people 
ordinarily think of themselves as appropriately subject to moral appraisal or criticism for 
a given action when, holding all else equal, they would judge someone else to be 
appropriately subject to moral appraisal or criticism for the same action?  In other words, 
do they understand themselves to be attributively responsible for all of their actions that 
are responsive to their own reasons?  Second, do they expect to take consequential 
responsibility for such actions?  What matters in Mason’s account is the assignment of 
attributive responsibility to others, and not the recognition, acceptance or affirmation of 
one’s own (attributive or consequential) responsibility.  That, of course, allows for the 
possibility that consequential responsibility may be imposed on a person for some action 
when that person does not accept that she is attributively responsible for it (such that 
she does not experience her own behaviour as appropriately subject to moral appraisal 
by others), and/or when she does not accept that she is consequentially responsible for 
it (such that she does not expect or think it appropriate to bear its costs or accrue it 
benefits).  If the answer to both of the questions I have just asked is yes, then people 
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expect to bear consequential responsibility for actions for which they and others hold 
they are attributively responsible, and consequential responsibility should be imposed on 
them for those actions.  If the answer to the first question is no, the implication is that 
people may not ordinarily believe themselves to be attributively responsible for actions 
for which others hold they are attributively (and thus consequentially) responsible, but 
consequential responsibility should nonetheless be imposed on them for the 
consequences of such actions.  If the answer to the second question is no, the implication 
is that people may not ordinarily expect to take consequential responsibility for (at least 
some) actions for which others hold they are attributively (and thus consequentially) 
responsible, but consequential responsibility should nonetheless be imposed on them.   
1.2.2.3  Three Excusing Conditions of Scanlonian Attributive Responsibility 
Scanlon suggests that there are three grounds for waiving attributive responsibility, or, 
three excusing conditions under which assigning attributive responsibility is 
inappropriate.  Mason argues that when any of these conditions hold such that 
Scanlonian attributive responsibility is lifted, consequential responsibility for the action 
should not be imposed (Mason 2006: 165-167).  First, Scanlon argues, ‘moral appraisal 
of an agent for an action’ is inappropriate when ‘that action is not, in the proper sense, 
attributable to the agent’ (Scanlon 1998: 277, see also Mason 2006: 165).  Actions 
undertaken while under hypnosis or while sleepwalking are, in this sense, not properly 
attributable to the agent, because it is not intelligible to ask her to justify them in terms 
of her own reasons.  Second, certain conditions of an action may alter the character of 
an action such that moral appraisal is inappropriate.  Actions undertaken under 
conditions of ignorance, mistake of fact, coercion and duress belong in this category.  In 
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these cases, while the action is attributable to the agent, in the sense that it is her own 
action and she can intelligibly be asked to give her reasons for doing it, ‘the lack of 
eligible alternatives makes it all right, or at least less blameworthy, to do something that 
would normally be wrong’ (Scanlon 1998: 280, see also Mason 2006: 166).  Third, moral 
appraisal is inappropriate when ‘a person lacks the general capacities presupposed by 
moral agency’ (Scanlon 1998: 280, see also Mason 2006: 166).  Scanlon cites here cases 
of mental and cognitive ill-health, when ‘a person is unable to understand and assess 
reasons or his judgments have no effect on his actions’ (Scanlon 1998: 280).21   
1.2.2.4  Three Excusing Conditions of (Pluralist) Attributivist Consequential Responsibility  
However, this ‘pure’ responsiveness to reason conception of consequential responsibility 
is ultimately viewed as inadequate by Mason, who rejects it in favour of a ‘pluralist’ 
conception (Mason 2006: 188).  Scanlonian attributive responsibility remains the 
necessary condition for Masonian consequential responsibility, but Mason introduces 
three new excusing conditions, which are not grounded in ordinary moral experience 
and practice of blaming, praising and excusing, and under which, even though a person 
                                              
21 Scanlon asserts that children do not attract attributive responsibility for their actions, for each 
of these three excusing reasons (Scanlon 1998: 280-281).  Accordingly, Mason can argue that 
children should not be held consequentially responsible for the costs and benefits of their 
actions. 
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is attributively responsible for some action, consequential responsibility for its costs and 
benefits should be relieved.  Mason’s (pluralist) attributivist principle or consequential 
responsibility thus runs as follows: people should be relieved of consequential 
responsibility for costs and benefits they are not attributively responsible for accruing 
(that is, for luck) and held consequentially responsibility for the costs and benefits of 
actions for which they are attributively responsible (that is, for choice), with three 
exceptions. 
First, Mason writes, ‘we might want to say that it would be unfair to require a person to 
bear these costs if he could not reasonably be expected to behave otherwise, given, for 
example, the socialization that has shaped his character and dispositions’ (Mason 2006: 
189).  Mason acknowledges that this might already be implied by Scanlon’s second 
excusing condition of attributive responsibility, but urges that it may be more stringent 
(Mason 2006: 189).  There may be cases in which a person had an eligible alternative 
such that Scanlon’s second excusing condition would not apply, but in which it would 
be unreasonable to expect the person to have taken the alternative, given her upbringing.  
In such cases, consequential responsibility should not be imposed, even though 
attributive responsibility may be appropriate.22  Second, when people accrue large costs 
                                              
22 Mason discusses Scanlon’s example of someone who, as a child, is subject to a process of 
socialization that results in him becoming ‘undisciplined and unreliable’, and ‘unemployable’ as 
an adult (Mason 2006: 189).  Scanlon thinks that if he had adequate opportunities to avoid 
developing the traits that make him unemployable, he attracts attributive responsibility for the 
disadvantages of being unemployed but that if he did not have those opportunities, attributive 
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by acting in accordance with an unjust social norm, consequential responsibility may be 
relieved.  He writes: ‘When people are subject to a process of socialization which is 
shaped by an unjust norm which it also imparts, it would be unfair to require them to 
bear the full costs of acting in accordance with that norm when these costs are large’ 
(Mason 2006: 188).23  Third, Mason follows Cohen (1989, 2004) in arguing that there are 
                                              
responsibility should be waived (Scanlon 1998: 292).  (Scanlon thinks consequential 
responsibility for those disadvantages should be waived either way: he does not think 
consequential responsibility follows from attributive responsibility.  I return to this point in the 
analysis in section 1.2.4.)  On Mason’s view, even if he had an eligible alternative to developing 
those traits (which may be possible, especially given that others subject to similar processes of 
socialization manage to avoid developing or acting on them), it may be unreasonable to expect 
him to have taken that alternative, given his upbringing.  If that is the case, consequential 
responsibility should be waived for that reason, even though an eligible alternative existed such 
that he does attract attributive responsibility. 
23 Mason uses the example of the career-sacrificing mother to illustrate the force of this excusing 
condition: 
Where these [sexist] norms continue to be widely accepted and 
promulgated, even those women whose preferences have not been 
shaped by them should not be required to bear the full costs of acting 
in a way that accords with them.  There is something hypocritical, and 
also unfair, about a society where a norm that mothers should take 
primary responsibility for childcare influences social expectations but 
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cases in which consequential responsibility for the costs of satisfying reflectively 
endorsed tastes that happen to be expensive should not be imposed.  He writes: ‘it would 
be unjust to require a person to bear the full costs of his choices when the expensiveness 
of those choices places a large burden on him and is due in significant part to some 
feature of his circumstances’ (Mason 2006: 188).24  Alleviating consequential 
responsibility for such costs is particularly appropriate, Mason argues, whenever it would 
help to ‘prevent the demise of a cultural community when this would make it difficult 
or even impossible for its members (or some of them) to lead a life they can find 
meaningful’ (Mason 2006: 182).  On the attributivist approach, then, people should be 
held consequentially responsible only for choices for which we would ordinarily hold 
them attributively responsible (because they are responsive to reason and none of 
Scanlon’s excusing conditions apply), except inasmuch as considerations to do with 
                                              
which requires mothers to bear the costs of behaviour that accords with 
it, and this is true irrespective of whether they are acting from that norm 
or even whether that norm has causally influenced their preferences.  
(Mason 2006: 187-188) 
24 On this score, both Cohen and Mason differ from Dworkin.  Dworkin thinks distributive 
justice requires people to bear the costs of satisfying reflectively endorsed tastes, precisely 
because their being reflectively endorsed means they are identified with by and form part of the 
personality of their bearer.  As outlined above, Dworkin holds that people should take 
consequential responsibility for the costs of choices that flow from their personalities, including 
the costs of satisfying preferences and fulfilling ambitions with which they identify. 
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socialization, unjust social norms and reflectively endorsed expensive tastes provide 
reasons for relieving consequential responsibility for choice. 
1.2.3  A Summary of the Attributivist Approach 
Employing Mason’s responsibility principle as the central luck egalitarian principle of 
consequential responsibility generates an attributivist approach to luck egalitarianism 
that can be summarized as follows: 
There is such a thing as our ordinary moral experience and practice of assigning 
attributive responsibility (that is, of praising, blaming, and excusing a person for an 
action).   
The principle of consequential responsibility should reflect and be grounded in our 
ordinary moral experience and practice of assigning attributive responsibility.   
Our ordinary moral experience and practice of assigning attributive responsibility is best 
explained by Scanlon’s conception of attributive responsibility: we assign attributive 
responsibility for an action only when it is appropriately responsive to reason and none 
of the three excusing conditions apply.   
Therefore, Scanlonian attributive responsibility is the necessary condition for 
consequential responsibility.   
However, were it to be a sufficient condition, that would have unattractive implications 
in three respects (for reasons to do with socialization, unjust social norms, and 
reflectively endorsed expensive tastes).   
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Therefore, three additional excusing conditions for consequential responsibility are 
necessary (such that Scanlonian attributive responsibility is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for consequential responsibility). 
1.2.4  A Critique of the Attributivist Approach  
In what follows, I present a number of objections to the attributivist approach, which I 
think provide strong grounds for its rejection.  In section 1.2.4.1, I argue against Mason’s 
general claim that there is such a thing as ordinary moral experience of assigning 
attributive responsibility, which can ground and be reflected in a principle of 
consequential responsibility.  I also argue against Mason’s more specific claim that 
Scanlon’s theory of when it is appropriate to assign attributive responsibility provides 
the best explanation of the basis on which we actually assign attributive responsibility in 
our ordinary, day-to-day lives.  I then imagine how supporters of the attributivist 
approach might reply to those objections.  In section 1.2.4.2, I consider whether they 
might concede the objections, but successfully insist that (even though it does not 
capture ‘our ordinary moral experience’) Scanlonian attributive responsibility still 
constitutes an appropriate basis for consequential responsibility.  I then provide reasons 
to reject that approach.  In section 1.2.4.3, I consider an alternative approach, on which 
supporters of the attributivist approach might concede my objection to the specific claim 
but reject my objection to the general claim and insist that the correct version of the 
principle of consequential responsibility should reflect ordinary moral experience (even 
if it is not Scanlonian).  I then provide further reasons to reject that approach.   
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1.2.4.1  Objection to the claims that ordinary moral experience of attributive responsibility exists 
and is Scanlonian 
As we have seen, Mason argues that his view of consequential responsibility as requiring 
Scanlonian attributive responsibility is plausible and attractive because it is grounded in 
and reflects our ordinary moral experience of blaming and praising.  This argument relies 
on two key empirical premises.  First, Mason makes a general claim that that there is such 
a thing as ‘our ordinary moral experience’ of the conditions of assigning attributive 
responsibility – some shared basis on which we ordinarily assign blame or praise in our 
everyday lives.  Second, he makes the more specific claim that Scanlon’s theory of when it 
is appropriate to assign attributive responsibility provides the best explanation of the 
basis on which we actually ordinarily assign attributive responsibility.  I reject the general 
claim that there is such a thing as our ordinary moral experience of blaming, praising and 
excusing, which is sufficiently homogenous, coherent, and stable to provide suitable 
grounds for a principle of consequential responsibility.  I argue, using evidence from 
empirical research, that such moral experience is heterogeneous between different 
people, internally incoherent in single individuals, and potentially unstable.  Relatedly, I 
reject the more specific claim that ordinary moral experience of assigning attributive 
responsibility is generally best explained by Scanlon’s theory.  The evidence suggests that 
people (sometimes) make judgements of attributive responsibility that are incompatible 
with Scanlon’s theory. 
Many philosophers have made claims about the features of our ordinary moral 
experience of attributive responsibility.  Some have claimed that people have 
incompatibilist intuitions around attributive responsibility (for example, Kane 1999: 218 
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and Galen Strawson 1986: 30), while others have claimed people have compatibilist 
intuitions (for example, Mason 2006: 174 and Susan Wolf 1990: 89).  However, as Eddy 
Nahmias et al. observe, 
few philosophers have tried to ascertain what these commonsense 
intuitions actually are.  More often than not, philosophers are 
content to place their own intuitions into the mouths of the folk in 
a way that supports their own position – neglecting to verify 
whether their intuitions agree with what the majority of non-
philosophers actually think.  (Nahmias et al. 2005: 562, original 
emphasis) 
Happily, some experimental philosophers have set out to gather evidence on how people 
assign attributive responsibility.  Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe’s (2007) research is 
especially relevant here.  They set out to ascertain whether people have compatibilist or 
incompatibilist notions of attributive responsibility (which they term moral 
responsibility) and to examine the processes by which people assign it.  Incompatibilists 
(for present purposes) maintain that full attributive responsibility is not possible if 
determinism is true.  Mason is not an incompatibilist: he holds and assumes (and 
premises his approach to consequential responsibility on the assumption) that people 
ordinarily hold the compatibilist view that attributive responsibility is possible even if 
determinism is true, because it requires (only) Scanlonian responsiveness to reason, 
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which is possible even in a determinist world.25  I want to draw attention to three 
empirical findings that are especially relevant: first, different people assign attributive 
responsibility in different ways – moral experience of assigning attributive responsibility 
is not consistent across individuals; second, the way in which single individuals assign 
attributive responsibility is not internally coherent; and, finally, much moral experience 
of assigning attributive responsibility is not Scanlonian.  The first two findings 
undermine Mason’s general claim, and the third undermines his specific claim.26   
Nichols and Knobe instructed respondents to assume determinism and then asked them 
‘is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions?’, to which 
14% answered yes, while 86% answered no (Nichols and Knobe 2007: 670).  First 
                                              
25 Explaining the compatibility of attributive responsibility with determinism, Scanlon writes 
that the truth of determinism: 
would not imply that our thoughts and actions lack the continuity and 
regularity required of rational creatures.  It would not mean that we lack 
the capacity to respond to and assess reasons, nor would it entail the 
existence of conditions that always disrupt the connection between this 
process of assessment and our subsequent actions.  (Scanlon 1998: 281) 
26 Of course, it should be noted that, although the aim of the researchers was to uncover what 
they call ‘folk intuitions’, the research gathered data under experimental conditions, which may 
not perfectly capture ordinary, day-to-day experience and practice.  Nonetheless, and even with 
this caveat, I think the data are illuminating.   
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(against the general claim) the moral judgements elicited here are not homogenous – 
they are clearly not all predicated on the same basis.  While a sizeable majority gave 
incompatibilist answers, the evidence suggests there is no single intuition, held in 
common, either that attributive responsibility is compatibilist or that it is incompatibilist.  
Perhaps Mason would insist that there is a sufficiently large majority to indicate that 
there is such a thing as an ordinary way of assigning attributive responsibility that is 
shared in common, on which consequential responsibility can be based.  But it seems to 
me that 14% is too significant a proportion of people to simply discount in the calculus 
of a purportedly shared ordinary moral experience.  Nonetheless, perhaps the minority 
can be discounted for some non-arbitrary reason and it can be said that the attributive 
judgement of the sizeable majority represents our ordinary judgement.  But the majority 
view of attributive responsibility expressed here is definitely not Scanlonian.  If the 
majority of people judge attributive responsibility to be impossible in a determinist 
world, that majority clearly do not think that what is required is – merely – Scanlonian 
responsiveness to reason, as that is possible in a determinist world.  The evidence thus 
far contradicts Mason’s specific claim.  Moreover, of course, it is not clear from the data 
whether the minority of compatibilists endorse something like the Scanlonian 
responsiveness to reason condition of attributive responsibility or whether they have an 
entirely different sort of compatibilist view.   
Perhaps the most interesting and important finding of the research was that single 
individuals actually hold both compatibilist and incompatibilist views of attributive 
responsibility.  Nichols and Knobe report: 
68 
 
Philosophers who have discussed lay intuitions in this area tend to 
say either that folk intuitions conform to compatibilism or that 
they conform to incompatibilism.  Our actual findings were 
considerably more complex and perhaps more interesting.  It 
appears that people have both compatibilist and incompatibilist 
intuitions.  Moreover, it appears that these different kinds of 
intuitions are generated by different kinds of psychological 
processes.  (Nichols and Knobe 2007: 681) 
When asked more abstract questions designed to trigger theoretical cognition (such as 
the one above), the majority of respondents gave incompatibilist responses (that is, they 
expressed intuitions that were not Scanlonian and, thus, did not conform to Mason’s 
expectations).  However, when emotional and motivational factors were brought into 
play – when they were asked to respond to vignettes describing concrete examples of 
actions that were designed to trigger more highly affective responses regarding whether 
full attributive responsibility for the action was possible – they were much more likely 
(than in response to abstract questions) to express incompatibilist attributive judgements 
(Nichols and Knobe 2007: 664, 671).  Respondents were instructed to assume 
determinism and asked: 
Bill stabs his wife and children to death so that he can be with his 
secretary.  Is it possible that Bill is fully morally responsible for 
killing his family?  (Nichols and Knobe 2007: 670) 
50% answered no, expressing incompatibilist judgements, while 50% answered yes, 
indicating compatibilist views that might or might not have been Scanlonian.  First, 
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against Mason’s specific claim, we can see that half rejected the Scanlonian view of the 
conditions of attributive responsibility: they judged that full moral responsibility was not 
at all possible, given determinism, despite it being open-ended whether Bill’s actions 
were responsive to his reason in Scanlon’s sense.  Second, against Mason’s general claim, 
we can see again that different people formed their judgements on different bases.  There 
was not even a majority view.  So we are at a loss as to which view might be considered 
representative of our ordinary moral experience.   
Now, it might be thought that people were readier to assign attributive responsibility in 
the second scenario because it featured a concrete person doing concrete things.  And 
Mason might respond that he is interested, not in theoretical, abstract responses, but in 
how people make judgements about concrete people doing concrete things in their 
everyday lives.  Nichols and Knobe ran a further experiment that controlled for the 
possibility that concreteness had an effect (Nichols and Knobe 2007: 675-676).  They 
compared high and low affect concrete cases, under assumptions of determinism and 
indeterminism.  In the low affect concrete case, they asked people to judge whether or 
not it is possible that Mark is fully attributively responsible for cheating on his taxes, as 
he has done many times before.  In the high affect concrete case, they asked people to 
judge whether it is possible that Bill is fully attributively responsible for raping a stranger, 
as he has done many times before.  The table below shows the percentage of respondents 
who thought full attributive responsibility possible in each case: 
Table 1: Judgements of Attributive Responsibility 
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 Agent in  
indeterminist universe 
Agent in  
determinist universe 
High affect case 95% 64% 
Low affect case 89% 23% 
 
First, we can see, again, that people disagreed with each other – there was no consensus 
– which strongly suggests different people assign attributive responsibility on different 
bases.  Second, we can see that in each case in which determinism was assumed, 
significantly fewer respondents thought full responsibility was possible than when 
indeterminism was assumed.  For some of the respondents, the truth or falsity of 
determinism was highly relevant to their (clearly non-Scanlonian) judgements of 
attributive responsibility.  Moreover, we can see that, when high affect is triggered, 
‘people may sometimes declare […] an agent to be morally responsible despite the fact 
that they embrace a theory of responsibility on which the agent is not responsible’ 
(Nichols and Knobe 2007: 664).  This suggests that the way (many) individuals assign 
attributive responsibility in different circumstances is inconsistent.  If, in order to 
provide an appropriate basis for a principle of consequential responsibility, ordinary 
moral experience of the conditions of assigning attributive responsibility must be shared 
in common and internally coherent (and it is hard to see how it could provide such a 
basis if not), this evidence suggests it does not exist.   
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Now, defenders of the attributivist approach might try to respond that emotions are 
crucial to the proper (or relevant) way of assigning attributive responsibility: the low 
affect cases might be irrelevant if they do not reflect how we make judgements of blame 
and praise in our day-to-day lives.  Perhaps only the reactions to high affect cases are 
really true to how people ordinarily make those sorts of responsibility judgements.  If, 
ordinarily, high affect influences the process of attributive judgement, it might be 
pointed out that, in high affect cases, far more respondents made compatibilist 
judgements.  But I would reply that, even if we agree that only the high affect cases shed 
light on ordinary practices, responses remained significantly divergent in these cases and 
a sizable minority (36%) expressed an incompatibilist, non-Scanlonian view.  Moreover, 
of course, we are still unsure from the data whether the compatibilist judgements were 
reached on a Scanlonian (or some other) basis.   
But, in fact, there seems no good reason to claim that only the responses to the high 
affect cases are indicative of how people ordinarily make attributive judgements.  For 
that claim to be successful, it would have to be the case that ordinary judgements of 
attributive responsibility are all infused with high affect, such that a judgement being 
emotional is what qualifies it to be a bona fide ‘ordinary’ attributive judgement.  But, 
remember, the high affect vignettes to which more respondents responded with 
compatibilist answers asked about attributive responsibility for rape and murder.  Of 
course, we do make attributive judgements of rapists and murderers (and some of us 
have more cause to do so throughout the course of our day-to-day lives than others).  
But there are many scenarios in day-to-day life in which we might assign attributive 
responsibility without high affect being triggered.  We are not always highly emotional 
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in our attributive judgements.  It seems arbitrary, then, to exclude those lower affect 
judgements from the realm of ordinary moral experience and practice.  Such an approach 
would amount to selecting and excluding facts to fit theory.  (And, of course, although 
it could then cite a majority view, it would still, I think, have to concede a lack of consensus, 
even in high affect cases.)  There is much that might be said regarding whether one or 
the other type of scenario and judgement captures ‘living life from the inside’, but it 
seems most intuitively plausible (at least, to my mind) that both are integral elements of 
the ordinary moral experiences and practices from which Mason seeks to draw support.  
As Nichols and Knobe suggest: 
It seems that certain psychological processes tend to generate 
compatibilist intuitions, while others tend to generate 
incompatibilist intuitions.  Thus, each of the two major views 
appeals to an element of our psychological makeup.  (Nichols and 
Knobe 2007: 677-678) 
Thus, inconsistency and incoherence may just be a genuine feature of individuals’ 
ordinary morality, which contains both compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions.27  If 
                                              
27 Additional support for my claim of inconsistency can be found in other empirical research.  
For example, David Pizarro et al.’s (2003) research suggests that single individuals can assign 
attributive responsibility in different ways under different conditions.  The research found that, 
when individuals were asked the same question about whether someone was attributively 
responsible for some concrete act twice and prompted to express their first, intuitive, gut 
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we recognize that, we recognize that people’s ordinary moral experience – and even the 
ordinary moral experience of single individuals – is too incoherent to form the basis of, 
ground, or be reflected in any principle of consequential responsibility. 
But perhaps that is too quick.  It might be relevant to know which judgement the 
respondents themselves felt was closest to their ordinary practices.  Unfortunately, they 
were not asked.  They were, however, shown the conflict between their compatibilist 
and incompatibilist answers, and asked to choose one judgement to hold on to and one 
to abandon.  This might be thought to indicate which they ‘really’ felt, on reflection, was 
the right one.  But, Nichols and Knobe report: 
The results showed no clear majority on either side.  
Approximately half of the subjects chose to hold onto the 
judgment that the particular agent was morally responsible, while 
the other half chose to hold onto the judgment that no one can 
be responsible in a deterministic universe.  Apparently, there is no 
more consensus about these issues among the folk than there is 
among philosophers.  (Nichols and Knobe 2007: 680-681) 
                                              
reaction, they made significantly different judgements from those they made when prompted to 
provide their most rational, thought out response (Pizarro et al. 2003: 5-7).  I would urge that 
moral experience and practice involve both gut reaction and rational deliberation. 
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On reflection, then, half of the (inconsistent) respondents who had made compatibilist 
judgements (which may or may not have been Scanlonian) in high affect cases 
abandoned that view in favour of the incompatibilist judgement.  This, I think, raises an 
interesting, if rather conjectural, possibility.  We might tentatively suppose it to be 
possible that people can change the way they make judgements – that their judgements 
can be sensitive to reflexive processes of moral deliberation.  Even more tentatively, we 
might further suppose that, were everyone to go through a similar process of reflexive 
deliberation, a significant proportion might stop making judgements on a compatibilist 
basis (or, at least, understand such judgements as problematic).  Ordinary moral 
experience may, in this way, be unstable.  Moreover, to the extent that people do 
ordinarily make compatibilist attributive judgements, their doing so may largely be the 
result of a lack of reflection on morality.  I suppose, however, that in reply to that 
conjecture Mason might point out that even if people have not, on the whole, gone 
through that kind of deliberative process, he seeks to reflect our ordinary moral 
experience as it is, not as it might possibly become.   
Perhaps most relevant to the issue of whether a defender of the attributivist approach 
could discount responses to the low affect cases is Nichols and Knobe’s attempt to 
explain the data.  They write: 
If we find that different intuitions are produced by different 
psychological mechanisms, we might conclude that some of these 
intuitions should be given more weight than others.  What we 
need to know now is which intuitions to take seriously and which 
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to dismiss as products of mechanisms that are only leading us 
astray.  (Nichols and Knobe’s 2007: 678) 
They consider two rival ways of understanding what is going on.  On the performance 
error model: 
strong affective reactions can bias and distort people’s judgments.  
On this view, people ordinarily make responsibility judgments by 
relying on a tacit theory, but when they are faced with a truly 
egregious violation of moral norms (as in our concrete cases), they 
experience a strong affective reaction which makes them unable 
to apply the theory correctly.  (Nichols and Knobe 2007: 671) 
The performance error model draws wide support from social psychology theory and 
research.28  On this view, there is no genuine sense in which the majority of respondents 
hold compatibilist views of attributive responsibility: the tacit theory on which they make 
attributive judgements is correctly applied in the low affect cases and compatibilist 
judgements only arise when the process of reaching them has gone awry due to co-
present high affect.  Conversely, the affective competence model holds that ‘people’s 
affective reactions actually lie at the core of the process by which they ordinarily assign 
responsibility’ (Nichols and Knobe 2007: 672).  Thus, on this view, ‘people’s 
fundamental moral competence is a compatibilist one’, but ‘some people happen to 
                                              
28 See Ziva Kunda (1990) for an overview of the literature. 
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subscribe to a theory that contradicts this fundamental competence’ (Nichols and Knobe 
2007: 673).  If it were shown that the affective competence model was the correct one, 
Mason might have some basis on which to argue that we should discount the low affect 
cases.  But, in fact, Nichols and Knobe conclude that while ‘the affective performance 
error model provides quite a plausible explanation of our results’, it is ‘much less clear 
that the affective competence theorist has a good explanation of the results’ (Nichols 
and Knobe 2007: 676, 677).29 
In sum, the attributivist approach to consequential responsibility relies on two key 
premises regarding the form and content of ordinary moral experience and practice of 
assigning attributive responsibility.  Namely, that it is sufficiently coherent across and 
within individuals to provide a basis for a principle of consequential responsibility, and 
that it is broadly Scanlonian.  I hope to have shown that these assumptions are 
contradicted by the available empirical evidence.  The evidence suggests that different 
people do not assign attributive responsibility on the same basis, single individuals do 
not always assign attributive responsibility on the same basis, and many attributive 
                                              
29 For further discussion of the reasons leading to this conclusion, see Nichols and Knobe (2007: 
675-681).  A finding from Jennifer Lerner et al.’s (1998) research may provide further support 
for the performance error model.  They found that people are more likely to hold others 
responsible (that is, to blame them) for a given action when their negative emotions have been 
aroused, even when those negative emotions are aroused by an entirely unrelated event (Lerner 
et al. 1998: 566). 
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judgements are incompatibilist and thus not Scanlonian.  I must acknowledge that this 
evidence is not comprehensive: there may be methodological issues that I have not 
discussed, the evidence was collected under experimental (rather than ‘ordinary’ day-to-
day) conditions, and the research focused on assignments of blame only and so cannot 
tell us anything concrete about people’s views of when it is appropriate to praise others.  
But there is certainly scope for further research to shed light on how people assign blame 
and praise.  Until we build up an accurate empirical picture, any assumption that people 
ordinarily assign attributive responsibility on a compatibilist (or, indeed, incompatibilist) 
basis and, more specifically, that our ordinary moral experiences and practices are 
Scanlonian (or, indeed, anything specific), must be recognized as unsubstantiated 
speculation.  In order to claim support from ordinary moral experience, we have, first, 
to get it right. 
How might a supporter of the attributivist approach respond to these objections?  If it 
is conceded that ordinary moral experience of assigning attributive responsibility is not 
sufficiently coherent to form the basis of a principle of consequential responsibility 
and/or that it is not Scanlonian, it might yet be thought that Scanlon’s view of attributive 
responsibility still constitutes an appropriate basis.  This approach would accord with 
Mason’s claims regarding the appropriateness of Scanlon’s view  but, obviously, forfeit 
any claim to draw support from ordinary moral experience.  It would have to provide 
additional argumentation for why consequential responsibility should depend on 
Scanlonian attributive responsibility.  In section 1.2.4.2, I set out reasons to judge this 
approach inadvisable.  Alternatively, supporters might concede that ordinary moral 
experience is not Scanlonian, but deny (contrary to the available evidence) that it is 
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insufficiently coherent to ground a principle of consequential responsibility and insist 
that the right version of that principle should reflect it.  This approach would abandon 
its attachment to Scanlonian attributive responsibility, but continue to claim the support 
of our ordinary moral experience of blaming and praising, whatever is the basis on which 
that happens.  I have already tried to show that there are empirical reasons to reject such 
an approach but, even if these are unconvincing, there are further arguments against it, 
which I raise in section 1.2.4.3. 
1.2.4.2  Objection to the claim that Scanlonian attributive responsibility should ground the 
principle of consequential responsibility  
If the arguments presented in section 1.2.4.1 are unsuccessful and Mason is correct to 
claim that there is such a thing as our ordinary moral experience of assigning attributive 
responsibility, and that ordinary assignations happen on a Scanlonian basis, are there any 
additional reasons to reject the argument that Scanlonian attributive responsibility should 
form the basis of the principle of consequential responsibility?  Further, if defenders of 
the attributivist approach accept either my objection to the general claim that there is such 
a thing as our ordinary moral experience of assigning attributive responsibility, or my 
objection to the specific claim that it is Scanlonian, or both objections, can they, in 
response, abandon their claim to continuity but retain Scanlonian attributive 
responsibility as the basis of the principle of consequential responsibility?  In what 
follows, I suggest that Scanlonian attributive responsibility – whether or not it provides 
the best explanation of (our) ordinary moral experience – is an inappropriate basis for 
the principle of consequential responsibility. 
79 
 
Perhaps one of the strongest arguments against grounding consequential responsibility 
in Scanlonian attributive responsibility consists in the reasoning behind Scanlon’s own 
explicit entreaties not to do so.  At one point, Mason questions whether his responsibility 
principle would be acceptable to Scanlon and, at others, he claims that it ‘follows’ directly 
from Scanlon’s original ideas.30  But Scanlon’s work makes clear he would not endorse 
any version of the attributivist approach to consequential (his substantive) responsibility.  
For Scanlon, attributive responsibility and consequential responsibility have different 
moral roots and should not be conflated or even viewed as conceptually related.  
Summarizing one of his central arguments, he writes: 
In this chapter I have distinguished two different notions of 
responsibility: responsibility as attributability and substantive 
responsibility.  When we ask whether a person is responsible in 
the first of these senses for a given action, what we are asking is 
whether that person is properly subject to praise or blame for 
                                              
30 He writes: ‘it is not clear whether he [Scanlon] would endorse the responsiveness to reason 
conception or prefer what I later call the pluralist conception’ (Mason 2006: 164).  As we saw, 
on the responsiveness to reason conception attributive responsibility is the necessary and 
sufficient condition for consequential responsibility, while on the pluralist conception an 
additional three excusing conditions are introduced, such that attributive responsibility remains 
necessary but is no longer sufficient for consequential responsibility.   
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having acted in that way.  To say that someone is responsible in 
the second sense for a certain outcome is, in the cases I have been 
concentrating on, to say that that person cannot complain of the 
burdens or obligations that result.  These two notions have 
different moral roots.  To understand the conditions of 
responsibility in the first sense we need to consider the nature of 
moral appraisal, praise and blame.  Judgments of responsibility in 
the second sense, by contrast, are substantive conclusions about 
what we owe to each other.  (Scanlon 1998: 290) 
This distinction does not figure in Mason’s discussion of Scanlon’s work.  As we have 
seen, Scanlon provides a responsiveness to reason conception of attributive 
responsibility, but his conception of consequential responsibility is grounded in what he 
terms the ‘value of choice’.  He maintains there are three sorts of ways in which choices 
can be valuable, consideration of which is relevant to deciding when consequential 
responsibility for choice is appropriate.  In short, for Scanlon, choice can be valuable in 
the following three ways.  First, it can be instrumentally (or, predictively) valuable in the 
sense that we can choose what is likely to lead to our future satisfaction (Scanlon 1998: 
252).  Second, choice can be valuable in the sense that it can allow us to represent 
something about ourselves to others.  That is, it can demonstrate our thoughts, feelings, 
tastes, imagination, or powers of discrimination and analysis (Scanlon 1998: 252-3).  
Third, choice can have the value of symbolizing the competence and status of the 
chooser as a chooser (Scanlon 1998: 253).  Furthermore, consequential responsibility is 
part of ‘what we owe to each other’, which concerns how we should share out benefits 
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and burdens.  Scanlon proposes a contractualist account of what we owe to each other 
according to which an act is wrong, such that we have reason to refrain from doing it, 
‘if and only if any principle that permitted it would be one that could be reasonably 
rejected’ (Scanlon 1998: 4).  The value of choice account of the value of having outcomes 
depend on a person’s choices informs whether a person can reasonably reject principles 
that impose liability on her, along with a number of other reasons for reasonable 
rejection.  These other reasons might include, for example, a reason of well-being to 
reject any principle that says a person should not be rescued from dire straits when she 
is consequentially responsible for the situation in which she now finds herself (Scanlon 
1998: 224).  By contrast, attributive responsibility is not part of ‘what we owe to each 
other’, because no liability necessarily follows from it.  Moral criticism and praise are not 
things we owe to each other but are, rather, to do with how we judge and relate to each 
other.  This is what Scanlon means when he says the two forms of responsibility have 
different ‘moral roots’.31 
Commenting on the compatibility of his responsibility principle with determinism, 
Mason writes: 
Following Scanlon, defenders of the responsiveness to reason 
conception would argue that the truth or otherwise of 
                                              
31 For further critical analysis of Scanlon’s value of choice theory see, for example, Matravers (2002), 
Alex Voorhoeve (2008: 187-190), Olsaretti (2013), and Stemplowska (2013).  For more on how Scanlon’s 
value of choice theory relates to his contractualism, see Williams (2006). 
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determinism is irrelevant to whether people can legitimately be 
required to bear the costs of their behaviour or aspects of their 
condition.  Instead what matters is whether a person’s actions or 
condition are responsive to his reasoning in the right way, so that 
his behaviour or desires can properly be regarded as the product 
of his own judgement.  (Mason 2006: 168) 
But this reading of Scanlon obscures his original work on consequential and attributive 
responsibility, from which no such argument follows.  If, the phrase ‘be required to bear 
the costs’ were replaced with ‘be subject to moral appraisal’, the claim would be accurate.  
Scanlon does indeed argue that the thesis of determinism (and also the weaker causal 
thesis) is compatible with attributive responsibility, for the reasons Mason cites.  Even if 
determinism is true, as long as our actions are responsive to our reasons, we may attract 
moral appraisal for them.  Whether an action can properly be regarded as the product of 
our judgement is ‘what matters’ to considerations of attributive responsibility.  Matt 
Matravers observes that ‘Establishing this compatibilism with respect to attributive 
responsibility is an important part of Scanlon’s overall project’ (Matravers 2002: 83).32  
However, as Matravers emphasizes, Scanlon clearly defines and distinguishes attributive 
responsibility from consequential responsibility, and his arguments for attributive 
compatibilism do not constitute arguments for substantive compatibilism (Matravers 
                                              
32 Matravers provides a sympathetic analysis of Scanlon’s approach to responsibility, judging it 
generally promising but ‘incomplete’ (Matravers 2002: 90).   
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2002: 81-83).  Scanlon argues that imposition of consequential responsibility is (also) 
compatible with determinism, because he grounds it, not in attributive responsibility, but 
in the value of choice.  Scanlon’s view is that none of the three kinds of value that choice 
can have is necessarily undermined if determinism is true and it is the value of choice 
that can justify making people bear its consequences.33   
It should be clear from this, therefore, that Scanlon’s attributive and consequential 
responsibility should not be conflated.  Scanlon notes that ‘It is tempting to say that the 
answer to the question of when a person is responsible in these two senses is the same’, 
but emphasizes that ‘this apparent similarity is misleading and that these two notions of 
responsibility have quite different moral roots’ (Scanlon 1998: 249).  He defends a 
conception of moral appraisal that ‘leads to an account of the conditions under which 
an action is attributable to an agent in the sense required to make moral appraisal 
appropriate that is quite different from the Value of Choice account, which explains the 
dependence of substantive responsibility on a person’s choices’ and insists that ‘it is 
important to distinguish clearly between judgments of responsibility of these two kinds’ 
(Scanlon 1998: 249).  In other words, his attributive responsibility was never intended to 
provide grounds for consequential responsibility.  Scanlon also mentions that, to the 
                                              
33 For discussion of Scanlon’s substantive compatibilism, see Matravers (2002) and Andrew 
Williams (2006).  Both of these writers believe that Scanlon’s substantive compatibilism is less 
successful than his attributive compatibilism, with Matravers going as far as to claim that 
‘Scanlon does not provide an account of substantive compatibilism’ (Matravers 2002: 88). 
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extent that people in their ordinary moral experience feel that consequential 
responsibility should follow from or depend on attributive responsibility, his theory is 
discontinuous with ordinary moral experience and should be considered a ‘revisionist’ 
account in that sense (Scanlon 1998: 274-275).   
My reading of Scanlon is shared by a number of writers.  Knight, for example, observes 
the distinction between the two types of Scanlonian responsibility: 
On his [Scanlon’s] definition, one might be attributively 
responsible for some good or bad outcome without there being 
any corresponding substantive responsibility.  Here, attributive 
responsibility might justify blame, but not sanctions.  (Knight 
2009a: 172)34 
The importance of the distinction is drawn out further by Matravers.  Part of his 
argument implies that any principle of consequential responsibility based on Scanlonian 
attributive responsibility (including Mason’s) would not only be wrong-headed, but 
worrying.  He argues that Scanlon’s compatibilist approach to attributive responsibility 
‘needs self-governance to be a weak condition, and it is’ (Matravers 2002: 90).  In other 
words, the condition of responsiveness to reason that must be met in order for a person 
to be considered attributively responsible for an action is not very demanding.  (Mason 
                                              
34 See also Dworkin (2000: 489).  For further discussion of the distinction between Scanlonian 
attributive and substantive responsibility, see Williams (2006).   
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would, I think, agree with this reading of the condition as weak.  Its weakness is why, 
for Mason, behaviour ‘generally falls into the category of choice’ (Mason 2006: 93).)  On 
Scanlon’s view, as Matravers notes, ‘attributive judgements do not carry with them 
substantive judgements so there is not much harm done’ (Matravers 2002: 88).  Indeed, 
Matravers speculates that the distinction between attributive and substantive 
responsibility may actually be the very reason Scanlon is comfortable with the weakness 
of that condition.  He writes: 
My guess is that this [the weakness of the responsiveness to reason 
condition] does not worry Scanlon because judgements of 
attributive responsibility do not carry consequences for 
substantive responsibility.  Although that may ease our 
consciences, it hardly seems an adequate reason to set the bar for 
achieving attributive responsibility so low.  (Matravers 2002: 90) 
But Mason’s attributivist approach to consequential responsibility does precisely what 
both Scanlon and Matravers would condemn: it fails to acknowledge the distinction 
between the two Scanlonian forms of responsibility and makes attributive responsibility 
a condition of consequential responsibility.  Matravers’ comments express – or, at least, 
imply – that such an approach should worry our consciences.  If Matravers is correct, it 
is not only a mistake but may even be harmful to base substantive judgements on 
attributive judgements when the conditions of attributive responsibility are as weak as 
Scanlon’s.  Against Mason’s claims that his approach draws support from Scanlon’s 
work, I urge that, in fact, it isolates and imports one of Scanlon’s concepts, and employs 
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it for a purpose to which Scanlon (and much of the literature on his work) would judge 
it ill-suited.35   
                                              
35 Mason recognizes that using Scanlonian attributive responsibility as the basis of his principle 
of consequential responsibility has several significantly counterintuitive (that is, intuitively 
unjust) implications.  That is why he adds three additional excusing conditions to that principle.  
It might be thought that, as long as these additional conditions waive consequential 
responsibility whenever it is inappropriately recommended by the ‘pure’ responsiveness to 
reason principle, the attributivist approach is vindicated.  I do not, here, attempt to show 
(though I do think) that the addition of the three extra conditions fails to waive consequential 
responsibility in all instances in which it is inappropriate.  However, I will point out that, in 
addition to the objections I have raised above, the fact that several independent correctives must 
be added to the original principle because it would otherwise produce faulty conclusions gives 
us reason to think the original principle is faulty.  In short, if Scanlonian (ordinary moral 
experience of) attributive responsibility has been revealed as an unreliable touchstone for 
questions of consequential responsibility, why does it continue to figure in the account instead 
of being abandoned altogether?  Furthermore (and separately), if it is not to be abandoned 
entirely but treated as one relevant consideration among others, what are the grounds for 
including those other considerations?  Explanation of the theoretical premises of the additional 
excusing conditions and justification of their inclusion is exiguous (particularly in comparison 
with the discussion of the ‘pure’ responsiveness to reason approach).  Consider the importation 
of Cohen’s expensive tastes clause.  Cohen, as we will see in section 1.3, can add his expensive 
tastes clause to his responsibility principle because he never commits to reflecting ordinary 
moral experience.  For him, non-responsibility for valuational tastes that happen to be expensive 
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Thus, while Mason seems to assume that Scanlon would endorse either the ‘pure’ 
responsiveness to reason version or the pluralist version of the attributivist principle of 
consequential responsibility, it is clear Scanlon would endorse neither.  He rejects 
outright the notion that consequential responsibility should follow from, presuppose or 
be grounded in attributive responsibility, whether that is understood in terms of the 
ordinary moral experience and practice of assigning blame and praise, or in terms of 
theoretically discontinuous necessary conditions of moral criticism and appraisal.  While 
Mason holds, pace Scanlon, that Scanlonian attributive responsibility is a necessary 
condition for consequential responsibility, he provides no plausible argument for this 
view and his claim that his conception of consequential responsibility is supported by an 
established theory is undermined by close examination of that theory, which emphasizes 
                                              
is a matter of fact-insensitive fundamental principle: it reflects a judgement that holds (for him) 
under any assumption about the facts.  Thus, he follows an entirely different theoretical and 
methodological approach from any that seeks continuity with ordinary moral experience.  
Mason’s importation of Cohen’s clause thereby entails that the (pluralist) attributivist approach 
he recommends is pluralist not merely in the sense that it advocates a number of clauses to the 
responsibility principle, but also in the sense that it is based on plural and contradictory 
philosophical methodologies – the continuous and the discontinuous.  Mason does not explicitly 
set out how the methodologically divergent elements of his approach may be reconciled.  In this 
respect, the (pluralist) attributivist principle of consequential responsibility not only relies on 
faulty and implausible premises but also appears, at the methodological level, internally 
incoherent.   
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the different moral roots of the two conceptions of responsibility.  Scanlon does not 
offer a theory of responsibility in which Mason can claim his is grounded.  Indeed, 
Scanlon’s arguments are manifestly incompatible with Mason’s conclusions.   
1.2.4.3  Objection to the claim that ordinary moral experience of attributive responsibility should 
ground the principle of consequential responsibility 
In this final part of my critique of the attributivist approach, I argue that (if it exists) 
ordinary moral experience of assigning attributive responsibility is an inappropriate basis 
for the principle of consequential responsibility.  I ask: if the arguments presented in 
section 1.2.4.1 are unsuccessful and Mason is correct to claim that there is such a thing 
as our ordinary moral experience of assigning attributive responsibility and that it is 
Scanlonian, are there further reasons to reject the argument that ordinary moral 
experience of assigning attributive responsibility should ground the principle of 
consequential responsibility?  Further, if defenders of the attributivist approach deny the 
validity or force of my objection to the general claim that there is such a thing as our 
ordinary moral experience of attributive responsibility, but concede the point that it is 
not Scanlonian, can they, in response, abandon their attachment to Scanlonian attributive 
responsibility, but still insist that the principle of consequential responsibility should 
reflect and be grounded in our ordinary moral experience of assigning attributive 
responsibility, whatever the basis on which attributive judgements are made?   
I reject the notion that there is such a thing as our ordinary moral experience of assigning 
attributive responsibility (that is, a shared, coherent basis on which people ordinarily 
assign attributive responsibility) but, even if that objection to the attributivist approach 
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is unconvincing and there is such a thing, we may yet reject the idea that a just principle 
of consequential responsibility should reflect it.  Arguing against the continuity of 
Dworkin’s and John Rawls’ principles of justice, Cohen writes that the appeal to 
continuity as a characteristic of principles of justice that somehow functions to justify 
them as correct is baseless, or at least question-begging.  The contingently ordinary or 
‘familiar way of thinking’ itself requires justification: it has no justificatory power simply 
by virtue of happening to be ordinary or familiar (Cohen 2004: 23).  In short, the appeal 
to continuity ‘may be nothing but an appeal to popular opinion’ (Cohen 2004: 23).  I 
follow Cohen (2003 and 2004) and Adam Swift (1999) here in understanding empirical 
facts about people’s beliefs and practices as constraints on what can be done to achieve 
justice, rather than as directly constitutive of what justice is.  As Swift argues, those facts 
may also be relevant to the legitimacy of principles of justice if we support an independent 
principle of democratic legitimacy or of legitimate expectations.  If we do, popular beliefs 
and ordinary moral experiences and practices inform how legitimate a principle of justice 
is.  But it is a mistake to think that those popular judgements can play a role in justifying 
a principle of justice as correct.  Mason ignores what Swift describes as a distinction 
‘between principles being justified as legitimate principles to govern the distribution of 
benefits and burdens in a society and their being justified as correct principles of justice’ 
(Swift 1999: 355, for further discussion see 351-357).  If Mason’s principle reflects 
ordinary moral experience, that fact may be important to its public justification, but it 
does not make the principle correct.  Swift writes: 
Popular beliefs about distributive justice are indeed important 
factors for the political philosopher to take into account, but for 
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reasons of feasibility or legitimacy, not because they play any role 
in the justification of principles of distributive justice.  (Swift 1999: 
361) 
I think this view is both plausible and clear-headed, but realize that Mason may yet insist 
that continuity with ordinary moral experience relates to the correctness – not merely 
the legitimacy – of principles.  The disagreement between Mason and I is, after all, to do 
in part with how we understand the proper justification of the principle of consequential 
responsibility, and that disagreement runs deep.  In a discussion of the relative 
appositeness and appeal of continuous and discontinuous approaches to understanding 
the grounds of responsibility principles, Dworkin observes that: 
argument may in the end be unavailing.  […] anyone’s choice 
between the two principles will probably reflect deeper attitudes 
and dispositions that lie beyond argument.  (Dworkin 2011: 229) 
I must acknowledge the force of this observation, but I also want to draw attention to 
some considerations that may tell against Mason’s version of continuity.   
A criticism Knight makes of Roemer’s approach to luck egalitarianism is relevant here.  
Roemer’s approach does not defend continuous principles or insist that consequential 
responsibility should track ordinary moral experience of assigning attributive 
responsibility.  It holds that people should be held consequentially responsible for those 
costs and benefits for which they are metaphysically responsible, but holds that the 
decision regarding what people are metaphysically responsible for must be a political 
decision, taken by the body politic (Roemer 1996: 181-182, 1998: 8).  In other words, 
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similarly to Mason’s approach, what the just distribution looks like follows from people’s 
moral judgements regarding responsibility (though, dissimilarly, the responsibility in 
question is metaphysical, not attributive).  Knight writes: 
We want members of the decision-making body to make 
judgments about the truth rather than merely express their 
preferences.  We are less likely to get this as the body gets larger 
and less familiar with the topic.  Many members of the public may be 
motivated by unreflective attitudes, stereotypes, and self-interest.  […]  In 
some spheres, democracy may further luck egalitarian ends; in this 
one, however, it does not.  (Knight 2006: 187, my emphasis) 
Marc Fleurbaey makes a similar observation of Roemer’s proposal, claiming that it is a 
‘dangerous tool for wanton applications of biased ideologies’ (Fleurbaey 2001: 503).  
These statements express the worry that inviting everyone to have a say in what people 
should be held consequentially responsible for is inviting objectionable inequality.  
People may make their judgements for reasons philosophers should reject as unattractive 
and disconnected from justice.  This criticism does not apply directly to the attributivist 
approach: on this approach, people are not invited to collectively decide the content of 
consequential responsibility.  But their judgements of blame and praise form the basis 
of the principle of consequential responsibility.  It is hardly any less likely that those sorts 
of judgements should be utterly devoid of unreflective attitudes, stereotypes, self-interest 
and biased ideologies.  The relevant point is that ordinary moral experience of the 
conditions of attributive responsibility, if it exists, may well turn out to be mean-spirited, 
petty, prejudicial, self-serving, or simply woefully misinformed.  Elevating contingent 
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and potentially repugnant moral experience to the status of the grounds of principles of 
justice seems both undermotivated and fraught with risks.  If the content of justice 
follows from the basis on which people ordinarily blame and praise people, how they 
blame and praise people (here and now in this non-ideal, decidedly unjust society) had 
better be fair and decent.  If it is not – and I submit that in the absence of comprehensive 
empirical evidence there can be no guarantee either way – the principles of justice that 
emerge from it will necessarily be noxious.  If the arguments I proposed in section 1.2.4.1 
are unsuccessful, it might be open to defenders of the attributivist approach to insist, in 
reply to this point, that ordinary moral experience is not repugnant, but Scanlonian.  The 
point should be far more worrying, however, to any who deny the validity or force of 
my objection to the general claim that there is such a thing as ordinary moral experience 
of assigning attributive responsibility (which should ground the principle of 
consequential responsibility), but concede the point that it is not Scanlonian (and might, 
therefore, be repugnant). 
More generally, I worry, though can only speculate, that requiring the principle of 
consequential responsibility to reflect ordinary moral experience of assigning attributive 
responsibility may risk not only importing unattractive notions and motivations into the 
heart of justice, but also the radical capacity of egalitarian theory.  Ultimately, moral 
experiences are contingent and changeable.  Indeed, they are contingent upon yet more 
contingent and changeable facts about the world.  And things might change: people may 
become increasingly or decreasingly convinced of the virtues of particular moral 
positions, including positions on how to assign blame and praise.  Even if the empirical 
research that I have cited in an attempt to show that moral experience of assigning 
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attributive responsibility is neither homogenous and coherent nor generally Scanlonian 
is wrong, and Mason is correct that it is currently Scanlonian, it may change.  If it did, 
the attributivist approach would be faced with a choice between keeping its Scanlonian 
elements and abandoning continuity with ordinary moral experience (which entails all 
the problems I canvassed in section 1.2.4.2), and committing to reflecting ordinary moral 
experience, whatever its content, and abandoning the Scanlonian view of attributive 
responsibility (which entails the problems I have just raised).  But the latter choice raises 
another potential problem (my worry).  Importantly, radical theories of justice may have 
some substantive role to play in informing the processes of deliberation by which people 
come to make judgements about attributive and consequential responsibility.  The 
continuity requirement limits the radical capacity of theories of justice, which are thereby 
required to reflect (some aspect of) contemporary morality and, so, serve to entrench it.  
But on a different approach, released from that requirement, theory might serve instead 
to inform, challenge and invigorate contemporary morality.  And egalitarian 
philosophers might recognize the active roles we may play in the ongoing struggle for 
equality.  As Swift has it: 
Rather than taking the feasible set as given, it might be thought 
that it is precisely the task of the philosopher to change that set, 
by changing the content of those popular beliefs that do so much 
to determine it.  (Swift 1999: 359) 
Defenders of the continuity requirement might, of course, respond by pointing out that 
it is by no means certain that any attempts to persuade people of the merits of our 
theories of justice will have any real effect, in terms of causing them either to agree with 
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or to actively pursue the implementation of our theories.  Certainly, my view may involve 
an overestimation of the radically transformative potential of theory (and of activist-
theorists).  Yet its hopefulness is not entirely naïve.  It is relevant to remember that, 
historically, much ordinary moral experience and practice told against equality of 
opportunity and of status between people of different genders, ethnicities, sexualities 
and abilities.  Indeed, such equality may have seemed an impossibly utopian dream.  But 
some feminist, queer, ethnicity and disability theorists refused to accept the moral status 
quo as a constraint on the content of their theories and proposals, and it is not 
implausible that at least a few were thereby able to play a role in rendering prejudice, 
discrimination and inequality of opportunity less morally acceptable today.  If theorists 
of justice are not permitted by their theoretical approaches to voice radical views and to 
imagine and advocate any ways of organizing the world that are presently unsupported 
by or at odds with whatever our contemporary ordinary moral experience happens to 
be, our discipline may be doomed to mere parochialism. 
In sum, I hope to have shown what the attributivist approach to distinguishing between 
luck and choice and assigning consequential responsibility consists in, and also to have 
furnished luck egalitarians with convincing reasons to eschew such an approach.  
Judgements of moral appraisal – whether ‘ordinary’, or Scanlonian, or both – constitute 
an inappropriate foundation for judgements of egalitarian distributive justice.  They 
cannot form the touchstone for a just, egalitarian distribution of benefits and burdens.  
In what follows, I outline an alternative metaphysical approach, which I believe is the 
most appropriate for a luck egalitarian theory of distributive justice that condemns the 
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inegalitarian influence of luck on life outcomes, but permits the inegalitarian influence 
of choice.   
1.3  The Metaphysical Approach 
1.3.1  Metaphysical Luck Egalitarianism 
My view is that luck egalitarian distributive justice should take a metaphysical approach 
to drawing the distinction between luck and choice and assigning consequential 
responsibility.  As this is the approach I favour throughout the thesis, I provide here an 
outline of its central features in order to ensure clarity of meaning in subsequent 
chapters.  In brief, this approach holds that the factors that influence a person’s outcome 
count as matters of luck if they are beyond her metaphysical control and count as chosen 
if they are under her metaphysical control.  The metaphysical approach is favoured by a 
number of luck egalitarians including, perhaps most prominently, Cohen (1989 and 
2004), Arneson (1989), Knight (2006, 2009a and 2012) and Barry (2008).36  Unlike 
                                              
36 In Arneson’s later work, he develops a theory of ‘responsibility-catering prioritarianism’, 
which differs in several significant respects from his earlier luck egalitarian theory of equality of 
opportunity for welfare (see, in particular, Arneson 2000).  He does, however, maintain his 
commitment to a metaphysical understanding of responsibility (see Arneson 2004).  Another 
luck egalitarian who has sometimes been characterized as favouring the metaphysical distinction 
is Roemer.  Fleurbaey, for example, comments: 
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Mason, all of these theorists (except, latterly, Arneson) are properly luck egalitarian in 
the sense that, for them, the distinction between luck and choice specifies the 
fundamental principle of egalitarian distributive justice: a just distribution of advantage 
is one in which individuals’ relative outcomes are insensitive to factors beyond their 
metaphysical control, but sensitive to their metaphysically free choices.  To be clear, 
then, this approach is not committed to the claim that its conception of consequential 
responsibility is grounded in or continuous with any aspect of ordinary moral experience.  
The metaphysical distinction between luck and choice specifies the content of the 
discontinuous, fundamental luck egalitarian principle and that distinction is insensitive 
to contingent experience and practice.  On this ‘foundationalist’ approach to normative 
theorizing, which I outlined in the introduction of the thesis, all fundamental principles 
are fact-insensitive: they express ‘a value-judgment that remains the same, for the judger, 
                                              
In some theories of equality of opportunity (Arneson, Cohen, Roemer), 
individuals are held responsible for their “genuine choices.”  The sphere 
of responsibility in such theories coincides with the scope of individual 
control.  (Fleurbaey 2008: 86)   
Roemer does think luck should be conceived in metaphysical terms, contrasting luck with 
‘autonomous choice’ (see Roemer 1998: 5-12).  However, as I mentioned above, he ultimately 
recommends that what counts as luck should be a political decision, in the sense that the public 
should decide what is beyond the metaphysical control of individuals (Roemer 1996: 181-182, 
1998: 8).  For that reason, his is better characterized as a political approach.   
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under any and all assumptions about the facts’ (Cohen, 2003: 214).  In other words, what 
people believe about what it is appropriate to hold people responsible for does not 
generate any normative conclusions regarding what they should, for reasons of luck 
egalitarian distributive justice and absent other considerations, be held responsible for.   
1.3.2  Consequential Responsibility and Metaphysical Responsibility 
The regulatory principle of consequential responsibility that serves the metaphysical luck 
egalitarian ideal can be expressed as follows: people should be relieved of consequential 
responsibility for factors beyond their control, but held responsible for the consequences 
of their metaphysically free choices.  On the metaphysical approach to luck egalitarian 
distributive justice, then, lack of metaphysical responsibility is a sufficient condition for 
relieving consequential responsibility and metaphysical responsibility is a necessary 
condition of imposing consequential responsibility.37  Thus, metaphysically free choice 
can legitimate inequalities of outcome.  Metaphysical luck egalitarians have used various 
                                              
37 As we will see below, advocates of the metaphysical approach do not always treat metaphysical 
responsibility as a sufficient condition of imposing consequential responsibility, nor lack of 
metaphysical responsibility as a necessary condition of alleviating consequential responsibility.  
The principle of consequential responsibility, as I have just expressed it, is therefore, in fact, 
missing a caveat: the expensive tastes clause.  I return to this issue in section 1.3.2.4 but, for 
now, set it aside. 
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terms for this sort of metaphysically free, inequality-legitimating choice.  Cohen, for 
example, uses the term ‘genuine choice’ (Cohen 1989: 131); following Cohen, both Barry 
(Barry 2008: 141) and Knight (Knight 2009a: 78) use the same term; and Arneson prefers 
‘voluntary choice’ (Arneson 1988: 84).  The core idea of the metaphysical approach is 
expressed (in welfarist language) by Arneson in the following terms: 
When persons enjoy equal opportunity for welfare in the extended 
sense, any actual inequality of welfare in the positions they reach 
is due to factors that lie within each individual’s control.  (Arneson 
1989: 86, my emphasis) 
Being in control in the metaphysical sense – making a genuine choice – refers to the 
independent exercise of human will.  Although Dworkin does not favour this approach 
to distinguishing between luck and choice, he usefully explains what metaphysical 
control consists in: 
We are in control when the causal chain that explains how we act 
travels back only to an impulse of our own will, not when it travels 
further back to past states and events that, together with natural 
laws, explain that act of will.  (Dworkin 2011: 228) 
Thus, what matters to the justice of holding people consequentially responsible for the 
costs and benefits that accrue to them is whether or not the accrual of those costs and 
benefits is a function of their will.   
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1.3.2.1  Metaphysical Theses 
Clearly, then, on this approach, issues concerning causality and, particularly, the issues 
of hard determinism and free will are relevant to the application of the principle of 
consequential responsibility in our social arrangements.  It is important to be clear, 
however, that the fundamental luck egalitarian principle holds under any assumption 
about the facts of metaphysical causality.  As Cohen writes: 
We can believe whatever we are inclined to do about how 
[metaphysically] responsible and/or culpable people are for their 
choices, and that includes believing that they are not responsible 
and/or culpable for them at all, while holding that on which I 
insist: that the pattern in such choices is relevant to how just or 
unjust a society is.  (Cohen 2008: 141) 
That is, at the fundamental level, luck egalitarianism is indifferent to the truth or falsity 
of theses of causality, including hard determinism and libertarianism.  It holds that a lack 
of genuine choice excuses consequential responsibility, but is (in itself) agnostic 
regarding whether or not genuine choice is ultimately possible.38  Answers to questions 
                                              
38 In brief, hard determinists hold that every event, including every instance of human action, is 
an inevitable consequence of natural laws and prior conditions (for further discussion see, for 
example, Derk Pereboom 1995, 2001 and 2005).  On the hard determinist view, the sort of 
choice with which luck egalitarians are concerned – metaphysically free choice – is not possible, 
as all choices are antecedently determined.  Conversely, libertarians generally hold that human 
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about metaphysical causality do, however, have significant implications for what luck 
egalitarianism requires in terms of regulatory arrangements and what it implies about the 
justice of actual distributions.  Notably, if hard determinism is true, such that people are 
incapable of the sort of genuine choice that would justify imposition of consequential 
responsibility, no inequalities of outcome are just.  Cohen expresses this as follows: 
Equality of access to advantage is motivated by the idea that 
differential advantage is unjust save where it reflects differences in 
genuine choice [...] on the part of relevant agents, but it [...] does 
not even imply that there actually is such a thing as genuine choice.  
Instead, it implies that if there is no such thing – because, for 
example, ‘hard determinism’ is true – then all differential 
advantage is unjust.  (Cohen 1993: 28)39 
                                              
actions are possible that are not determined by anything prior to their occurrence, and that 
human action can be spontaneous and creative (for further discussion see, for example, Robert 
Kane 1996, 2002 and 2005).  On this view, it is theoretically possible for people to make genuine 
choices. 
39 This point is reiterated throughout Cohen’s work (see, for example, Cohen 2006: 442) and in 
the work of other metaphysical luck egalitarians.  Knight emphasizes that: 
If hard determinism is assumed, then the luck egalitarian principle of 
equality of opportunity for advantage is in all possible circumstances 
equivalent to the outcome egalitarian principle of equality of advantage.  
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The salient point here is that, on the metaphysical approach to luck egalitarianism, the 
truth of metaphysical causality must be ascertained before it can be known for certain 
whether or not the imposition of consequential responsibility is ever just.  If genuine 
choice is possible (because the thesis of determinism is false), then a detailed theory of 
metaphysical causality (that is, of soft determinism or libertarianism) is required before 
we can ascertain whether – and, if so, to what extent – a person is responsible for her 
outcome.  But metaphysical luck egalitarians can remain entirely agnostic about causality 
and still usefully engage in theorization regarding what justice fundamentally is.  They 
can also theorize in purely conditional terms about what justice would require given the 
truth of various theses of causality, while remaining agnostic on which thesis is correct.  
                                              
If no person is responsible for any of her actions, equality of 
opportunity for advantage’s policy of compensating for those and only 
those disadvantages for which persons are not responsible amounts to 
equality of advantage’s policy of compensating for all disadvantages.  
(Knight 2006: 179) 
And Arneson says the same: 
The norm of equal opportunity for welfare is distinct from equality of 
welfare only if some version of soft determinism or indeterminism is 
correct.  If hard determinism is true, the two interpretations of equality 
come to the same.  (Arneson 1989: 86) 
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To date, metaphysical luck egalitarians have tended to acknowledge the lack of 
theoretical certainty regarding the truth of causality, while employing a working 
assumption that some version of soft determinism obtains.  (I follow suit here in taking 
this assumption to be the most plausible of the available alternatives and follow it 
throughout this thesis.)  Accordingly, it is (tentatively) assumed that people may make 
choices, each of which may be more or less under their metaphysical control.   
1.3.2.2  The Nuance of the Metaphysical Distinction 
On that assumption, the distinction between luck and choice is dichotomous only in 
theory.  In practice, life outcomes tend to be a function of a complex mix of both luck 
and choice – of external factors and human will.  And the orientation of human will is 
itself often profoundly influenced by external factors.  Thus, choices may be more or 
less genuine, neither totally free nor totally determined.  Complete absence of luck in the 
aetiology of a set of relative outcomes can justify inequalities of outcome but, if some 
version of soft determinism is true that entails people’s choices are always influenced 
and more or less constrained by factors other than their own (pure) free will, luck will 
always play at least a partial role in the realization of any particular outcome.  The more a 
choice is influenced and constrained by forces external to the person’s will, the less it is 
under her metaphysical control, and the less genuine it is.  The more a choice follows 
freely from a person’s own will, the more it is under her metaphysical control, and the 
more genuine it is.  Accordingly, responsibility for choice is standardly a matter of degree: 
a person is more (or less) responsible for a choice, the more (or less) genuine that choice 
is.  Cohen elucidates some of the considerations that bear on determinations of 
metaphysical responsibility for choice: 
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In each case facts in the background to the choice, facts about 
degrees of control, and about the cost of alternatives, affect the 
proper allocation of responsibility for the consequences of the 
choice.  […]  It is false that the only relevant questions about 
choice and responsibility are whether or not something (an action, 
a preference) is, simply, chosen (that is, tout court), and that the only 
relevant upshot is whether the agent is responsible, tout court.  […] 
we make judgments of degree of responsibility, and they are based 
on graded and shaded judgments about choice.  (Cohen 2004: 21-22, 
original emphasis) 
This illuminates the need to take a carefully nuanced approach to determining 
responsibility.  The facts that are relevant to how genuine a choice is include the 
chooser’s ‘knowledge’ and ‘self-possession’ (Cohen 2004: 22).  Where factual 
information is relevant to a person’s choice, how full and accurate is the information 
available to her?  And, to what extent is she able to understand, process, and use that 
information to inform her choice?  Considerations of cognitive ability come into play 
here, as do considerations of mental wellbeing and emotional functioning.  For example, 
the genuine exercise of will may be difficult or impossible for those with certain mental 
health problems that involve compulsions.  In some cases, people may be (or feel) 
compelled to do (and unable to resist doing) certain actions, without those actions being 
chosen in the sense of constituting a genuine exercise of will.  Mental health issues 
including psychosis, neurosis, depression and addiction may affect self-possession and 
thus the genuineness of choice if people are compelled by these conditions to act in ways 
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that are a function, not of their will, but of their condition.  Moreover, constraining 
circumstances and external influences on choice affect how free a particular choice is.  
Cohen holds that choice is always necessarily situated and thus can never be entirely 
independent of all forces that are external to the self.  He writes that ‘people do have 
choices: it is, indeed, only their choices that reproduce social practices; and some, 
moreover, choose against the grain of nurture, habit, and self-interest’ (Cohen 1997: 25, 
original emphasis).  But he emphasizes that it is also important to recognize the various 
ways in which choices are influenced by external factors: 
although there exists personal choice, there is heavy social 
conditioning behind it and there can be heavy costs in deviating 
from the prescribed and/or permitted ways.  If we care about 
social justice, we have to look at four things: the coercive 
structure, other structures, the social ethos, and the choices of 
individuals, and judgment on the last of those must be informed 
by awareness of the power of the others.  (Cohen 1997: 26) 
The first three of these things constitute the constraining and conditioning 
circumstances in which any choice is made.  Constraining circumstances include, perhaps 
most obviously, the set of options for action that happens to be available to any given 
person.  But circumstances can also limit and orient action in a less strict sense by, for 
example, conditioning and influencing the ways in which people understand and evaluate 
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their options.40  As with the issues to do with self-possession outlined above, the ways 
in which circumstances condition a person’s tendencies can make it harder for some than 
others to make any given choice.  Arneson expresses this aspect of the nuance of the 
metaphysical approach – the relevance of the relative ease and difficulty of various 
choices to judgements of responsibility – in the following way: 
(1) one is not (properly held) responsible for what lies beyond 
one’s power to control (call this “the control principle”), and (2) 
one is less responsible for what is harder and more painful to 
control (if one fails to control it) (call this “the extension of the 
control principle”)  (Arneson 2004: 2)  
                                              
40 Barry illustrates this kind of limiting and orienting with an example of two students who make 
different choices about higher education.  He writes: 
one individual has a more accurate perception of the advantages of 
college education than the other because of differences in their 
upbringing.  This means that one student makes a more genuine choice 
of outcome than the other does, and the inequality that results between 
them is luck derived (Barry 2008: 145) 
For more detailed discussion of how a person’s holding false beliefs can make choices made on 
the basis of those beliefs less genuine, see Vallentyne (2011). 
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Thus, consequential responsibility follows from metaphysical responsibility, which is a 
matter of degree.  How metaphysically responsible someone is for a choice depends on 
how full and accurate the chooser’s information is, how able she is to process that 
information and use it to inform and guide her choice, how constraining the 
circumstances are in which the choice is made, and how conditioned the choice is by 
prior circumstances.   
1.3.2.3  Brute Luck Egalitarianism and All Luck Egalitarianism 
Thus far, then, we have seen that the more genuine a choice is, the more consequential 
responsibility can be imposed for its consequences.  But, in fact, this obscures some 
further complexity in the metaphysical approach.  There are schisms within that 
approach and different versions can be distinguished according to how they treat ‘option 
luck’, or, the sort of luck that plays out when a gamble has been taken.  Those versions 
run on a spectrum from those that treat genuine choices to gamble as legitimating the 
imposition of consequential responsibility on gamblers for the results of their gambles, 
to those that view option luck as luck that should not, for reasons of justice, have any 
inegalitarian influence on outcomes.  That is, while some treat option luck as falling on 
the choice side of the distinction between luck and choice, others treat it as falling on 
the luck side.  In what follows, I canvass two versions of the metaphysical approach that 
fall at the extremes of that spectrum (brute luck egalitarianism and all luck 
egalitarianism), as well as what might be termed moderate or middle ground approaches. 
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Brute Luck Egalitarianism (Cohen and Arneson) 
Dworkin was the first egalitarian theorist to draw a distinction between ‘brute luck’ (the 
inegalitarian effects of which luck egalitarians condemn) and option luck (the 
inegalitarian effects of which a luck egalitarian might accept as appropriately chosen).  
His theory of equality of resources is not strictly luck egalitarian and Dworkin himself 
explicitly rejects the label (Dworkin 2003: 191).  However, he provides this canonical 
statement distinguishing brute luck from option luck: 
Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles 
turn out – whether someone gains or loses through accepting an 
isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have 
declined.  Brute luck is a matter of how risks fall out that are not 
in that sense deliberate gambles.  If I buy a stock on the exchange 
that rises, then my option luck is good.  If I am hit by a falling 
meteorite whose course could not have been predicted, then my 
bad luck is brute (even though I could have moved just before it 
struck if I had any reason to know where it would strike).  
Obviously the difference between these two forms of luck can be 
represented as a matter of degree, and we may be uncertain how 
to describe a particular piece of bad luck.  If someone develops 
cancer in the course of a normal life, and there is no particular 
decision to which we can point as a gamble risking the disease, 
then we will say that he has suffered brute bad luck.  But if he 
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smoked cigarettes heavily then we may prefer to say that he took 
an unsuccessful gamble.  (Dworkin 1981: 293) 
Cohen and Arneson both accept this distinction between brute and option luck – 
modified to account for the genuineness of choices to gamble – as fundamentally 
pertinent to distributive justice, claiming the label of ‘brute luck egalitarians’.  That is, 
they hold that any inegalitarian influence of brute luck on outcomes is unjust: 
consequential responsibility for costs and benefits that accrue to people as a matter of 
brute luck should be relieved.  Conversely, as long as a risk is both genuinely chosen, and 
foreseeable and avoidable in the sense specified by Dworkin above, responsibility for 
the consequences of taking that risk may be imposed on the risk-taker.41  Thus, the 
                                              
41 Consideration of the case of the smoker from Dworkin’s canonical statement of the 
distinction between brute and option luck illuminates the importance of the risk-anticipation 
clause attached to option luck and of informational constraints on choice.  Before the link 
between smoking and cancer was established, smokers could not have been conceived as taking 
a calculated gamble that turned out badly, because they could not have known they were taking 
any risk with their health.  They did not have access to the information required to form the 
true belief that the choice to smoke holds a risk to health and thus to anticipate that risk.  As 
such, brute luck egalitarians might previously have held it to be a smoker’s brute bad luck if she 
developed a smoking-related disease.  Given that the risks of smoking are currently far better 
publicized in countries like Britain than they used to be, brute luck egalitarians might now be 
more inclined to count a choice to start smoking and any subsequent disease as matters of 
option luck.  On the other hand, given differences in people’s susceptibility to smoking-related 
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option luck that plays out when a gamble is taken may justly influence the outcome of 
the gambler for better or worse.  
Vallentyne (2002) and Barry (2008) both note that brute luck egalitarians have sometimes 
used the term option luck to indicate the results of genuine choice as well as the results 
of genuinely chosen gambles, but argue that expressing the distinction between luck and 
choice as a distinction between brute luck and option luck is misleading.  Barry suggests 
that, because the genuineness of the choice to gamble matters to brute luck egalitarians, 
they should be careful to distinguish their understanding of option luck from Dworkin’s 
(according to which the genuineness of the choice is not conceptually or morally 
relevant).  He writes: 
to avoid confusion, luck egalitarians may do well to refer directly 
to “genuine choice” and “genuinely chosen gambles” instead of 
option luck.  […]  In fact, this is the approach Cohen tends to 
adopt in his own work, where he rarely uses the term “option 
luck.”  (Barry 2008: 143)   
                                              
diseases, lack of knowledge about one’s own susceptibility might be viewed as a relevant 
informational constraint on the genuineness of the choice to smoke, perhaps particularly for 
those who are unaware and have no way of finding out that they face a higher than average risk 
of developing smoking-related diseases. 
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Vallentyne argues that the distinction between luck and choice should, in fact, be 
understood as a fourfold distinction that more adequately captures the types of ‘factors 
that jointly determine what outcomes are realized’ (Vallentyne 2002: 538).  Explaining 
the fourfold distinction, he writes: 
However exactly brute luck is understood, it will include luck in 
initial opportunities for advantage (e.g., one’s initial genetic 
endowment and one’s initial social position) and some kinds of 
outcome luck (i.e., some kinds of luck in how things turn out; e.g., 
whether an uninfluenceable contingent possibility of a lighting 
strike is realized).  Not included in brute luck are outcomes that 
are suitably related to choice – option luck.  This includes both 
outcomes that are directly chosen in some appropriate sense (e.g., 
avoidable foreseen and certain outcomes of one’s choices; e.g., 
being wet when one chooses not to open one’s umbrella in the 
rain) and those that are risky outcomes that are suitably related to 
one’s choices (e.g., winning or losing a lottery for which one 
purchased a ticket) – option outcome luck.  (Vallentyne 2002: 538) 
Thus, for the sake of clarity and precision, brute luck egalitarians might continue to 
differentiate between genuine choices and genuinely chosen gambles, imposing 
responsibility for the consequences of both.  And they might also differentiate between 
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brute luck in initial opportunities and brute outcome luck, relieving consequential 
responsibility for both.42 
All Luck Egalitarianism (Knight) 
Not all metaphysical luck egalitarians have accepted that option luck inequality (or, 
inequality resulting from genuine choices to gamble) is just.  Knight (2012, 2013b) 
defends the view that all luck-based inequality – including option luck inequality – is 
unjust, and that people should therefore be relieved of consequential responsibility for 
costs and benefits accruing to them as a matter of option luck.43  (It should be noted 
that Knight, pace Vallentyne (2002), does not include direct choice in his construal of 
option luck, which indicates only the luck involved in gambles.)  According to this ‘all 
luck egalitarian’ approach, the inegalitarian influence of all luck on outcomes is 
condemned by justice whether or not the luck is brute or a matter of how a genuinely 
                                              
42 In his later work, Cohen expresses some doubts about the fairness of option luck inequality, 
though he continues to judge it legitimate to hold people responsible for the option luck gains 
and losses they accrue.  See Cohen (2009) and, for discussion, Daniel Butt (2012). 
43 Other egalitarians, including Vallentyne (2002), Alexander Cappelen and Ole Norheim (2005), 
and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2005), have also described views according to which 
consequential responsibility for costs accruing to people as a result of gambles should be fully 
relieved.  For a critique of all luck egalitarianism, see Segall (2010: chapter 3). 
 
112 
 
chosen, deliberate and calculated gamble turns out.  As Knight recognizes, because far 
less inequality is permitted by this approach than by brute luck egalitarianism, such that 
it lies somewhere between brute luck egalitarianism and outcome egalitarianism, it ‘offers 
a more radically egalitarian interpretation of the central luck egalitarian objective of 
counteracting the distributive effects of luck’ (Knight 2013a: 932).  Explaining the 
considered judgement that informs and motivates his all luck egalitarianism, Knight 
writes: 
I submit that to allow gambles to stand is to allow a morally 
arbitrary influence on distribution, while preventing them or 
redistributing their effects need not create a morally arbitrary 
influence on distribution if would-be gamblers are compensated 
for their reduced opportunities.  Furthermore, I believe that we 
should not only prohibit or correct for gambles, but prohibit or 
correct for all forms of option luck.  The wager which turns on a 
coin toss or roll of the dice is special only in that things are clear 
cut.  Any action for which there is a range of possible outcomes is 
a gamble of a sort, even if the action is involuntary, and the 
unfairness of an outcome where two persons make identical 
choices but receive different results remains the same even if those 
results are not immediately obvious.  If two identically capable 
people choose to pursue different careers with identical prospects 
and identical demands, and each exerts an identical degree of 
conscientious effort in support of it, there is moral arbitrariness in 
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an outcome of one becoming a millionaire and the other a pauper 
on account of some change in the marketplace which neither 
foresaw.  The best strategy for the egalitarian is therefore to 
prevent gambles or redistribute after the event to losers from 
winners and, if redistribution is made, to compensate the ‘winner’ 
wherever an unchosen welfare loss arises.  (Knight 2012: 555) 
Here, Knight expresses the thought that luck egalitarians should be fully committed to 
the position that outcomes are morally arbitrary and thus unjust if they are not genuinely 
chosen.  While people may make genuine choices to gamble, no one has metaphysical 
control over how gambles they have chosen to make turn out, and so the results are not 
genuinely chosen.  (Indeed, this lack of control over the result constitutes a significant 
element of the definition of a gamble.)  Given this commitment, luck egalitarians should 
recognize that the morally arbitrary inequalities produced by gambles are condemnable 
on distributive justice grounds.  When brute luck egalitarians claim that the distribution 
of advantage should be luck-neutral and choice-sensitive, this amounts to a claim that 
some luck – the luck of how gambles fall out – can influence the distribution of advantage, 
as long as it is mediated by a genuine choice to gamble.  All luck egalitarians, on the other 
hand, really do mean that the distribution of advantage should be insensitive to any form 
of (morally arbitrary) luck.  (Thus, all luck egalitarianism recommends minimizing ‘access 
to choices which create exposure to option luck’ (Knight 2013b: 1066).  If gambling and 
other forms of risk taking result in option luck inequality, either those actions should be 
prohibited, or any option luck inequalities that result from them should be fully 
redressed.)  On this view, then, Vallentyne’s fourfold distinction collapses into a 
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threefold distinction between direct choice on the one hand, and luck in initial 
opportunities and outcome luck (including brute and option outcome luck) on the other.  
People should be held consequentially responsible for the outcomes they choose, but 
relieved of consequential responsibility for costs and benefits to the extent that their 
accrual has been mediated by luck of any type.   
Middle Ground Approaches 
Falling somewhere between brute luck egalitarianism and all luck egalitarianism are a 
range of views that allow some – and only some – option luck inequality to stand.  
Lippert-Rasmussen (2001) draws a distinction between ‘gambles proper’ and ‘quasi-
gambles’ that forms the basis of a distinction between types of option luck.  In gambles 
proper, the gambler prefers the gamble itself to the expected value of the gamble: she 
would rather take her chance for a larger win than refrain from gambling and walk away 
with the value of the winnings she can expect.  In quasi-gambles, the gambler prefers 
the expected value of a gamble to facing the gamble: she would rather not take the risk 
and instead walk away with the value of the expected winnings.  Barry (2008) has argued 
for an approach according to which consequential responsibility should be fully relieved 
for option luck wins and losses resulting from quasi-gambles, but imposed for the option 
luck wins and losses of gambles proper.  Responsibility for the former should be relieved 
because, first, the way option luck plays out is beyond the control of the individual 
gambler and, second, as the (reluctant) gambler prefers the expected outcome to the 
gamble, relieving consequential responsibility is consistent with the underlying 
motivation of the ‘choice’ to gamble.   
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This moderate position seems intuitively appealing in the sense that it recognizes the 
relevance of the content of the reasons behind people’s choices to the judgement of 
whether we should respect those choices by allowing their results to stand.  It attends to 
what people actually will.  If someone would really rather not gamble, it seems reasonable 
to judge a choice to go ahead with a gamble as less than genuine and thus not the sort 
of choice that can justify the resulting inequality.  That is because metaphysical luck 
egalitarians are concerned with the free exercise of will.  Reluctance to gamble indicates 
that the choice to (nevertheless) gamble does not properly reflect the will of the gambler.  
It indicates, instead, that the choice is made in the face of external constraints limiting 
access to viable alternative, risk-free routes to accruing the expected value of the gamble.  
On the other hand, if someone really does want to take a particular gamble, and would 
rather gamble and lose than not gamble at all, the choice to go ahead with it can 
reasonably be judged genuine.  Moreover, in these cases we can say that, because morally 
arbitrary outcomes are inherent to and indeed a defining element of gambles, the moral 
arbitrariness of the outcome of a gamble proper might itself be at least part of the object 
of choice.   
Knight admits there may be a better ‘intuitive case for denying assistance to losing 
gamblers proper than there is for denying assistance to losing quasi-gamblers, who 
might, after all, be risk averse, and exposing themselves to option luck only because it is 
the prudent thing to do given the lack of attractive low-risk alternatives’ (Knight 2013a: 
931).  However, he nevertheless concludes that it is unnecessary to permit any choices 
to gamble or any option luck inequalities resulting from gambles to stand.  So the 
question arises, is there any luck egalitarian reason to preserve gambles proper?  Dworkin 
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argues that ‘we can say that the possibility of loss was part of the life they [gamblers] 
chose – that it was the fair price of the possibility of gain’ and, further, that if ‘winners 
were made to share their winnings with losers, then no one would gamble, as individuals, 
and the kind of life preferred by those who in the end win and those who lose would be 
unavailable’ (Dworkin 1981: 294).  This, clearly, is not an argument for preserving option 
luck inequality entailed by quasi-gambles, as quasi-gamblers do not prefer the gambling 
kind of life and would avoid it if they reasonably could.  Gambling, for them, is only a 
means to an end they would rather reach by other means and is not inherently valuable.  
But is it a serious argument for preserving gambles proper and the option luck 
inequalities they produce?  Both Barry and Knight suggest that the moral arbitrariness 
of all gambling outcomes tells against allowing them to stand.  As Barry writes: 
by endorsing the idea of noncompensable option luck, brute luck 
egalitarians allow inequalities to emerge even if they have not been 
directly chosen.  This sits uneasily with the underlying motivation 
of luck egalitarianism, which is to achieve a choice and 
responsibility-sensitive pattern of distribution.  […]  Just because 
a person has chosen to bring luck into play is no reason for her to 
be entitled to all its fruits.  Why should a person enjoy the full 
benefits of luck when all she has done is place a bet?  It seems a 
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strange position for egalitarians to take if they aim to prevent 
morally arbitrary differences in well-being  (Barry 2008: 137-138)44 
But Barry ultimately accepts the force of Dworkin’s point and concludes this moral 
arbitrariness is rendered acceptable when (and only when) people value the actual 
gamble.  I would add that in cases where the object of the gambler’s choice is not merely 
partaking in the risky process of gambling, but also accruing luck-based winnings and 
losses, we might think the moral arbitrariness of the result of the gamble is itself 
diminished.  In these cases, luck itself is an object of choice: what is chosen is both the 
process of fortune playing out and the fortune or misfortune – the luck-based nature – 
of the result.  Knight, however, does not accept Dworkin’s point.  He insists that 
gambling outcomes are morally arbitrary and thus unacceptable, and not rendered any 
                                              
44 The same point is expressed by Knight as follows: 
it is unclear why an egalitarian should be interested in securing for 
individuals the possibility of creating inequalities between themselves 
and others who have made similar (genuine) choices.  This seems like a 
recipe for the kind of moral arbitrariness that egalitarians seek to avoid.  
How can the roll of a dice or toss of a coin be thought to carry sufficient 
moral weight to (potentially) make one person’s life go much better than 
a similarly responsible other person’s?  (Knight 2012: 552-553) 
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less so merely if and because a risky process is an object of genuine choice.  I suspect he 
would neither concede that the luck-based nature of the result being an object of choice 
renders that result just.  Knight’s position seems to trade on a point I made in section 
1.1.3 regarding a form of asymmetry in the distinction between luck and choice.  If the 
egalitarian injunction to ensure luck-neutral outcomes is weightier than the 
responsibilitarian injunction to impose the consequences of choice then in cases such as 
genuinely chosen gambles, where luck and choice are copresent and inextricable, luck-
neutrality trumps choice-sensitivity.  Knight’s view is that ‘committed egalitarians’ can 
and indeed should be expected to prioritize luck-neutrality over choice-sensitivity 
(Knight 2012: 553).  Thus, as option luck manifests inextricably copresent elements of 
both luck and choice, such that preventing or redressing option luck inequality maintains 
luck-neutrality but forfeits choice-sensitivity while permitting it to arise maintains choice-
sensitivity but forfeits luck-neutrality, those who endorse this form of luck egalitarian 
asymmetry have a reason to treat option luck as luck rather than choice.   
Moreover, Knight argues that the sacrifice thereby entailed (the forgoing of preferred 
lives of gambling) should not be too worrying: ‘Committed egalitarians would hardly be 
surprised or dismayed by the possibility that some individuals would have to give 
something up to achieve social equality’ (Knight 2012: 553).  Admittedly, this is unlikely 
to convince those luck egalitarians of a more responsibilitarian bent (those who prioritize 
choice-sensitivity over luck-neutrality), but Knight also has a ‘simple’ reply for them: 
What egalitarians require qua egalitarians need not be what they 
require all things considered.  Brute luck egalitarians are usually 
pluralists, endorsing values other than equality (see Arneson 1999; 
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2000; 2011; Cohen 2008).  There is no reason why egalitarians 
opposed to option luck inequalities cannot take a similar stance.  
If, for instance, equality was endorsed as a value alongside welfare 
promotion, as brute-luck egalitarians often suggest, the latter 
would provide good reasons for keeping open risky but potentially 
rewarding activities, provided that the rewards were sufficiently 
large relative to the risks (and if they were not, it is hard to see 
much justification for allowing the activity in the first place).  […]  
The proposal of combating option luck can thus be combined 
with non-egalitarian values for those of more qualified egalitarian 
views.  (Knight 2012: 553) 
Ultimately, then, luck egalitarians’ various positions on option luck reveal the relative 
strength of their egalitarian and responsibilitarian credentials and any asymmetry in their 
favoured distinction between luck and choice.  For those (such as Cohen and Arneson) 
who favour imposing consequential responsibility for option luck gains and losses, 
gambles can be understood and treated in terms of a relatively more expansive 
conception of responsible choice.  Those (such as Knight) who favour relieving 
consequential responsibility for (or restricting opportunities to accrue) option luck gains 
and losses see, manifested in gambles, a clash between luck and choice, and prioritize 
luck-neutrality and equality over choice-sensitivity and responsibility.  Others (such as 
Barry) might be described as moderate in the sense that they occupy a place in the middle 
ground between these two extremes.  Rather than attempt here to defend one particular 
position, when I apply luck egalitarian theory to a case study of internships, I will 
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illustrate some of the differences between the implications of brute luck egalitarian and 
all luck egalitarian approaches.   
1.3.2.4  The Expensive Tastes Clause 
Before moving on to a brief defence of the metaphysical approach and account of my 
reasons for favouring it, I must canvass a final feature, to which I will refer in subsequent 
chapters.  A number of luck egalitarians including, most prominently, Cohen, have 
argued that the addition of an extra non-responsibility clause is required to work in 
conjunction with the core principle that lack of metaphysical control over the accrual of 
costs and benefits excuses consequential responsibility for those costs and benefits.  This 
additional clause, which can be termed the expensive tastes clause, concerns when people 
can be held responsible for the costs of satisfying their relatively expensive tastes.  Those 
with expensive tastes require to spend more than others to secure an equal level of 
welfare.  Holding all else (including the resources people have at their disposal) equal, 
bearers of expensive tastes would thus achieve a lower level of welfare than their 
counterparts with inexpensive tastes.  Luck egalitarians who favour a purely resourcist 
conception of the currency of justice are unconcerned about welfare inequalities – 
whether chosen or unchosen.  But welfarists (such as Knight) and those who favour a 
conception of advantage that includes a welfarist element (such as Cohen and Barry) are 
concerned about inequalities of access to welfare.  Each of these luck egalitarians has 
claimed that some expensive tastes are such that their bearers should not be held 
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consequentially responsible for the costs of satisfying them.45  For Cohen, the relevant 
subset of expensive tastes are those that may be termed ‘valuational’: their bearers 
identify with them, such that to forgo their satisfaction would be to violate their own 
judgement and experience ‘alienation from what is deep in them’ (Cohen 2004: 14).  
Cohen writes: 
I distinguish among expensive tastes according to whether or not 
their bearers can reasonably be held responsible for the fact that 
their tastes are expensive.  There are those that they could not 
have helped forming and/or could not now unform without 
violating their own judgment, and then there are those for whose 
cost, by contrast, they can be held responsible, because they could 
have forestalled their development, and/or because they could 
now quite readily unlearn them, without violating their own 
judgment.  (Cohen 2004: 8) 
                                              
45 Barry favours Cohen’s approach to expensive tastes (see Barry 2008).  Knight, on the other 
hand, has suggested an approach that might be understood as following from Cohen’s, though 
it differs in some respects (see Knight 2009b).  In what follows, I concentrate exclusively on 
Cohen’s version of the clause. 
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Thus, whether or not a person made a genuine choice, at some point in the past, to 
develop expensive tastes, if forgoing their satisfaction would require her to act against 
her judgement and thereby face alienation from a part of her identity, she should not be 
held responsible for the (relatively high) costs of satisfying them.   
Dworkin, as we saw section 1.2.2.2 above, takes a different view: he thinks that precisely 
because people identify with their valuational tastes, they ordinarily expect to bear and 
be held responsible for the costs of satisfying them, and that justice should therefore 
hold them responsible.  Cohen notes the difference between the two approaches: 
So what Dworkin gives as a reason for withholding compensation 
[or, imposing responsibility] – the subjects’ approving 
identification with their expensive tastes – is something that I 
regard as a reason for offering it [or, alleviating responsibility], 
since, where identification is present, it is, standardly, the agents’ 
very bad luck that a preference with which they strongly identify 
happens to be expensive, and to expect them to forgo or to restrict 
satisfaction of that preference (because it is expensive) is, 
therefore, to ask them to accept an alienation from what is deep 
in them.  (Cohen 2004: 14, original emphasis) 
This point illuminates a crucial feature of expensive valuational tastes, the costs of the 
satisfaction of which people should not be held consequentially responsible for.  While 
the expensive tastes clause may seem, at first glance, to be wholly independent of 
metaphysical considerations, in fact, it is not.  When the relatively high price is incidental 
to the development of someone’s tastes, it is a matter of luck for the individual that 
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satisfaction of those tastes happens to be costly.  In a market economy, the high cost is 
a matter of luck for her because, as Cohen argues, the market is ‘at best a mere brute 
luck machine’: no one has individual control over the market-set costs of satisfying 
particular tastes (Cohen 2004: 17).  On the other hand, if any tastes are cultivated largely 
because of the relatively high expense of satisfying them, it is clearly not the case that 
those tastes just happen to be expensive to satisfy.  In such cases, it is not merely a matter 
of luck that a person has expensive tastes, as she set out purposefully to cultivate or 
continue to maintain her tastes precisely because of their relative costliness.  The high cost 
is not simply an external constraint on the exercise of her will but, significantly, at least 
in part the object of choice and a desideratum of the will.  This is why the high expense 
of satisfying a person’s tastes is only ‘standardly’ and not always a matter of luck.  Thus, 
the expensive tastes clause recommends that people should be relieved of consequential 
responsibility for the high costs of satisfying valuational tastes that are, as a matter of 
luck for their bearer, expensive.46 
                                              
46 The expensive tastes clause is important for my purposes not only because it has formed a 
key part of luck egalitarian thinking, but also because it might be argued that wanting to 
undertake internship work or to enter a sector in which working as an intern improves access 
to paid employment is, at least for some, a valuational taste.  In chapter 3, I will argue that, if 
that is convincing, when the internships that are available are (and, of course, from the 
perspective of potential interns, just happen to be) unpaid, the disadvantages consequent on a 
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1.3.3  A Summary of the Metaphysical Approach 
In summary, a plausible reading of the metaphysical approach to luck egalitarianism 
proposes the following: 
Metaphysical responsibility is the necessary condition of consequential responsibility: 
people should be relieved of consequential responsibility for brute luck in initial 
opportunities and brute outcome luck, and held consequentially responsible for their 
genuine choices (excepting choices to gamble).  The less (or more) genuine the choice, 
the less (or more) consequential responsibility should be imposed. 
Consequential responsibility for costs and benefits falling out from choice to gamble 
should be: imposed inasmuch as the choice to gamble is genuine; or, relieved (or gambles 
should be banned); or, imposed in the case of gambles proper and relieved in the case 
of quasi-gambles. 
Consequential responsibility for the costs of satisfying valuational tastes that happen (as 
a matter of luck for their bearer) to be expensive should be relieved. 
1.3.4  A Defence of the Metaphysical Approach 
The metaphysical approach to luck egalitarian distributive justice is the one I favour 
throughout this thesis.  That approach has been robustly defended elsewhere and I do 
                                              
genuine choice to take up an unpaid internship may, in light of the expensive tastes clause, be 
conceived as unjust. 
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not attempt here to provide much further justification for it.47  As such, I acknowledge 
that my view that it is the most appropriate approach to luck egalitarianism is an 
incompletely defended assumption of the thesis.  That said, in what follows, I canvass 
two objections that might at first glance seem worrying for this approach and suggest 
some reasons why they are unconvincing.  The first objection runs as follows: it tells 
against the metaphysical approach that it imposes no consequential responsibility if 
determinism is true.  In section 1.3.4.1, I suggest that this objection is weak in the sense 
that it holds normative force only for those who already accept its premise and can do 
nothing to persuade metaphysical luck egalitarians that they are wrong.  Similarly, 
though, if metaphysical luck egalitarians attempt to rebut this objection with the claim 
that it tells against other approaches if and because they would impose consequential 
responsibility if determinism is true, they must acknowledge that their claim will be 
equally unpersuasive to those who disagree with its premise.  The second objection is 
potentially more worrying.  It holds that, because the full implications of the 
metaphysical approach cannot be known until the truth of causality has been ascertained, 
the approach is theoretically unfulfilled and practically useless.  In section 1.3.4.2  I 
suggest that lack of knowledge cannot tell against the metaphysical approach in any 
                                              
47 For thoroughgoing arguments in defence of the metaphysical approach, see, in particular, 
Cohen (1989), Knight (2006 and 2009a: chapter 5). 
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fundamental way and need not prevent metaphysical luck egalitarians from making 
regulatory recommendations.48   
1.3.4.1  Reply to the objection that consequential responsibility is incompatible with determinism 
On the metaphysical approach to luck egalitarian distributive justice, unlike on the 
attributivist approach, just consequential responsibility is incompatible with 
determinism: given determinism, the approach would recommend flat equality of 
outcome.  Mason asserts that it ‘might be regarded as a disadvantage’ of the approach 
that it would impose no responsibility if determinism were true (Mason 2006: 171).  In 
particular, we can expect that the metaphysical approach will be unappealing to any 
egalitarians who are attached to substantive judgements of just consequential 
responsibility in particular cases.  That is, to any who hold stubbornly persistent 
intuitions that flat equality is unjust because there are some actions or behaviours for 
                                              
48 Another line of objection might attempt to claim that the metaphysical approach is an 
incorrect reading of luck egalitarian distributive justice and should be abandoned because it is 
discontinuous with ordinary moral experience.  I reject this objection for the many of the 
reasons I rejected the attributivist approach.  In brief, the evidence suggests ordinary moral 
experience is too heterogeneous and incoherent to allow for continuity.  Even if it were not, we 
would certainly need far more empirical evidence of what it consists in before we could hope 
to know which theories reflect it and which are at odds with it.  Finally, continuity is no virtue 
of a principle of justice: rather, it risks elevating repugnant moral judgements to the status of 
the grounds of justice and may function to constrain theoretical radicalism. 
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which people should, for reasons of distributive justice, definitely be held responsible 
(which intuitions are insensitive to the truth of causality).   
To illustrate this point, consider how the metaphysical approach accommodates the 
substantive judgement that ‘lazy’ people should be held responsible for their laziness.  It 
might, perhaps, be thought unfair to make hardworking people bear the costs of others’ 
laziness.  This view involves a substantive judgement that ‘lazy’ people should 
(ordinarily) bear the costs of their own laziness.  Dworkin’s approach to distributive 
justice accommodates that substantive judgement because it (ordinarily) counts laziness 
as a feature of people’s personalities and, therefore, as a choice, regardless of whether or 
not the characteristic of laziness could have been avoided.  Conversely, the metaphysical 
approach does not necessarily accommodate that substantive judgement.  It cannot insist 
that all ‘lazy’ people bear the costs of their laziness, because the characteristic of laziness, 
taken alone, bears no normative weight.  Substantive judgements regarding the justice of 
imposing consequential responsibility in particular cases attend only to the genuineness 
of choice and not to the character of choice, such that the only relevant question is: how 
genuine is this – lazy or diligent – choice?  If it is not genuine, responsibility should not 
be imposed.   
But, while the flat equality of outcome that metaphysical luck egalitarianism recommends 
if determinism is true may seem – at least to some egalitarians – inappropriately generous 
to the ‘lazy’ and unfair to the relatively diligent, it is one of the reasons I find it appealing.  
If people have no more control over the development of characteristics of laziness and 
diligence than they have over, for example, their genetic inheritance, there is no 
compelling reason of distributive justice why the distribution of advantage should track 
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those characteristics.  Because, on the metaphysical approach, substantive judgements 
(including those concerning responsibility for laziness) are flexible in the sense of being 
dependent on as yet unknown facts about causality, those whose judgements are flexible 
in this sense will find the metaphysical approach far more appealing than any theory on 
which people are definitely held responsible for certain actions (such as lazy behaviour) 
regardless of whether they were genuinely avoidable.  Moreover, of course, value pluralist 
metaphysical luck egalitarians can note that if determinism is true, inequalities might be 
justified on the balance of reasons.  For example, perhaps alleviating all responsibility 
would entail the moral hazard of encouraging ever-costlier behaviour.  If so, 
externalizing the costs of all behaviour onto society may risk bankrupting society in the 
long term and, accordingly, for reasons other than distributive justice (namely, reasons 
to do with economic sustainability and efficiency), flat equality of outcome might be 
undesirable.  Thus, metaphysical luck egalitarians can concede that, given determinism, 
some inequalities may be justified, all things considered, but they are committed to the 
position that those inequalities would be unjust. 
Thus far, however, there has only been a trading of statements of intuitions and 
judgements, and no presentation of any persuasive arguments.  I think, in response to 
the claim that it tells against the metaphysical approach that it waives all consequential 
responsibility if determinism is true, defenders of the approach can only counterclaim 
that it tells against other approaches if and because they impose consequential 
responsibility if determinism is true.  Crucially, each claim is only persuasive if its premise 
has already been conceded.  As such, neither claim amounts to a genuine objection to 
the other view.  A statement by Knight helps to illuminate that egalitarians are simply 
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talking past each other on this point.  He criticizes the continuity with ordinary ethical 
experience of Dworkin’s principles of distributive justice on precisely the basis that they 
render consequential responsibility compatible with determinism: 
It seems broadly right to say that people distinguish between 
choices and circumstances in the stark way Dworkin describes, 
and it is probably also correct that people generally can not help 
but blame themselves for their bad choices and blame others (or 
no one at all) for their bad circumstances.  But it is quite a jump 
from there to the conclusion that distributive justice should track 
the same distinction.  If ‘hard determinism’ is true, so there can be 
no free will and no true agent responsibility – no responsibility in 
a deep, morally- and metaphysically-valid way – it might follow 
that the people had best continue as though free will and 
responsibility did exist.  […]  But it does not at all follow that 
social institutions should fall under the same spell.  Treating 
individuals as though they are responsible for outcomes when it is 
known they are not [metaphysically responsible] is manifestly 
arbitrary and unfair.  (Knight 2012: 543, my emphasis) 
I agree with Knight that if determinism is true, distributive justice condemns the 
imposition of consequential responsibility.  But I think the force of his claim is limited 
in the sense that it is only persuasive if the premise has already been conceded.  The 
premise is that metaphysical issues matter to consequential responsibility.  To anyone 
who affirms this premise, it is indeed manifestly arbitrary and unfair to impose 
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consequential responsibility on people for matters over which they have no control.  But 
to those, such as Dworkin and Mason, who maintain that metaphysical issues are 
fundamentally irrelevant to consequential responsibility, determinism is equally 
irrelevant and provides no grounds for judging imposition of consequential 
responsibility unfair.  We cannot persuade those who disagree with us merely by stating 
our intuitions and judgements: the argument must focus on the relative plausibility of 
the premises that underpin our positions. 
I acknowledge, then, that the metaphysical approach will be unappealing to those with 
substantive views that there are particular instances in which people should, for reasons 
of distributive justice, be held responsible.  Egalitarians who are resolutely opposed to 
equality of outcome will find the necessarily agnostic view of the metaphysical luck 
egalitarian – who must accept that flat equality may be required by justice – unappealing.  
But the statement that the metaphysical approach condemns all inequality if determinism 
is true does not amount to a persuasive objection.  Neither does my insistence that it is 
wrong of other approaches that they impose consequential responsibility if determinism 
is true amount to a persuasive defence.  We must turn our attention to the premises that 
underpin the metaphysical approach. 
1.3.4.2  Reply to the objection from uncertain causality 
Perhaps one of the most prima facie obvious objections against metaphysical luck 
egalitarianism is that it is held hostage to the problem of theoretical uncertainty regarding 
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the truth of metaphysical causality.49  The lack of certainty and consensus on the truth 
of metaphysical causality might be thought to tell against a fundamental principle that is 
premised on metaphysical notions of responsibility if, as a result of that uncertainty, the 
implications of the principle cannot be fully worked out.  That is, if the metaphysical 
premise of this approach entails that we cannot employ our theory to judge how just or 
unjust contemporary society is, or to issue any firm regulatory recommendations, 
perhaps the premise should be abandoned.  As Fleurbaey writes, ‘egalitarianism would 
be seriously endangered of being practically impotent if it was held hostage by 
metaphysics’ (Fleurbaey 2001: 502).   
Cohen acknowledges that it might be objected that ‘to make choice central to distributive 
justice lands political philosophy in the morass of the free will problem’ and thereby 
‘subordinates political philosophy to metaphysical questions that may be impossible to 
answer’ (Cohen 1989: 934).  But, in reply, he notes that:  
we may indeed be up to our necks in the free will problem, but 
that is just tough luck.  It is not a reason for not following the 
argument where it goes.  (Cohen 1989: 934) 
In other words, our lack of understanding and agreement does not undermine the value 
of getting theory right: the particular limitations to philosophical understanding we are 
                                              
49 Versions of the objection from the problem of uncertain causality have been suggested by 
Fleurbaey (2001) and Saul Smilansky (1997). 
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currently faced with do not and cannot tell against fundamental philosophical principles 
that are (on the foundationalist view) insensitive to (as yet unknown or unsettled) facts 
regarding causality.  Uncertainty over causality does not motivate the abandonment of 
theories grounded in metaphysics but, rather, provides a case for further philosophical 
enquiry in that area.  Uncertainty may be uncomfortable, but it does not indicate 
theoretical error.  Moreover, in the meantime we can, of course, make conditional and 
conjectural statements about justice in contemporary society and about what regulation 
luck egalitarianism would recommend, given the truth of different theses of causality.  
Admittedly, luck egalitarian theory is not always properly caveated and can sometimes 
read as though some degree of genuine choice has been shown to be possible, but that 
is a problem with its expression and does not tell against its content.   
Nevertheless, to comprehensively apply the theory at the level of regulation, it seems 
that a convincing theory of metaphysical causation is required to inform judgements 
about whether control is ever possible and, if so, under what conditions.  Without such 
a theory, we cannot know for certain whether and, if so, when people make the kind of 
genuine choices that might justify imposition of consequential responsibility for costs 
and benefits.  In response to this problem of implementation, Cohen attempts to 
reassure us with the following statement: 
We are not looking for an absolute distinction between presence 
and absence of genuine choice.  The amount of genuineness that 
there is in a choice is a matter of degree, and egalitarian redress is 
indicated to the extent that a disadvantage does not reflect genuine 
choice.  That extent is a function of several things, and there is no 
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aspect of a person's situation which is wholly due to genuine 
choice.  Let me illustrate this point.  One of the things that affects 
how genuine a choice was is the amount of relevant information 
that the chooser had.  But we do not have to ask, Exactly what 
sort and amount of information must a person have to count as 
having genuinely chosen his fate?  All that we need say, from the 
point of view of egalitarian justice, is: the more relevant 
information he had, the less cause for complaint he now has.  It 
seems to me that this plausible nuancing approach reduces the 
dependence of political philosophy on the metaphysics of mind.  
(Cohen 1989: 934) 
At first glance, Cohen’s ‘nuancing’ approach might be thought to provide a practical way 
to reach judgements of consequential responsibility that releases luck egalitarian 
regulatory recommendations from dependence on the correct theory of metaphysical 
causality.  But, on closer inspection, some theory still must be assumed, on which to 
predicate nuanced judgements.  Cohen does, in the quotation cited directly above, seem 
to be making what Scheffler (2003a and 2005) and Fleurbaey (2001) have described as 
an assumption of metaphysical libertarianism.  To claim that a chooser’s having more of 
the relevant information makes her choice more genuine does, after all, assume that some 
degree of genuineness of choice is possible in principle. 
More reassuringly, practical solutions to the problems of implementation are at hand.  
Knight recognizes those problems, but argues that there is, after all, an acceptable way 
to obviate them.  He writes: 
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Can luck egalitarians take metaphysics seriously, as I have urged 
they should, and still offer concrete distributive proposals?  I 
believe they can, provided they accept the pragmatic solution of 
legislating on the basis of our best metaphysical guess.  (Knight 
2006: 184) 
Metaphysical luck egalitarianism favours whatever view of causality is correct.  What is 
required in order to make ‘concrete distributive proposals’ is, therefore, an acceptable 
way of deciding which view of causality to use.  Knight’s solution is to employ an expert 
panel of specialists in the field of metaphysics to make that decision (that is, to make a 
‘best guess’ about the truth of causality).  Describing his proposal, he writes: 
Governments have various ways of arriving at educated guesses; 
luck egalitarianism has no preference here, other than favoring 
greater accuracy over lesser accuracy.  I will describe one option 
here: a responsibility committee composed of some of the leading 
authorities on the relevant metaphysical issues.  The committee 
would be representative in terms of the positions (hard 
determinism, libertarianism, compatibilism, and maybe others) 
initially held by each member, though they may change during the 
course of the committee's deliberations.  It would be charged with 
surveying the research appropriate to its topic and would 
ultimately provide the distributive arm of the government with 
their assessments of the likelihoods of each of the [… positions] 
being correct.  (Knight 2006: 185-186) 
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The appropriate distribution would then be based on a probabilistic compromise 
between each position that weights each according to the committee’s best guess 
regarding the likelihood of its accuracy (see, in particular, Knight 2006: 186).  It cannot 
be claimed either that this method would definitely make the correct judgements or that 
the panel would eventually reach consensus but it does seem to constitute an acceptable 
approach to overcoming the potential implementational problems of luck egalitarian 
regulation.  As Knight comments, ‘Our best guess is that metaphysicians are the group 
best qualified to make the required decision’ (Knight 2006: 187).  He goes on, ‘If there 
is a fully neutral method, then luck egalitarianism is open to it; if there is not, then the 
committee will suffice’ (Knight 2006: 188).  The important point for now is that while, 
at first glance, the seeming intractability of the problem of determining the correct causal 
thesis might appear to render implementation of luck egalitarian regulatory requirements 
impossible and, therefore, to tell against the plausibility or appeal of the entire approach, 
Knight’s work reveals that that problem need not be too worrying if we are willing to 
accept the best guess of informed experts acting in good faith.  Even if we are not, there 
is no good reason to dismiss as impossible that other acceptable methods of 
implementation may yet be imagined. 
In fact, we can certainly make some regulatory recommendations without a panel of 
expert metaphysicians and without presupposing any particular thesis of causality.  In 
chapters 2 and 4, I discuss a number of luck egalitarian regulatory actions that could be 
implemented in the absence of a resolution to the debates around causality.  Provision 
of ex post compensation to accurately offset (only) advantages and disadvantages that are 
a matter of luck would indeed require a plausible determination of the extent to which a 
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person’s overall level of advantage or disadvantage is the result of luck, which would in 
turn require a working theory of causality.  But I maintain that this is not the only kind 
of regulatory action that luck egalitarians might endorse.  I argue that luck egalitarians 
have a (provisional) reason to endorse action to reduce unjust advantage and 
disadvantage ex ante redistributive compensation.  Implementation of at least some kinds 
of ex ante luck egalitarian regulatory action is perfectly possible in the absence of 
agreement on the thesis of causality.  That is (not least) because, regardless of whether 
or not genuine choice is possible, there are some factors (such as, for example, a person’s 
gender) that are beyond metaphysical control and thus unchosen and a matter of luck 
on any thesis.  Luck egalitarians can condemn the influence these forms of luck currently 
have on outcomes and recommend regulatory action to minimize that influence: rather 
than insisting that we must work out how much influence luck has had on a person’s 
outcome, luck egalitarians might advocate a variety of regulatory actions that minimize 
the extent to which such factors influence distributive processes in the first instance.  
The idea that uncertainty over causality necessarily renders luck egalitarianism entirely 
impotent at the level of regulation is, then, certainly unfounded.   
Ultimately, as I acknowledged above, Dworkin may be right that anyone’s choice 
between the metaphysical view and other, continuous views may reflect deeper 
dispositions and convictions that are beyond argument.  Discussing Cohen’s view that 
metaphysical responsibility is the necessary condition of consequential responsibility, 
Scheffler comments that he ‘just thinks that’s the egalitarian intuition’ (Scheffler 2005: 
13).  Arneson, Knight, Barry and I are in agreement with Cohen on that score.  Indeed, 
I agree with Knight that holding people consequentially responsible when they are not 
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metaphysically responsible is manifestly arbitrary and unfair, but, of course, the 
unfairness is not manifest to many others and it does not seem unlikely that that 
divergence may reflect disparity in the deeper dispositions to which Dworkin refers.  I 
do not claim to have provided a thoroughgoing defence of the metaphysical approach, 
but I do hope to have shown that it is not a persuasive objection against that approach 
that it recommends equality of outcome if determinism is true, and that the problems 
entailed by lack of certainty over the truth of causality are neither necessarily intractable 
nor, even as they stand, too debilitating.  I would like to end by raising a final 
consideration that may tell positively in favour of the metaphysical approach.  For my 
part, I think at least part of the underlying motivation for preventing or redressing the 
inegalitarian influence of luck on outcomes while permitting the influence of choice 
consists in the notion that people should have genuine – that is, metaphysical – control 
over how well their lives go.  People should be able to determine their own outcomes.  
If there is to be inequality, people should be in control of where they end up and no level 
of advantage should be out of reach for reasons beyond individuals’ control.50  When a 
                                              
50 One potential avenue for luck egalitarian theorists to explore, which I suspect may bear 
interesting fruit but do not venture into here, concerns the question of whether this motivation 
implies a luck egalitarian reason to relieve consequential responsibility – even for genuine choice 
– when its imposition would curtail or unacceptably limit a person’s ability to be self-
determining in future.  For a discussion of related ideas, see Brown (2005a).  Brown’s argument 
holds that it is ‘sometimes it is better not to hold individuals responsible for their past choices 
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person does not control her outcome and when that outcome is influenced by factors 
beyond her control, her self-determination is problematically compromised.  The 
metaphysical approach to luck egalitarian distributive justice seems appealing to me in 
part because it speaks to this deep concern for genuine self-determination.  It is the best 
expression of my egalitarian intuition.   
Conclusion 
The distinction between luck and choice forms the touchstone of luck egalitarian 
theories of distributive justice.  In this chapter, I have suggested that different 
approaches to understanding that distinction yield different principles of consequential 
responsibility and that luck egalitarians must choose between the alternatives with care.  
I hope to have shown that the attributivist approach to luck, choice and responsibility 
outlined in section 1.2 yields an implausible and unattractive candidate for the central 
luck egalitarian principle, and should be rejected.  The notion of ‘ordinary moral 
experience of blaming and praising’ that it presupposes is in itself dubious and, in any 
case, can tell us nothing about the content of egalitarian distributive justice.  Instead, 
luck egalitarians should favour a discontinuous, metaphysical approach to the distinction 
between luck and choice, and to the alleviation and imposition of consequential 
responsibility.  With this metaphysical approach in mind, I now turn from the question 
                                              
by denying them aid now, so that they might be better able to assume individual responsibility 
at a later date’ (Brown 2005a: 23). 
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of what luck and choice consist in to the question of what to do about the inegalitarian 
influence of luck on life outcomes.  I ask: given that, for reasons of distributive justice, 
factors beyond individuals’ metaphysical control should not unequally influence their 
relative life outcomes, what regulatory strategies should luck egalitarians endorse? 
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2 
 
Luck Egalitarian Regulatory Strategies:  
Compensation, Levelling, and Direct Structural Regulation 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the regulatory strategies through which the luck egalitarian ideal 
can be pursued.  At the fundamental level, that ideal holds that a just distribution of 
advantage is one in which people’s outcomes are insensitive to matters of luck beyond 
their control, but sensitive to their genuine choices.  Accordingly, at the level of 
regulation, the luck egalitarian ideal holds that people should be relieved of consequential 
responsibility for matters of luck, but held consequentially responsible for their choices.  
In other words, luck egalitarianism demands that the inegalitarian influence of luck on 
outcomes is neutralized.  In what follows, I argue that this regulatory demand may be 
met through a variety of regulatory strategies.  My argument is motivated by the tendency 
of luck egalitarian theory to conceive of luck egalitarian regulation in terms of 
compensation: the regulatory demand of luck egalitarianism is standardly presented as a 
demand for compensation.   
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In section 2.1, I outline how the term ‘compensation’ has been understood within the 
luck egalitarian literature.  I highlight how it has been used in both a narrow and a broad 
sense.  In its narrow usage, it indicates the imposition of taxation to offset luck-based 
advantage and the provision of compensation to offset luck-based disadvantage.51  In its 
broad usage, it is a vague (and, I will argue, inappropriate) term for any kind of luck 
egalitarian regulatory action.  In section 2.2, I present a conceptual argument intended 
to bring greater clarity to discussion of luck egalitarian regulation.  This argument 
proposes that a great variety of regulatory actions might be employed in service of luck 
egalitarian ends, and that these may all be usefully categorized into three different types 
of regulatory strategy.  That is, all luck egalitarian regulatory action can be understood as 
falling within (at least) one of three broad categories, depending on its strategic rationale 
and the target to which it is oriented.  These categories of luck egalitarian regulatory 
strategy are: ‘redistributive compensation’, ‘levelling’, and ‘direct structural regulation’.  
In section 2.3, I draw attention to a number of features and implications of this pluralist 
approach to the regulatory strategies of luck egalitarian distributive justice, which I think 
render it a plausible and attractive approach.  I then go on to consider how the relational 
egalitarian ideal can inform the choice between regulatory strategies and attempt to show 
that there are good reasons, in some instances, for luck egalitarians who value relational 
                                              
51 By luck-based advantage and disadvantage, I mean advantage and disadvantage that is a 
function of unchosen inequalities of opportunity and/or outcome luck.   
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equality to pursue distributive equality through levelling and direct structural regulation, 
rather than through redistributive compensation.   
2.1  Redistributive Compensation 
2.1.1  The Paradigmatic Status of Redistributive Compensation  
For all its diversity, there is a remarkable congruity in luck egalitarian theory regarding 
the paradigmatic status of redistributive compensation.52  Within theoretical work on 
luck egalitarian regulation, the lines of reasoning tend to conceive of luck egalitarian 
regulatory demands as demands for compensation, and the characteristic questions 
concern whether, to what extent, and how compensatory transfers should be 
implemented.  On John Roemer’s version ‘Equality of opportunity requires 
compensating persons for the differences in their circumstances [...] but not 
compensating them for the consequences of the differential application of effort’ 
(Roemer 1998: 6-7).  In order for Arneson’s ‘strict equal opportunity for welfare to 
obtain, it must be the case that any windfall gains that some agents get and sheer 
misfortunes that others suffer are fully offset by compensation after the fact, so that it 
                                              
52 I take inspiration here from Young’s definition of a paradigm as: 
a configuration of elements and practices which define an inquiry: 
metaphysical presuppositions, unquestioned terminology, characteristic 
questions, lines of reasoning, specific theories and their typical scope 
and mode of application.  (Young 1990: 16) 
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remains true that agents who behave with comparable prudence will gain the same level 
of welfare’ (Arneson 1999: 490-491).  On Kristin Voight’s account, ‘distributions should, 
as a matter of justice, reflect the choices that it is reasonable to hold agents responsible 
for, while the effects of “brute luck” must be compensated for’ (Voight 2007: 389-390).  
Segall writes that ‘justice requires compensating individuals only for disadvantages for 
which one cannot be held responsible’ (Segall 2007: 177).  For Hugh Lazenby, ‘the prime 
focus of egalitarian concern’ is ‘the compensation of unearned or unchosen comparative 
disadvantage’ (Lazenby 2010: 271).  Carl Knight takes the ‘generic distributive principle’ 
of luck egalitarianism to be ‘equality of opportunity for advantage’, according to which 
‘disadvantages that arise from [… ] circumstance are typically said to give rise to 
entitlements for compensation, for they derive from inequalities of opportunity, whereas 
those that arise from choices […] do not, for they reflect different uses of opportunity’ 
(Knight 2006: 173).  In his last published paper on the subject, G. A. Cohen writes that 
‘luck egalitarianism says: distribute equally, compensating appropriately for luck-induced 
deficits, and then whatever arises from people’s choices is just’ (Cohen 2009: 18).  
Commentators on and critics of luck egalitarianism have also tended to conceptualize 
luck egalitarian regulation in terms of compensation in their descriptions and analyses, 
writing of luck egalitarianism as a theory of compensation.  In her influential 1999 essay 
‘What is the Point of Equality?’, Elizabeth Anderson begins her critique of luck 
egalitarianism with the observation that ‘egalitarian writing has come to be dominated 
by the view that the fundamental aim of equality is to compensate people for undeserved 
bad luck’ (Anderson 1999: 288).  Marc Fleurbaey characterizes luck egalitarians as 
committed to ‘the principle of compensation’, which holds that ‘opportunities should be 
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equal, or, in other words, that unequal circumstances should be compensated by appropriate 
transfers’ (2001: 506, original emphasis).53  And Neil Levy includes among the ‘central 
questions’ of distributive justice the question of ‘whether we ought to compensate 
people for bad luck’ (Levy 2011: 11).  This view of the existing literature is justified, for 
luck egalitarians share a tendency to write in the language of compensation. 
2.1.2  The Nature of Redistributive Compensation 
But what do supporters and critics of luck egalitarianism mean by the term 
compensation?  In short, compensation has both a narrow and a broad meaning.  As 
Wolff notes, luck egalitarianism:  
sees the goal of egalitarian justice as that of neutralizing the effects 
of good and bad (brute) luck on individual fortunes.  The method 
by which it is proposed to achieve such neutralization is normally 
termed ‘compensation’.  […]  Now it is not always clear what is 
                                              
53 On  Fleurbaey’s definition of this principle, it states that ‘inequalities not due to responsibility 
should be eliminated’ (Fleurbaey 2008: 7).  Luck egalitarians do tend to interpret elimination in 
terms of compensation but, as I will argue in section 2.2, the inegalitarian influence of luck might 
be eliminated through strategies other than compensation.  Accordingly, the name given to the 
principle might (and, I hold, should) be judged to accurately capture much of the theory on luck 
egalitarian regulation thus far but, ultimately, to inappropriately characterize the luck egalitarian 
position as committed to disregarding non-compensatory strategies. 
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meant by ‘compensation’.  Sometimes it appears to be little more 
than a placeholder for the idea that ‘something must be done’.  But 
sometimes compensation is viewed in cash terms, or at least in 
terms of material goods, the provision of which is regarded as 
‘making up for’ something else which is lost or lacking.  (Wolff 
2009a: 114)54 
Let us consider the narrow meaning first.  On this view, the central rationale of 
redistributive compensation is to redress unjust inequalities of outcome by offsetting luck-
based advantage and disadvantage.  It targets overall outcomes – individuals’ overall 
levels of advantage – and adjusts these so that they are what they would have been, were 
it not for the inegalitarian influence of luck.  Thus, it brings about luck-neutral outcomes.  
Compensatory regulatory action typically takes the form of policies that impose financial 
taxes and provide financial benefits.  Money is collected from those who reap the 
benefits of luck to offset luck-based gains.  Conversely, money is provided to those who 
suffer the adverse consequences of luck to reimburse luck-based costs.55  Following 
                                              
54 The pluralist approach I develop throughout this chapter amounts, on the one hand, to a 
rejection of the view that compensation in the narrow sense is the method through which luck-
neutral outcomes should be achieved and, on the other, to a much needed framework for 
thinking more clearly about what sorts of things can be done, given that something must. 
55 On the standard luck egalitarian view, the costs of providing compensation to offset luck-
based adverse consequences are socialized, that is, paid out of the public purse.  In section 4.2.1, 
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Michael Otsuka, full compensation can be understood as ‘an amount of money awarded 
that would make the person indifferent between (1) that amount of money plus the harm 
and (2) the absence of that amount plus the absence of the harm’ (Otsuka 2002: 44).  
Otsuka’s ‘indifference test’ can also be extended to apply to luck-based benefits: full tax 
of the benefits of luck would make the individual indifferent between (1) reaping the 
benefits of luck and paying the tax and (2) not reaping the benefits of luck plus not 
paying the tax.  The idea here is that the costs and benefits that people accrue as a matter 
of luck should be exactly offset by redistribution.56  The strategy of redistributive 
compensation is therefore backward-looking or retrospective in its orientation: it aims for 
ex post redress of injustice after the fact of its creation.  This narrow reading of the 
meaning of compensation is suggested by, for example, Lazenby, who writes that:  
the ultimate aim of the luck egalitarian project [… is] to delineate 
which elements of a person’s situation they can be said to have 
responsibility for and which elements they cannot, allowing 
                                              
I consider an alternative view proposed by Steiner (1998), according to which compensation for 
adverse consequences that are not the result of choices made by a third party is paid out of the 
public purse.  The costs of providing compensation for adverse consequences that are the result 
of others’ choices are paid by those whose choices caused the adverse consequences.   
56 Of course, feasibility constraints and the demands of other values may constrain the extent to 
which full compensation can be achieved.  If compensation is partial, rather than full, it only 
mitigates, and does not neutralize, the inegalitarian influence of luck on outcomes.   
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relative welfare to be a function only of the former.  […] once 
these elements have been drawn apart we can begin trying to 
adjust the effects of brute luck between individuals through 
taxation of the ‘brute’ lucky and compensation of the ‘brute’ 
unlucky.  (Lazenby 2010: 274) 
Much of Cohen’s discussion of luck egalitarian regulation also focuses on eliminating 
luck-based inequality through ‘income taxation which redistributes to fully luck 
egalitarian effect’ (Cohen 1997: 9).  And, in his critique of luck egalitarianism, Fleurbaey 
suggests that the purpose of luck egalitarian policy is standardly to redistribute ‘resources 
so that the influence of circumstances over well-being […] is exactly counterbalanced by 
appropriate transfers’ (Fleurbaey 2008: 26). 
2.1.3  Beyond Ex Post Redress of Unjust Outcomes 
However, the regulatory proposals advanced by luck egalitarians are not exhausted by 
redistributive policies that aim to adjust unjust outcomes ex post.  First, resources might 
be redistributed for the purpose of adjusting individuals’ future opportunities for 
advantage, as well as or instead of for the purpose of redressing unjust outcomes.  Thus, 
regulatory action that luck egalitarians characterize in terms of compensation may have 
more than one rationale.  Moreover, although provision of financial benefit and 
imposition of financial taxation is certainly the primary regulatory strategy discussed and 
recommended by luck egalitarians, some luck egalitarian theorists have recommended 
(or, at least, mentioned the possibility that luck egalitarians could recommend) very 
different sorts of regulatory action.  Knight, for example, mentions that increasing access 
to high quality state education and training among those who would otherwise lack skills 
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would ‘prevent many unfair disadvantages from arising in the first place’ (Knight 2009a: 
129).  Roemer also argues that, while luck egalitarian outcomes might be achieved 
through a redistributive income tax policy, regulation of education systems might also 
be implemented to reduce the inequalities of opportunity that children will face in future 
(see Roemer 1998: chapter 9).  Indicating a broader reading of the term compensation, 
Cohen mentions that luck egalitarians might endorse an ‘antimarket policy’ according to 
which libraries charge all library users the same fee, regardless of the expense of the 
books they borrow.  This, he states, would constitute a form of compensation for 
expensive tastes in books (see, in particular, Cohen 2004: 11-12, 17-18).  Segall (2012a) 
advocates direct regulation of job recruitment processes to ensure that job distribution 
serves luck egalitarian ends.  (I examine Segall’s arguments in more detail in chapter 4.)  
And Knight (2013b) suggests that a ban on gambles might be enacted in order to reduce 
exposure to option luck.  These policies do not amount to ex post compensation for 
unjust advantage and disadvantage: the rationale is not to redress injustice after the fact 
of its creation by adjusting unjust outcomes, but to equalize opportunities for advantage 
in future.  Despite this diversity, however, Knight, Roemer, Cohen and Segall use the 
label of compensation to indicate all kinds of luck egalitarian regulation action.  It seems 
to me that their work hints at the possibility of a pluralist approach to the regulatory 
strategies of luck egalitarian distributive justice, but never fully develops the implications 
of these intimations.  The approach I advocate is intended to develop those implications 
much more fully and to provide a framework that explicitly recognizes and clearly 
categorizes the many and diverse regulatory actions luck egalitarians might recommend. 
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In sum, supporters and critics of luck egalitarianism often overlook regulatory action 
that is not compensatory in the narrow sense of the term.  This, as I explain in section 
2.2, is unnecessarily and unhelpfully reductive: luck egalitarian outcomes can and 
sometimes should be achieved through alternative strategies.  Alternatively, those who 
allow that alternative strategies are available to the luck egalitarian continue to 
characterize all luck egalitarian regulatory actions as forms of compensation.  The latter 
tendency is, I think, less worrying than the former, as it does not preclude sensible luck 
egalitarian policies.  But it is, nevertheless, a misstep that luck egalitarians should avoid: 
it obscures the real variety of available luck egalitarian regulatory actions.  In what 
follows, I hope to show that it is at best imprecise and at worst misleading to use 
compensation as a catch-all term for luck egalitarian regulation whether or not it is 
compensatory in the narrow sense.  Theoretical clarity and precision is enhanced by 
distinguishing between the different targets and rationales of regulatory action, and the 
pluralist approach I advocate enables those distinctions to be made clearly while also 
focusing attention on the range of possible action.  But the critical force of my argument 
is directed against the position that compensation in the narrow sense – that is, ex post 
imposition of financial taxation and provision of financial benefit to adjust unjust 
outcomes by offsetting luck-based advantage and disadvantage – is the only regulatory 
strategy of luck egalitarian distributive justice.57  That position renders invisible any luck 
                                              
57 For the remainder of this chapter, unless otherwise stated I use the terms ‘compensation’ and 
‘compensatory redistribution’ in this narrow, specific sense. 
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egalitarian regulatory strategies that target ex ante differences in circumstance or the 
structures that set the terms of dynamic inequality creation in order to equalize 
opportunities for advantage and prevent unjust outcomes from being produced.  In 
focusing on compensation as the appropriate regulatory strategy through which to 
achieve luck neutralization, luck egalitarians have tended not to engage in very much 
critical analysis of current and possible background distributive systems – the systems 
which, taken together, determine the distribution of benefits and burdens ex ante any 
redistributive compensation (or, pre-redistribution).  The luck egalitarian society is too 
often presented as, or implied to be, one in which luck is permitted to have an 
inegalitarian influence on outcomes: justice is achieved to the extent that ex post 
redistribution redresses the unjust inequalities that are thereby created.  Hence, two 
important questions seldom arise.  First, the question of whether different social 
arrangements might reduce luck-based inequalities of outcome pre-redistribution.  
Second, the question of whether, if they would reduce such inequality, those different 
social arrangements might be desirable in the name of equality, and even desirable on 
the balance of all relevant considerations.  This entails that the radical capacity of luck 
egalitarianism as a transformative theory of justice is limited: it recommends tweaking 
the outcomes of distributive processes, rather than transforming the very processes that 
produce those outcomes.  Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I attempt to 
demonstrate that treating compensation as the sole or primary strategy of luck egalitarian 
regulation is unnecessary, unjustified and unhelpful.  Theorists of luck egalitarian 
distributive justice should relinquish attachment to the compensatory paradigm and 
embrace a pluralist approach to regulatory strategies.  
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2.2  A Pluralist Approach to Luck Egalitarian Regulatory Strategies 
This aim of this section is to illustrate that luck egalitarian regulatory strategies are not 
exhausted by redistributive compensation to redress unjust advantage and disadvantage, 
and to propose a clear and useful framework for thinking about alternative regulatory 
options.  While luck egalitarians have tended to recommend that inequalities of outcome 
resultant on inequalities of opportunity and outcome luck should be compensated, 
compensation strikes me, in many instances, as the wrong strategy in response to 
inequalities of opportunity, given the availability of others.  Instead of responding to the 
inequalities of opportunity that are implicated in the production of luck-based advantage 
and disadvantage by leaving them intact and compensating individuals for the unjust 
outcomes that result, luck egalitarians can, alternatively, respond by equalizing opportunities.   
2.2.1  Wolff’s Tripartite Model of Opportunities  
I employ here Wolff’s tripartite model of the determinants of opportunity to show that 
inequalities of opportunity may be eliminated or reduced by regulation that targets one 
or more of the original determinants of those inequalities.  Explaining his model of 
opportunity, Wolff writes:  
A person’s opportunities in life are determined by three kinds of 
factor: first, his or her internal resources (Rawlsian natural assets); 
second, his or her external resources (money, property and so on); 
and third, the social and material structure of that person’s society.  
(Wolff 2009a: 113) 
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I elaborate further on what precisely is meant by the social and material structure of 
society in section 2.2.4 below but suffice it to say for now that it includes ‘laws and 
customs, the influence of tradition, religion, language, culture and other social norms; 
the configuration of the material and natural environment; and perhaps other things too’ 
(Wolff 2009a: 123).  Wolff defines the ‘overall formula’ as follows: 
the interaction of your internal and external resources with the 
social and material structure within which you find yourself 
determines your opportunities, creating for you paths of varying 
cost and difficulty.  In short, your resources are what you have to 
play with; the structure provides the rules of the game.  (Wolff 
2009a: 124) 
Wolff himself advances a formulation of justice according to which the primary 
distributive goal is to ensure sufficient – not equal – genuine opportunities for secure 
functionings by ‘declustering disadvantage’ (see, in particular, Wolff and de-Shalit 2007).  
He is not a luck egalitarian.  But I believe it is possible to harness his view of opportunity 
to luck egalitarianism.  To demonstrate this, I draw on Wolff’s discussion of how society 
should address disability relating to cognitive and physical impairment, and explain how 
his insights can be interpreted from a luck egalitarian perspective.  Wolff understands 
disability in terms of an unacceptable lack of opportunity, which is a function of the 
triaxial conjunction of impaired mental or bodily functioning (that is, impaired internal 
resources), external resources, and the social and material structure.  He writes: 
To be disabled is to be in a position where one’s internal resources 
do not provide one with sufficient genuine opportunities for 
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secure functionings, given the social and material structure in 
which one lives […] and the external resources at one’s disposal.  
(Wolff 2009a: 113) 
Luck egalitarianism requires that people have equal – not merely sufficient – 
opportunities for advantage.  And people may have lesser or greater opportunities for 
advantage than luck egalitarianism demands.58  Thus, extending Wolff’s foregoing claim, 
we can say that to lack opportunities is to be in a position where one’s internal resources 
and other personal characteristics provide one with lesser opportunities for advantage 
(than the norm), given the social and material structure in which one lives and the 
external resources at one’s disposal.59  It is necessary to add ‘other personal 
characteristics’ here because luck egalitarianism is concerned with how opportunities for 
advantage are delineated on the basis of unchosen personal properties that are not 
                                              
58 By lesser opportunities, I mean opportunities below the normative level of equality required 
by luck egalitarianism.  By greater opportunities, I mean opportunities above that level.   
59 The emphasis can, of course, be placed on any of the three factors determining opportunities: 
to lack opportunities is to be in a position where the external resources at one’s disposal provide 
one with lesser opportunities for advantage (than the norm), given the social and material 
structure in which one lives and one’s internal resources and other personal characteristics; or, 
to lack opportunities is to be in a position where the social and material structure in which one 
lives provides one with lesser opportunities for advantage (than the norm), given one’s internal 
resources and other personal characteristics, and the external resources at one’s disposal. 
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normally understood as constituting either internal or external resources.  Most notably, 
those personal properties include characteristics such as gender, ethnicity and sexuality 
or, more precisely, those features of the body that are taxonomized into social categories 
of gender, ethnicity and sexuality.  (For the sake of economy of expression, in what 
follows I use the term ‘personal resources’ to indicate a person’s gender, ethnicity and 
sexuality, as well as their internal and external resources.)  Moreover, the luck egalitarian 
version of Wolff’s model of opportunities, as I have just expressed it, is neutral with 
regard to the currency of justice.  Internal and external resources are not coterminous 
with outcomes, as the opportunities they provide (given the social and material structure) 
might be opportunities for welfare, resources, capabilities, or some combination of these 
metrics.  Thus, given differences between people’s internal and external resources and 
other unchosen personal characteristics, the structure provides unequal opportunities 
for advantage, with advantage understood in terms of whatever currency is favoured. 
How, then, can opportunities be adjusted?  In order to equalize (currently unequal) 
opportunities, the opportunities of those with opportunities below the normative level 
of equality must be improved, while the opportunities of those above that level must be 
reduced.  Wolff’s analysis demonstrates that, given the view of opportunities as 
determined by the three factors outlined above: 
if someone is thought to be lacking in opportunities, then, in 
principle, there are at least three spheres in which we might try to 
address this: internal resources; external resources; and social 
structures.  (Wolff 2009a: 124) 
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Wolff argues that strategies to tackle disability-related disadvantage by improving the 
opportunities of disabled people can be categorized according to a fourfold typology.  
The strategies are distinguished by their target.  ‘Cash compensation’ augments a 
person’s external resources: money is provided to the individual to spend as she wishes 
(Wolff 2009b: 50-51).  ‘Targeted resource allocation’ also augments a person’s external 
resources, but takes the form of provision of non-monetary resources that must be used 
for a particular purpose (and not, for example, sold for cash).  Such resources might 
include equipment such as wheelchairs or large button telephones, carer support, or 
‘even money with strings attached about how it can be spent’ (Wolff 2009b: 51).  
‘Personal enhancement’ works to augment internal resources: ‘action is taken directly on 
the impairment, by surgery, physiotherapy or training and so on’ (Wolff 2009b: 51).  
Finally, ‘status enhancement’ makes changes to the social and material structure of 
society ‘in order to modify the structural mediating factors between impairment and 
adverse consequences’ (Wolff 2009b: 51).  Status enhancement may take various forms: 
for example, removal of discriminatory laws and implementation of laws against 
discrimination, alterations to the physical environment to improve wheelchair access, 
and promotion of social norms of equally respectful treatment.  This kind of regulatory 
action aims to alter the structure in such a way as to improve disabled people’s 
opportunities without acting directly on either internal or external resources. 
One of Wolff’s central complaints about luck egalitarianism and one of the reasons he 
rejects it as an expression of justice is that it tends to disregard the great variety of 
regulatory strategies that might be employed to promote distributive justice in favour of 
cash compensation.  He notes, ‘luck egalitarianism – at least in the forms currently on 
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offer – typically recommends a strategy which is rarely thought of as appropriate, or at 
least sufficient, for addressing disability’ (Wolff 2009a: 115).  I think Wolff is right and 
that his objection undermines the standard compensatory approach to luck egalitarian 
regulation.  But it also helps to motivate the pluralist approach to luck egalitarian 
regulatory strategies that I advocate.  There is no reason why luck egalitarians should not 
accept one of his central insights: regulation to address distributive injustice need not be 
restricted to compensating (or ‘making up for’) unjust advantage and disadvantage after 
the fact of its creation.  When that insight is harnessed to luck egalitarianism, it becomes 
clear that luck egalitarian regulation may also aim to prevent unjust advantage and 
disadvantage from arising by equalizing opportunities for advantage.  It can do this by 
targeting any of the three factors that, as Wolff demonstrates, determine opportunities.  
That is, a regulatory agency seeking to promote luck egalitarian distributive justice might 
attempt to make adjustments to a person’s internal and external resources and the social 
and material structure.60  Indeed, there is a luck egalitarian reason to endorse the very 
sorts of regulatory actions – medical treatment, changes to the built environment, and 
so on – that Wolff recommends: they work to equalize opportunities for advantage and 
thereby prevent unjust, luck-based inequalities of outcome from arising.61   
                                              
60 By ‘regulatory agency’, I mean the state or other body charged with enacting and implementing 
regulation on behalf of all members of society.   
61 On my approach (as we will see shortly) targeted resource enhancement and personal 
enhancement can both be viewed as subcategories of regulatory strategy that fall into the 
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2.2.2  An Outline of the Pluralist Approach  
Luck egalitarian regulatory action may, then, compensate for all unjust inequalities of 
outcome, or it may prevent some of those unjust inequalities of outcome that can be 
prevented (by following one or both of the two strategies to equalize opportunities – 
levelling and direct structural regulation) and then compensate for any unjust outcomes 
that are not thereby prevented.  I advocate the latter, pluralist approach.  Before drawing 
out the details of that approach, I will briefly summarize here its key features.   
The three categories of luck egalitarian regulatory strategy – redistributive compensation, 
levelling, and direct structural regulation – are exhaustive but not mutually exclusive.  
That is, all luck egalitarian regulatory actions can be categorized according to this 
typology, and single actions may fall into more than one category.  The strategy of 
redistributive compensation is already familiar.  The pluralist approach does not reject 
that strategy as unimportant or useless, but seeks to clearly delineate its features, and 
supplement it with other strategies.  As outlined at the start of section 2.1.2, the rationale 
of redistributive compensation is to redress unjust inequalities of outcome produced in 
and through the original (pre-redistribution) distribution of benefits and burdens.  It 
occurs ex post inequality creation, and the effect is to retrospectively offset – make up 
for, rectify, or remedy – unjust advantage and disadvantage consequent on either unequal 
                                              
category of levelling, while status enhancement can be viewed as a subcategory of direct 
structural regulation. 
158 
 
opportunities or outcome luck.  Redistributive compensation targets people’s overall 
levels of advantage, adjusting those overall levels by providing or exacting money until 
they are what they would have been, were it not for the inegalitarian influence of luck.62  
On the pluralist approach, if a regulatory action does not have these features, it is not an 
instance of redistributive compensation.63  The strategies to which I am most eager to 
                                              
62 Wolff’s writes of cash compensation for disability: 
A disabled person, we noted, suffers from adverse consequences of 
impairment.  Cash compensation simply provides money to “make up 
for” these adverse consequences  (Wolff 2009b: 50).   
In luck egalitarian terms, cash compensation for disability can be categorized as an instance of 
compensatory redistribution.  The general case can be expressed as follows: an unjustly 
disadvantaged person suffers from adverse consequences of luck.  Money is provided to the 
person to make up for (or, to offset) those luck-induced costs.  Conversely, an unjustly 
advantaged person reaps the benefits of luck.  Money is collected from the person to offset 
those luck-induced gains. 
63 Thus, if financial resources are provided to an individual solely for the purpose of improving 
her future opportunities and not for the purpose of retrospectively offsetting a cost they have 
previously accrued as a matter of luck, the action does not count as an instance of redistributive 
compensation but, rather, as an instance of levelling.  Of course, such financial provision may 
often serve both purposes, in which case it falls into the categories of both levelling and 
redistributive compensation.  I address these issues in more detail below. 
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draw attention, however, are levelling and direct structural regulation.  Levelling targets 
individuals’ sets of internal and external resources and acts to remove (or, at least, reduce) 
differences in the structurally determined values of those sets.  In effect, it removes (or, 
reduces) inequalities of opportunity for advantage.  Levelling occurs ex ante inequality 
creation and its rationale is to prevent unjust outcomes from arising (or, at least, to 
reduce the degree of unjust advantage and disadvantage produced by the original 
distribution of benefits and burdens).  Direct structural regulation targets social and 
material structures to alter the ways in which inequalities are produced.  Like levelling, it 
occurs ex ante inequality creation, works to equalize opportunities, and is done for the 
purpose of preventing unjust outcomes from arising.  Thus, while compensation can be 
understood as a strategy of redress in the sense that it works to redress injustice, levelling 
and direct structural regulation can be understood as strategies of prevention in the sense 
that they work to prevent it.   
To extend Wolff’s game metaphor, direct regulation changes the rules of the game, 
levelling equalizes the resources people have to play with, and compensation alters the 
prizes.  A mathematical metaphor might also be used: direct regulation changes the terms 
of the complex equation that produces inequality, levelling changes (that is, adds to or 
subtracts from) the input variables of that equation, and compensation changes (that is, 
adds to or subtracts from) the final expression or output value given by the equation.  The 
target, rationale, effect and timing of the regulatory strategies, on which they are 
distinguished, are illustrated in the table below. 
Table 2: Distinctions between the Regulatory Strategies 
160 
 
 Target Timing Rationale Effect 
Compensatory 
redistribution 
Overall levels 
of advantage 
Ex post 
inequality 
creation 
To redress 
injustice 
Offsets luck-
based 
advantage and 
disadvantage 
Levelling 
 
Personal 
resources 
 
Ex ante 
inequality 
creation 
To prevent 
injustice 
Equalizes 
opportunities 
Direct 
structural 
regulation 
Social and 
material 
structures 
Ex ante 
inequality 
creation 
To prevent 
injustice  
Equalizes 
opportunities 
 
2.2.3  Levelling 
So, unjust inequalities of outcome consequent on inequalities of opportunity can be 
prevented by equalizing opportunities (or reduced by reducing inequalities of 
opportunity).  Opportunities are a function of people’s personal resources, and social 
and material structures: those structures furnish people with unequal opportunities on 
the basis of differences in personal resources.  Were unchosen differences in personal 
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resources to be eradicated, they could no longer herald the kind of inequality of 
opportunity that produces unjust inequality of outcome.  To illustrate the basic point 
with a simplification, if society were arranged such that units of advantage were simply 
bought at a uniform (monetary) price and could not be acquired through any other 
means, and there were no differences in the financial resources at people’s disposal, all 
individuals would (holding all else equal) have equal opportunities for advantage.  Of 
course, in reality things are not so simple, but the point still holds.  If unchosen 
differences in internal and external resources – unchosen differences in cognitive and 
physical ability, wealth, and so on – were erased, inequalities of opportunity based on 
those differences would necessarily disappear.   
I should emphasize, however, that levelling does not, in fact, aim to eradicate (or reduce) 
unchosen differences in personal resources per se.  Levelling targets individuals’ personal 
resources to remove or reduce those unchosen differences among them that are 
pertinent to inequality creation.  Importantly, not all unchosen differences are pertinent.  
Levelling does not seek to make us all the same, but to make our unchosen personal 
resources the same in one particular respect: their structurally determined potential rate of 
return, or, value.  To say that the social and material structures of society provide people 
with unequal opportunities for advantage on the basis of differences in personal 
resources is to say that structures place unequal values on different sets of personal 
resources.  The value of a set of personal resources is its potential rate of return to the 
individual in terms of advantage.  If, given structures, person A’s set of personal 
resources afford her better opportunities for advantage than person B has with her set, 
we can say that person A’s set of resources is more valuable than person B’s: it has a 
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higher potential rate of return.  Levelling (unlike direct structural regulation) does not 
change the way structures impose (unequal) values on different sets of resources: it does 
not challenge the structurally determined inequality of those valuations.  Rather, it seeks 
to provide everyone with sets of personal resources that are (at least more) equally 
valuable, given the structurally determined values of sets of personal resources.  Thus, 
levelling acts on unchosen differences in people’s personal resources, which would 
otherwise have heralded inequalities of opportunity, to level the value of personal 
resources and thereby reduce the scope for the production of unjust outcomes.  
Levelling of personal resources is an ex ante regulatory strategy of luck egalitarian 
distributive justice, the rationale of which is to prevent unjust outcomes from arising by 
equalizing opportunities.  In other words, it works to improve the fairness of the 
background circumstances of future inequality creation.64   
If levelling were the only regulatory strategy of luck egalitarian distributive justice, it 
would seek to eliminate all pertinent unchosen differences in people’s sets of personal 
resources.  In other words, those sets would be valued equally – they would each have 
                                              
64 In section 4.2.2, I suggest that levelling regulatory action can target and adjust people’s internal 
and external resources, but that it is deeply infeasible to adjust personal characteristics such as 
gender, ethnicity and sexuality.  Thus, levelling aims to equalize opportunities for advantage, 
given social and material structures, by ensuring people’s unchosen personal resources (their 
internal and external resources and personal characteristics) have an equal potential rate of 
return, but does so by adjusting internal and external resources only. 
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an equal potential rate of return (except inasmuch as differences resulting from genuine 
choice are permitted).  This kind of ‘full levelling’ or, bringing about luck egalitarian 
outcomes through levelling alone, would seek to ensure that people’s unchosen personal 
resources provided them with equal opportunities for advantage, given the social and 
material structures of society.  ‘Partial levelling’ might also be implemented to adjust 
personal resources so that their structurally determined values are more equal than they 
would otherwise be.  This kind of partial levelling would only reduce (rather than fully 
remove) inequalities in the structurally determined values of unchosen personal 
resources, but it may be particularly effective in reducing particular kinds of luck-based 
inequalities.  For example, if technological advances made it possible to provide medical 
treatment to reduce differences in sight (an internal resource) such that everyone could 
see but some needed eyeglasses (an external resource) to see well, which were also freely 
provided, inequalities of opportunity for advantage based on differences in sight would 
surely all but disappear.  Some professions, of course, might still require entirely 
unimpaired vision, which might entail that some degree of inequality of opportunity for 
advantage remained between those who wore glasses and those who did not.  But there 
would nevertheless be a considerable reduction in sight-based inequalities of opportunity 
and outcome (and, therefore, in the amount of compensatory redistribution required to 
redress remaining inequalities).   
Examples of Regulatory Actions in the Levelling Category 
Having outlined the general features of the luck egalitarian regulatory strategy of 
levelling, I will now illustrate some examples of levelling regulatory actions, which luck 
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egalitarians might endorse.  Wolff’s personal enhancement policies are exemplary 
instances of regulatory action falling within the category of levelling.  Wolff writes: 
An attempt to address disadvantage in the ‘space’ of internal 
resources means, in effect, acting on the person […]  This would 
include education and training as well as medical and surgical 
intervention.  This, for obvious reasons, I call personal 
enhancement.  (Wolff 2009a: 124) 
On Wolff’s policies of personal enhancement of internal physical resources, ‘action is 
taken directly on the impairment, by surgery, physiotherapy or training and so on’ (Wolff 
2009b: 51).  Medical and surgical intervention that targets individuals’ internal resources 
to reduce or remove impairment and thereby improve opportunities constitutes a form 
of levelling.  In Wolff’s terms, impairment is measured against an instrumentally useful 
standard of ability.  Those whose internal resources do not enable them to reach that 
standard would, on a personal enhancement policy, be entitled to receive free medical 
treatment to augment their internal resources until they did so enable the normative 
standard to be met.65  In my terms, medical intervention can reduce pertinent differences 
                                              
65 Of course, medical technologies are not, at present, so advanced that personal enhancement 
can eliminate all impairment.  One implication of this is that, in cases where it is desirable but 
not technologically possible to treat certain physical impairments, there may be a reason of 
justice to research and develop the necessary medical technology. 
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in physical ability, to reduce inequalities in the structurally determined valuations of 
people’s internal resources and so equalize opportunities for advantage (or, at least, 
render opportunities more equal).   
Given its target and rationale, Wolff’s targeted resource allocation also counts as an 
instance of levelling.  On these policies: 
resources are made available to the disabled person.  These can 
take the form of equipment, support from carers or family, or 
even money with strings attached about how it can be spent.  Such 
a policy differs from cash compensation in the conditions attached 
to the grant of money or goods.  Its point is to enable the disabled 
person to find alternative means of achieving the ends that are put 
in jeopardy through impairment.  Hence the support is targeted in 
the sense that the resources are provided for a particular purpose 
and are restricted in their permitted uses.  For example, those 
provided with a wheelchair from the state would not normally be 
permitted to sell it, use it to make a go-cart for their children, or 
even to give it away  (Wolff 2009b: 51) 
Other examples of targeted resources include eyeglasses, large-buttoned telephones, 
guide dogs, hearing aids, stair lifts, mobility scooters, and prosthetic body parts.  
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Targeted resource allocation, then, aims to level inequalities in the potential rates of 
return of sets of personal resources by acting on and augmenting external resources.   
Other regulatory actions falling into the category of levelling might target internal 
cognitive resources and external financial resources at the age of majority.  As children 
before the age of majority are not capable of the sort of responsible choice that can 
justify inequality between them, differences in their personal resources are entirely 
unchosen and therefore should not, given social and material structures, afford them 
unequal opportunities.  Education systems might be radically re-hauled, to the end of 
furnishing all individuals with equally valuable internal cognitive resources – abilities, 
skills, and so on.  That is, education might be arranged to ensure (as far as possible or 
desirable) that on reaching the age of majority, everyone’s various abilities were such 
that, given the social and material structures of society, any differences in ability would 
not translate into inequalities of opportunity for advantage.66  The value of people’s 
external financial resources at the age of majority might also be equalized (or rendered 
far more equal).  Regulatory actions to achieve this might include the imposition of a 
ban on inherited and gifted personal wealth.  Additionally, a substantial, universal, 
                                              
66 For further discussion of how this kind of educational policy might work, see Roemer (1998: 
chapter 9).  As this form of regulatory action targets and aims to adjust the structure of 
educational systems (in order to level ability) and works to equalize future opportunities for 
advantage, it can be viewed as an instance of direct structural regulation, as well as an instance 
of levelling.   
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unconditional grant might be made to people at their majority.  Together, these two 
regulatory actions would do a great deal to reduce inequalities in the value of the external 
resources with which people begin adulthood.67 
2.2.4  Direct Structural Regulation 
Luck-based inequalities of opportunity are a function of how social and material 
structures treat differences in unchosen personal resources.  But luck egalitarians tend 
neither to pay those structures much sustained critical attention nor to focus their 
discussions of regulation on regulatory action to change them.  In what follows, I outline 
a category of luck egalitarian regulatory strategy that I term direct structural regulation.  
Into this category fall any regulatory actions that directly target and act on social and 
material structures for the purpose of equalizing (or reducing inequalities of) 
opportunities for advantage.  Direct structural regulation captures the idea that if 
inequalities should not track luck-based differences in personal resources, one way to 
achieve that desideratum is to arrange structures such that they do not afford people 
unequal opportunities on the basis of those luck-based differences.  It reduces or nullifies 
what the differences ‘count for’.  In other words, where levelling seeks to provide people 
with personal resources of (more) equal value, given structurally determined valuations 
                                              
67 For further discussion of a ban or 100% tax on gifts and inheritance see, in particular, Otsuka 
(2004: 70-78 and 2009: 132-144), Dworkin (2004: 352-353), Philippe Van Parijs (2009: 145-163), 
and Steiner (2009: 242-246).  For further discussion of the unconditional grant see Bruce 
Ackerman and Anne Alstott (1999) and Carole Pateman (2003). 
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of sets of resources, direct structural regulation alters the way structures determine the 
value of personal resources.  It changes those structurally determined valuations.  Thus, 
given differences in personal resources, structures can be regulated in order that the 
potential rate of return to different sets of resources is (more) equal.  To borrow Wolff’s 
terms, direct structural regulation changes the rules of the game.  By equalizing (or 
reducing inequalities of) opportunities for advantage, it prevents (at least some) unjust 
outcomes from ever arising. 
What precisely is meant by ‘social and material structures’?  Material structures refer to 
‘the configuration of the material and natural environment’ (Wolff 2009a: 123).  They 
comprise the spaces through which we navigate ourselves and make up the ‘physical 
world’ in which we live, including, among other things, ‘the design of street furniture, 
shopping centres and even domestic appliances’ (Wolff 2009b: 52, 54).  Given various 
differences in people’s physical abilities (and particularly differences in mobility and 
vision), the configuration of physical space has an important role in determining 
inequalities of opportunity.  (For example, different configurations may be more or less 
accessible to users of wheelchairs.)  Social structures refer to a vast range of phenomena 
and might be more accurately termed social, cultural, legal, and economic structures.  As 
we saw briefly in section 2.2.1, they include both formal structures such as laws and legal 
frameworks, and other structures such as customs, norms, and attitudes.  These 
correspond to what Cohen terms the ‘legally coercive structure of society’ and the non-
coercive, informal structure, which, together, produce the ‘major distributive 
consequences’ (Cohen 1997: 28, 23).  The coercive structure ‘prevents people from doing 
things by erecting insurmountable barriers […], and it deters people from doing things by 
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ensuring that certain forms of unprevented behavior carry an (appreciable risk of) 
penalty’ (Cohen 1997: 28, original emphasis).  Informal structures, on the other hand, 
order society ‘by rules and conventions of accepted practice’ (Cohen 1997: 20).  Cohen 
writes that informal structures constitute a powerful ‘socially constructed expectation 
which [can] possess informal coercive force’, thus ensuring that ‘some people have much 
more power than others to determine what happens within those [coercive] rules’ (Cohen 
1997: 22-23, original emphasis).  Informal pressure is ‘as relevant to distributive justice 
as it is to liberty’ (Cohen 1997: 22): it is part of the structure that determines an 
individual’s opportunities, given their personal resources.  Institutions that are a part of 
the social structure include, among others, the education system, the job market 
(including, for example, job recruitment and promotion rules and practices), and the 
healthcare system.   
So, regulatory action falling within the category of direct structural regulation intervenes 
in and imposes change on the social, cultural, legal, economic and material structures 
that, given differences in personal resources, determine inequalities of opportunity, to 
eliminate (or reduce) luck-based inequalities of opportunity.  Wolff’s strategy of status 
enhancement (on which regulatory action makes changes to social and material 
structures such as to improve the opportunities of disabled people and so reduce 
disability-related disadvantage) can be considered a subcategory of direct structural 
regulation.  Wolff writes of this strategy that: 
changes to social, material and cultural structure [sic] are made in 
order to modify the structural mediating factors between 
impairment and adverse consequences.  An individual’s status is 
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improved in the sense that external barriers to achievement are 
removed and so the person will have a wider range of 
opportunities.  [… It can] take a material and cultural form.  
Physical access to places can be improved, technology can be 
adapted to meet the needs of a wider range of people, and 
employers, shop-keepers and other citizens can come to treat 
disabled people in the same way as they treat others.  To the 
degree it is successful, status enhancement “cancels out” 
impairment, turning disability into “difference”.  (Wolff 2009b: 
51) 
This conception can be reformulated and extended in order to express luck egalitarian 
direct structural regulation: changes to social, material and cultural structures are made 
in order to modify the structural mediating factors between luck and adverse or 
beneficial consequences.  To the degree it is successful, direct regulation ‘cancels out’ 
luck, preventing unchosen differences in sets of personal resources from translating into 
inequalities of opportunity or outcome.  Thus, direct structural regulation targets neither 
people’s personal resources ex ante inequality creation (as levelling does), nor people’s 
outcomes ex post inequality creation (as redistributive compensation does) but, rather, 
applies directly to the structures that set the terms of the processes through which 
inequality is produced.  The rationale is to prevent or reduce unjust inequalities of 
outcome by equalizing opportunities for advantage.  As Wolff writes of status 
enhancement, it is typically ‘a collective, rather than individualized, approach, in that it 
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can improve the opportunities of many people without acting directly on any of them’ 
(Wolff 2009b: 51). 
Direct structural regulatory action may take stronger or weaker forms.  Strong ‘command 
and control’ legislation uses the force of the law to set and enforce fixed standards of 
acceptability, immediately prohibiting unacceptable structural rules or processes.  
(Examples include laws against discriminatory hiring practices and laws that require 
certain buildings to be accessible by wheelchair.)  A regulatory agency might also take 
strong direct structural regulatory action to change the material environment, by 
arranging or executing reconfigurations thereof.  (For example, a regulatory agency 
might build and supply some work premises, or undertake to build or maintain well-
ordered pavements with adequate ramps.)  Legal sanctions and incentives – ‘imposing 
negative or positive taxes or deploying subsidies from the public purse’ (Robert Baldwin, 
Martin Cave and Martin Lodge 2012: 111) – which can discourage or encourage 
particular changes to be made and sustained, may take stronger and weaker forms: lighter 
or heavier sanctions for failing to meet certain standards, and more or less generous 
incentives to meet others.  (A current example would be the differential tax on leaded 
and unleaded petrol.  A more salient potential sanction might take the form of, for 
example, fines imposed on any companies that have inadequate female representation 
on their boards.)  Other weaker direct structural regulatory actions might include the 
issuing of guidelines or other arrangements for self-regulation.  (A legal requirement to 
publish statistics on female representation at board level might constitute an example of 
a very weak form of this kind of regulation, if the requirement could be shown to 
contribute to improve opportunities for women in business, although it might be 
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insufficiently effective.)  A regulatory agency might also undertake to organize, contract 
or fund public information and awareness-raising campaigns, in an effort to change 
social norms and attitudes.  (A recent example in Britain is the government’s part funding 
of Mind and Rethink’s Time to Change public information campaign, which aimed to 
change social norms regarding mental health (Time to Change 2011).)  Norms and 
attitudes can also, of course, change in response to strong direct structural regulatory 
action, as well as in response to norm- or attitude-focused campaigns.  (For example, it 
is possible that attitudes have become more hostile to smoking since the Health Act 
(2006) introduced a smoking ban in public spaces across England and Wales.  Kudlur 
Praveen et al. (2009) researched attitudes toward smoking among mental health service 
staff, and found a ‘small but noticeable change in staff attitudes following initial reforms 
in smoking policy.  […]  Staff were generally less permissive towards smoking in mental 
health units when compared with previous studies’ (Praveen et al. 2009: 84).) 
Examples of Direct Structural Regulation Policies 
With these general features of direct structural regulation in mind, I now turn to a closer 
examination of some examples of regulatory action falling within that category.  Luck 
egalitarians might endorse direct structural regulatory action to change hiring and 
promotion processes, unjust social norms, and the built environment. 
Sexist, racist, heteronormative, cisnormative, ableist and other prejudiced norms still 
pervade society, constraining the extent to which the original distribution yields luck 
egalitarian outcomes.  Various theorists have highlighted the phenomenon of bias in the 
sphere of employment and, in particular, discrimination in selection for jobs and 
promotions.  Young (1990), for example, argues that more or less unconscious racism, 
173 
 
sexism, homophobia, ageism and ableism on the part of those making hiring and 
promotion decisions set certain groups at a disadvantage.  There is plenty of empirical 
evidence to support this insight.  For example, a 2012 report from the University and 
College Union has shown that equivalently qualified black and minority ethnic (BME) 
academics applying for top positions in British universities are less successful than their 
white peers at the interview and appointment stages: ‘White applicants are three times 
as likely to be successful in securing a professorial role as their BME colleagues’ (UCU 
2012: 12).  A 2013 report from the Equality Challenge Unit (a charity funded by grants 
from the UK higher education sector funding bodies, Universities UK and GuildHE) 
concludes that underrepresentation of BME appointees to top academic jobs may be 
explained by unconscious bias on the part of employers.  Rather than (merely) 
compensating BME (and other) academics for any disadvantage they suffer as a 
consequence of discrimination, luck egalitarians might advocate direct structural 
regulatory action that targets hiring and promotion processes directly, to reduce the 
inegalitarian influence of ethnicity (and other luck-based characteristics) on those 
processes.  For example, laws such as the Sex Discrimination Act (1975), the Race 
Relations Act (1976), the Disability Discrimination Act (1995) and the Equality Act 
(2010) have made discriminatory hiring and promotion practices illegal in the UK.  
However, existing legislation appears insufficient to prevent unconscious bias from 
having an important inegalitarian influence on individuals’ outcomes (at least where 
some discretion is afforded to decision makers).  Direct structural regulation might, then, 
go further in an attempt to tackle biased and discriminatory hiring and promotion 
practices: for example, the Equality Challenge Unit (2013) advocates anonymous 
shortlisting.  Where shortlisting is anonymous, decision makers do not have access to 
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the sort of information (on applicants’ gender, ethnicity, sexuality and so on) that could 
bias their decisions.  But, of course, unconscious bias may yet set certain people at a 
disadvantage at the interview stage.   
On the pluralist approach to regulatory strategies I defend, luck egalitarians can 
recommend direct structural regulatory action that aims to change the very social norms 
that underpin bias and discrimination.  Where social norms ensure people face unequal 
opportunities on the basis of gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and so on, there is a reason of 
luck egalitarian distributive justice to target them directly.68  Examples of regulatory 
action to tackle such social norms include mandatory equality and diversity training for 
key decision makers, and poster and email campaigns to raise awareness of the fact of 
unconscious bias and to encourage greater self-reflection on these issues.  The Equality 
Challenge Unit has also commissioned and distributed among institutions of higher 
education an academic literature review on BME underrepresentation to persuade 
academics, with empirical evidence, to recognize that current appointment processes 
produce unjustly unequal outcomes, and to re-think any biases they may have.  On my 
approach to regulatory strategies, these are all direct structural regulatory actions that 
luck egalitarians certainly could (and, all things considered, probably should) endorse.  
                                              
68 The reason is provisional in the sense that targeting social norms may be only one of a number 
of things that could be done to tackle inequalities of outcome based on gender, ethnicity, 
sexuality, and so on.  Luck egalitarianism provides a reason to tackle those inequalities and, so, 
a provision reason in favour of any regulatory action that would be effective in doing so.   
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They each target the aspects of the formal and informal structures that set the terms of 
inequality creation, to reduce inequalities of opportunity for jobs and thus reduce the 
inegalitarian influence of luck on outcomes.   
With regard to tackling luck-based inequalities of outcome consequent on inequalities of 
opportunity between disabled and able-bodied people, much regulatory action could be 
taken – and, indeed, some has been taken – to change the built environment in such a 
way as to limit the extent to which the material structure of society translates physical 
impairment into disadvantage.  For example, as Wolff suggests, physical access to places 
can be improved for those with impaired mobility.  Precisely what sorts of regulatory 
action might achieve this?  Perhaps most obviously, a regulatory agency might take 
responsibility for ensuring public spaces are accessible to those in wheelchairs: they 
might, for example, build (or contract to be built) all new public pavements in accordance 
with standards of accessibility, including specifications about the evenness and width of 
the surface, and availability of ramps between the pavement and road.  They might also 
re-build (or contract to be re-built) any public pavements or buildings that do not 
conform to accessibility specifications.  When space or material is not publicly owned, a 
regulatory agency may nonetheless impose direct structural regulation on it in the form 
of accessibility requirements.  (The costs of meeting those requirements might fall to the 
owners of the space or material, or be subsidized by the state.)  The Disability 
Discrimination Act (1995), for example, makes UK taxi licenses conditional on meeting 
accessibility regulations.  It also requires public transportation buildings to be well lit, 
with timetabling information available in consistent, clear, large print, which 
requirements have the effect of improving the opportunities of people with impaired 
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sight.  Each of these regulatory actions directly target aspects of the material structure 
that would otherwise ensure opportunities were delineated on the basis of differences in 
personal resources (namely, mobility and vision).  They aim to equalize (or reduce 
inequalities of) opportunities between disabled and able-bodied people, and to thereby 
prevent (at least some) unjust disadvantage from arising.  
2.2.5  Exhaustive But Not Mutually Exclusive 
The three categories of luck egalitarian regulatory strategy identified above are not 
mutually exclusive, in two senses.  Firstly, a single regulatory action undertaken by a 
regulatory agency may qualify as an instance of more than one type of strategy.  As 
explained above, the strategies are distinguished on the basis of their target and rationale.  
The rationale of redistributive compensation is to redress unjust advantage and 
disadvantage ex post (that is, after it has arisen).  It targets and adjusts individuals’ overall 
outcomes, to offset luck-based costs and benefits.  Levelling and direct structural 
regulation share the same rationale but have different targets.  The purpose of both of 
these strategies is to prevent (at least some) unjust advantage and disadvantage from 
arising, by equalizing (or rendering more equal) opportunities for advantage.  Levelling 
does this by targeting individuals’ sets of personal resources, adjusting these to reduce 
inequalities in their structurally determined values.  Direct structural regulation does it 
by targeting social and material structures, adjusting these to reduce inequalities in the 
valuations they make of different sets of resources.  But a single regulatory action may 
have more than one target and rationale. 
Consider the case of a policy of providing financial benefit to the unjustly disadvantaged.  
Within the luck egalitarian literature, this has standardly been understood as an instance 
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of redistributive compensation.  But it might also be understood as an instance of 
levelling.  This would be so if the policy not only aimed to adjust an individual’s overall 
outcome – that is, overall level of advantage – to redress the unjust influence of luck on 
that outcome, but also to augment the individual’s personal resources to improve their 
future opportunities for advantage.  Indeed, the pluralist approach to luck egalitarian 
regulatory strategies brings to the fore that such a policy might quite often be understood 
in those terms and endorsed on the grounds that it fulfils both of those purposes.  If a 
single regulatory action might be undertaken for two reasons, in service of two purposes, 
theoretical clarity requires that we distinguish between those two reasons, and specify 
whether the action is undertaken for one or both.  The approach I advocate both 
demands and facilitates this theoretical clarity. 
The second sense in which the three categories of regulatory strategy are not mutually 
exclusive is, I hope, already clear.  Luck egalitarians are not required to follow one 
strategy exclusively in pursuit of luck egalitarian outcomes.  In section 2.3, I suggest some 
reasons why redistributive compensation should not be understood as the sole regulatory 
strategy of luck egalitarian distributive justice, but neither should levelling or direct 
structural regulation.  All three strategies are available to use and various combinations 
of regulatory actions spanning the three categories might be implemented to bring about 
luck egalitarian outcomes.  Luck egalitarianism itself provides no reason to prefer any 
one combination over others: it simply demands that luck egalitarian outcomes 
somehow be brought about.  Thus, all combinations of regulation actions that are equally 
effective in bringing about luck egalitarian outcomes are equally favourable from the 
perspective of luck egalitarian distributive justice.  But feasibility constraints and the 
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demands of other values will inform judgement of which combination of regulatory 
actions is most desirable, all things considered.69   
To illustrate, consider the case of disability-related disadvantage.  Imagine that the 
balance of reasons tells strongly against following a purely compensatory approach to 
tackling disability-related disadvantage.  Perhaps, for example, to do so would constitute 
an unacceptable failure of respect.  But feasibility constraints and the demands of other 
values may limit the extent to which we can prevent disability-related disadvantage 
through levelling.  For example, medical technologies are, at least at present, 
insufficiently developed to remove all impairment.  Moreover, some people with physical 
impairments may not wish to receive medical treatment, in which case their liberty (or 
right) to refuse treatment may trump any other considerations.  And perhaps it is also 
the case that no configuration of social and material structures is possible that would 
offer people with impairments and people without impairments completely equal 
opportunities for advantage or that, if it is possible, it would not be desirable on the 
balance of reasons.  In that case, a luck egalitarian might advocate levelling (in the form 
of medical intervention to reduce impairment and provision of targeted external 
resources) as far as is possible and desirable in light of all relevant values, in addition to 
direct structural regulation to improve the opportunities of disabled people as far as is 
                                              
69 That said, in section 2.3.3 below, I consider the possibility that, in a specific range of cases, 
luck egalitarianism itself provides a reason to favour strategies of prevention over strategies of 
redress. 
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possible and desirable.  Then, whatever unjust disadvantage is thereby, on the balance 
of reasons, unable to be prevented might be compensated.  So the approach I advocate 
is also pluralist in two senses.  First, it insists that plural regulatory strategies are available 
to the luck egalitarian.  Second, it recognizes that luck egalitarians may themselves be 
value-pluralist.  Luck egalitarian distributive justice is one important value among others 
that must be accommodated in our social arrangements.  In choosing among the 
different ways in which we could regulate those arrangements, we will choose the 
combination of regulatory actions that best serves luck egalitarianism, while respecting 
the properly balanced demands of other values.   
Knight has claimed that if provision of compensation would either fail to improve or 
worsen an individual’s outcome, luck egalitarianism would simply not recommend its 
provision.  Knight’s claim is a response to Wolff’s critique of the compensatory approach 
to luck egalitarianism, which expresses the concern that gathering the information 
required to ascertain the correct level of compensation due to any given individual would 
require ‘shameful revelation’: it may be ‘demeaning’ for some individuals to have to admit 
that, for example, their native endowments set them at a disadvantage in the sphere of 
employment (Wolff 1998: 113-114).  Knight argues that, at least on a welfarist approach 
that accounts self-respect an important element of advantage, wherever provision of 
compensation would undermine individuals’ self-respect to the extent that, overall, they 
would be worse off than they would have been without it, it would not be provided 
(Knight 2009a: 132-133).  On the pluralist approach to regulatory strategies, it is 
unacceptable to stop there.  The unjust disadvantage remains, and perhaps unnecessarily.  
Luck egalitarians must ask: given that, on the balance of reasons, compensation is 
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undesirable, are other sorts of regulatory actions to tackle the disadvantage available and 
desirable?  Can we, instead, level the pertinent differences in personal resources or 
directly regulate (by adjusting or even completely overhauling) social and material 
structures?  I think the answer will often be yes.70   
                                              
70 Knight does not, in fact, ‘stop there’.  As a response to unemployment-related disadvantage, 
he recommends a ‘group based’ policy, on which financial benefit is provided to unemployed 
people regardless of the aetiology of their unemployment (Knight 2009a: 134).  Thus, ‘being 
unemployed’ is used by a regulatory agency as a kind of proxy for ‘being unemployed due to 
matters of luck’.  This does not, of course, account for the influence of choice on outcomes.  
But it would not require the sort of shameful revelation that may damage self-respect, and may 
also be more economically efficient than ascertaining and providing the amount of 
compensation that would be correct from the perspective of luck egalitarian distributive justice, 
given the administrative costs of implementing the latter policy.  (Knight’s position seems, once 
again, to indicate his preference for luck-neutrality over choice-sensitivity.  That is, it appears to 
rest on a judgement that the twin demands of luck egalitarianism are asymmetrical in the sense 
of being unequally weighty: the injunction to relieve responsibility for luck is weightier than the 
injunction to impose responsibility for choice.)  Knight also briefly mentions that New Deal-
style public sector jobs might be created to provide more opportunities for employment (Knight 
2009a: 134).  As this action targets and changes a part of the social structure (namely, the job 
market) in order to improve the opportunities of disadvantaged people, it falls into the category 
of direct structural regulation. 
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2.2.6  More Ideal and Less Ideal Theory 
Thus far, I have not attempted to situate my arguments anywhere on the spectrum of 
more to less ideal theory.  It might be thought, at first glance, that the pluralist approach 
is relevant only to less ideal theory that is concerned with how to tackle distributive 
injustice here and now, given background inequalities of opportunity.  Cohen writes that 
inequalities are unjust unless they reflect ‘patterns of choice against a background of 
equality of access’ (Cohen 1989: 920).  Barry also argues that, given background 
inequalities of opportunity, ‘few of the inequalities that exist today are acceptable’ (Barry 
2006: 102).  Background equality of opportunity might, then, be thought to be a given 
in all discussions of compensatory redistribution.  That is, it might simply be assumed that 
there are no background inequalities of opportunity and that compensatory 
redistribution applies only to the costs and benefits of what Vallentyne (2002) terms 
‘outcome luck’.  But, even on this assumption, it should be recognized that constant 
regulatory action would be required to ensure background equality of opportunity.  If 
opportunities are to be equal, as assumed, then the personal resources and social and 
material structures of which they are a function must be appropriately configured, which 
is to say that they must be regulated.  Even at this more ideal level of theory, then, 
levelling and direct structural regulation are required to provide the background equality 
of opportunity against which equality-upsetting choices can be made: they are necessary 
parts of the set of regulatory strategies required to achieve luck egalitarian outcomes.   
Discussion of less ideal worlds also looms large in luck egalitarian debates, and here the 
exclusion of levelling and direct structural regulation seems even more obviously myopic 
and unjustified.  Given the fact of pronounced inequalities of opportunity, luck 
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egalitarians might usefully refocus discussion on the regulatory actions required to 
equalize opportunities – that is, on regulatory actions falling into the categories of 
levelling and direct structural regulation.  Compensation is standardly taken to be the 
appropriate response not only to counteract the inegalitarian influence on outcomes of 
outcome luck happenings, but also to redress inequalities of outcome that are resultant 
on inequalities of opportunity.  (Consider once again Knight’s statement that 
‘disadvantages that arise from […] circumstance are typically said to give rise to 
entitlements for compensation, for they derive from inequalities of opportunity’ (Knight 
2006: 173).)  But compensation often seems an inadequate response to such inequalities 
of opportunity.  The pluralist approach to luck egalitarian regulatory strategies provides 
a clear and useful framework for thinking about the best way to respond.  It illuminates 
that, while unjust inequalities of outcome consequent on luck-based inequalities of 
opportunity might be offset through compensation, they might instead be avoided if 
effective levelling and direct structural regulatory strategies are available.   
Thus, in luck egalitarian theoretical discussion, when background equality of opportunity 
is assumed the (hitherto largely unacknowledged) implication must be that levelling and 
direct structural regulation are in force.  When inequalities of opportunity are assumed, 
the (hitherto largely unacknowledged) implication must be that levelling and direct 
structural regulation could (and I will argue in the next section, often should) be 
employed to equalize opportunities. 
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2.3  The Implications of the Pluralist Approach 
Thus far, I have outlined the core elements of the pluralist approach to luck egalitarian 
regulatory strategies I advocate.  In this section, I want to draw out in more detail some 
of the most important features and implications of that approach and also to suggest 
that it enables luck egalitarianism to answer a number of criticisms that have been raised 
against it.  In particular, I focus on the implications of the readiness of the approach to 
critique and to recommend changes to the way in which the original distribution of 
benefits and burdens is produced. 
The corollary of holding redistributive compensation to be the sole regulatory strategy 
of luck egalitarianism is taking a laissez-faire approach to the original distribution of 
benefits and burdens.  The problem of the unjust, luck-based advantage and 
disadvantage that is created within the original distributive system, ex ante redistribution, 
can supposedly be ‘solved’ without changing that system.  Thus, compensatory luck 
egalitarianism recognizes that the original distribution produces unjust results – unjust 
outcomes – but, rather than looking to the causes of those unjust results, it recommends 
adjusting them after the fact of their production.  On the compensatory approach, there 
is no space or reason to critique the differences in personal resources and the social and 
material structures and processes that are so crucial in determining people’s outcomes, 
ex ante redistribution.  There is no reason to consider whether and how more just 
outcomes might be produced – no reason to consider changing how benefits and 
burdens are originally distributed – because unjust outcomes can simply be tweaked 
through imposition of tax and provision of benefit until they are just (that is, luck-
neutral).  In other words, compensatory redistribution targets and adjusts unjust results 
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without attending to the causes of injustice.  In doing so, it privileges and protects from 
critique the status quo of the original distributive system.   
By contrast, the pluralist approach to the regulatory strategies of luck egalitarianism 
opens up space for critique of all elements that play a role in the production of unjust 
outcomes.  On this approach, injustice can be addressed by attending to its causes: the 
problem of unjust outcomes can be tackled at its roots through interrogation of how 
those outcomes are originally produced.  In addition to the option of compensating to 
redress unjust advantage and disadvantage, there is also the option of changing how the 
original distribution works (that is, how outcomes are produced), to lessen the extent to 
which unjust advantage and disadvantage are created in the first instance.  Instead of 
responding to inequality of outcome consequent on inequality of opportunities with 
compensation, we can respond by equalizing opportunities.  The pluralist approach to 
the regulatory strategies of luck egalitarianism is, then, a more radical approach in the 
sense that it provides a space and rationale for radical and wide-ranging critique of the 
status quo.  In what follows, I examine what I think are the most important and attractive 
features and implications of this more radical, pluralist approach.  First, employment of 
strategies of prevention may enhance the feasibility of achieving luck egalitarian 
outcomes.  Second, because these strategies target the causes of unjust outcomes, they 
enable us to prevent injustice: luck egalitarians are not committed to permitting unjust 
outcomes to arise and then redressing them.  Third, levelling and direct regulation can 
be employed to improve access to specific, important goods.  And fourth, the pluralist 
approach brings to the fore the social construction of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ luck. 
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2.3.1  The Feasibility of Neutralization 
As we saw in the introduction of this chapter, the fundamental principle of luck 
egalitarianism expresses what luck egalitarian distributive justice is: a just distribution of 
advantage is one in which individuals’ distributive outcomes are insensitive to their luck 
but sensitive to their choices.  At the level of regulation, luck egalitarianism requires the 
inegalitarian influence of luck on individuals’ outcomes to be neutralized (while that of 
choice is permitted).  Absent consideration of the demands of values other than 
distributive justice, luck egalitarians should endorse the regulatory strategy or strategies 
that enable that demand to be fulfilled as far as possible, given feasibility constraints.  
One might think, then, that in order for redistributive compensation to warrant its 
paradigmatic status – and for the neglect of the two other available regulatory strategies 
to be justified – it should at least be the case that the compensatory approach can 
neutralize luck just as well as the pluralist approach.  However, drawing support from 
Otsuka (2002), I argue here that the (heretofore paradigmatic) regulatory strategy of 
redistributive compensation cannot, on its own, accomplish the task of neutralizing luck, 
and that additional employment of the other available strategies renders the 
accomplishment of that task more feasible.  This is so not only if the currency of 
distributive justice is equal opportunity for non-commensurable preference satisfaction 
or hedonic welfare, but also if the currency is equal opportunity for resources or 
commensurable preference satisfaction.  Luck egalitarians should, therefore, embrace 
the pluralistic approach to luck egalitarian regulatory strategies. 
As Wolff writes, cash compensation: 
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is perfectionist in that it appears to assume that the only good is 
either some form of money or something that can be acquired 
through the possession of money, such as preference satisfaction  
[…] the key assumption behind the strategy of cash compensation 
as a preferred or exclusive approach is that all disadvantage can be 
made good through awards of cash.  […] one theory on which this 
is so is on a resourcist understanding of advantage, in which 
external resources are provided to make up for a lack of internal 
resources.  Another is that of subjective preference satisfaction in 
which all preferences are, in principle, commensurable  (Wolff 
2009a: 22-23) 
The thought here is that on resourcist or commensurable preference-satisfaction views 
of advantage it is always possible to provide those who experience unjust disadvantage 
with some amount of money that, in Otsuka’s (2002) terms, would make them 
indifferent between having the disadvantage and the money, and having neither the 
disadvantage nor the money.  However, I concur with Otsuka that even on resourcist or 
commensurable preference-satisfaction views, cases arise in which cash compensation 
cannot fully neutralize the inegalitarian effects of luck on outcomes (at least, if 
indifference is the test of luck-neutrality).  As Otsuka comments: 
Ailments such as blindness or insanity might be impossible fully 
to compensate because no amount of money could purchase a 
[…] supply of other things which money can buy, which in turn 
would make an individual indifferent between a situation in which 
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he or she was never afflicted by the ailment and one in which he 
or she is afflicted by the ailment but it is remedied or offset by the 
monetary award.  (Otsuka 2002: 44) 
This demonstrates that, even if resources or preferences are fully commensurable, a luck-
based deficit may nonetheless be noncompensable if the deficit is, as they say, ‘off the 
chart’ – if it constitutes a kind of infinite loss or cost for the individual.  In the cases of 
‘blindness or insanity’, then, it seems neutralization would at least sometimes be better 
served (that is, it would be more likely to be achieved) if additional strategies were 
employed.  Early, high quality psychiatric intervention would, to the extent it is effective, 
count as a form of levelling of internal resources; medical treatment to stop the onset of 
blindness or treat it where possible would, again, count as a form of levelling of internal 
resources; and direct structural regulation of social and material structures might also 
help to minimize the extent to which differences in individuals’ sight and mental health 
translate into inequalities of opportunity.  It should be noted that part of what may make 
the costs of blindness and insanity so costly to some individuals – infinitely costly, rather 
than just very costly – is the way those attributes are dealt with by society.  Levelling and 
direct structural regulation may, then, render full compensation possible in a greater 
number of cases, by reducing the degree of disadvantage that requires to be 
compensated.  If, for example, social norms and employment law were targeted by direct 
structural regulatory action, with the aim of removing or reducing the disadvantaging 
social stigma that is often attached to experiencing mental health problems and ensuring 
that workplaces are reasonably accommodating of mental health problems, the 
distributive disadvantages consequent on experiencing those problems might be much 
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reduced.  Indeed, such regulatory action might make the difference between the sort of 
infinite cost to advantage that is noncompensable and the sort of cost that could in 
theory be compensated. 
On incommensurable preference satisfaction and hedonic welfare approaches, it is even 
clearer that it may be infeasible to redress some luck-based welfare deficits through 
compensation alone.  Extra cash may be able to neutralize some of the costs of luck, but 
the utility conversion rate of cash depends on individuals’ utility functions, and utility 
functions of many human beings (that is, too many to ignore) are such that money cannot 
buy happiness.  For example, consider the case of a newly-paraplegic theatre lover.  She 
enjoys theatre so much and is so persistently disenamoured of alternative pursuits that, 
were she unable to go to the theatre, she simply could not reach the normative level of 
preference satisfaction or hedonic welfare from which departures must be chosen.  
Money would not help.  On the pluralist approach, however, it is immediately obvious 
that luck egalitarians can recommend a direct structural regulatory policy to require 
theatres to ensure their premises are accessible to people who use wheelchairs.  Luck 
egalitarians can, after all, endorse regulatory action that would enable the newly-
paraplegic theatre lover to take part in the activity that makes her happy.   
Thus, while it may at first glance seem that, on resourcist and commensurable preference 
satisfaction approaches, it is always possible for cash compensation to accomplish 
neutralization, even on these approaches there will be cases in which no amount of 
money can make up for ‘off the chart’ luck-induced deficits.  That such cases will arise 
on incommensurable preference satisfaction and hedonic welfare approaches is even 
more obvious.  Given the problem that cash compensation is not up to the job of 
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neutralizing the inegalitarian influence of luck on outcomes, the solution is to recognize 
and utilize the broader range of regulatory strategies that are available.  Wherever the 
additional employment of levelling and direct structural regulation would make luck 
neutralization more feasible, there is a pro tanto reason of luck egalitarian distributive 
justice to endorse their employment.   
2.3.2  The Prevention of Injustice 
Another implication of the pluralist approach to luck egalitarian regulation and its 
eschewal of any commitment to a laissez-faire attitude toward the original distribution 
of benefits and burdens, which I think counts in its favour, is that it enables us (at least 
sometimes) to recommend regulation to prevent injustice from arising, rather than (always) 
recommending that injustice be permitted to arise and then redressed ex post.  If, given 
differences in personal resources, distributive structures produce unjust results that 
require to be rectified, it seems unnecessarily defeatist, restrictive, and myopic to insist 
that only the results should be altered.  We can, instead (or, as well) challenge and alter 
those differences and structures of which unjust outcomes are a function.  If it is possible 
to level differences in personal resources and/or directly regulate distributive structures, 
to produce fairer outcomes (such that less injustice is created that then requires to be 
redressed), luck egalitarians should recognize that possibility.  In other words, when the 
distribution of benefits of burdens produces outcomes that luck egalitarians condemn 
as unjust, we can tackle the unjust outcomes or the causes of those unjust outcomes, and 
there is no reason to rule out tackling the causes in order that less injustice arises in the first 
instance.   
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This eschewal of the commitment to a laissez-faire attitude toward the original 
distribution enables luck egalitarianism to meet a criticism made by Mason.  Mason raises 
a complaint that is, I think, a specific case of a wider problem with compensatory luck 
egalitarianism’s inability to prevent injustice from arising by changing how inequality is 
created.  His specific complaint is that luck egalitarianism does not condemn or 
recommend banning racial or sexual discrimination.  This is because: 
discounting black applicants or women applicants in the process 
of filling a particular set of prestigious advantaged social positions 
might be fully compensated by adjusting the overall distribution 
of benefits and burdens, through some system of redistributive 
taxation.  (Mason 2006: 154) 
On a compensatory approach, the correct response to unjust disadvantage consequent 
on racial or sexual discrimination is to provide compensation.  Mason sees this as a real 
defect of luck egalitarianism, but it is clearly not an objection that can be raised against 
luck egalitarianism when it endorses the pluralist approach to regulatory strategies, which 
incorporates the possibility of directly regulating the structures and processes (including 
hiring practices) that set the terms of distribution.  Discrimination is a problem because 
it results in – it is a cause of – unjust outcomes.  On my approach, we can tackle the 
result (by compensating people who have been discriminated against for their unjust 
disadvantage), or we can avoid the result altogether by tackling its cause (by banning 
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discrimination).71  Thus, there is a luck egalitarian reason to (either compensate for or) 
ban discrimination.  The crucial point here is that luck egalitarianism, on my approach, 
is not committed to allowing discrimination and then redressing the unjust inequality of 
outcome that results from it: it can recommend banning discrimination.  The final choice 
between the strategies will be informed by the demands of other values and feasibility 
constraints.  In section 4.2 I suggest that the value of relational equality tells in favour of 
direct structural regulation rather than compensation as the best regulatory strategy to 
employ in response to discrimination.  Mason also suggests that banning discrimination 
might be more Pareto efficient than compensating for it (Mason 2006: 154).  On the 
pluralist approach to luck egalitarian regulatory strategies, these considerations can be 
accommodated.   
It is illustrative to take this point further: sexual discrimination is one facet of gendered 
inequality of opportunity in the sphere of work.  As a generalization, women have worse 
opportunities than men for highly paid jobs, resulting in unjustly unequal outcomes (see, 
for example, Wendy Olsen and Silvia Walby (2004) for evidence and analysis of the 
gender pay gap).  This inequality of opportunity may involve discrimination against 
                                              
71 For example, direct regulation of legal structures might be employed to ban (and impose 
serious negative sanctions on) discrimination against black or female applicants in the labour 
market, including during recruitment processes.  A regulatory agency might also take direct 
structural regulatory action to tackle and dislodge the racist and sexist social norms that underlie 
discrimination, which might help to ensure legal prescriptions were followed in good faith.   
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women during recruitment processes, but that is not all it involves.  Women may also 
face discrimination within education systems that encourage development of certain 
talents while discouraging development of others.  Social norms may also play a role in 
encouraging people of different genders to make different choices about their education, 
careers and domestic labour.  Further, legal rules and norms contribute to unequal 
opportunities between men and women who have children by providing far shorter 
paternity leave than maternity leave, thereby making it difficult for many couples with 
children to take an equal share of time-consuming childrearing duties.  Faced with this 
unequal legal provision, many women will take more time out from work than men, 
which in turn can damage their career prospects (Rebecca Ray et al. 2009: 1-2).  
Compensatory luck egalitarianism has no reason to be concerned about any of these 
things: the unjustly inegalitarian outcomes that follow from unequal opportunity sets can 
and should be remedied through compensation.  Conversely, on the pluralist approach, 
because all of these things are implicated in the production of unjust inequalities of 
outcome, they are prima facie potential targets of regulatory action.  Thus, luck 
egalitarianism provides a provisional reason of distributive justice to equalize 
opportunity sets by directly regulating structures in order to ensure recruitment practices, 
socialization and legal rules do not result in unjustly disadvantaged outcomes for women.  
In other words, we may prevent – not just redress – injustice: we can prevent much 
unjust advantage and disadvantage from ever arising by equalizing opportunities.  
Admittedly, we might compensate instead – that option is available – but I think as soon 
as we bring in other considerations to inform the (all things considered) choice between 
the available regulatory strategies, we will be glad to have the option of direct structural 
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regulation, and will find strong reasons from without distributive justice to favour that 
strategy over compensation.72 
2.3.3  Access to Important Goods 
A further, related implication of the pluralist approach is that it can recommend 
improving access to important goods.  A point raised by Scanlon is relevant here.  He 
notes that, in some cases, the proper response to inadequate opportunities for important 
goods is not compensation, but the provision of better access to those goods.  He cites 
three of Cohen’s expensive taste cases, for which Cohen thinks compensation is due: 
(a) a person who finds the taste of ordinary water ‘gagging’; (b) a 
person who cannot stand eggs but lives in a place where fish and 
                                              
72 An interesting point in relation to this is that, even if compensation can always perfectly 
redress the inegalitarian effects of luck on outcomes (and I have argued it cannot), a luck 
egalitarian might see the creation of injustice as itself undesirable.  That is, it might be better 
from the perspective of distributive justice, absent other considerations, to prevent injustice 
from arising than to permit it to arise and then redress it.  The correct response to unjust 
advantage and disadvantage consequent on unequal opportunities would then be to equalize 
opportunities, rather than adjusting the unjust outcomes through compensation.  If that point 
is accepted, it introduces a lexical ordering to the three strategies.  All else equal, and absent 
other considerations, levelling and direct regulation are (equally) preferable to compensation: 
compensation should be provided to redress only those injustices it is not possible to prevent 
entirely. 
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eggs are the only available nutrients and fish is much more 
expensive; and (c) a person who cannot perform ordinary physical 
movements without pain.  In each case, Cohen believes that 
equality requires that people be ‘compensated’ for these special 
difficulties.  It seems to me that special treatment may be called 
for in some of these cases.  […]  The people in these examples do 
not have unusual tastes.  They want the same things that everyone 
wants: nourishment, hydration, and the ability to move freely.  The 
normative force of the examples derives from the objective 
importance of these interests, rather than from the value of 
satisfying special tastes or preferences.  The problem these people 
have is that they cannot pursue these quite ordinary aims without 
pain, or gagging, or feelings of disgust.  What they need is help in 
overcoming these obstacles.  This help might be provided by 
giving them water or food that they like better, or money to buy 
it.  But it could just as well be given by providing access to medical 
treatment.  ‘Compensation’ is therefore a somewhat misleading 
term for what is required, since the point is to enable the people to have 
these essential things without difficulty, not simply to raise their level of welfare 
(understood hedonistically or in terms of preference satisfaction).  
Understood in this way, these cases are analogous to those of 
individuals who live far from the available supply of drinkable 
water, or who cannot get it themselves because of chronic 
weakness.  What these people are entitled to is transportation, or 
195 
 
special water supplies, not compensation.  (Scanlon 2006: 79, my 
emphasis) 
Scanlon’s criticism raises a number of important points.  The first is that luck 
egalitarianism is far more appealing when it is open to ensuring fair access to important 
goods: it should not restrict its regulatory demands to compensation for disadvantage 
consequent on inadequate access.  Provision of medical treatment and transportation to 
improve the opportunities of those who are currently disadvantaged are options that are 
available to the luck egalitarian to recommend and should not be ruled out or ignored.  
When regulatory action can be implemented to improve access to important goods 
(rather than to compensate for any disadvantage consequent on lack of access), the 
balance of reasons may tell in favour of such action.73  Now, Cohen might respond by 
claiming that water or food or medical treatment could all be conceived as non-financial 
forms of compensation.  I would agree, but I think that response can only go so far.   
A second point, which I have already noted above, is that theoretical clarity is much 
improved when we distinguish between the different targets and rationales of regulatory 
action.  Compensation does not tell the whole story of regulation to provide medical 
                                              
73 Consider again the case of discrimination on the basis of gender in job recruitment: if women 
have consistently lower access to highly paid jobs due to gender discrimination in recruitment 
processes, compensation does nothing to improve their access to those important goods.  But 
luck egalitarianism can recommend direct structural regulation to ban discrimination and this 
would help to improve access to those goods. 
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treatment and transportation.  Medical treatment, whether or not it is an instance of 
compensation, is certainly an instance of levelling.  Its target is the individual’s internal 
resources and its rationale is, at least in part, forward-looking because it aims to ensure 
better access to advantage in future.  Building a better transportation system is a form of 
direct regulation of material and social structures: it acts, not on the individual’s resources 
or overall outcome but, rather, directly on the configured environment to improve the 
opportunities of those who would otherwise have borne unjust (though compensated) 
costs.  Again, the rationale is to provide better access (to water) in future.  The pluralist 
approach both demands and facilitates clarity on these different facets of regulatory 
action.  Further, what I think Scanlon is alluding to, when he claims compensation is a 
misleading term, is that it gives or risks giving the impression that what is being referred 
to is compensation in the narrow sense.  Certainly, using the term without making it 
explicit that, in the present case, it is being used in the broad sense as a placeholder to 
indicate some unspecified form of regulatory action may be misleading, especially given 
that so much luck egalitarian discussion uses the term in the specific, narrow sense.   
But a third point, which is at least implied by Scanlon’s remarks, is that there may be 
reasons intrinsic to distributive justice itself to favour equalizing access to important 
goods.  The currency debates that have dominated political philosophy for the last few 
decades are useful and important.  Distributive justice needs a currency, a focus, to know 
what it is about people’s lives that makes them go well and, thus, what they should have 
equal opportunities to accrue.  But, the focus on overall, macro-outcomes should not 
cause egalitarians to lose sight of the disaggregated goods about which people care and which 
are – on any currency – crucial to how well they do.  There are some goods possession 
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of which constitutes or has an irreducible effect on a significant part of a person’s 
outcome.  That is, these goods have a significant weight in the measurement of overall 
levels of advantage, whatever metric is employed.  They include, for example, jobs, 
university places, places on specialist vocational training programmes, and internships.  
It may be that luck egalitarianism itself provides reasons to favour equalizing access to 
these weighty goods over compensating for disadvantage consequent on luck-based 
inequalities of access, and that the weightier the good, the weightier the reason of luck 
egalitarian distributive justice to ensure that access to that good is not unequally 
influenced by luck.  It may be that, as Scanlon notes, these goods are objectively 
important and so hold a special place in distributive justice.  In the context of luck 
egalitarian distributive justice, this would amount to a claim that luck egalitarianism 
provides a (defeasible) reason to allocate these special goods in accordance with luck 
egalitarian principles.  In other words, it rejects what Roemer terms the ‘anonymity of 
goods maxim’, according to which ‘Once the type of outcome that is our concern 
[resources, welfare, or advantage] is named, then the names of resources that generate it 
should not count further’ (Roemer 1996: 165).  Such a position might draw some support 
from Mason, who, as we saw in section 1.2.1, focuses on the allocation of important 
goods (including, for example, jobs and leisure), treating their allocation as a question of 
distributive justice.   
But there may be another, more characteristically luck egalitarian reason to treat 
important and weighty goods as special to distributive justice.  A central motivation of 
the luck egalitarian project is the idea that people should choose how well their lives go 
(with ‘well’ understood in terms of their level of advantage).  This can be understood in 
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terms of a commitment to a certain kind of self-determination: people should determine 
for themselves how well their lives go.  But people very often do not, in shaping their 
life plans, aim only to reach a particular level of advantage.  They have ideas about what 
it is they want to do, which is to say they have ideas about how they want to accrue 
advantage, or, about how they want their lives to go.  People often aim to get a particular 
job, to get a place at university, or to undertake specific training or internship work in a 
particular sector.  Luck egalitarianism might also, then, be concerned with people’s ability 
to be self-determining in this latter sense.  For example, we can recognize that people do 
not tend to aspire merely to, say, a particular level of income, but also to earn an income 
from particular sorts of work or work within particular sectors.  Jobs are a weighty good 
in the sense that they have a significant influence on current outcomes, and they are also 
significant in the sense that they tend to form an integral part of people’s qualitative life 
plans.  The luck egalitarian concern with self-determination might, then, motivate a 
position according to which access to goods (such as jobs) that have a weighty influence 
on outcomes and which form an integral part of people’s qualitative life plans should 
not be influenced by luck.  The weightier the good, the weightier the reason of luck 
egalitarian distributive justice to ensure that access to that good is not unequally 
influenced by luck.  This is because, when people are excluded from access to such goods 
on the basis of luck, their self-determination (in the sense of choosing how their lives go) 
is compromised.  If a theory of distributive justice cannot object to individuals and 
particular groups of people (women, minorities, and so on) having consistently worse 
access to these important things as a matter of luck, instead recommending that they be 
adequately paid off, then it is missing something important.  But that is precisely what 
the compensatory approach entails.  It is a bean-counting kind of approach to regulation 
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and is unappealing because its response to inequalities of access to weighty goods that 
form important parts of people’s life plans is not to equalize them, but to compensate 
the unjust outcomes they herald.  If this point has force, there is a reason of luck 
egalitarian distributive justice to favour regulation to equalize access to important goods 
over compensating for disadvantage consequent on lack of access.  (If it does not, then 
it is still a virtue of the pluralist approach to luck egalitarian regulatory strategies that it 
insists the option of equalizing access to goods should be considered alongside the 
option of providing compensation.) 
2.3.4  The Social Construction of ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Luck 
The final feature of the pluralist approach to which I wish to draw attention is that, 
because it requires consideration of how unjust inequalities are produced to inform the 
design of regulation to abrogate those inequalities, it brings to the fore the social 
construction of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ luck.  This has two important implications.  First, it 
enables luck egalitarians to emphasize that many aspects of people’s circumstances – 
things that are beyond the individual’s control and thus count as matters of luck – are 
not inherently or essentially good or bad.  Second, it enables us to emphasize that 
inequalities are by social design: they are not beyond all control.  What luck egalitarians 
term ‘luck-based inequality’ is not simply or wholly serendipitous.  In what follows, I 
draw out these two implications. 
I follow Lesley Jacobs (2004) in understanding all inequalities as necessarily social and 
not natural.  I acknowledge that there is ‘incredible natural diversity among persons’ 
(Jacobs (2004: 52).  But that natural diversity (for example, in potential for intellectual or 
physical prowess) amounts only to difference.  Of course, as I outlined above, natural 
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differences are treated differently by social and material structures: those structures 
afford better and worse opportunities to people on the basis of the natural differences 
between them, and natural difference thereby translates into inequality of opportunity as 
a result of how structures treat it.  But natural differences as such do not constitute 
inequalities in any way that matters to distributive justice: they are factors that play into 
the determination of inequalities of opportunity and outcome.  In short, natural 
inequality is ‘a myth’ (Jacobs 2004: 53).  As Jacobs writes: 
All inequalities must be mediated by social institutions and 
practices; all inequalities are thus […] by social design, and do not 
originate in nature.  (Jacobs 2004: 54) 
For distributive justice, then, that which is a matter of luck for the individual, including 
native endowment, is only ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in light of the better or worse opportunities 
that are afforded to the individual by social and material structures, on the basis of their 
luck.  This means that luck egalitarians have no need ever to use the phrases ‘good luck’ 
and ‘bad luck’ and, further, it entails that those phrases in fact misrepresent what is going 
on – what it is that is really good or bad.  They imply that it is the matter of luck in itself 
that is the proper object of evaluation, and in doing so imply that some forms of luck 
(say, some natural attributes) are inherently or essentially good or bad, when it is actually the 
distributive consequences of luck (which are determined by changeable structures and thus 
non-essential) that are positive or negative.   
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Consider the cases of disability and gender.  Disability is consistently referred to as a 
form of bad luck by Dworkin.74  But this unnecessarily and unhelpfully essentializes being 
disabled as a ‘bad’ thing.  On my view, physical impairment is (only) a form of luck.  
Given social and material structures, it tends to have a negative influence on 
opportunities and outcomes.  What is ‘bad’ (from the perspective of distributive justice) 
is, then, not the luck – the fact of physical impairment – but its unjust negative 
distributive consequences.  And there may be ways to significantly reduce the negative 
distributive consequences of physical impairment by directly regulating social and 
material structures to reduce inequalities of opportunity for advantage between disabled 
and able-bodied people.  This nuance is lost – or, at least, fades from the foreground – 
when disability is labelled ‘bad luck’.  As Peter Handley writes, on Dworkin’s approach 
to disability-related disadvantage, ‘wider structural and attitudinal factors that relate to 
disability remain unquestioned’ (Handley 2003: 111).  The same argument applies to 
gender (and, indeed, ethnicity and sexuality).  With regard to gender, Dworkin could 
consistently call being a woman ‘bad luck’.  I would reply that it is a matter of luck for 
women that they are women.  But, I maintain, it is a matter of social design that being a 
woman in a patriarchal society is disadvantageous, relative to being a man.  It might be 
                                              
74 See, for example, Dworkin’s statement that he accepts ‘the commonsense view that handicaps 
of various kinds are a misfortune’ (Dworkin 2000: 347).  (In this particular instance, Dworkin 
uses the term ‘handicaps’ to indicate what I have been calling ‘cognitive and physical 
impairments’, though he uses it in a broader sense elsewhere (see, for example, Dworkin 1981: 
302-303).) 
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possible to arrange social and material structures so that different gender identities 
yielded no inequalities of opportunity for advantage.  To label being a woman ‘bad luck’ 
would be to misrepresent the locus of the badness, and essentialize being a woman as a 
bad thing.  It manifests an evaluative judgement of the wrong object, which is to say that 
it gets the object of evaluation wrong.  It is not the luck – the being a woman – that is 
bad, but only its negative distributive consequences, which are determined by social and 
material structures.  On my approach to luck egalitarian distributive justice, then, ‘good 
luck’ and ‘bad luck’ are misrepresentative and misleading terms for ‘luck that, given social 
and material structures, has positive or negative distributive consequences’.   
But, of course, social and material structures are not simply given.  What luck egalitarians 
call ‘luck-based inequality’ is not wholly serendipitous: it not beyond all control but is, 
instead, in part a function of how we collectively arrange our society.75  The relevant point 
is that we could collectively decide to arrange things differently – to arrange structures 
in such a way that they offer everyone equal (or, at least, more equal) opportunities.  My 
approach brings that to the fore: in service of luck egalitarian ends, we can either 
compensate unjust inequalities, or level differences in personal resources, or directly 
regulate social and material structures.  The structural status quo is, therefore, always up 
for examination and changing it through direct regulation may, all things considered, 
quite often be the most desirable luck egalitarian regulatory strategy to follow.  To be 
                                              
75 I assume here a democratic society, although I do not claim that we all have an equal say or deny 
that some people have more power to influence our arrangements than others. 
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clear, I do not mean to imply that disadvantage can always be effectively addressed by 
changing only social and material structures.  Rather, I want to emphasize, first, that we 
should always consider whether it can and, second, that we will often find it can.  
Furthermore, even if it is the case that disadvantage cannot be fully addressed through 
structural change, we must still recognize that it is the conjunction of personal resources 
and structures that produces disadvantage.  On my approach, then, even if it is not deeply 
or sociologically feasible to fully address, say, disability-related disadvantage by 
implementing direct structural regulatory action, it should still be clear that the 
disadvantage is a function of impairment on the one hand and social and material 
structures on the other, and not impairment alone.  And it should also be clear that what 
luck egalitarians must object to – what is ‘bad’ from the luck egalitarian perspective – is 
not the impairment, but the disadvantage.   
In her critique of the distributive paradigm, Young writes that ‘it tends to ignore, at the 
same time as it often presupposes, the institutional context that determines material 
distributions’ (Young 1990: 18).  This is certainly an accurate characterization of 
compensatory luck egalitarianism.  Young criticizes theorists of luck egalitarian 
distributive justice for failing to highlight that inequalities are (in Jacobs’ terms) by social 
design.  She observes: 
A large set of the causes of an unequal distribution of resources 
or unequal opportunities between individuals […] is attributable 
neither to individual preferences and choices nor to luck or 
accident.  Instead, the causes of many inequalities of resources or 
opportunities among individuals lie in social institutions, their 
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rules and relations, and the decisions others make within them that 
affect the lives of the individuals compared.  (Young 2001: 8) 
Anne Phillips makes the same point.  She claims that, on the standard luck egalitarian 
view: 
The cause of the bad luck becomes incidental.  It no longer 
matters much whether it arose from genetic disorder, from racism 
or sexism, or the rules governing the inheritance of money; and 
since the cause of the bad luck is no longer the issue, there is less 
interest in identifying which ones are open to structural change.  
(Phillips 2004: 17) 
This is a crucial point and one that my approach to luck egalitarianism fully embraces.  
Institutions form part of the social and material structures that determine opportunities.  
They are not given and they are not a function of either individual choice or luck: they 
are, at least in a democratic society, a matter of collective choice.  They can be changed 
through direct structural regulation.  My approach is, therefore, not subject to the 
criticism Young and Phillips advance.  It neither ignores nor presupposes institutions 
that determine opportunities but, instead, both scrutinizes their role in the determination 
of inequalities and insists they are potential targets of direct structural regulation.76  
                                              
76 Admittedly, as my approach is concerned with institutions and other structures only as they 
affect distributive justice, it might seem at first glance to fall within the distributive paradigm.  
However, Young notes that ‘What marks the distributive paradigm is a tendency to conceive 
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Because luck egalitarians focus so closely on luck, we must be especially careful to avoid 
implying that luck-based inequalities – or, to be precise, inequalities that are a function 
of how socially designed social and material structures treat attributes that are a matter of 
luck for the individual – are wholly serendipitous.   
In sum, the pluralist approach I advocate brings a number of benefits.  It may render 
achievement of luck egalitarian outcomes more feasible than it would be through 
compensation alone.  It invites and, indeed, requires interrogation of the causes of unjust 
outcomes and allows for regulatory action to tackle injustice at its roots.  Luck 
egalitarians need not be committed to permitting unjust outcomes to arise and then 
redressing them after the fact of their creation.  It also leaves space to argue for more 
equal access to important and weighty goods.  And it brings to the fore the social 
construction of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ luck.  It emphasizes that essentialist evaluative 
judgements of people’s attributes can and should be avoided by theorists of distributive 
justice: it is not luck itself that is good or bad, but the unjust distributive consequences 
of luck – consequences that are a function of luck and socially designed structures – that 
should be characterized as beneficial or costly.  
                                              
social justice and distribution as coextensive concepts’ (Young 1990: 16).  I hold that value-
pluralist luck egalitarians may endorse a conception of justice that is inclusive of but not 
exhausted by distributive justice.  In section 2.3.5, I propose that the value of relational equality 
is also a concern of justice. 
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2.3.5  Distributive and Relational Equality 
In what follows, I want to demonstrate how the pluralist approach to luck egalitarian 
regulatory strategies can help to frame discussion of alternative regulatory responses to 
distributive injustice.  When considering how to tackle unjust advantage and 
disadvantage, the pluralist approach encourages us to consider whether levelling or direct 
structural regulatory action might prevent it.  If a range of alternative regulatory actions 
might be implemented – that is, if in addition to redistributive compensation, there are 
options to implement levelling or direct structural regulation – then a decision between 
them must be made.  The decision of which regulatory actions to implement should be 
based on an all things considered judgement about which from among the feasible set 
are most desirable.  Luck egalitarian distributive justice is but one important value among 
others that must be accommodated in the design of our social arrangements.  From 
among the wide range of policies that might potentially be implemented in service of 
luck egalitarian ends, the policies we actually choose to implement should be maximally 
compatible with the properly balanced demands of all relevant values.  It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to provide an all things considered judgement regarding which 
regulatory actions it is both feasible and maximally desirable to implement.  To 
accomplish such a task would require not only detailed factual information concerning 
the deep and sociological feasibility of the relevant regulatory actions: information on 
our present technological capabilities, on how popular and thus ‘votable’ the policies are, 
and so on.  It would also require a determination of the demands of all relevant values 
and of how those demands should be balanced against each other, as well as a 
comprehensive analysis of how well each possible set of regulatory actions would meet 
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the properly balanced demands of all relevant values.  However, the issues of how 
different values should be weighted and which should take priority in cases of value 
conflict are still very much a matter of philosophical debate.77  I do not seek to resolve 
that debate here but, rather, to consider how two policies that I think would do much to 
reduce unjust, luck-based inequality fare in light of just one other value.  I consider 
whether the value of relational equality tells in favour of or against two luck egalitarian 
regulatory actions.  The first action – provision of medical treatment for physical 
impairment – falls into the category of levelling.  The second action – reform of social 
norms concerning appearance, ‘ugliness’ and ‘beauty’ – falls into the category of direct 
structural regulation.   
I assume, then, that relational equality is one of the values that it is important to respect 
in our social arrangements.  Before proceeding with the analysis, it will be useful to 
briefly outline what the value of relational equality consists in.  Where distributive 
equality is a property of the distribution of burdens and benefits in society, relational 
equality is a property of social relations.  In its most general expression, it requires that 
people view and treat each other as equals.  Wolff characterizes the distinction between 
distributive and relational equality as follows: 
it has become common in recent discussions of equality to 
distinguish between a distributive ideal of equality, in which 
                                              
77 See, for example, Steiner (1994: chapter 4). 
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equality requires the equal provision of some good to all, and an 
ideal of social equality in which equality concerns the relations in 
which people stand to each other.  (Wolff 2009a: 121-122) 
He goes on to explain that theorists of relational equality have not tended to provide a 
positive specification of the value, instead defining it in terms of what it is not: 
Limited progress, however, has been made in understanding the 
latter idea […].  Most often the idea of social equality is expressed 
negatively: an opposition to snobbery and servility; and opposition 
to hierarchy and patterns of deference.  […]  In the current 
context the most important aspect of social equality is that if 
people are not accepted in their differences from each other they 
will be excluded or marginalized.  […] a society of equals is one 
that accepts people in their differences’ (Wolff 2009a: 122-123) 
For present purposes, then, we can think of relational equality as the value of accepting 
people in their differences and respecting them as equals.78  Crucially, while theorists of 
relational equality often present their views in opposition to luck egalitarianism, as 
Arneson (2013) writes, ‘these disparate equality ideals need not be opposed’.  My view is 
that relational and distributive equality are not rival interpretations of the value of 
                                              
78 For further discussion of the value of relational equality see, for example, Scheffler (2010) and 
Schemmel (2011). 
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egalitarian justice but, rather, both follow from what Christian Schemmel terms ‘the 
abstract moral equality of humans, according to which all humans, qua humans, enjoy a 
basic equality of moral standing’ (2011: 370).  Both matter, and not just for their 
implications for the other.  Relational equality matters in itself: given our basic equality 
of moral standing, it is morally desirable that we view and treat each other as equals.  
Relational inequalities are not only unjust if and because they undermine distributive 
equality.  (Thus, contra Barry (2006), I do not think oppression is only objectionable 
because of the luck-based distributive inequality it entails, but also because it is an 
inegalitarian and unjust form of social relation.)  Distributive equality matters in itself: 
given our basic equality of moral standing, it is morally desirable that no one is worse off 
than anyone else through no choice of her own, regardless of whether we view and treat 
each other as equals.  (Thus, contra Schemmel (2011), I do not think distributive 
inequality is only unjust if and because it harms relational equality.) 
Why focus on relational equality?  First, this thesis is a work of egalitarian political 
philosophy, and so to start with another egalitarian value – that is, a non-distributive 
egalitarian value – seems logical.  Second, luck egalitarianism has sometimes been 
accused of failing to recognize the importance of relational equality and I wish to 
demonstrate that this failure is not inherent to the luck egalitarian position.  Wolff 
expresses the criticism as follows: 
The failure of luck egalitarianism has been attributed to its 
excessive concentration [on] the idea of fairness between 
individuals, to the exclusion of the idea of creating relations of 
equality between people.  However it is important not to make the 
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opposite mistake of imagining that all that matters is social 
relations.  Rather equality is surely a matter both of distribution 
and social relations  (Wolff 2009a: 116) 
It is true that luck egalitarian approaches that view regulation as coextensive with 
redistributive compensation do not accommodate the idea of creating equal relations.  
First, luck egalitarians may reject that relational equality is a value that is worth pursuing 
in its own right.  Second, even if it is viewed as an important value, if the luck egalitarian 
regulatory strategy – compensatory redistribution – is fixed in advance of any 
consideration of the demands of relational equality, in a range of cases those demands 
will seem to simply tell against implementing luck egalitarian regulatory action.  (As we 
saw above, if provision of compensation that would accurately neutralize the 
inegalitarian effects of luck on individuals’ outcomes requires people to engage in 
shameful revelation, which undermines self-respect and is therefore offensive to 
relational equality, that tells against the policy.)  But once the range of luck egalitarian 
regulatory strategies is opened up, it becomes clear that alternative (non-compensatory) 
regulatory actions may be permissible in light of the demands of relational equality and 
some may even serve that value.  Thus, a concern with creating a society of equals is 
relevant to and will inform the choice between the different luck egalitarian regulatory 
strategies that might be employed.  When a policy of compensation is unacceptably 
offensive to relational equality, policies falling into the categories of levelling and direct 
structural regulation may be more appealing on broad egalitarian grounds (that is, on 
distributive egalitarian and relational egalitarian grounds).  Indeed, the ends of 
distributive and relational equality may often be available through the same means, that 
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is, the same regulatory action.  The scope for those two ideals of equality to work in 
tandem is, then, considerable: there is nothing in my version of luck egalitarianism that 
necessarily ‘excludes’ the idea of relational equality.  In what follows, I consider whether 
levelling regulatory action that targets physical impairment and direct structural 
regulatory action that targets social norms concerning appearance are compatible with – 
whether they serve or undermine – the value of relational equality.   
2.3.5.1  Medical Treatment of Physical Impairment 
The first policy I want to consider in relation to relational equality is one on which 
medical treatment is provided to remove (or reduce) physical impairment.79  This is an 
instance of levelling, which acts on a person’s personal internal resources (namely, their 
physiology), to increase their value or potential rate of return, given social and material 
structures.  By removing impairment, medical treatment can improve the opportunities 
of people who were previously disabled.  Whether relational equality tells in favour of 
this policy or is, in fact, undermined by it is not a straightforward matter.   
Many proponents of the social model of disability – including many disability rights 
activists and campaigners in the UK – insist that there is nothing inherently 
disadvantageous or undesirable about physical impairment and that we should not seek 
to eradicate it: the onus is on society to accommodate it.  On this view, a sharp distinction 
                                              
79 Wolff, as we saw above, terms this ‘personal enhancement’. 
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is drawn between impairment and disability.  An early statement of the social model of 
disability states that: 
it is society which disables physically impaired people.  Disability 
is something imposed on top of our impairments, by the way we 
are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in 
society.  (UPIAS 1976: 3, my emphasis)80 
This implies that provision of medical treatment is the wrong response to disability.  As 
Tom Shakespeare writes: 
                                              
80 This quotation comes from a report entitled Fundamental Principles of Disability, released by The 
Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation and The Disability Alliance.  The report 
continues: 
it is necessary to grasp the distinction between the physical impairment 
and the social situation, called ‘disability’, of people with such 
impairment.  Thus we define impairment as lacking all or part of a limb, 
or having a defective limb, organism or mechanism of the body and 
disability as the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a 
contemporary social organisation which takes little or no account of 
people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them from 
participation in the mainstream of social activities.  (UPIAS 1976: 14) 
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If disability is about social arrangements, not physical or mental 
impairments, then attempts to mitigate or cure medical problems 
will be regarded with intense suspicion.  They will appear 
irrelevant or misguided responses to the true problem of disability, 
and distractions from the work of barrier removal and civil rights.  
(Shakespeare 2006: 31) 
Thus, a central reason why relational equality may tell against provision of medical 
treatment to remove impairment is that the policy may fail to respect people in their 
differences, incorrectly locating the ‘problem’ in people’s bodies and minds, rather than 
in our social arrangements.  As Wolff notes, provision of medical treatment: 
appears essentialist, or, at least, perfectionist.  It pre-supposes that 
there is a particular way in which people ought to be.  Of course 
it can be replied that at least some forms of personal enhancement 
are enabling in that they will allow people to pursue many new 
goals, and in that way are antiperfectionist.  However this should 
not be allowed to obscure the point that very often forms of 
personal enhancement are proposed as ways of bringing people 
closer to some form of idealised stereotype, if only that of ‘normal 
species functioning’.  (Wolff 2009a: 128) 
It might be thought that all standards of physical normality are offensive to relational 
equality, because to deem those do not reach it ‘abnormal’ – even ‘subnormal’ – is to fail 
to respect those people in their differences, to marginalize and to stigmatize them.  Even 
the term ‘physical impairment’, which is fully endorsed by most proponents of the social 
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model of disability, seems to imply a normative standard of unimpaired functioning.  
Shakespeare notes that during the 1970s, when some deaf people began organizing as a 
social movement, they sought to challenge the notion of deafness as hearing impairment, 
instead defining themselves as a ‘linguistic minority, using the model of ethnicity’ 
(Shakespeare 2006: 69).  Petra Rose and Gary Kiger explain: 
The transformation involved deaf persons: (a) identifying 
themselves as members of a community sharing common values 
and traits (e.g. sign language) and (b) evaluating the group and its 
values and traits in a positive light.  (Rose and Kiger 1995: 522) 
Perhaps, then, relational equality always tells against a policy of providing medical 
treatment to remove impairment.  Perhaps that value (considered in isolation from 
others) suggests direct structural regulation is always a preferable strategy to employ in 
response to disability because, as Wolff has it, ‘changing the world can be better than 
changing the person; it sends a message of acceptance of people as they are’ (Wolff 
2009b: 56).   
On the other hand, it may be that provision of medical treatment need not always be so 
offensive to relational equality.  (Of course, medical treatment should always be offered 
and never imposed: coercion of individuals into medical treatment would immediately 
constitute a gross failure to respect the person and the integrity of their bodies, not to 
mention a breach of their liberty (or right) to refuse medical treatment.)  It does not 
seem clear to me that the offer of medical treatment will always conflict with the 
demands of relational equality, particularly if direct structural regulation is applied 
extensively to social and material structures such as to reduce, as far as is justifiable on 
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the balance of considerations, inequalities of opportunity and disadvantage consequent 
on impairment.  If some disability yet remains, a regulatory agency offering medical 
treatment might make clear that it understands and endorses the view that there is 
nothing inherently ‘wrong’ with having an impairment and that disability is a function of 
how society treats impairment.  It might emphasize that it has taken all justifiable steps 
to equalize opportunities – that is, to remove disability through social and material 
reform – but that, unfortunately, it is unable to entirely eradicate the disadvantages faced 
by some people with impairments.  It might then state a concern, in light of this 
regrettable but unavoidable failure, that the remaining disabilities be somehow 
addressed, lest people with physical impairments be left worse off than they need be, 
and offer medical treatment (or, indeed, compensation) to any who desire it.  In cases 
where a disability cannot be fully removed through direct structural regulation, it seems 
less disrespectful than in cases where a disability can be removed in this way to 
demonstrate a concern to address the disadvantage by targeting impairment.  In other 
words, where society can be arranged in such a way as to accommodate impairment and 
prevent it from being translated into disability, relational equality provides a reason for 
it to be so arranged and against medical treatment.  Here, the demands of relational and 
distributive equality are compatible.  But where society cannot accommodate 
impairment, the reason relational equality provides against medical treatment seems less 
decisive.  The social model of disability assumes that exclusion from full participation in 
society is avoidable and unnecessary: it occurs only because society fails to respect people 
with impairments and therefore takes little or no account of them in the design of social 
arrangements.  But it seems to me that reform of social and material structures may not 
be sufficient to remove all disability.  If so (and given extensive direct structural 
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regulation), it is not a failure of respect that unnecessarily causes exclusion, but a failure 
of current sociotechnological capability that determines it.  As Wolff observes, some 
impairment ‘is very tightly connected to an adverse consequence – those who are blind 
cannot achieve the enjoyments of visual experience’ (Wolff 2009b: 53-54).  Treatment 
to enhance vision can enable people to pursue new goals and develop new interests and 
so, in that way, can promote self-determination and perhaps also self-respect, at least 
among those who accept treatment.  Thus, Wolff, even given his strong commitment to 
the value of relational equality, endorses its provision on the balance of considerations. 
That said, I confess I still share the concern of many disability rights activists and 
campaigners that such policies run the risk of exceptionalizing those who cannot or do 
not wish to receive treatment.  If provision of particular medical treatments is offensive 
to relational equality, for the reasons canvassed above, that does tell against their 
provision.  But such provision may also be extremely effective in promoting distributive 
equality.  Ultimately, in the selection of real world regulatory actions, these conflicting 
considerations must be balanced against each other: the cost to relational equality 
entailed by a policy of providing medical treatment of impairment may be acceptable in 
light of the benefit the policy brings to distributive equality. 
2.3.5.2  Reform of Social Norms Regarding Appearance 
One of the most significant features of the pluralist approach to luck egalitarian 
regulatory strategies, I have argued, is that it provides a provisional reason to endorse 
regulatory action to change social norms when they function to set individuals at an 
unfair disadvantage.  This is a crucial point of differentiation between that approach and 
compensatory luck egalitarianism.  The latter has been criticized by a number of 
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theorists, including Anderson (1999), Mason (2006) and Wolff (2009a), for failing to 
provide such a reason, and for accepting unjust norms as long as their distributive 
consequences are offset through compensation.  Such action may also have an additional 
point in its favour: it may sometimes serve the value of relational equality, too.  This 
certainly seems the case with regard to action to tackle social norms regarding 
appearance.  To illustrate this point, consider Anderson’s objection to luck egalitarianism 
on the grounds that it offers – and can only offer – compensation for any disadvantage 
people face as a result of being deemed ‘ugly’.  She writes: 
What about the ugly?  Are they not entitled to compensation for 
their repugnant appearance, which makes them so unwelcome in 
social settings?  Some luck egalitarians would view this bad luck as 
calling for a remedy, perhaps in the form of publicly subsidized 
plastic surgery.  Democratic equality refuses to publicly endorse 
the demeaning private judgments of appearance which are the 
basis of such claims to compensation.  Instead it asks whether the 
norms based on such judgments are oppressive.  Consider a birth 
defect, affecting only a person’s appearance, that is considered so 
abhorrent by current social norms that people tend to shun those 
who have it.  Since the capability to participate in civil society as 
an equal citizen is fundamental to freedom, egalitarians demand 
some remedy be provided for this.  But the remedy need not 
consist in the plastic surgery that corrects the defect.  An 
alternative would be to persuade everyone to adopt new norms of 
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acceptable physical appearance, so that people with the birth 
“defect” were no longer treated as pariahs.  (Anderson 1999: 335) 
Luck egalitarians who adopt the pluralist approach to regulatory strategies can put this 
objection to rest.81  First, we can agree with Anderson’s implicit claim that it is 
inappropriate to equate ‘ugliness’ with ‘bad luck’.  An individual’s personal appearance 
is (at least in large part) a matter of luck.  But appearances are only costly or beneficial 
in light of certain informal structures: social norms that function to ensure opportunities 
for advantage are delineated on the basis of differences in physical appearance.  Some 
appearances are more socially acceptable – and thus have a higher potential rate of return 
in terms of advantage – than others.  This view does not essentialize or in any way 
‘endorse’ the view of certain physical traits as constituting ‘good’ or ‘bad’ luck, but 
acknowledges the social construction of appearance norms, including notions of 
‘ugliness’ and ‘beauty’.   
Second, as we have now established, luck egalitarianism does, in fact, provide a 
provisional reason to follow the alternative approach Anderson favours.  Luck 
egalitarianism condemns appearance-related disadvantage and says, in response, that we 
                                              
81 In fact, on the pluralist approach, provision of plastic surgery counts as an instance of levelling.  
Surgery acts directly on the physical body in order to improve opportunities for advantage in 
future.  But Anderson’s point still holds, and also holds against a policy of cash compensation: 
the issue in this case is that both levelling and compensatory policies fail to target the 
problematic social norms that set ‘ugly’ people at a disadvantage.   
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might implement either a policy on which compensation is provided for the costs of 
being ‘ugly’; or a policy on which plastic surgery is provided to make ‘ugly’ people more 
attractive; or a policy on which those aspects of the social structure (including 
appearance norms) that set ugly people at a disadvantage are altered in order to remove 
or reduce appearance-based inequalities of opportunity; or some combination of these 
policies.  If appearance norms are indeed demeaning to those they posit as ‘ugly’ – if, 
that is, they are offensive to the value of relational equality – then it is clear that value 
tells against those strategies that would leave current norms in place (compensation and 
levelling) and in favour of the sort of direct structural regulation that seeks to ‘persuade 
everyone to adopt new norms of acceptable physical appearance’ (Anderson 1999: 335).   
How, precisely, does the value of relational equality tell in favour of a policy to reform 
appearance norms?  That policy shares a number of the features Wolff ascribes to his 
policies of ‘status enhancement’ to tackle disability-related disadvantage.  Indeed, he 
terms action to change structures to improve the opportunities of disabled people status 
enhancement precisely because it is so closely ‘connected with the idea of a society of 
equals’ (Wolff 2009a: 113).  There are three central reasons, Wolff claims, why relational 
equality will often be better served by reform of social and material structures, rather 
than by adjusting personal resources or outcomes, all of which apply to this case: 
One is that status enhancement is non-stigmatising.  A second is 
that it is inclusive.  A third is that it benefits everyone.’  (Wolff 
2009a: 130)   
Reform of appearance norms avoids targeting individuals and so represents a more 
communal approach to tackling disadvantage.  As Wolff writes of status enhancement, 
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it ‘helps to communicate a message that human beings are all equals and should all be 
included in our social arrangements’ (Wolff 2009a: 131).  It also benefits everyone by 
reducing the risks we all face of future exclusion and marginalization.  Wolff notes that 
anyone may accrue an injury that leads to quadriplegia: 
A world already adapted to the needs of people with impairments 
makes disability less of a disadvantage, and hence the prospect of 
possibly becoming disabled somewhat less threatening, at least to 
the preservation of one’s existing way of life.  (Wolff 2009b: 55) 
The same point applies to appearances.  Each of us faces the risk of accidents that could 
leave us with what has been termed ‘facial disfigurement’.  Most of us will also go 
through an ageing process that will change our appearances.  In the UK, appearance 
norms seem to deem age itself unattractive, particularly in women.  But we all age, for as 
long as we live, and so alternative, less demeaning appearance norms really would benefit 
us all.   
That said, reformists must proceed with care to ensure that regulatory action to change 
social norms really does work to equalize both opportunities and social status.  Attempts 
to reform social norms may be fraught with the risk of producing unintended 
consequences.  Most notably, relational equality might itself be harmed in the event of 
backlash against reform.  If, for example, advertisements, television programmes and 
fashion shows were required to include a broader range of physical types, as way of 
normalizing what is currently considered ‘ugliness’, some people working in those 
industries might grow to resent and blame the most direct beneficiaries of the restriction 
on their working practices.  (For discussion of a similar point in relation to disability, see 
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Wolff 2009b: 53.)  But, of course, policy can be designed with due attention to this 
possibility: if a policy were likely to produce a backlash of such proportions that 
relational equality would suffer, that policy would be, as a result, less desirable on the 
balance of reasons.   
Now, luck egalitarians who favour a compensatory approach might object that reform 
of social norms may take some time.  Compensation, on the other hand, can redress 
disadvantage much more immediately.  I think this is a valid concern, but it does not 
amount to an objection against pursuing the direct structural regulatory strategy in this 
case.  That ‘ugly’ people may continue to suffer disadvantage until the point at which 
social norms are successfully reformed may provide a reason to offer them 
compensation until that point.  But as long as it would be better, on the balance of 
reasons, if appearance norms were less offensive to relational equality, there remains a 
reason to pursue their reform.  It is also worth pointing out that following a 
compensatory or levelling strategy would not only leave current norms intact, but might 
be additionally stigmatizing to ‘ugly’ people.  As Anderson implies, it might well be 
demeaning for a person to be judged so ‘ugly’ by a regulatory agency that she qualifies 
for financial benefit or surgery.  If, on the balance of reasons, compensation would not 
be offered on those grounds, reform of social norms becomes even more urgent.   
In sum, once it is recognized that a regulatory agency might attempt to bring about luck 
egalitarian outcomes through a plurality of different strategies, the range of regulatory 
actions that might be implemented for reasons of luck egalitarian distributive justice is 
thrown open.  The choice from among the feasible set will be informed by consideration 
of how well different combinations of regulatory actions would respect the demands of 
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a number of values, including relational equality, liberty, economic efficiency, 
environmental sustainability, and so on.  I have considered here whether regulatory 
action to provide medical treatment for physical impairment is compatible with relational 
equality and found that, although wide scale medical treatment would certainly prevent 
much unjust distributive disadvantage from arising, it may also manifest a failure to 
respect people in their differences.  Regulatory action to reform appearance norms fares 
better in light of relational equality: the value of distributive equality and the value of 
relational equality both suggest the desirability of such action.  Of course, whether or 
not either of these actions could actually be successfully implemented here and now, 
given deep and sociological feasibility constraints, is not something I have considered.  
Perhaps implementation of the reforms I have canvassed would require a change in the 
laws of nature and is, therefore, deeply infeasible.  But, if not, and if the relevant 
feasibility constraints are only sociological then, of course, what is sociologically 
infeasible today may become feasible tomorrow.  Sociological feasibility is liable to rapid 
change, as life changes, and so its lack should never be too disheartening.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I hope to have shown that the compensatory approach on which much 
luck egalitarian theory has thus far been developed should be abandoned in favour of a 
pluralist approach to the regulatory strategies of luck egalitarian distributive justice.  This 
approach makes explicit that, in addition to compensating for unjust outcomes, luck 
egalitarians may endorse regulatory action to prevent the original distribution of benefits 
and burdens from producing unjust outcomes in the first place.  The pluralist approach 
also facilitates clarity on the target and rationale of regulatory action, enhances the 
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feasibility of luck neutralization, provides space for arguments in favour of more equal 
access to important goods, and exposes the social construction of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ luck.  
Ultimately, while compensatory redistribution functions to redress unjust, luck-based 
advantage and disadvantage after the fact of its creation, levelling and direct structural 
regulation work to stay the hand of fortune: they work to forestall fortune’s blows and 
blessings and to obstruct (rather than merely expiate) the inegalitarian influence of luck 
on life outcomes. 
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PART II 
LUCK EGALITARIANISM AND INTERNSHIPS 
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Internships:  
A Luck Egalitarian Analysis 
 
 
Introduction 
Recent years have seen a significant increase in the number of internship positions 
available in Britain and a parallel expansion of the range of industries and sectors within 
which internships are offered.  Within many sectors, completion of a period of internship 
work has been shown to provide a relative advantage in subsequent competitions for 
paid employment and, within some, it is becoming a necessary condition of access to a 
variety of jobs.  These trends might not be very worrying, were it not for the fact that a 
great number of contemporary internships are unpaid, sold at auction, or distributed on 
a nepotistic basis.  These sorts of internships engender significant luck-based inequalities 
of opportunity for advantage, thus raising important issues of distributive justice.   
This chapter analyzes these issues from a luck egalitarian perspective.  In section 3.1, I 
briefly outline some of what is known about contemporary internships in the UK, and 
suggest a typology of internships, distinguishing between different types according to 
their distributive mechanism and whether or not they are adequately remunerated.  In 
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section 3.2, I offer an analysis of how luck currently influences who may take up the 
different types of internship.  This analysis motivates the case I present in chapter 4 for 
regulatory action to tackle the unjust inequalities contemporary internships help to 
create. 
3.1  An Exposition of Contemporary UK Internships 
3.1.1  UK Internships 
There is a notable lack of comprehensive, longitudinal studies of internships: 
contemporary British internships have yet to receive much investigation or sustained 
critical analysis from academic researchers (and have received none at all from egalitarian 
political philosophers).  However, reports have been published by the Institute for Public 
Policy Research (IPPR), the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD), 
the government’s Panel on Fair Access to the Professions (PFAP), campaign groups 
Interns Anonymous and Intern Aware, and Unite the union, and some smaller scale 
research has been published by The Guardian, which provide a view of the UK picture.   
Thousands of internships are offered across the UK every year and there is some 
evidence to suggest the number may be rising.  CIPD (2010a) estimates that 13% of 
employers intended to hire interns during the summer of 2009.  By 2010, that figure had 
risen to more than one in five employers.82  IPPR’s 2010 report on internships claims 
                                              
82 Subsequent CIPD reports do not present any data on intentions to hire interns.   
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that this CIPD figure from 2010 ‘is the equivalent of 280,800 organizations across the 
UK, potentially offering a quarter of a million internship places over the summer’ (IPPR 
2010: 6).  A further report from CIPD (2010c) estimates that just over half of all 
internships (56.5%) are located in London, where living costs are particularly high.   
In recent years, internships have become a (more or less formal) precondition of access 
to paid employment within some sectors.  This trend has been recognized by 
government, unions, professional organizations, and campaigners.  For example, a recent 
report from the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission states that ‘83% of new 
entrants [into journalism] do internships’ (SMCPC 2014: 65).  CIPD have also suggested 
that ‘internships are the ticket into an increasing number of professions but they are only 
accessible to some people, which has serious negative consequences for social mobility 
and ‘fair access’ to certain careers’ (CIPD 2010c: 6, original emphasis).  The PFAP, 
meanwhile, writes in its 2009 report that: 
Undertaking an internship is an important access point for entry 
to a career in the professions […]  Yet, by and large, they operate 
as part of an informal economy in which securing an internship all 
too often depends on who you know and not on what you know  
(Alan Milburn 2009: 99) 
The duration of internships varies, but they overwhelmingly tend to continue for 
months, rather than weeks.  Many internships last for two or three months, but some go 
on for as many as six or twelve.  The largest online survey of UK interns to date, which 
was conducted by the campaign group Interns Anonymous and gathered data from 594 
respondents, found that 39% of the internships carried out by respondents lasted three 
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months or longer.  Many graduate internship positions are advertised on the Graduate 
Talent Pool bespoke online job board run by the Department for Business and Skills 
(BIS), and analysis by The Guardian of 621 internships advertised on that website found 
that, of unpaid internships, over half (54.7%) lasted two to three months, while 7.8% 
lasted between seven months and one year (Lisa Evans 2011).  With regard to working 
hours, research commissioned by Unite the union and campaign group Intern Aware 
reports that 48% of the interns they surveyed worked full time for five days per week, 
while 33% worked for three to four days per week (Charlotte Gerada 2013: 5). 
All the reports agree that, while they vary in substance and quality, internships are distinct 
from both work experience and volunteering.  As IPPR states in its 2010 report: 
Internships normally work in a different way to work experience 
or volunteering.  Genuine work experience placements tend to last 
for just a few weeks and primarily involve work shadowing and 
the completion of small tasks that do not form a core part of an 
organisation’s work.  Volunteering can take many forms, but for 
most people it does not involve full-time, set hours or specific 
required duties  (IPPR 2010: 5)   
Internship work involves more than work shadowing, in the sense that actual work is 
undertaken that would otherwise be done by an employee.  Work experience placements, 
during which young people work shadow for a couple of weeks or so, should therefore 
be kept distinct and are not the focus of analysis here.  Internships also differ from 
voluntary work: while interns tend to sign contracts agreeing to particular terms 
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(regarding working hours, duties, and so on), volunteers have no contractual obligations 
to work.   
3.1.2  Remuneration 
Regarding pecuniary remuneration, most of the estimates agree that around half of all 
interns receive pay, while around a third receive limited expenses for travel and perhaps 
lunch.  The Guardian’s analysis of BIS-advertised graduate internships found that 49.8% 
were paid, 33.5% provided limited expenses, and 15.5% were entirely unpaid (Evans 
2011).  Larger scale research by CIPD suggests that approximately half of all 
organizations employing interns pay them at least the National Minimum Wage, 28% 
pay expenses less than the National Minimum Wage, and 18% do not pay any expenses 
(CIPD 2010b).  Remuneration also looks very different in different sectors.  The 
Guardian’s analysis suggests that in the banking and financial sectors, internships are 
overwhelmingly paid.  However, 92% of internships in the arts were unpaid, 77% of 
fashion internships were unpaid, 76% of public relations internships were unpaid, and 
50% of media internships were unpaid (Shiv Malik and James Ball 2011).  According to 
research into parliamentary and constituency office interns conducted by Unite the 
union, ‘interns carry out about 18,000 hours of unpaid work each week and [… 44%] do 
not receive travel and food expenses’ (Unite 2009). 
3.1.3  Distributive Mechanisms 
The available data on internships reveal that they are distributed through a number of 
different mechanisms.  I suggest here five conceptual categories of distributive 
mechanism, which capture what I believe to be the morally relevant empirical differences 
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between the central features of the different types of mechanism and which are, as far 
as I have been able to ascertain from the available empirical data, exhaustive of all 
internship distributive mechanisms within the UK.  The categories of internship 
distributive mechanism are: open competition; closed competition; open auction; closed 
auction; and nepotism.  The categories indicate the broad characteristics of the different 
internship distributive mechanisms.  In practice these characteristics may be instantiated 
in different ways and so each conceptual category is sufficiently broadly specified to 
encompass those empirical variations.  The broadly conceived features of each category 
of distributive mechanism signify how access to different internship positions operates 
and deployment of these conceptual categories therefore usefully facilitates the analysis, 
given in section 3.2, of how luck influences who can take up internships.83   
3.1.3.1  Open and Closed Competitions 
The distribution of internships by competition has two central features that are relevant 
for the purposes of constructing a luck egalitarian analysis of internships.  These are, 
first, application eligibility, which pertains to initial entry into the competition and, second, 
competitive selection, which pertains to the selection of the winning competitor.  First, then, 
                                              
83 These categories of distributive mechanism bear some similarity to Jon Elster’s ‘allocative 
mechanisms’, in the sense that they are intended ‘to describe and explain how institutions allocate 
goods and burdens’ (Elster 1992: 9, 2, my emphasis).  However, while Elster’s ‘goal is not to 
evaluate allocative practices by some particular standard of justice’, I go on to evaluate the 
distribution of internships by luck egalitarian standards (Elster 1992: 4). 
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application eligibility concerns who may apply to enter the competition.  Some 
competitions for internships have no application eligibility restrictions, such that anyone 
may apply to them (including those who do not meet the competitive selection criteria).  
Others do have application eligibility restrictions, entailing that eligibility to apply is 
restricted on some basis and that some are therefore excluded from applying.  In other 
words, entry into competitions for internship positions may be open, or more or less 
closed.  I therefore propose two categories of competitive internship distribution: open 
competition (to which anyone may apply) and closed competition (to which only those 
who meet the application eligibility restrictions may apply). 
Open competitions for internships, as I define them here, exhibit two essential 
characteristics: first, there are no restrictions on eligibility to enter the competition (that 
is, no one is barred or prevented from applying to the competition for the internship 
position); and, second, the internship vacancy is openly advertised, such that anyone 
looking for internship positions might find out about it.  If a competition does not 
exhibit both of these characteristics, the competition is (more or less) closed.  The 
distributive mechanisms of many of the internships advertised on the BIS website fall 
into the category of open competition. These internships are prominently advertised and 
anyone may apply, such that their distributive mechanisms exemplify the two essential 
characteristics of open competition.  (Of course, those who do not meet the competitive 
selection criteria are unlikely to be offered the internship, but they may apply in any case.) 
Closed competitions for internships either have specific restrictions on eligibility to apply 
that formally exclude some people from applying, or are visible (and therefore de facto 
accessible) only to a restricted range of potential applicants.  Of course, how closed a 
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closed competition is will often, in practice, be a matter of degree.  That is, application 
eligibility criteria may be more or less restrictive, and vacancies may be more or less 
visible.  A growing number of internship vacancies now invite competitive applications 
by ‘word of mouth’, such that only those who hear of the vacancy may apply to the 
competition.  The UK Commission on Employment and Skills reports that: 
Word of mouth recruitment disadvantages young people without 
the right networks and contacts.  But this is on the rise  (UKCES 
2013: 4)   
Internships ‘advertised’ by word of mouth may have no formal or intended restrictions 
on eligibility to apply, but their invisibility to all who do not hear of them by word of 
mouth renders the competition more or less closed: the reality is that only those who hear 
about the vacancy know of its existence and are then able to apply.  To illustrate, 
professionals within an organization may be asked to advertise an internship vacancy 
within their online social networks (such as Facebook or Twitter), simply because this 
form of advertising is cost-effective.  But it serves to ensure that only members of those 
professionals’ networks find out about the vacancy and may apply to compete for it.  
The distributive mechanism of such internships thus falls into the category of closed 
competition.  Other instances of closed competition differ in the way they restrict 
applications.  For example, an internship vacancy may be advertised in a local newspaper, 
which entails only those with access to that newspaper can find out about the 
competition and apply to it.  Application eligibility criteria may also be more formally or 
even intentionally exclusive: for example, if application to the competition is by 
invitation only.  Professionals may be asked to invite people within their familial and 
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social networks to apply to an internship competition, perhaps because their 
organization values close interpersonal connections among colleagues.  Moreover, if 
eligibility to apply to a competition for an internship position were restricted on the basis 
of, say, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, disability, age, religion or marital status, the internship 
distributive mechanism would, of course, fall into the category of closed competition.  
Competitions for internships may, then, be open or (more or less) closed, depending on 
whether (and the extent to which) applications to the competition are restricted.   
The second feature of competition for internship positions that is relevant to a luck 
egalitarian analysis concerns the basis or bases on which the winning applicant is chosen 
by intern selectors.  Regardless of whether a competition is open or closed, some 
competitive selection criterion or criteria will be applied by selectors to determine the 
selection of the intern from among the applicants.  Competitive selection criteria can 
take a number of forms and, of course, if the categories of distributive mechanism were 
so fine grained as to capture all variations in competitive selection criteria, there would 
be as many categories as criteria.  For present purposes, I retain the broadness of the 
competitive categories of internship distributive mechanism, but acknowledge that these 
might be thought to contain a variety of sub-categories that reflect differences in 
selection criteria.84  As we will see in section 3.2, selection criteria partly determine which 
                                              
84 Of course, an open competition and a closed competition might both employ the same 
selection criteria: the difference between the two categories is about entry to the competition, 
rather than selection of competitors. 
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forms of luck influence who is offered competitive internships.  It will be useful, 
therefore, to briefly outline here some of the different sorts of selection criteria that are 
used within competitions for internships.  Broadly speaking, competitive selection 
criteria tend to select for ability to successfully complete the duties attached to the 
internship position and ‘fit in’ with the organization.  (They are therefore similar to 
competitive selection criteria used in job distribution, which tend to select for ability to 
do the job.)  More specifically, the sorts of abilities that constitute qualification for a 
position might include abilities to communicate effectively in person, on the telephone 
and in writing, to work flexibly and to multitask, to work well with others, to work with 
computers or particular software packages, and so on.  When selection criteria select 
(only) for ability to successfully complete the internship, the distributive mechanism can 
be conceived as belonging to a subcategory of competition, termed ‘ability competition’.  
Furthermore, as we saw in section 2.2.4, evidence suggests that bias persists in applicant 
selection for jobs in the UK.85  We might infer from this that it is highly likely that the 
competitive selection criteria of some internships are, like those of jobs, biased.  That is, 
in addition to the ability of applicants to successfully complete the internship, the 
selection criteria actually enacted by intern selectors may select for demographic 
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, sexuality and (dis)ability, even when they 
                                              
85 There is an abundance of further empirical research suggesting that candidate selection for 
jobs is sometimes biased.  See, for example, John McConahay (1986), Martha Foschi et al. 
(1994), and Ralph Fevre et al. (2011). 
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nominally or officially select only for ability to successfully complete the internship.  
These characteristics then become substantive (though informal and perhaps 
misrecognized) qualifications for the internship.86  When demographic characteristics 
are treated as qualifications, the internship distributive mechanism can be conceived as 
belonging to a subcategory termed ‘biased competition’.87  A final consideration is that 
competitive selection criteria might also favour applicants who are part of the personal 
networks of professionals within the organization offering the internship over applicants 
who are not so well-connected.  That is, they might select for ability, but also treat the 
connection as a kind of qualification.  The distributive mechanism of such internships 
                                              
86 For further theoretical discussion of how bias can affect selection of job applicants, see Young 
(1990: chapter 7).   
87 Disability-related bias may be due to the ableist prejudices of selectors, or, in the case of bias 
against people with physical impairments that reduces their mobility, it may be to do with a 
combination of inaccessible premises and an unwillingness or inability on the part of the 
organization to make adjustments to premises to make them accessible.  This issue of the 
accessibility of premises cuts across internships of different types: however an internship is 
distributed and whatever its remuneration arrangements, if it based in a premises that is 
inaccessible to people with reduced mobility, those people will not be able to take it up.  I return 
to the issue of accessible premises in section 4.2.3 but (with the foregoing caveat in place) for 
now I set it to one side in order to concentrate on how the distributive mechanisms and 
remuneration arrangements of internships interact with background differences to produce 
inequalities of access to internships. 
236 
 
can be conceived as belonging to a subcategory of competition termed ‘nepotistic 
competition’.88   
3.1.3.2  Open and Closed Auctions 
Internships are also distributed through auctions, which can be either open or closed.  
During these auctions, the internship is sold to the highest bidder.  More precisely, what 
is sold is the power to decide who will be offered the opportunity to undertake the 
internship: the winning bidder may undertake the internship herself or, alternatively, 
offer it to a third party of her choosing.  Whether an internship auction is open or closed 
depends on whether there are any restrictions on who may bid for the internship.  Access 
to open auctions is open in the sense that there are no restrictions on who may bid.  
Over the last few years, internships in the UK have begun to be sold at online auctions 
(Danielle Kurtzleben 2013).  Anyone with access to the internet may bid for these 
internships and we can plausibly assume that this includes all, or very nearly all, people 
looking for internship positions.  The distributive mechanism of these internships can 
therefore be understood as falling into the category of open auction.  (Interestingly, the 
chief executive officer of one company that arranges online internship auctions claims 
that around half the bidders are parents bidding on behalf of their children (Beth Harpaz 
2010).)  
                                              
88 For further discussion of nepotistic competition in the context of job recruitment and 
promotion, see, for example, Linda Wong and Brian Kleiner (1994). 
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Access to closed auctions is restricted, normally on the basis of membership of some 
more or less elite group.  That is, bidding is by invitation only.  Again, the internship is 
sold to the highest bidder.  Two recent examples of closed internship auctions are worthy 
of note.  First, Conservative Party Members who were invited to the Conservative’s 
annual Black and White Party in 2011 – Cabinet members, other key party members, big 
party donors, and so on – were able to bid at an internship auction held at the party.  
Prestigious internships in finance, hedge-fund work, fashion and media sold for an 
average of £3000 each, raising over £20,000 for the Conservative Party (Simon Walters 
and Brendan Carlin 2011).  Second, parents of pupils at Westminster school – one of 
the most elite public schools in the country – are regularly invited to bid at internship 
auctions organized by the school, reportedly raising thousands of pounds for 
Westminster School every year.  Despite some recent bad press, the school is continuing 
with these closed auctions (Nico Hines 2013).   
It might be thought that the distributive mechanisms of open and closed auction are, in 
fact, subcategories falling within the categories of open and closed competition, 
respectively.  That is, perhaps auctions might be conceived as a form of competition, the 
competitive selection criteria of which is wholly financial: ability to pay is the sole 
qualification for the internship.  Thus, people compete for the internship and whoever 
is willing and able to spend the most money on the internship position wins.  However, 
for the purposes of my analysis, it is worth singling out auctions for special attention, 
precisely because the selection criterion is so singularly financial.  Indeed, there are no 
selectors to make a choice from among a number of applicants: the winner is decided 
mechanically on the basis of the relative financial worth of each bid.  Furthermore, while 
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the qualifications selected for by competitive selection criteria normally refer (at least in 
part) to ability to perform internship work, auctions sever the link between possession 
of relevant abilities and success in gaining an internship position.89  On my construction 
of the categories of internship distributive mechanism, auctions are therefore 
distinguished from competitions. 
3.1.3.3  Nepotism 
The final category of internship distributive mechanism is nepotism.  Some people are 
able to become interns because they happen to be a member of the personal network of 
an established professional who is in a position to gift them access to an internship 
position and does so.  No competition occurs and no exchange of money takes place.  
As nepotistic recruitment is likely to go unrecorded (that is, to be ‘off the record’), there 
is currently scant hard evidence of this practice.  However, as the reports of the PFAP 
(2009) and IPPR (2010) note, there is an abundance of anecdotal evidence of internship 
positions being gifted to the personal contacts of professionals.  As IPPR writes, 
‘internships often operate as part of an ‘informal economy’ where opportunities depend 
on personal contacts rather than proven ability or potential’ (IPPR 2010: 7). 
                                              
89 Of course, the winning bidder may offer the internship to someone who possesses relevant 
abilities, but this is not required: who is offered the internship is a matter of the winner’s 
discretion.   
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We saw above how nepotism broadly construed might influence the outcomes of 
competitions for internships.  I noted two examples of how application eligibility and 
competitive selection criteria might reference familial and social networks (where 
applicants are sourced from within the personal networks of professionals working in 
an organization but must then compete with each other for the internship, and where 
applicants who are members of the personal networks of professionals are favoured 
within competitive selection procedures).  However, nepotism as described here is 
distinct from competition.  It is a category of distributive mechanism in its own right 
because of the singular decisiveness of the nepotistic interest: it does not merely 
influence a competitive procedure, but wholly determines who is offered the internship.  
As with auctions, when nepotism is the distributive mechanism of an internship, there 
is no selection from among a number of applicants and ability to perform internship 
work does not constitute a qualification for the internship.  The sole ‘qualification’ (if it 
can be termed as such) is knowing the right person.   
3.1.4  Types of UK Internship 
Distinguishing between internships according to their distributive mechanism and 
whether or not they are remunerated, internships can be categorized into ten ‘types’.90  
                                              
90 This specific construal of what distinguishes the different types of internships suits the analysis 
offered in section 3.2 below.  I distinguish between types of internships on the basis of their 
distributive mechanism and whether or not they are remunerated because this facilitates 
identification and clear analysis of the different forms of luck that influence access to 
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For the purposes of my analysis, I count internships that pay less than the National 
Minimum Wage as unpaid internships.  This is because, first, provision of limited 
expenses does not constitute payment for internship work and the organizations offering 
expenses-only internships tend to specify themselves that they are unpaid.  Second, and 
more importantly, the analysis I present below is concerned with how access to 
internships works and how people are excluded from access.  As expenses for travel and 
lunch do not amount to an income that is sufficient to support an intern throughout a 
period of internship work, those interns who earn below the National Minimum Wage 
need additional resources to sustain themselves throughout that period.  Those who do 
not have such resources at their disposal are excluded from access to expenses-only 
internships, as they are from unpaid internships.  In other words, provision of expenses 
is insufficient to ensure that no one is excluded from access on the basis of an unchosen 
lack of resources.  I should acknowledge, however, that in counting expenses-only 
internships as unpaid I am making a simplifying assumption that provision of limited 
expenses has no effect on access.  In fact, of course, there may be cases in which such 
provision does make a difference.  Contrary to my simplifying assumption, not all of 
those who lack the resources needed to undertake unpaid internships also lack the 
resources needed to undertake an expenses-only internship.  Perhaps most notably, 
                                              
contemporary UK internships.  Of course, internships might be distinguished into (different 
sorts of) types on alternative bases, such as the sectors in which they are offered, their relative 
quality, whether they are full- or part-time, and so on.   
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individuals who have access to free accommodation, breakfast and dinner in London, 
but who do not have sufficient wealth to cover the travel and lunch expenses that would 
be incurred on undertaking an internship, would be excluded on the basis of their 
financial disadvantage from access to unpaid internships in London, but not those that 
pay travel and lunch expenses.  Nonetheless, as discounting consideration of those cases 
affects nothing substantive about my argument, I simply treat expenses-only internships 
as if they were unpaid.  On that basis, then, the ten types of internship are outlined in 
the table below. 
Table 3: The Types of UK Internship  
 
Distributive 
mechanism: 
 
Remuneration: 
 
Open 
Competition 
 
Closed 
Competition 
 
Open 
Auction 
 
Closed 
Auction 
 
Nepotism 
 
Paid 
 
 
 
Open 
competitive, 
paid 
internships 
 
Closed 
competitive, 
paid 
internships 
 
Open 
auctioned, 
paid 
internships 
 
Closed 
auctioned,  
paid 
internships 
 
Nepotistic, 
paid 
internships 
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Unpaid 
 
 
 
Open 
competitive, 
unpaid 
internships 
 
Closed 
competitive, 
unpaid 
internships 
 
Open 
auctioned, 
unpaid 
internships 
 
Closed 
auctioned, 
unpaid 
internships 
 
Nepotistic, 
unpaid 
internships 
 
3.2  A Luck Egalitarian Analysis of Contemporary UK Internships 
3.2.1  Internship Luck 
The luck egalitarian approach to distributive justice holds that the inegalitarian influence 
of luck on individuals’ life outcomes is unjust and should be eliminated.  In chapter 2, I 
argued that, while luck egalitarians might respond to unjust inequalities of outcome 
resulting from inequalities of opportunity by recommending provision of compensation, 
they might also recommend levelling, direct regulation, or some combination of 
strategies to equalize opportunities (or render them more equal) and thereby prevent (to 
some degree) those inequalities of outcome from arising.  In what follows, I analyse how 
luck influences access to internships, asking the question: what forms of luck influence 
who can take up the different types of internship?  I argue that various aspects of the 
structure internship schemes function to delineate access to internships on the basis of 
various forms of luck (that is, various luck-based differences in people’s personal 
resources).  These luck-based inequalities of access are, in turn, implicated in the 
production of unjust inequalities of outcome.  This analysis motivates the case for luck 
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egalitarian regulatory action to tackle the unjust inequalities produced in and through the 
distribution of internships.  Precisely what regulation luck egalitarians might recommend 
in response to those unjust inequalities is the subject of chapter 4.  To briefly anticipate 
my argument, while a strategy of compensation would seek only to adjust overall levels 
of advantage post-internship distribution, a levelling strategy would seek to adjust luck-
based differences in personal resources to ensure equal access to internships, given the 
structure of internship schemes.  A strategy of direct regulation would seek to adjust 
relevant aspects of the structure of internship schemes to ensure equal access to 
internships, given luck-based differences in personal resources.  Alternatively, a 
combination of compensatory, levelling and direct structural regulatory strategies might be 
employed to tackle internship-related injustice. 
How, then, does luck influence access to internships?  Consider, first, the forms of luck 
that delineate access to competitive internships.  (I examine the forms of luck that 
application restrictions bring into play below but, for now, focus on competitive 
selection criteria.)  As we saw in section 3.1.3.1, the selection criteria used to determine 
which applicant is offered a competitive internship are normally similar to those of jobs.  
Standardly, the criteria select for ability to successfully complete the internship, as job 
selection criteria select for ability to successfully do the job.  The ability to successfully 
complete an internship includes the competence required to fulfil the duties attached to 
the internship position, and to ‘suit’ the role and ‘fit in’ with the organization.  
Competitive selection criteria may also be influenced by the biases of selectors, thereby 
delineating access to internships on the basis of demographic characteristics such as 
gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and so on.  (As mentioned above, nepotism may also 
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influence selection from among competing candidates.  I will return to ‘nepotistic 
competitions’ shortly but, for now, focus on ‘ability competitions’ and ‘biased 
competitions’.)  The question that interests me here is whether having these 
competences and characteristics is a matter of luck.  To the extent that inequalities of 
access to competitive internships track luck, the overall advantages and disadvantages 
they produce are unjust and luck egalitarians have a reason to recommend regulatory 
action – whether compensation, levelling, direct regulation, or some combination 
thereof – to tackle that injustice.   
3.2.1.1  Demographic Characteristics – ‘What You Are’ 
The sorts of characteristics that become relevant to competitive selection when selectors 
are biased include gender, ethnicity, sexuality and (dis)ability.  Even given the diversity 
of approaches to conceptualizing the distinction between luck and choice, there is 
consensus within the luck egalitarian literature that such demographic characteristics are 
paradigmatic instances of brute luck: generally speaking, no one chooses to be a 
cisgender woman or a cisgender man, or to be transgender or intersex or queer, or to be 
gay or straight or bisexual, or to have or not have physical or cognitive impairments, or 
to be black or white or Asian, and so on.  Certainly, on the metaphysical approach I 
favour, these demographic characteristics are beyond individuals’ metaphysical control.91  
                                              
91 The attributivist approach I rejected in chapter 1 also counts demographic characteristics as 
matters of luck because they are outside the space of rational agency.   
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Thus, inequalities of access to internships that track these characteristics are luck-based 
inequalities of access.   
3.2.1.2  Abilities – ‘What You Know’ 
But what about the sorts of skills and abilities that count as qualifications for internships 
distributed by open or closed competition?  My view is that an individual’s developed 
abilities are a function of her native talents (or, natural endowments), the influence of 
her social circumstances, and perhaps also her choices (which are themselves constrained 
and conditioned by native talents and social circumstances).  Luck egalitarians agree that 
native talents are matters of brute luck: no individual chooses the native talents with 
which she is born.92  Indeed, no one chooses them.93  Moreover, there are, as far as we 
know, differences between the native talents with which different individuals are born.  
Some individuals appear to have natural aptitudes for particular skills and abilities, such 
                                              
92 See, for example, Dworkin (1985: 207), Cohen (1989: 932), Arneson (1989: 89), Roemer (1998: 
38), and Knight (2009a: 1).   
93 That said, Steiner (2002) raises the interesting point that if and when the ‘revolution’ in 
genetics affords us choice in the design of the genetic information carried within the cells from 
which humans develop, individuals’ native talents might no longer be conceived as entirely 
unchosen.  Rather, they would be conceived as unchosen by the individual in question, but 
chosen by some other party (most likely the individual’s parents).  Thus, the distinction between 
nature and nurture is set to become increasingly blurred ‘as our knowledge of the human genome 
advances and, with it, our capacity to manipulate its information loads’ (Steiner 2002: 190). 
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that, given identical social circumstances, they would be able to develop those skills and 
abilities to a more advanced level than others.  The constellation of native talents with 
which others are born appear to be more constraining.  For example, some individuals 
are born with genetically predetermined mild, moderate or severe learning disabilities, 
which can make it difficult for them (relative to others and holding all else equal) to learn 
and develop certain skills and abilities.  Thus, it is the case not only that the native talents 
with which each individual is born are matters of luck, but also that differences in native 
talent across different individuals are matters of luck.   
But native talents are not the only determinant of developed skills and abilities.  As Rawls 
observes, ‘The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is affected 
by all kinds of social conditions’ (Rawls 1999: 64).  The same point has been made by a 
number of luck egalitarians.  For example, both Roemer (1998: 54-58, 60-61) and Knight 
(2009a: 129) emphasize the effect of education on the development of ability.  An 
individual’s native talents constitute her potential to develop skills and abilities, but how 
that potential develops is influenced by social circumstances, which are as unchosen by 
the individual as are her native talents.  Perhaps most significantly, an individual’s family 
and schooling provide her with opportunities to develop talents and so orient and set 
constraints on the development of her talents.  Parents and teachers can provide 
encouragements and inducements to learn and develop particular skills and abilities, but 
they can also discourage learning or make development difficult.  And, as with native 
talents, these social factors are not held constant across individuals.  That is, different 
families and different schools are differently willing and able to provide children with an 
environment that encourages development of the sorts of abilities required to undertake 
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internships.  For example, while some parents do little to encourage their children to 
develop those abilities, others spend thousands of pounds per year on high quality 
private education or tutoring for their children precisely because they believe doing so 
will facilitate learning and development.  Further, a number of egalitarians have noted 
that, holding all else equal, parents who read bedtime stories to their children often, in 
doing so, confer educational advantage on those children.94  Thus, holding native talent 
constant across individuals, differences in different individuals’ social circumstances 
provide them with unequal opportunities to develop skills and abilities and, conversely, 
holding social circumstances constant, differences in different individuals’ native talents 
provide them with unequal opportunities to develop skills and abilities.  There is 
disagreement, even among expert developmental psychologists, over whether native 
endowments or social circumstances constitute the more significant determinant of how 
ability develops: this is the ‘nature versus nurture’ debate that still dominates much of 
the psychological, medical, and sociological literature on ability.95  For present purposes, 
what matters is that both of these factors are beyond the individual’s control and are 
thus (for her) matters of luck for which she should not be held responsible.  To the 
extent that differences in ability are a function of these two factors, then, they are matters 
                                              
94 See, in particular, Mason (2006 and 2011), Olsaretti (2009), Swift (2009) and Segall (2011). 
95 See, for example, Ulric Neisser et al. (1996), Robert Plomin et al. (1997), Robert Plomin and 
Frank Spinath (2004), and Steven Pinker (2004).  
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of luck, and inequalities of access to internships that track those differences constitute 
luck-based inequalities of access.   
But is it plausible that people may also make choices that affect the development of their 
abilities?  A relevant consideration here is that, from the perspective of luck egalitarian 
distributive justice, a child’s abilities, and differences between different children’s 
abilities, are necessarily matters of luck.  As we saw in section 1.1.4, children do not make 
responsibility-attracting choices: whatever people may do to affect the development of 
their own abilities, none of their actions can be conceived as chosen (in the sense that 
matters to luck egalitarianism) until they reach their majority.  Thus, ability is unchosen 
and a matter of luck for all individuals up until the age of majority.96  But the unchosen 
abilities people possess as they reach their majority will surely always orient and constrain 
the choices they make as adults to develop their abilities further.  As Steiner explains, 
‘adults who develop them [abilities] must construct them on some already-present 
foundational ability which was laid down prior to that construction and prior to their 
becoming adults’ (Steiner 2002: 185).  That foundational ability can influence choice: for 
example, some people may choose to further develop abilities that are already relatively 
well-developed, precisely because they are already well-developed.  And it can constrain 
                                              
96 That is not to say that others’ choices do not influence the development of children’s abilities: 
as I have just outlined, children’s abilities are very much affected by the actions of third parties, 
including their parents and teachers.  But children themselves cannot be (held) responsible for 
their abilities, which therefore count as matters of luck for them. 
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choice: for example, it may be very difficult for some people to make choices to develop a 
particular kind of ability unless that ability already happens to be relatively well-developed.  
That is, given social structures (and, in particular, education systems), differences in 
individuals’ foundational abilities afford them unequal opportunities to develop their 
abilities further.  To illustrate this point, consider that people do not standardly have the 
opportunity to choose to go to university to further develop certain abilities unless they 
have the correct qualifications.  In the UK, entry into university depends on having 
particular A level grades (or equivalent qualifications), which grades in turn depend on 
individuals’ foundational abilities prior to their becoming adults.  (This consideration is 
particularly relevant to the discussion given that many internship positions are ‘graduate 
internships’, access to which requires possession of a degree.)  Thus, while people may, as 
adults, make choices that affect how their abilities develop, whether or not a person 
possesses the sort of competence that qualifies her for a competitive internship will also 
ordinarily be influenced, to some more or less significant degree, by luck.  Regarding 
differences in developed ability across individuals, these are a matter of luck to the extent 
that they are a function of the unequal opportunities to develop ability afforded to 
individuals by virtue of their different native talents and social circumstances.  In sum, while 
inequalities of access to internships that track differences in ability may be traceable in part 
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to individuals’ prior choices and are therefore not wholly matters of luck, there is certainly 
some extent to which they constitute luck-based inequalities of access.97   
                                              
97 It might be thought that this discussion of developed ability and skill does not fully capture 
what I referred to above as the ability to ‘fit in’ with the organization.  That ability seems to 
depend significantly on the values and norms the candidate endorses.  Indeed, the distinction 
between the ability to, for example, use software and the ability to ‘fit in’ is reminiscent of the 
distinction Young (1990) draws between technical competence and cultural competence.  
Technical competence refers to ‘competence at producing specified results’ (Young 1990: 201).  
Cultural competence has to do with: 
whether those being evaluated behave according to certain social 
norms, whether they promote specifically defined organizational goals, 
and whether they demonstrate generally valued social competences and 
characteristics.  (Young 1990: 204) 
This kind of competence appears ambiguous between standard notions of ability and what 
Dworkin terms personality.  As we saw in section 1.2.2.2, Dworkin claims that because, first, 
we ordinarily identify with aspects of our personalities and expect to take responsibility for their 
distributive consequences and, second, principles of justice should be continuous with ordinary 
ethics, there is a reason of justice to insist individuals take responsibility for the distributive 
consequences of holding particular values or supporting particular norms (see, in particular, 
Dworkin 2000: 289-296).  On the attributivist approach examined in section 1.2, again, it is 
appropriate to assign consequential responsibility to individuals for preferences such as whether 
they support organizational goals, as such preferences are within the space of rational agency 
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(see, in particular, Mason 2006: 93-94).  For Dworkin and Mason, our values count as matters 
of choice, not luck, regardless of whether we have freely chosen to endorse them.  Inequalities 
of outcome consequent on values-based inequalities of access to internships thus appear 
unproblematic from these perspectives.  On a metaphysical approach, however, whether or not 
a person’s values count as matters of choice depends on the extent to which they are freely 
chosen and under her ongoing metaphysical control.  As Dworkin readily acknowledges, if we 
have any choice over our values, it is not fully free but necessarily constrained and conditioned 
(see, for example, Dworkin 2002: 289-290).  There is a vast literature on the development of 
values (much of it from psychology) and I do not attempt to engage with it here, instead 
bracketing the question of whether ‘ability to fit in with an organization’ can be subsumed within 
‘ability to successfully complete internship work’ and simply assuming it can.  But it is notable 
that little of the literature mentions the influence of personal choice over the development of 
values.  Indeed, the ‘nature versus nurture’ debate in relation to the development of ability has 
its parallel in relation to the development of values, attitudes, personality and temperament, and 
both sorts of development are often covered in the same model.  (See, for example, Robert 
Plomin and Gerald McClearn (1993), W. Andrew Collins et al. (2000) and Gregg Murray and 
Matthew Mulvaney 2012 for discussion and analysis of various approaches to understanding 
how values and abilities develop.)  The simplifying assumption I make here is not unreasonable 
if it is the case that the values and attitudes we hold as individuals are, like our developed abilities, 
a complex function of the interweaving influence of both factors beyond our control and 
(constrained and conditioned) choice.  There may also be a similar argument that the values 
people hold on reaching their majority (that is, before responsibility-attracting choice is possible) 
strongly orient and constrain the choices they may make about what values to hold after that 
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3.2.1.3  Personal Social Networks and Wealth – ‘Who You Know’ and ‘What You Have’ 
In addition to demographic characteristics and abilities, access to internships is also 
delineated by ‘who you know’.  Indeed, ‘who you know’ delineates access to all types of 
internship other than those distributed by open ability competition and open biased 
competition.  Knowing the right person certainly influences access to many paid and 
unpaid internships distributed by closed competition.  In particular, in order to apply to 
competitive internships advertised by word of mouth, people need to be in contact with 
someone who is willing and able to, and who does, inform them of the internship 
vacancy.98  Knowing the right person also clearly influences access to paid and unpaid 
internships distributed by (open or closed) nepotistic competition.  In these cases, interns 
who know someone (that is, who have a contact) in an organization offering an 
internship who is willing and able to, and who does, influence the recruitment process 
                                              
point.  The salient point is that (on the metaphysical approach) to the extent that values are not 
matters of individual choice, inequalities of access to internships based on the values candidates 
hold are unchosen, and the overall inequalities of outcome they produce are unjust.  Below, I 
consider in more depth the related question of whether wanting an internship can be treated as 
a case of an expensive valuational taste.   
98 A caveat is required here.  In fact, closed competitions might restrict applications in ways that 
do not require applicants to know the right person.  For example, the internship might be 
advertised in a local newspaper, in which case it is location (rather than social networks) that is 
likely to delineate applications.  I return to this issue below.   
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in their favour are advantaged within selection relative to those who do not know the 
right person.  Regarding access to all internships distributed by closed auction, knowing 
the right person is crucial.  To secure the internship, a person must know someone who 
is a member of the elite group that is invited to the auction and who is willing and able 
to, and does, go to place the winning bid.  We can assume that this contact is generally 
likely to be a family member or family friend, but I also consider below the possibility 
that interns may work to cultivate relationships with elite contacts.  Having the right 
contact is the sole factor determining who has access to internships distributed by 
nepotism.  In these cases, the intern must know a professional who is willing and able 
to, and who does, gift them an internship position.  Again, we can assume that the 
professional contact is generally likely to be a family member or family friend of the 
intern, but may sometimes be someone with whom the intern has cultivated a 
relationship.  In addition, access to all auctioned and unpaid internships depends on 
‘what you have’ or, more precisely, it depends on having or being able to acquire 
sufficient financial resources.  Bidding expenses are required in order to buy auctioned 
internships; living expenses are required in order to be able to undertake unpaid 
internships; and bidding and living expenses are required in order to buy and undertake 
auctioned, unpaid internships.  Of course, some people may undertake paid employment 
and save up these expenses in advance of their internship, but it is undoubtedly the case 
that many interns are simply gifted the necessary expenses by their parents or other close 
contacts.  In other words, they have access because they know the right person: someone 
who is willing and able to, and who does, gift them the expenses required to buy an 
internship or work as unpaid intern. 
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So access to all of these types of internship – unpaid internships and those distributed 
by closed competition, nepotistic (open or closed) competition, nepotism, closed auction 
and open auction – is delineated by ‘who you know’.  Furthermore, with regard to unpaid 
internships and those distributed by nepotism, open auction and closed auction, access 
to these generally requires that the contact does something for the intern: they must gift the 
intern the necessary expenses, or gift her the internship position, or go on her behalf to 
bid successfully for the internship.99  In all of these latter cases, I maintain, ‘gift luck’ 
delineates access to the internship.  Lazenby’s work on gifts is relevant here.  He notes 
that, for an action to count as a gift: 
It must consist in the bestowing of a benefit upon an individual 
or group of individuals where, if there are conditions placed upon 
the bestowing of this benefit, the benefit is greater in value than 
the cost of the conditions imposed for the recipient(s).  (Lazenby 
2010: 272) 
On this construal, the three types of action I have just mentioned qualify as gifts: they 
are advantaging in the sense that they secure the intern’s access to the internship.  (We 
can also assume that the intention behind them would ordinarily be to advantage the 
                                              
99 In the case of closed auctions, it is not necessarily the case that the same contact both bids 
and pays for the internship: one contact may provide the money with which another bids. 
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intern and that they are not ordinarily undertaken in repayment of a debt.)  Lazenby 
further clarifies the different forms gifts may take: 
what can count as a gift is not limited to the material; it includes 
other non-material transactions that might more commonly be 
characterised as favours or even simply as kindness.  The three 
main forms of non-material giving examined are gifts of labour, 
gifts of non-material capital in either its intellectual, social or 
cultural varieties, and gifts of affection. (Lazenby 2010: 272) 
Living and bidding expenses given to interns count as straightforward material gifts.  
Gifting an internship position is slightly different: here, what is gifted is a role or position, 
which might be conceived as constituting non-material capital.100  Finally, taking time to 
bid for an internship position in order to offer it to a third party can itself be conceived 
as a gift of non-material labour time.  The contact intentionally bestows an advantage on 
the intern by doing her the favour of going to bid on her behalf at the internship auction.  
There is a great deal of discussion within the (luck and other) egalitarian literature on 
gifts and their status with regard to justice, but the questions in which I am interested 
here concern, firstly, whether it is a matter of luck for any given individual to be given a 
                                              
100 That said, if the gifted internship is paid, that remuneration might count as a material gift.  
On the other hand, intern remuneration is not gifted from the pocket of the professional contact 
(or donor), but provided from the budget of the organization offering the internship position. 
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gift that gains her access to an internship and, relatedly, whether gift-based inequalities 
of access to internships are matters of luck.   
First, consider whether it is a matter of luck for an individual to be gifted expenses, 
internships or bidding labour time.  To illustrate my argument, I will focus on receipt of 
bidding expenses for open auctioned internships, but the argument applies just as well 
to receipt of living expenses, gifted internships, and gifted bidding labour time.  Imagine 
that wealthy and generous Alpha has a daughter, Beta, who wants to become an intern 
but – not unusually for someone at the start of her career – has insufficient personal 
wealth to buy an auctioned internship position.  Simply because Alpha wants the best 
for her child (and not because Beta has done anything to ‘earn’ the money), she makes 
Beta an unconditional offer of the bidding expenses required to buy an internship at 
open auction.  Beta gladly accepts and, as a result, has access to the internship, which 
she would not otherwise have had.  Alpha’s financial loss is genuinely chosen by her and 
so she has no complaint.  But Beta’s windfall is not chosen: she did nothing to warrant 
it and simply received it because her mother was able and willing to help her.  In other 
words, she just happened to have the right mother, which is a matter of brute luck.  
Lazenby comes to an equivalent conclusion in his discussion of a different Alpha who 
gifts a different Beta, through no choice of Beta’s.  He writes that, because ‘Beta did not 
act to bring about the gift’, it qualifies as an instance of ‘‘brute luck giving’, that is, giving 
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that disturbs the luck egalitarian distribution’ (Lazenby 2010: 276).101  Lazenby writes of 
brute luck giving that its ‘greatest instance occurs between parents and children: it is 
                                              
101 As Lazenby writes, ‘because Alpha has chosen the brute luck for Beta, the resulting 
distribution cannot appear for Alpha as a matter of brute luck’ (Lazenby 2010: 275, original 
emphasis).  This highlights the paradoxical status of gifts in luck egalitarian theory.  As Cohen 
notes in relation to gifts, ‘one man’s choice is another man’s luck’ (Cohen 2009: 143).  In 
Lazenby’s terms, gifts are instances of other-affecting choice: choices to give can create brute 
luck advantages for donees, and brute luck inequalities between donees and non-donees.  This 
raises complex questions regarding how luck egalitarians should respond to gifts.  As Otsuka 
(2004: 51-54) notes, protecting people’s choices to give is incompatible with a luck-neutral 
distribution but, on the other hand, protecting a luck-neutral distribution would require severe 
constraints on freedom of choice to give.  In deciding how to respond, Otsuka argues that, 
inevitably, ‘there is a morally regrettable trade-off to be made’ between freedom and equality 
(Otsuka 2004: 75).  When this trade-off must be made, Otsuka argues, we should err on the side 
of protecting equality: ‘strict regulation of gifts and bequests […] would be necessary to ensure 
that nobody benefits to a greater degree from such gifts or bequests than anyone else’ (Otsuka 
2002: 52).  Vallentyne (2000) holds that gifts should be taxed to some extent, Van Parijs argues 
that gifts are 100% taxable (1995: 90, 101), and Lazenby maintains that ‘the only way to ensure 
that giving does not upset the luck egalitarian distribution would be to forbid it ex ante’ (Lazenby 
2010: 284).  Ultimately, I think Lazenby is correct to claim that consideration of other-affecting 
choice, and especially of the inegalitarian implications of gifts, provides ‘reasons to revise 
downwards our view of how ‘choice friendly’ luck egalitarianism really is’ (Lazenby 2010: 285).  
I consider in the next chapter what regulatory action luck egalitarians might recommend in 
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simply a matter of luck from the child’s perspective whether they happen to be born to 
parents who are wealthy or poor, miserly or generous’ (Lazenby 2010: 276).  This echoes 
Dworkin’s earlier statement that it ‘is bad luck to be born into a relatively poor family or 
a family that is selfish or spendthrift’ (Dworkin 2000: 347).  Rakowski agrees, maintaining 
that receipt of gifts from family members should normally be treated as a matter of brute 
luck: 
Most generalizations with respect to the role of brute luck in gift-
giving are honeycombed with exceptions, but one might be 
sufficiently solid and important to incorporate in public policies 
governing redistributive taxation.  The material gains […] that 
people receive from their parents generally depend more on brute 
luck than do the friends or spouse someone has and the financial 
benefits he receives in consequence.  To the extent that this 
relationship holds, there exists a good reason for treating gifts and 
bequests to children more like one would pure cases of good brute 
luck than for treating transfers between friends or spouses in this 
manner.  (Rakowski 1991: 159) 
                                              
response to inequalities of access to internships and discuss in more detail there how luck 
egalitarians might respond to gifts of internship expenses, internships, and bidding labour time.  
For now, the important point is that Beta’s receipt of the advantaging gift is unchosen.   
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It may well be that the single most decisive factor delineating access to open auctioned 
internships is the wealth and generosity of potential interns’ families.  That would 
certainly be the case if one’s family wholly determined one’s wealth at the start of one’s 
career.  But perhaps that is too fast.  What if Alpha were not Beta’s doting mother but, 
instead, a friend with whom Beta had made efforts to cultivate a friendship?  Might those 
efforts be sufficient to transform the receipt of the gift of bidding expenses from brute 
luck to option luck?  As Mason notes: 
it might be argued that not all gifts and bequests are a matter of 
good brute luck for their recipients.  Some are the result of choices 
made by the recipient, for example, those that express the 
gratitude of the gift-giver for something the recipient has done or 
for the friendship they have enjoyed together.  (Mason 2006: 146) 
Vallentyne makes a similar point and claims that, even within families, whether or not a 
gift is received may partly depend on prior choices:   
Typically, gifts are made at least in part in response to the prior 
choices made by the donee.  An attentive daughter may receive 
more gifts from her parents than her neglectful brother.  
(Vallentyne 1997: 333) 
Mason and Vallentyne’s point is that it is possible for a donee to receive a gift (say, of 
bidding expenses) partly due to choices she has previously made to cultivate friendships 
and relationships.  Rather than always being a matter of pure brute luck, receipt of gifts 
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may sometimes be – to some extent – a matter of donees’ option luck.  Of course, 
ascertaining to what extent it is option luck is not straightforward.  As Lazenby writes: 
it is unclear exactly when one should consider a recipient’s actions 
sufficient to make a gift the result of option luck rather than brute 
luck.  The pertinent question will be: how close a relationship must 
there be between an action on the part of a recipient and some 
corresponding gift to make that gift the result of option luck?  
(Lazenby 2010: 278) 
Still, imagine those difficulties have been overcome and we can say with certainty that 
Beta has acted in such a way that Alpha’s gifting Beta is partly Beta’s option luck (rather 
than her pure brute luck).  Whether part of Beta’s resulting advantage is therefore 
acceptable to luck egalitarian justice or not depends on which view of option luck is 
favoured.  As we saw in section 1.3.2.3, luck egalitarians disagree over whether option 
luck inequalities are just.  Knight’s rejection of the justice of option luck inequality entails 
that Beta’s advantage is objectionable on the grounds that, although she made choices 
to act in ways that led to Alpha choosing to gift her, she did not directly choose to be 
given expenses: that choice rested with Alpha and, as such, was not under Beta’s 
metaphysical control.  But, as we also saw, other luck egalitarians, including Cohen and 
Arneson, deem option luck inequality acceptable to justice.  On this view, then, it might 
seem that at least part of the advantage Beta gains on receipt of Alpha’s gift of bidding 
expenses is unproblematic to luck egalitarian distributive justice.   
However, Beta’s gains cannot be considered in isolation.  Brute luck plays a part in who 
has the opportunity to receive gifts.  While particular individuals may make choices 
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leading to receipt of gifts (such that their advantage is a matter option luck to some 
extent), others do not have that option.  Thus, while the discussion above concerns the 
extent to which an individual’s post-gift advantage is a matter of luck, it does not fully 
address the question of whether gift-based inequalities of access to internships are 
matters of luck.  To answer that question, we must consider the opportunities of all to 
receive the relevant gifts.  To illustrate, consider the case of Gamma.  Gamma is alike 
and similarly positioned to Beta in every respect, except that she happens to have no 
Alpha in her life.  Like Beta, she wants to become an intern and would bid for an 
internship if she could but, unfortunately, she has neither the money to bid nor family 
or other contacts who could gift her the requisite bidding expenses.  Assume, first, that 
Alpha’s gifting Beta is Beta’s brute luck.  The result of Alpha’s choice is not merely that 
Beta is more advantaged than she was before the gift.  It is also that an inequality is 
created between Beta and Gamma, which neither chose.  Beta is advantaged relative to 
Gamma and not through any choice either made.  Assume, second, that Alpha’s gifting 
Beta is – to some considerable extent – Beta’s option luck.  The result of Alpha’s choice 
is, again, that Beta is more advantaged than she was prior to the gift, and that an 
inequality is created between Beta and Gamma.  Gamma is disadvantaged relative to 
Beta and, while Beta’s relative advantage may be traced in part to her previous choices, 
Gamma did not choose her relative disadvantage.  That is, Gamma is worse off than 
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Beta through no choice of her own.102  This brings us to what is, in my view, a crucial 
consideration: in both cases, Beta and Gamma’s opportunities to be gifted bidding 
expenses were not equal.  Regardless of whether it is option luck or brute luck that Beta 
is advantaged relative to her position pre-gift, it is Gamma’s brute luck that she had no 
Alpha in her life and that the advantage afforded to Beta by Alpha was never available 
to her.  If access to open auctioned (and other) internships depends on receipt of the 
gift of bidding expenses (and other gifts), inequalities of opportunity to receive that gift 
result in luck-based inequalities of access to internships.  Lazenby expresses the general 
point as follows: even if we suppose that Beta had acted in such a way as to bring about 
a gift, ‘this would still not be sufficient to transform corresponding gifts into being the 
result of option luck, as this must also be determined by the value of the opportunity set 
of givers one had access to’ (Lazenby 2010: 278-279).  He continues:  
it is to some extent a matter of brute luck which potential givers 
make up one’s opportunity set.  In short, while we could expect 
that some will actively search out these generous givers, there will 
always be an element of brute luck involved in who we meet 
during the course of our lives and whether or not they are 
generous.  (Lazenby 2010: 279) 
                                              
102 Of course, Alpha’s choice does not render Gamma worse off, in absolute terms, relative to 
her position prior to Alpha’s gift to Beta.  But it does entail that Gamma is now worse off than 
Beta, where before the gift was given they both lacked access to open auctioned internships. 
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Rakowski also acknowledges the point that opportunities to receive gifts – including 
opportunities to cultivate the sorts of relationships within which gifts are likely to be 
forthcoming – will always be influenced in part by brute luck: 
close relationships are usually bound up with shared experiences.  
Those experiences depend on physical proximity and thus are 
invariably influenced by where and when someone happened to 
be born and live at a particular time. […]  Brute luck may therefore 
dominate in the case of interspousal gifts or gifts between friends 
as well as in the case of gifts from parents to children, particularly 
given its sizable part in bringing people together.  (Rakowski 1993: 
160) 
Now, if it were the case that everyone had an Alpha in their lives or, at least, had genuine 
opportunities to cultivate lucrative relationships with people of Alpha’s wealth and 
generosity, there might then be grounds to claim that all had opportunities to acquire 
the expenses on which access to internships sold at open auction depends.  But, I submit, 
that does not capture the present reality of access to open auctioned (and, indeed, closed 
auctioned and unpaid) internships.  The distribution of wealth in the UK today is such 
that some young people have access to more wealth than they will ever require, while 
others struggle to pay for the most basic necessities of life.  Those from the poorest 
families may also be the least likely to have genuine opportunities to cultivate lucrative 
relationships with wealthy and generous people outside of their families.  Thus, whether 
or not option luck inequalities are acceptable to justice, unequal opportunity sets for gifts 
of internship expenses from within and without the family entail that the current 
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expenses-based inequalities of access to internships are to some very considerable extent 
a matter of brute luck.   
Thus far, I have focused on gifts to demonstrate that, to the extent that inequalities of 
access to unpaid, auctioned and nepotistic internships depend on ‘who you know’ and 
whether those contacts are able and willing to gift expenses, bidding labour time and the 
internship itself, those inequalities are in large part matters of luck.  But I want also to 
mention how ‘who you know’ delineates access to internships distributed by closed 
competition.  If the above arguments hold, they demonstrate that ‘who you know’ is to 
some significant degree a matter of luck.  When applications to competitive internships 
are invited by word of mouth, eligibility to apply depends on the luck of knowing the 
right person.  And, again, it may be the case that the least advantaged in Britain today 
are the least well-connected, in the sense of having contacts who can inform them of the 
availability of internship positions.103   
Perhaps, however, this discussion of gifts is somewhat of a red herring in relation to 
expenses-based inequalities of access to internships.  Certainly, access to internships 
distributed by closed auction and nepotism requires that the intern knows the right 
person – someone who is in a position to go to an invitation-only internship auction or 
                                              
103 Moreover, if (as mentioned in footnote 98 above) closed competitive internships are 
advertised in local newspapers, rather than through word of mouth, such that location delineates 
who hears of internship positions, this may be no less a matter of luck.  As Rakowski notes 
above, where one happens to live is often very much a matter of brute luck.   
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to gift the internship outright.  But acquisition of bidding or living expenses – or, ‘what 
you have’ – may not necessarily always or wholly depend on being gifted those expenses.  
Not everyone enjoys lucrative relationships or opportunities to cultivate them, but some 
may take up paid employment and save up the expenses required to buy an internship 
or work as an unpaid intern.  In other words, they may make choices to take up 
opportunities to overcome their financial disadvantage and thereby gain access to open 
auctioned and unpaid internships.  Others may have these opportunities but choose not 
to take them up and, in these cases, we might think their lack of access is chosen.  Indeed, 
if all had genuine opportunities to earn living and bidding expenses – if there were 
plentiful well-paid entry level jobs available to young people at the start of their working 
lives – expenses-based inequalities of access to internships might be conceived as matters 
of choice.104  However, while some may have the opportunity to gain paid employment 
(and choose to take it up), it is one thing to earn a living and quite another to earn so 
much as to enable accrual of sufficient living and bidding expenses, which often run into 
the thousands of pounds.  Given the current scarcity of (and inequalities of access to) 
well-paid entry level jobs, working to save up to pay for auctioned and unpaid internships 
                                              
104 Dworkin makes a similar point in his discussion of Adrian and Bruce who, while beginning 
from a position of equality of opportunity, make different choices and end up unequally placed: 
Adrian works hard to make money, while Bruce prefers to spend his time playing tennis.  
Dworkin argues that the resulting inequality of outcome between Adrian and Bruce is just (see 
Dworkin 1981: 304-305).  
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is simply not a genuine option available to many young people.105  Furthermore, access 
to adequately well-paid jobs may in turn depend on factors that are a matter of luck.  
Thus, just as there are inequalities of opportunities to receive gifts of expenses, there are 
also inequalities of opportunities to earn expenses.  The crucial point is that, while some 
people’s lack of access to auctioned and unpaid internships on financial grounds may be, 
to some degree, a matter of their choice, inequalities of access to internships on financial 
grounds are not fully chosen.  If all were similarly placed and had the opportunity to earn 
sufficient expenses to bid for an internship or work as an unpaid intern, we might say 
that those who chose not to take up the opportunity chose their lack of access to 
auctioned and unpaid internships.  But all budding interns are not similarly placed.   
To illustrate this point, consider the following eight graduates, each of whom wants to 
buy an internship at open auction.  Alpha is given the requisite bidding expenses by her 
wealthy and generous mother (because her mother wants the best for her child and not 
because Alpha has done anything to warrant the gift), and so has access to the internship.  
Beta has no opportunity to be given expenses but, due in large part to an abundance of 
native talent, supportive parents and high quality education, she is highly qualified and, 
                                              
105 The Office for National Statistics estimates that in the period from February to April 2014, 
there were 677,000 unemployed 18 to 24 year olds, while the number of jobs vacancies from 
March to May 2014 was 637,000 (ONS 2014).  The number of young unemployed people 
therefore exceeds the total number of vacancies and, moreover, we can assume that some of 
these vacancies are not well-paid, entry level jobs.  
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by virtue of her qualifications, has the opportunity to get such a well-paid job that she 
could save up expenses from her income.  She chooses to work and save up the expenses, 
and so has access to the internship.  Gamma has no opportunity to be given expenses 
but, like Beta, is fortunate enough to have the opportunity to earn them.  She chooses 
not to save up the expenses and so does not have access to the internship.  Delta has no 
opportunity to be given expenses but, despite the disadvantages of nature and nurture, 
has chosen against the grain to work hard in developing her native talent and to get a 
good degree that will qualify her for a well-paid job.  She chooses to work and save up 
the expenses, and so has access to the internship.  Epsilon started out similarly placed to 
Delta and made similar choices to become well qualified, but chooses not to take up 
available opportunities to earn expenses, and so does not have access to the internship.  
Zeta has no opportunity to be given expenses, but she does have the opportunity to 
enter paid employment.  The jobs available to her are not, however, paid sufficiently well 
that she could save up expenses.  Despite the advantages of nature and nurture – 
considerable native talents, a supportive family, and so on – she chose not to work hard 
and shunned her opportunities to gain a good degree.  She chooses to work and earn 
money, but cannot save up the expenses required to buy an internship.  Eta has no 
opportunity to be given expenses, but does have the opportunity to gain paid 
employment.  She was not advantaged by nature or nurture, but made difficult choices 
to try hard to develop her talents.  Unfortunately, despite her best efforts, she was still 
unable to get a good degree, and the jobs to which she has access are not paid sufficiently 
well for her to save up expenses from the income.  She chooses to work and earn, but 
does not have access to the internship.  Finally, Theta has no opportunity to be given 
expenses.  She has also recently been compelled to undertake time consuming caring 
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duties for her disabled mother, as state support is inadequate and no one else is available 
and willing.  She can only work three days a week and so is unable to save up the bidding 
expenses required to buy the internship.   
Considering the individual cases, we can see that an individual’s access or lack of access 
to an internship can be more or less genuinely chosen by that individual.  Gamma, 
Epsilon and Zeta’s lack of access to auctioned internships appears a matter of their own 
choices not to take up the opportunities available to them and so, considered in isolation, 
might not be too worrying.  But Eta and Theta’s lack of access is a matter of luck: they 
cannot make choices to gain access.  In the cases of Beta and Delta, they made choices 
to get themselves into positions from which they have access to the auctioned internship, 
but those choices were, to borrow Arneson’s (2004) terms, differently ‘difficult’ or 
‘painful’ for each of them.  Beta’s choices were fairly easy for her to make, but Delta’s 
were more difficult.  Further, when we consider inequalities of access between the 
graduates, we can see that while some had opportunities to make choices to gain access 
to auctioned internships, others never had equivalent opportunities.  Certainly, the 
inequalities of access between some of the graduates (between Beta and Gamma, and 
between Delta and Epsilon) are the result of their different choices.  They had equal 
opportunities to exercise choices that would result in them having the expenses to access 
auctioned internships, but chose differently.  But Beta and Gamma had better 
opportunities to earn and save than Delta and Epsilon: the latter’s choices were more 
difficult to make than were the former’s.  So it may seem that, while Beta and Delta both 
made choices that led to them gaining access, Beta was luckier than Delta.  Zeta also had 
better opportunities to gain access than Eta, and the former’s lack of access therefore 
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seems more chosen and less a matter of luck than the latter’s.  We can see, then, that 
some of the graduates had opportunities to make more or less difficult choices to accrue 
internship expenses (namely, Beta, Gamma, Delta, Epsilon and Zeta), but equivalent 
opportunities were unavailable to others (Eta and Theta), and Alpha was simply brute 
lucky to be given the expenses.  These are artificial cases, but I think it likely that they 
are representative of the situations of many young people in Britain today.   
Luck egalitarians disagree over what kind of significance these sorts of background 
inequalities in people’s opportunity sets have.  Knight (2009a) argues that, even where 
opportunity sets are unequal, choice can still legitimate inequalities of outcome, as long 
as due consideration is given to the circumstances in which choices are made.  Knight 
would, then, judge inequality of outcome between Beta and Gamma to be acceptable if 
and because they were equivalently positioned (that is, had equal opportunity sets) when 
they made their different choices.  With regard to Beta’s advantage relative to Theta, I 
think Knight would view it as far less acceptable, given the marked inequality in their 
initial opportunities, but perhaps not entirely unjust, given that Beta made responsible 
choices leading to her internship.  Barry, on the other hand, advocates an ‘equal footing 
proviso’ according to which choice can only legitimate inequality of outcome given equal 
opportunity sets (Barry 2008: 139).  On this more demanding, more ‘radically egalitarian’ 
view, because opportunity sets were not equal across the relevant population (from 
Alpha to Theta), any advantages and disadvantages that result are unjust (Barry 2008: 
139).  On either view, however, it is certainly true that there are significant luck-based 
inequalities of access to auctioned internships, which are a function of luck-based 
differences in the financial resources people have (or can acquire) coupled with the use 
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of auctions as a distributive mechanism.  Similarly, there are significant luck-based 
inequalities of access to unpaid internships, which are a function of luck-based 
differences in people’s financial resources coupled with the lack of remuneration 
afforded to unpaid interns.   
In sum, access to internships is delineated by a variety of forms of luck.  Luck-based 
differences in personal resources – demographic characteristics, developed abilities, 
social networks and wealth – combine with aspects of the structure of internship 
schemes – their distributive mechanism and (lack of) remuneration – to ensure 
inequalities of access to internships are, to some considerable degree, a matter of luck.  
Precisely how significant a role luck plays is in part an empirical question but, with the 
foregoing account in mind, it does not seem an unreasonable assumption that its role is 
significant and weighty.   
3.2.2  A Comparison of Access to Different Types of Internship 
Thus far, I hope to have demonstrated that there are luck-based inequalities of access to 
each type of internship available in the UK today.  An interesting question arises, then, 
how restricted access to each type is, on the basis of luck-based differences in personal 
resources.  To answer this question accurately would require comprehensive data on 
precisely what personal resources enable people to gain access to the different available 
internships, how many people have them and how many do not, and the extent to which 
their having or not having them is a matter of luck.  Unfortunately, such data are 
currently unavailable.  However, it is still possible in their absence to conjecture which 
of the types of internship have the most restricted access and which the least.  By making 
some empirical assumptions, we can make contingent conjectures regarding which types 
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of internship are likely to have the most unequal access.  Doing so also clarifies how 
accurate judgements might be made, were the data available. 
For the purpose of drawing some contingent conclusions, then, I make one 
uncontroversial assumption and four simplifying assumptions regarding what the 
empirical data would tell us were it to be gathered.  First, I assume – uncontroversially, 
given background inequalities of wealth – that the greater the amount of money required 
to take up an internship, the fewer people will have the requisite amount.  My next four 
assumptions hold a number of independent variables constant for the sake of 
argumentative simplicity and clarity.  So, second, I assume that the amount of money 
required to fund unpaid interns throughout unpaid internships is held constant.  (In 
actuality, this amount will vary according to the internship’s location and duration, and 
perhaps other relevant factors.)  Third, I assume that all internships sold at auction go 
for the same price.  (Again, the actual prices of auctioned internships vary.)  Fourth, I 
assume that all competitions for internships share the same eligibility and selection 
criteria.  (As explained above, in reality competitions may employ a variety of eligibility 
and selection criteria.)  Finally, I make the simplifying assumption that differences in 
personal resources are entirely a matter of luck, and so do not account for the influence 
of choice on developed abilities, social networks and wealth.  (Of course, if the foregoing 
arguments hold, they show that, in fact, while those differences are to some considerable 
degree a matter of luck, they may also sometimes be influenced by choice.)  On the basis 
of these five assumptions, I consider, first, which types of internship have the most 
restricted access on the basis of wealth (that is, which types require interns to have the 
most wealth).  This generates an ordering of the different types of internship according 
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to how restricted their access is.  Next, I consider the less straightforward matters of 
how access to the different types of internship is further restricted on other bases and 
how this affects their ordering. 
Perhaps most obviously, when the distributive mechanism is held constant, wealth-based 
inequalities of access to unpaid internships are more pronounced than access to their 
paid equivalents.  This is because more wealth is required to undertake an unpaid 
internship than a paid internship distributed by the same mechanism: in the absence of 
an income from internship work, interns must have an alternative source of wealth to 
fund their living expenses.  Background wealth inequalities entail that the more wealth 
is required to undertake an internship the fewer people have access to it.  Thus, holding 
the distributive mechanism constant, access to unpaid internships is more restricted on 
the basis of wealth than access to paid internships.   
Looking more closely at access to the different types of internships, we can see that 
access to paid internships distributed by open competition, closed competition and 
nepotism is not restricted on the basis of wealth: lack of wealth does not directly prevent 
interns from being able to take up these types of internships.  However, unpaid 
internships distributed by open competition, closed competition and nepotism require 
that interns have sufficient living expenses.  Access to these is therefore more restricted 
on the basis of wealth than access to their paid counterparts.  Paid internships distributed 
by open auction and closed auction also each require that interns have bidding expenses.  
Access to these is therefore more restricted on the basis of wealth than access to paid 
internships distributed by open competition, closed competition and nepotism.  The 
question of whether access to unpaid internships distributed by open competition, 
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closed competition and nepotism is more or less restricted on the basis of wealth than 
access to paid internships distributed by open or closed auction depends on whether the 
price of an auctioned internship exceeds the amount of money required to fund a period 
of unpaid internship work (that is, on whether bidding expenses exceed living expenses).  
If so, paid auctioned internships have the more restricted access and, if not, unpaid 
internships distributed by open competition, closed competition and nepotism have the 
more restricted access.  Wealth-based inequalities of access to unpaid internships 
distributed by open or closed auction are the most pronounced of all: whatever the cost 
of buying an internship at auction and the cost of living throughout a period of unpaid 
internship work, the cost of buying an internship and paying for living expenses for its 
duration, as a composite of both, exceeds it.   
These considerations yield an ordering of the types of internship from those with the 
least restricted access on the basis of wealth, to those with the most.  On the assumption 
that bidding expenses exceed living expenses, the ordering is as follows: access to paid 
internships distributed by open competition, closed competition and nepotism is the 
least restricted; access to unpaid internships distributed by open competition, closed 
competition and nepotism is more restricted; access to paid internships distributed by 
open auction and closed auction is even more restricted; and access to unpaid internships 
distributed by open auction and closed auction is the most restricted on the basis of 
wealth.  On the assumption that living expenses exceed bidding expenses, unpaid 
internships distributed by open competition, closed competition and nepotism, and paid 
internships distributed by open auction and closed auction switch position.  If bidding 
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and living expenses are equal, access to these internships is equally restricted on the basis 
of wealth.   
But this ordering will be upset in ways that are not straightforward when we factor in 
how access to internships is restricted on bases other than wealth. Paid and unpaid 
internships distributed by closed auction require interns to know the right elite contact.  
If it is the case that some interns who have the requisite bidding expenses to buy an 
auctioned paid internship do not have the right elite contact to get into a closed auction, 
then access to paid internships distributed by closed auction is more restricted than 
access to paid internships distributed by open auction.  Similarly, if it is the case that 
some interns who have the requisite bidding and living expenses to buy and undertake 
an auctioned unpaid internship do not have the right elite contact to get into a closed 
auction, then access to unpaid internships distributed by closed auction is more restricted 
than access to unpaid internships distributed by open auction.  In other words, if only a 
subset of those with the wealth required to buy an internship at auction have an elite 
contact with access to closed internship auctions, ‘who you know’ plays a live role in 
restricting access to these internships.  If (less plausibly, I think) all interns who have 
bidding expenses and all those who have both bidding and living expenses also have an 
elite contact who can go to bid at auction on their behalf, the fact that an internship 
auction is closed plays no live role in further restricting access to it.  Access to paid and 
unpaid internships distributed by closed auction would then be no more restricted than 
access to paid and unpaid internships distributed by open auction, respectively.  If (as I 
would tentatively assume) fewer people have bidding expenses and the right elite contact 
than have both bidding and living expenses, then access to paid internships distributed 
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by closed auction is more restricted than access to unpaid internships distributed by open 
auction (and vice versa).   
How restricted access to internships distributed by nepotism is depends on how many 
people have a professional contact who can gift them an internship position.  I suspect 
that access to nepotistic internships is extremely restricted, but there is no empirical 
evidence available that could confirm or rebut this suspicion.  It is clear, though, that if 
some interns who do know the right professional do not have living expenses, access to 
nepotistic unpaid internships is more restricted than access to nepotistic paid internships.  
If, alternatively, all interns who might be gifted an internship also have access to 
sufficient living expenses to support a period of unpaid internship work, wealth does not 
play any live role in restricting access to nepotistic internships, which would have equally 
restricted access whether or not they were paid.  However, without the relevant data, 
internships distributed by nepotism hold a somewhat ambiguous position in the 
ordering.  That ambiguity extends to internships distributed by competition.  Having the 
ability to successfully complete an internship may well be the most prevalent personal 
resource, such that more people have that ability than have bidding expenses, living 
expenses, elite contacts or professional contacts.  But, again, such claims would require 
support from empirical data that, as yet, has not been gathered.  We can say with some 
certainty that, holding application eligibility criteria constant, access to competitively 
distributed internships that employ discriminatory selection criteria is more restricted 
than access to competitive internships that employ selection criteria that select only for 
ability, if it is the case (as seems undeniable) that discrimination excludes people who 
would be able to successfully complete the internship.  Similarly, closed competitions 
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have more restricted access than their open counterparts, holding selection criteria 
constant, as application eligibility criteria restrict who can apply (usually on the basis of 
‘who you know’).   
As acknowledged above, without the necessary empirical data, this analysis is necessarily 
conjectural.  However, it is intended to demonstrate that while access to all types of 
internships currently available in the UK is delineated on the basis of factors that are, at 
least in large part, a matter of luck, access to some is likely to be much worse than others.  
To the extent that internship distribution generates unjust inequalities of outcome, luck 
egalitarians have reason to consider how those unjust outcomes can be prevented and 
redressed.  When we come to consider internship regulation in the following chapter, 
we will see that luck egalitarians can recommend bespoke regulatory action to minimize 
luck-based inequalities of access, in particular by changing those aspects of the structure 
of internship schemes which function to restrict access the most severely, by advantaging 
those with the least common personal resources. 
3.2.3  Internships and Expensive Tastes 
In the discussion above, I have been concerned with how luck-based differences in 
personal resources on the one hand and internship distributive mechanisms and lack of 
remuneration on the other function together to produce (more or less pronounced) luck-
based inequalities of access to internships.  But there is another question relevant to the 
luck egalitarian considering the justice of contemporary internships.  That question 
concerns the costs of working as an unpaid intern or buying an auctioned internship and, 
specifically, whether it is fair for interns to bear those costs.  Might the preference to buy 
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an internship at auction or work as an unpaid intern be a case of an ‘expensive taste’ and, 
if so, is it fair to impose the costs of satisfying that expensive taste on the intern?   
On the metaphysical distinction between luck and choice, the costs of an action may 
count as chosen if they were foreseeable and avoidable.  But, following Cohen and on 
the assumption that welfare is or constitutes part of the correct metric of advantage, it 
is yet unjust to impose those costs on the chooser if the choice was not reasonably 
avoidable.  That is, the cost should be alleviated if the preference from which the choice 
follows is strongly identified with, such that to have refrained from making that choice 
would have unreasonably entailed ‘alienation from what is deep within them’ (Cohen 2004: 
14, see also section 1.3.2.4).  Considering individual interns who intern unpaid or buy 
internships, then, are the living and bidding costs they accrue chosen in the sense of 
being foreseeable and avoidable?  If not, the metaphysical luck egalitarian must deem it 
unjust to impose those costs on the intern.  If so, we must ask whether the costs were 
reasonably avoidable, without entailing alienation from a deeply identified with 
preference.  If not, again imposition of the costs on the intern is unjust.  But if so – if 
the intern could reasonably have avoided making the choice to intern unpaid or to buy 
an internship – that might constitute a case in which it is fair to impose the related costs.   
First, are the costs of meeting living and bidding expenses foreseeable?  I think the fairly 
straightforward answer to that is yes.  At auction, the bidder knows at the time of bidding 
how much she is bidding for the internship.  The costs are explicitly consented to at the 
time of purchase.  Regarding living expenses during a period of unpaid internship work, 
it is reasonable to expect interns to work out in advance of taking up an unpaid internship 
what living expenses will amount to.  The costs of meeting internship living and bidding 
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expenses are foreseeable, then.  Are the costs avoidable?  In the narrow sense of 
avoidability, absent considerations of the reasonableness of avoidability, it seems they 
are.  No one is forcibly compelled to buy or take up an unpaid internship.  Moreover, as 
long as there is some paid work available (either a paid internship or paid employment) 
that the intern could have taken up instead, we might be tempted to think the costs are 
reasonably avoidable.  (In the absence of paid opportunities, we might think, however, 
that the intern could not have avoided accruing living costs by not interning.  In this case 
the intern would have remained unemployed through no choice of her own and so would 
have needed her cost of living to be covered, perhaps by unemployment benefits.  
Bidding expenses are avoidable, but the cost of living must always be met.)  But this does 
not take into account interns’ preferences, which may render it unreasonable to expect 
them to take up other work.  I assume here that interns undertake internships because 
they have a more or less deeply held preference to gain experience of what it might be 
like to work in a sector (that is, a preference to complete the internship itself), or because 
they have a more or less deeply held preference to gain paid employment in a sector, for 
which completion of an internship will advantage them (that is, an instrumental 
preference for an internship as a means to fulfilling their preference for gaining paid 
employment in a sector).  Relatedly, I also assume that, in the standard case, it would be 
odd if accrual of the costs of interning were itself the subject of the intern’s preference.  
It is the intrinsic or instrumental value of the internship that is the subject of the 
preference – not its being auctioned or unpaid.   
Some preferences to intern may not be deeply held or identified with, such that the intern 
could reasonably make a different choice to gain paid employment.  Some interns may 
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be able, without alienation, to school themselves out of their preference for internships 
that happen to be auctioned or unpaid, and to develop a less expensive preference for 
paid employment.  If other paid work is readily available to the intern, we might consider 
her buying an internship or undertaking an unpaid internship to be a choice, 
responsibility for the costs of which may justly be imposed on her.  But if – for example, 
in times of high unemployment – alternative paid employment is not readily available, it 
seems more unreasonable to require her to bear the costs of choosing to undertake 
internship work.  What about when the preference for an internship in itself, for the 
experience and not merely as a means to a paid job, is deeply identified with?  It is 
relevant here whether there is another paid internship available to the individual at no 
financial cost, that is otherwise of equivalent benefit to the individual.  If so, the costs of 
interning unpaid or buying an internship are foreseeable and reasonably avoidable 
without any alienation.  If not, the costs were foreseeable but not reasonably avoidable.  
But it seems highly likely that, were a paid and otherwise equivalent internship available 
at no financial cost to an individual, she would opt for that, rather than an unpaid or 
auctioned internship: if a less costly but otherwise just as good option is genuinely 
accessible, surely most would take it.  Where the internship is itself deeply preferred, 
then, it appears unfair to impose bidding and living expenses on the intern.  With regard 
to cases where the individual has a deeply held preference for a job, to which an 
auctioned or unpaid internship is the means, it is relevant whether there are equivalently 
valuable paid internships available at no financial cost, or accessible entry level jobs that 
would enable the individual to fulfil that preference without accruing bidding or living 
expenses.  If so, the costs are reasonably avoidable without alienation: buying an 
internship or interning unpaid is not a necessary step to fulfilling the preference.  But, if 
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not, buying or undertaking the internship is necessary to fulfilling the preference and 
avoiding alienation, and so the costs were not reasonably avoidable.  Again, it seems 
highly unlikely that anyone would choose the more costly but otherwise equivalent 
option if less costly options were available.  Thus, in these cases, it again appears unfair 
to impose the costs on the intern.  Overall, then, assuming that welfare is (part of) the 
correct metric of advantage, the metaphysical approach will tend to view the imposition 
of living and bidding costs on interns as unjust: if we find something intuitively 
objectionable about unpaid and auctioned internships, that tells in its favour.106   
Non-metaphysical approaches to luck egalitarianism differ in the way they assign 
responsibility for meeting the costs of expensive tastes.  Most notably, Dworkin’s 
identificationist approach assigns responsibility for meeting the costs of expensive tastes 
when and precisely because they are identified with.  Dworkin thinks distributive justice 
requires people to bear the costs of satisfying reflectively endorsed tastes, because their 
                                              
106 I specified above that interns, on my assumption, want to undertake internship work because 
they want to gain experience of what it might be like to work in a sector or to gain an advantage 
in competitions for jobs, and that it would be odd if the object of their preferences were the 
accrual of internship-related expenses.  I suppose, however, that an intern might want to 
undertake an internship precisely because its expense makes it exclusive.  That is, in Cohen’s 
terms, she might want it for its ‘snob value’ (Cohen 2004: 20).  Cohen suggests that such cases 
‘justify less sympathy’ and, as such, ‘justice should look less kindly on the proposition that’ she 
be relieved of responsibility for those costs (Cohen 2004: 12, 20). 
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being reflectively endorsed means they are identified with by and form part of the 
personality of their bearer.  As outlined in section 1.2.2.2, Dworkin holds that people 
should take consequential responsibility for the costs of choices that flow from their 
personalities, including the costs of satisfying preferences and fulfilling ambitions with 
which they identify.  (Moreover, it may be the case that, on a Dworkinian approach, non-
payment of interns could be conceived as part of the workings of the market and the 
upshot of others’ preferences – namely, the preferences of managers to maximize profit 
– which should be respected.)  These considerations suggest that Dworkin’s 
identificationist approach to luck egalitarianism may permit the living and bidding costs 
required to undertake unpaid and auctioned internships to be imposed on the intern, 
when the preference to intern (or to get a job to which such internships are the means) 
is deep and identified with.  If this is correct, and if we find something intuitively 
objectionable about unpaid and auctioned internships, I think it tells against the 
identificationist approach.   
There is more ambiguity, on my reading, in Mason’s attributivist approach with regard 
to assigning living and bidding costs on interns.  On that approach, responsibility should 
be assigned for meeting the costs of preferences when and precisely because they are 
inside the space of rational agency.  This suggests that bidding and living costs should 
be assigned to interns when their preference to undertake internships that happen to 
require these expenses (or to get a job to which such internships are the means) is deeply 
preferred and identified with.  However, as we saw in section 1.2.2.4, Mason claims that 
he follows Cohen (1989, 2004) in holding that there are cases in which consequential 
responsibility for the costs of satisfying reflectively endorsed tastes that happen to be 
282 
 
expensive should not be imposed.  He writes that ‘it would be unjust to require a person 
to bear the full costs of his choices when the expensiveness of those choices places a 
large burden on him and is due in significant part to some feature of his circumstances’ 
(Mason 2006: 188).  Reducing consequential responsibility for such costs is particularly 
appropriate, Mason argues, whenever it would help to ‘prevent the demise of a cultural 
community when this would make it difficult or even impossible for its members (or 
some of them) to lead a life they can find meaningful’ (Mason 2006: 182).  Indeed, 
Mason’s discussion of expensive tastes is very much focused on the imperative to avoid 
the demise of cultural communities and it is unclear whether he would recommend 
relieving responsibility for costs when imposing them would not put any cultural 
community at risk (see Mason 2006: 181-182).  In other words, if we can take it as given 
that continuing to impose living and bidding costs on interns does not harm any cultural 
community, it is unclear (at least, on my reading) whether the attributivist approach 
would permit or require those costs to be relieved.  While I have already rejected that 
approach for a range of reasons in section 1.2.4, I submit further that, if it does not 
relieve responsibility for living and bidding costs, it fails to capture the intuitive 
objectionableness of unpaid and auctioned interns, and that this tells against it.   
Conclusion 
In sum, there are pronounced luck-based inequalities of access to all types of internship 
currently on offer in the UK.  Competitions for internships select for the ability to 
successfully complete the internship and to ‘fit in’ with the organization and may also 
discriminate against applicants on the basis of their unchosen demographic 
characteristics.  Access to internships distributed by nepotism, closed auction, closed 
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competition (where the internship is ‘advertised’ through word of mouth) and nepotistic 
competition is restricted on the basis of differences in personal social networks, or, ‘who 
you know’.  Finally, auctioned and unpaid internships are available only to those who 
have or can acquire the necessary bidding and living expenses.  To the extent that the 
relevant differences in people’s demographic characteristics, personal social networks, 
wealth and abilities are matters of luck, inequalities of access that track those differences 
are also matters of luck.  On the luck egalitarian account of distributive justice, overall 
inequalities of outcome resulting from these luck-based inequalities of access to 
internships are unjust.  If compensatory redistribution were the only regulatory strategy 
of luck egalitarianism, the account would recommend that internship-related inequalities 
of outcome be redressed ex post.  However, on the pluralist approach to luck egalitarian 
regulatory strategies I outlined in chapter 2, luck egalitarians might instead recommend 
employment of levelling and direct structural regulatory strategies to prevent (ex ante) 
those inequalities of outcome from arising, at least to some extent, and provision of 
compensation (ex post) to redress any remaining inequality.  In the next chapter, I 
consider what regulatory action to tackle internship-related inequality luck egalitarians 
might endorse.  
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4 
 
Internships:  
Luck Egalitarian Regulatory Proposals 
 
 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, I sought to illuminate how luck influences the distribution of 
contemporary internships in the UK.  To the extent that inequalities of outcome are a 
function of inequalities of opportunity – including luck-based inequalities of access to 
internships – luck egalitarianism accounts them unjust.  On a compensatory approach 
to luck egalitarian regulation, the regulatory response to this injustice would be to refrain 
from changing the way it is produced and to redress it ex post by providing compensation 
to offset any unjust disadvantage and imposing tax to offset any unjust advantage.  
However, if the arguments I presented in chapter 2 hold, luck egalitarians might advocate 
levelling and direct structural regulatory action to reduce (or prevent) injustice, in 
addition to (or instead of) redistributive compensation to redress it.  In this chapter, I 
employ the pluralist approach to the regulatory strategies of luck egalitarian distributive 
justice to frame discussion of the different sorts of regulatory action luck egalitarians 
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might endorse in response to internship-related injustice, examining what internship 
regulation might look like in three different societies.107   
In section 4.1, I consider what internships might look like in a much more ideally just 
society than our own.  In section 4.2, I consider what forms regulation to tackle 
internship-related injustice might take in a less ideal society that is far more like our own.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer an all things considered judgement regarding 
which action or combination of actions should be taken on the balance of reasons.  
However, in section 4.3, I draw attention to how consideration of a number of relational 
egalitarian concerns tells in favour and against the various regulatory actions discussed 
in section 4.2 and, on the basis of those limited considerations, draw some tentative 
conclusions regarding the comparative desirability of the various regulatory options from 
a broadly egalitarian perspective.  Finally, in section 4.4, I briefly consider what regulatory 
actions should be urged by luck egalitarians seeking to minimize internship-related 
injustice here and now in this non-ideal, decidedly unjust society.   
Theoretical proposals for normative regulation must be clear about whether they 
constitute more or less ideal theory.  As I outlined in the introduction of this thesis, I 
employ the account of more and less ideal theory developed by Stemplowska (2008) and 
Hamlin and Stemplowska (2012).  This account states that the formation of normative 
                                              
107 By ‘internship-related injustice’ I mean unjust advantages and disadvantages that are the result 
of luck-based inequalities of access to internships. 
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regulatory rules must take account of the relevant facts and circumstances, but that some 
of these may be idealized.  Non-ideal theories make no idealizing assumptions about the 
facts but, rather, tell us which regulatory options from among the feasible set are 
desirable in light of the demands of the plurality of relevant values (Stemplowska 2008: 
326-329; Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012).108  Non-ideal theories of regulation are 
therefore (or, at least, should be) immediately feasible in the sense that they (should) set 
out how to reduce injustice, starting from where we are now.  They propose regulation 
for society as it is.  On the other hand, theories of regulation may also be more or less 
                                              
108 As Swift notes, identifying the feasible set is a social scientific rather than a philosophical 
task.  He writes:  
Identifying the feasible set requires careful description of existing states 
of affairs – to judge well where we can realistically hope to get to from 
here we need to know precisely where we are – and predictions – with 
probabilities and timescales – about the likely effects of any things we 
might do, collectively or individually, to change them, which itself 
requires adequate understanding of social mechanisms and causal 
processes.  (Swift 2008: 370) 
Thus, he concludes, ‘it is for social science to tell us which states of affairs are feasible and how 
to achieve them’ (Swift 2008: 364).  I would add that, in addition to social scientific 
considerations, insights from political science, social psychology, economics and applied law 
may also be required to identify the feasible options.   
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ideal, depending on the extent to which they idealize pertinent facts: the more facts are 
idealized, the more ideal the theory is (Stemplowska 2008: 326-329, Hamlin and 
Stemplowska 2012: 52-58).  Thus, more or less ideal theory may absent certain feasibility 
constraints.  Summarizing these ideas, Hamlin and Stemplowska write: 
we conceive of less-ideal theory as aimed at identifying short-term 
reforms that take seriously the feasibility constraints that bind here 
and now, while conceiving of more-ideal theory as aimed at 
identifying long-term reforms that become relevant if feasibility 
constraints relax  (Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012: 59) 
I also draw a distinction between deep (or ‘possible worlds’) and sociological (or 
‘Panglossian’) feasibility (Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012: 60).  Implementation of deeply 
infeasible proposals would require, in the terms Stemplowska (2008) borrows from 
Parfit, ‘a major change in the laws of nature, including the laws of human nature’ (Parfit 
1984: 388).  If a proposal requires the laws of physics to be upturned, or requires ‘us to 
change into fundamentally different creatures’, it is deeply infeasible (Hamlin and 
Stemplowska 2012: 57).  Sociological feasibility constraints, on the other hand, concern 
those contingent and at least potentially changeable constraints on what may be 
practically achieved, starting from where we are now and given the current status quo.  
In short, ‘this almost-Panglossian approach to feasibility takes very seriously the 
limitations that may be imposed by individual character and social arrangements’, 
including, for example, contemporary technological capabilities, even when such 
contingencies are liable to change (Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012: 56).   
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4.1  Internship Regulation in a More Ideal Society 
First, then, I consider what internships might look like in a much more (though not 
entirely) ideally just society.  It might be thought that internships inevitably produce 
distributive injustice or that they should have no place in a just society.  My aim is to 
demonstrate that that is not the case and to show how internships could work in 
accordance with the luck egalitarian ideal.  I account for deep but not certain sociological 
feasibility constraints and make various idealizing assumptions, from which emerges an 
idealized picture of internships.  The proposals therefore fall somewhere on the more 
ideal end of the spectrum of more to less ideal theory: they are deeply feasible, as they 
require no change in the laws of nature, but they are not immediately practically 
achievable or intended for immediate implementation.  The utility of regulatory 
proposals for internships seems to me severely diminished if implementation of those 
proposals is not (even) deeply feasible.109  In any case, I will not propose here any 
regulation, the implementation of which would require the laws of physics to be 
upturned or humans to turn into fundamentally different creatures.  Clearly, however, I 
do not judge sociological feasibility to be a constraint that must always be applied to 
regulatory proposals.  The status quo can change: attitudes can (sometimes quite 
suddenly) become receptive to once-radical ideas and technology is developing rapidly.  
Our philosophical imaginations should be free to consider possible worlds in which a 
                                              
109 That is not to claim, however, that there is never any value in developing regulatory proposals 
that are not deeply feasible (see, for example, Stemplowska 2008: 329).   
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variety of things are different from how they currently are and this radical capacity should 
not invariably be constrained by a necessity to know that we could definitely get there 
from where we are now.  In addition to idealizing certain sociological facts, I also absent 
consideration of the demands of other values.  I am interested here in what luck equality 
demands in relation to internships and therefore do not account for any potential 
objections to this account of internship regulation that might be raised in light of the 
demands of other values.   
4.1.1  Job Equality 
First, I assume that there would be no difficulties in implementing and securing 
widespread compliance with the regulatory proposals (or that any difficulties could be 
overcome).  The second central idealizing assumption I make is that what Segall terms 
‘justice in jobs’ (and what I will term ‘job equality’) holds (Segall 2012a: 40).  Internships 
are a (contingent) part of working life and, as such, the circumstances and facts that are 
relevant to the luck egalitarian planner’s decisions regarding how best to implement 
ideals of equality as they pertain to internships include the configuration, allocation, and 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of jobs.  Segall claims that in a luck egalitarian 
society jobs would provide all workers with equal pecuniary and non-pecuniary job 
benefits.  He writes: 
Suppose that all jobs pay an equal salary, and [...] that all jobs are 
equally good, also in their non-pecuniary aspects.  In fact, this 
seems to me to be what an egalitarian conception of justice in jobs 
(to be distinguished from justice in hiring) would, in any case, 
recommend.  (Segall 2012a: 40). 
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If all jobs were equal in their pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits, such that what I 
term job equality holds, the fact of people having different jobs would not itself 
constitute or create any distributive inequality.  As the distribution of jobs would not 
create any inequality, it would create no unjust, luck-based inequality.  I share Segall’s 
judgement that job equality is (or, more precisely, can be) recommended by luck 
egalitarian distributive justice, but I should acknowledge that his account remains only 
briefly sketched out: he gives only the above concise statement of his interpretation of 
justice in jobs and does not provide reasoning or justification for it.  It is not my intention 
here to provide a fuller account or justification of that idea.  To be sure, it may not be 
the only possible luck egalitarian account of justice in jobs.  But I assume here that it is 
one plausible account and that it therefore provides one good starting point from which 
to question what internships would look like (if, indeed, they would exist) in a – that is, 
in one possible – more ideally just society.   
That said, the arguments I presented in chapter 2 do suggest a possible reason to endorse 
job equality.  As I argued, there is no reason of justice necessarily requiring us to privilege 
what Vallentyne terms ‘the pre-coercive-redistribution – or “natural” – payoff structure’ 
and then compensate individuals for the luck-based costs and benefits they accrue 
(Vallentyne 2002: 550).  We might, instead, alter the distribution of benefits and burdens 
that accrue to people ex ante redistributive compensation, so as to make that original 
distribution insensitive (or less sensitive) to their luck.  If it were the case that jobs had 
unequal pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits such that their distribution created overall 
inequalities of outcome, but the distribution of jobs was entirely luck-neutral and choice-
sensitive, the inequalities of outcome created by job distribution would be chosen.  
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However, this possibility seems implausible: if who got what jobs depended in part on 
people’s abilities, and if (as I argued in section 3.2.1.2) differences in ability were 
inevitably a matter of luck to some degree (particularly in the absence of extensive 
educational reform), job distribution would be influenced by luck.  On a compensatory 
approach, compensation would be provided to offset any overall luck-based inequalities 
of outcome, including those resulting from job distribution.  However, actually 
determining the extent to which luck on the one hand and choice on the other influenced 
the unequal outcomes created by job distribution and other distributive processes – and 
thus how much compensation would be due – would present what Dworkin terms the 
‘strategic problem’ (Dworkin 2000: 324-325).  Even given agreement on a working 
theory of causality, in the absence of full information regarding the history of luck and 
choice in an outcome, the luck egalitarian planner will face hefty – and perhaps 
insurmountable – problems in identifying the precise levels of compensation required to 
offset luck-based inequality.  An alternative regulatory approach that avoids that strategic 
problem is available to luck egalitarians who embrace the pluralist approach to luck 
egalitarian regulatory strategies I advocate.  On the alternative approach, job benefits 
might be arranged so that the distribution of jobs had no inegalitarian influence on 
outcomes.  If job distribution is inevitably influenced by luck and it is impractical to 
determine the extent of that influence (and thus the appropriate level of compensation 
required to fully offset the resulting luck-based inequalities of outcome), another way of 
ensuring no luck-based inequalities of outcome ensue is to prevent job distribution from 
creating any inequalities of outcome.  In other words, to avoid the strategic problem, luck 
egalitarians might recommend job equality.  Further support for this kind of response 
can be found within Barry’s work.  He writes: 
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The effects of luck are so pervasive that, if we are unable to make 
judgments about individuals on a case-by-case basis, we should 
adopt a general presumption in favor of equality of outcome.  
Absent more detailed information, we should assume that any 
inequalities in income and wealth are the result of luck rather than 
genuine individual choice.  This may produce some injustice, 
redistributing resources towards those who are responsible for 
being worse off than others, but the pervasive nature of luck 
means that this is the most reliable second-best strategy for 
implementing the theory.  (Barry 2008: 147) 
Job equality is, of course, somewhat of a heavy-handed response in the sense that, in 
neutralizing the inegalitarian influence of luck in the sphere of employment, it also 
neutralizes the inegalitarian influence of choice.  But this is not necessarily unjust: it is not 
a matter of taxing chosen advantage and compensating chosen disadvantage.  Rather, it 
is more accurate to say that implementation of job equality adjusts the consequences of 
different choices within the sphere of employment, such that those consequences are no 
longer unequally costly or beneficial.  As I argued in chapter 2, while luck egalitarianism 
imposes responsibility for the consequences of genuine choice, luck egalitarians are not 
compelled to accept that those consequences should be wholly determined by an 
unfettered free market.  Nonetheless, in the absence of a full justification for equal job 
benefits, I frame my discussion here in conditional terms.  To be precise, therefore, I am 
asking: if it is the case that luck egalitarian distributive justice recommends job equality, 
what does that mean for internships?  Given job equality, would there be any reason for 
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internship schemes to exist and, if so, what would internships look like and how would 
they be distributed?   
Before responding to those questions, I want to examine in more detail what it means 
for jobs to be equal in their pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.  Segall takes a welfarist 
approach to the currency of distributive justice but, on a resourcist approach, to say that 
jobs should provide equal pecuniary benefits is to say they should pay equal salaries.  
With regard to non-pecuniary job benefits, these matter to distributive justice only 
inasmuch as they influence people’s resources.  If they do not influence levels of 
resources, they are not benefits in the sense that matters to distributive justice.  So, for 
example, if the resources that constitute people’s outcomes include internal resources 
such as skills and abilities, the influence on these of non-pecuniary benefits such as 
training and skill development matters.  Inasmuch as non-pecuniary job benefits 
(including, perhaps most significantly, job satisfaction) do not constitute or influence 
people’s levels of resources, their distribution is not a matter of justice on the resourcist 
approach.  On a welfarist approach, equality of job benefits entails all jobs having an 
equal beneficial influence on workers’ levels of welfare.  Segall’s welfarist approach, as 
we saw, recommends equal salaries.  I would point out, however, that, as people have 
different welfare functions, providing them with the same salary may not entail that the 
pecuniary benefits of jobs have an equal influence on their welfare: different people 
generate different levels of welfare with the same amount of money.  (In other words, 
some are ‘easier to please’ with money than others.)  Thus, if salaries are to have no 
inegalitarian influence on welfare, they may require to be unequal.  A similar point can 
be made in relation to non-pecuniary job benefits.  Some people may gain welfare from 
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skill development but not teamwork, others from teamwork but not independent 
working, and so on.  Given that different people will find different things beneficial to 
their welfare, diversity of job roles seems required for all to be equally benefitted in non-
pecuniary terms by their jobs.  Moreover, whatever metric of advantage is favoured, if 
Segall is right that both pecuniary and non-pecuniary job benefits should be equal, this 
entails that the influence on outcomes of both variables should be held constant.  That 
is, extra pecuniary benefits cannot ‘make up for’ a deficit in non-pecuniary benefits, and 
vice versa.  Thus, job equality holds that jobs should have an equal overall influence on 
outcomes, but that influence breaks down into two parts – the influence on outcomes 
of pecuniary benefits on the one hand, and the influence of non-pecuniary benefits on 
the other – each of which should be equal.   
I mentioned in section 2.1.3 that, although Segall claims that ‘justice requires 
compensating individuals only for disadvantages for which one cannot be held 
responsible’, his proposals for luck egalitarian regulation extend beyond ex post 
redistributive compensation as I define it (Segall 2007: 177).  His approach to regulating 
the distribution and benefits of jobs demonstrates this.  Implementation of the job 
equality Segall envisages would undoubtedly require regulatory action falling into the 
category of direct structural regulation to be undertaken.  Ensuring salaries were equal 
(or, equally beneficial) would require direct structural regulation – legal remuneration 
requirements – to compel employers to pay the equal salary.  Admittedly, income equality 
(or, equally beneficial income) might be achieved through an ex post compensatory 
strategy.  This would permit some inequalities of pay (or, inequalities in the benefit 
people receive from pay), but then tax and compensate to the point of equality.  (On any 
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currency that involves a welfarist element, redistributive compensation would, of course, 
have to account for any welfare costs – dignitary harm, for example – consequent on 
receiving compensation rather than pay, should any arise.)  But Segall recommends salary 
– not income – equality, which demonstrates his support of the view that direct structural 
regulatory action can be employed to adjust the original distribution of benefits and 
burdens ex ante redistribution.  Arranging jobs so that they provide workers with equal 
non-pecuniary benefits would also seem to require direct structural regulation: for 
example, regulatory action targeting the content of job roles, to ensure the non-pecuniary 
benefits of all jobs have an equal influence on workers’ outcomes.  As I explain in section 
4.2 below, Segall also makes recommendations for direct regulation of job allocation 
processes to achieve what he terms ‘justice in hiring’.  Although I do not agree with all 
of Segall’s arguments, I certainly view it as a virtue of his approach to luck egalitarianism 
that it recommends regulatory action falling outside the category of redistributive 
compensation.   
4.1.2  Internships Given Job Equality 
If job equality held, would there be any reason for internships to exist or would they 
simply become obsolete?  If the latter, the question of their regulation becomes moot.  
It is clear that undertaking an internship would not improve future opportunities for job-
related advantage, as job prospects would in any case be equal.  The value of undertaking 
an internship as a means to secure higher pecuniary and non-pecuniary job benefits in 
future would thus be eliminated.  However, they might yet remain in demand for other 
reasons.  Internships might still be in demand if they enabled people to make more 
informed choices about what sort of career to pursue and to thereby increase the 
296 
 
likelihood of future job satisfaction.  On a welfarist approach, then, internships might 
even have a role to play in supporting job equality.  If luck egalitarian distributive justice 
requires that jobs provide workers with equal non-pecuniary benefits (such as, for 
example, job satisfaction) then it seems, as I mentioned above, that it would require job 
roles to be diverse in order to ensure that different people, with their different welfare 
functions, could all undertake equally beneficial work.  However, if there was a lack of 
clarity regarding what kind of role would benefit a person up to the level of equality, 
undertaking an internship might enable a job role appropriate for that person to be 
identified.  (By ‘appropriate’, I mean a job that would be as beneficial to the person, in 
non-pecuniary terms, as others’ jobs were to them.)  Even on a resourcist approach, 
there might be a reason external to luck egalitarianism for internships schemes to serve 
this purpose: namely, if there is an independent reason to care about the absolute level 
of welfare in society, having internship schemes in place that effectively enable people 
to identify satisfying jobs would be desirable.  But would employers have any reason to 
supply them?  Internship schemes might still be useful to employers as a mechanism 
through which to identify suitable recruits for longer-term employment, which might be 
valuable, for example, if it served economic efficiency and organizational harmony.  
Given that the rationales for the supply and demand of internships would be to enable 
interns to make informed judgements regarding their careers and employers to make 
informed judgements regarding employee recruitment, internship schemes should be 
arranged so that those objectives could be met.  Thus, there would be a focus on 
providing interns with experience of a range of tasks to give them an understanding of 
different roles and to enable employers to form an impression of how well they were 
doing.  This would entail, as with most contemporary internships, that interns would 
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actively contribute to the core work of the organization.  Internships would also be 
short-term: just long enough to usefully inform interns’ and employers’ decisions.  Thus, 
two central differences between internships and jobs would standardly be their duration 
and the focus on task diversity.   
If there are, then, reasons to keep internships in a more ideal society exhibiting job 
equality, what regulation would be required to ensure the distribution of internships did 
not upset luck egalitarian distributive justice?  Luck egalitarianism is concerned with 
internships as they affect outcomes and opportunities, that is, as they influence current 
levels of advantage and future opportunities for advantage.  As we have seen, 
undertaking an internship would not improve interns’ future opportunities for advantage 
within the sphere of employment, as equality of job benefits (or job-related advantage) 
would be guaranteed in any case.  But what about their immediate influence on interns’ 
current levels of advantage?  Internships would still be relevant to distributive justice in 
respect of their influence on current outcomes, that is, in respect of the immediate costs 
and benefits of undertaking them.  In a society in which, for reasons of justice, all (non-
intern) workers were equally benefitted by their jobs, would there be any egalitarian 
justification for inequality between interns and workers?  I do not see why there should 
be.  If it were desirable for internships to be part of the world of work either for welfarist 
luck egalitarian reasons or for non-egalitarian reasons to do with the absolute level of 
welfare, economic efficiency and organizational harmony, there seems no reason of 
distributive justice to introduce inequality between interns and workers, that is, no clear 
reason that tells in favour of treating interns and workers unequally for the purposes of 
distributive justice.  Indeed, there seems potentially to be a positive reason of distributive 
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justice to maintain equality between interns and workers.  However, this reason rests on 
a theoretical premise, and an empirical premise that might not hold under all 
circumstances.  The theoretical premise is as follows.  As luck should not have an 
inegalitarian influence on outcomes, if it is a matter of luck that some people become 
interns while others become workers, there is a reason of distributive justice to equalize 
benefits to interns and workers: the more it is a matter of luck, the weightier the reason.  
If interns could reasonably choose to work in a job providing them with benefits equal 
to those of other workers, becoming an intern appears a matter of reasonably avoidable 
choice.  However, I suggested above that, given job equality, people would become 
interns due to a lack of clarity regarding what sort of job role would provide them with 
appropriate non-pecuniary benefits.  In which case, we might not think of becoming an 
intern as a reasonably avoidable choice.  The alternative would be to risk working in an 
inappropriate job.  That said, I acknowledge that if that lack of clarity were the upshot 
of genuine choices – for example, to shun other available opportunities to become 
informed about career options – this would weaken the luck egalitarian case for equality 
of benefits between internships and jobs.  Equality of internship and job benefits would 
thus rest on the empirical premise that people do not tend to make genuine choices to 
be uncertain – rather than certain – about what kind of work would be beneficial for 
them to pursue.  If that premise were false, the case for equality would be weakened.   
Equality of pecuniary benefits between internships and jobs would require interns and 
workers to be paid equally advantaging salaries.  Ensuring equal non-pecuniary benefits 
might be more complex, particularly on a welfarist approach, given the specification that 
interns would become interns precisely to find out what kind of role would provide them 
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with non-pecuniary benefits at the level of equality.  In other words, if interns were 
unsure before beginning their internship what sort of work they might find satisfying, 
ensuring their internship work was satisfying might not be straightforward.  An intern 
might begin an internship only to find that she did not find the work satisfying.  
Nevertheless, the design of internship schemes might take this in to account, offering 
varied and dynamic work designed to be as satisfying and informative as possible.  
Moreover, if undertaking a short period of inadequately satisfying internship work were, 
in fact, informative and beneficial in the sense that it enabled the intern to identify work 
that would be more satisfying, it might perhaps be acceptable.   
4.1.3  The Distribution of Internships Given Job Equality 
If the case for equality of internship and job benefits were successful and interns were 
neither advantaged nor disadvantaged relative to workers, would luck egalitarianism 
impose any requirements on the distribution of internships?  It might be thought that if 
interns’ benefits were equal to workers’ benefits, how internships were distributed would 
not be a question of distributive justice.  This is because inequalities of access would 
entail neither immediate inequalities of outcome nor (given job equality) future 
inequalities of opportunity.  In that case, luck egalitarian distributive justice would 
impose no regulatory requirements on their distribution.  This seems a reasonable 
conclusion to draw, at least at first glance. 
On the other hand, there might be a reason – though perhaps quite a weak one – to 
regulate the distribution of internships, even if that distribution had no inegalitarian 
influence on outcomes.  Internships are weighty goods in the sense that accrual of 
internship-related benefits has a significant influence on people’s overall levels of 
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advantage.  That is, even where the influence on outcomes of undertaking internships 
(and jobs) is held constant across individuals, it is still a significant influence.  Moreover, 
on the approach specified above, internships would form important parts of people’s 
life plans: people would want to undertake internship work in order to find appropriate 
jobs.  In section 2.3.3, I suggested that luck egalitarianism may provide a (defeasible) 
reason in favour of luck-neutral access to such weighty, important goods.  If luck 
egalitarians are committed to enabling a certain kind of self-determination because they 
hold that relative outcomes should be a function of choice (such that people determine 
for themselves how well their lives go), they might also be concerned with people’s ability 
to be self-determining in the broader sense of choosing how their lives go, or, how they 
accrue advantage.  Accordingly, a luck egalitarian concern with self-determination 
broadly construed might motivate a position according to which access to weighty and 
important goods should not be influenced by luck because when people are excluded 
from access to such goods on the basis of luck their self-determination (in the sense of 
choosing how their lives go) is compromised.  Thus, as internships are weighty and 
important goods, there might perhaps be a reason to regulate their distribution to ensure 
equal access.  However, given that the distribution of internships would create no 
distributive inequality, that reason appears weaker than it otherwise might.  In other 
words, unequal access to weighty, important goods seems less objectionable on luck 
egalitarian grounds if no (rather than some) inequality of outcome results, even if it does 
curtail people’s ability to choose how their lives go.   
Moreover, it seems reasonable to think that, given job equality, the appropriate 
mechanism through which to distribute internships should be informed by the rationale 
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for running internship schemes, which is to enable interns to identify desirable work and 
employers to identify desirable workers.  In other words, the distribution of internships 
should enable those two goals to be met.  This would seem to entail that ability (but not 
demographic characteristics, personal social networks or wealth) might influence 
internship distribution, as employers are likely to want to identify able workers.  There 
might also be other reasons external to distributive justice for the distribution of 
internships to be somewhat sensitive to ability, even if ability is in part a matter of luck, 
which may trump the weak luck egalitarian reason in favour of a luck-neutral distribution.  
Perhaps, for example, economic efficiency and sustainability depend on the core work 
of organizations, to which interns contribute, being done competently.  Accordingly, 
where internship distribution respected the properly balanced demands of the plurality 
of relevant values, it would not track luck, except inasmuch as a characteristic that was 
(at least in part) a matter of luck constituted a justified reason to hire an intern, on the 
balance of relevant considerations.  This would entail that access to internships might 
not be fully luck-neutral, but that the value of luck equality would be given its proper 
weight, such that any luck-based inequalities of access would be justified on the balance 
of reasons.   
In sum, in a society exhibiting job equality, appropriately designed internship schemes 
would be useful to and valued by both interns and employers.  On a welfarist approach, 
they may even have a role to play in securing job equality.  I think there is a case for 
equality between interns and workers, and that there may also be a case for minimizing 
luck-based inequalities of access to internships, though this latter case may be quite weak.  
In short, I think it valuable to acknowledge that internships could be a good thing in a 
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more ideal society.  But, of course, the question of how to respond to internship-related 
injustice in today’s society is quite another matter.  It is to that question that I now turn. 
4.2  Internship Regulation in a Less Ideal Society 
The society we inhabit is one in which job equality seems somewhat of a distant dream.  
Pronounced inequalities of pecuniary and non-pecuniary job benefits persist and, in 
addition, significant inequalities of opportunity for advantage (including job-related 
advantage) continue to be a feature of contemporary life.110  The distribution of 
internships, as we saw in chapter 3, contributes to this inequality of opportunity by 
restricting access to an important route into employment in many professional sectors 
on the basis of demographic characteristics, personal social networks, wealth and 
abilities.  In this section, I consider what regulatory action to tackle internship-related 
injustice luck egalitarians might endorse, given the current configuration and distribution 
of jobs and contemporary background inequalities.  That is, I ask what action a regulatory 
agency might take in response to the unjust inequalities of outcome that are produced in 
and through the distribution of internships, starting from where we are now.  I treat deep 
feasibility as a constraint on the regulatory proposals, which is to say that implementation 
                                              
110 Secondary research by The Equality Trust indicates that the ‘UK has the 7th most unequal 
split of incomes out of 34 countries in the developed world’ (The Equality Trust 2014), and a 
report published by the Institute for Fiscal Studies notes that in 2009-10 the Gini coefficient 
measure of overall income inequality in the UK ‘was at its highest level since at least 1961’ 
(Jonathan Cribb et al. 2012: 2).   
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of the regulatory actions I consider would not require the laws of nature to be broken 
or humans to turn into fundamentally different creatures.  However, I idealize certain 
facts to do with the practicalities of implementation in order to absent consideration of 
a number of sociological feasibility constraints: namely, I do not treat as constraints on 
the proposals those obstacles to implementation that might arise from legal technicalities 
in changing the law, a lack of political will to implement policy, and issues with gaining 
compliance with the spirit of the law.  I make the idealizing assumption that any such 
obstacles could be overcome.111  Thus, the regulatory actions I consider are not 
necessarily immediately sociologically feasible, but neither are they entirely fantastical: 
they constitute actions that might well become entirely feasible with sufficient legal 
ingenuity and political and public support.   
                                              
111 To illustrate, perhaps one of the most significant implications of these idealizing assumptions 
is that I assume internships can be kept distinct – in law and in practice – from work experience 
and volunteering.  One concern with implementing regulatory action to tackle internship-related 
injustice is that organizations might simply re-label internships in an attempt to circumvent any 
new standards applying to their distribution and remuneration, maintaining them unchanged in 
all but name.  That is, there may be technical issues with drawing up legislation to keep the three 
sorts of placement distinct and problems with ensuring that organizations comply with the spirit 
of the law.  That said, a report from CIPD makes a number of suggestions regarding how these 
particular obstacles might be overcome (CIPD 2010c: 13). 
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In chapter 3, I demonstrated that aspects of the structure of internship schemes interact 
with background differences in demographic characteristics, social networks, wealth and 
ability to create inequalities of access to internships.  Other things equal, to the extent 
that those differences are a matter of luck, the advantages and disadvantages produced 
in and through the distribution of internships are unjust.  At the level of regulation, luck 
egalitarians might respond to internship-related injustice by recommending a strategy of 
ex post redistributive compensation.  On that approach, internship schemes and 
background differences, and thus inequalities of access to internships, would remain as 
they are, but compensation would be provided to offset any unjust overall advantages 
and disadvantages, including those that are a function of luck-based inequalities of access 
to internships.  Alternatively, on the pluralist approach to regulatory strategies I 
advocate, luck egalitarians have the option to recommend strategies of prevention in 
addition to or instead of strategies of redress.  That is, they might endorse regulatory 
actions falling into the categories of levelling and direct structural regulation, which aim 
to reduce or prevent unjust inequalities of outcome by reducing or removing inequalities 
of opportunity for internship-related advantage, ex ante any compensatory action.  
Levelling would aim to adjust the relevant differences in people’s personal resources 
(that is, those unchosen differences that, given the structure of internship schemes, yield 
inequalities of access to internships), while direct structural regulation would aim to 
change the structure of internships so that those differences no longer counted for 
anything (or counted for less) in internship distribution.  In what follows, I will seek to 
demonstrate that, in addition to redistributive compensation, a range of luck egalitarian 
regulatory actions falling into the categories of levelling and direct structural regulation 
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might be employed in response to internship-related injustice, and to outline what the 
alternative regulatory actions would consist in.   
Before outlining the range of regulatory actions luck egalitarians might recommend in 
response to internship-related injustice, I will briefly recapitulate how the different forms 
of luck influence access to internships.  I observed in section 3.2.1.1 that competitions 
for internships may discriminate against applicants on the basis of their demographic 
characteristics.  Thus, access to paid and unpaid internships distributed by open and 
closed competition may be delineated on the basis of characteristics such as gender, 
ethnicity, sexuality, and disability, wherever competitive selection criteria are influenced 
by the conscious or unconscious biases of selectors.  I also noted that people with 
physical impairments that restrict their mobility may not be able to undertake internships 
(of any type) that are located in inaccessible premises.  Moreover, as discussed in section 
3.2.1.3, access to internships can also be restricted on the basis of ‘who you know’.  That 
is, given differences in people’s personal social networks, the distributive mechanisms of 
some types of internship function to create network-based inequalities of access.  Most 
obviously, access to paid and unpaid internships distributed by nepotism – that is, to 
internships that are gifted outright to an intern by a professional contact – is only open 
to those who know and who have the right sort of relationship with the right professional 
contact.  In addition, access to paid and unpaid internships distributed by closed auction 
is only open to those who know someone (an elite contact) who is invited to and who is 
willing and able to attend and place the winning bid at a closed internship auction.  
Access to paid and unpaid internships distributed by closed competition is also restricted 
on the basis of ‘who you know’ wherever applications are ‘advertised’ through word of 
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mouth.  In these cases, only those whose personal social networks include someone who 
tells them of the available internship position will hear about it and thus be able to apply.  
Finally, differences in the social networks of applicants to paid and unpaid internships 
distributed by open competition can also influence access to those internships, where 
the competition is rigged by a nepotistic interest.  That is, where competitive selection 
criteria favour applicants who are part of the personal networks of professionals within 
the organization offering the internship over applicants who are not so well-connected, 
treating the connection as a kind of qualification.  Further, as we saw in section 3.2.1.3, 
when internships are distributed by auction or are unpaid, access is delineated on the 
basis of wealth.  Bidding expenses are required for access to all paid and unpaid 
internships distributed by open and closed auction, and living expenses are required for 
access to all unpaid internships, regardless of their distributive mechanism.  Indeed, of 
the ten types of internships I examined, only paid internships distributed by nepotism 
and paid internships distributed by competition do not have access directly restricted on 
the basis of wealth.  Finally, as discussed in section 3.2.1.2, access to paid and unpaid 
internships distributed by open and closed competition is restricted on the basis of 
ability.  As competitive selection criteria select for the ability to successfully complete 
the duties attached to the internship position and to ‘fit in’ with the organization, access 
to competitive internships is delineated on the basis of such ability.  To the extent that 
the relevant differences in people’s demographic characteristics, personal social 
networks, wealth and abilities are a matter of luck, inequalities of access that track those 
differences are also a matter of luck, and so too are the advantages and disadvantages 
produced by the distribution of internships.  In what follows I ask, given that luck 
egalitarians are concerned to ensure that overall inequalities of outcome are luck-neutral, 
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what regulatory actions might be recommended in response to unjust advantages and 
disadvantages that are a function of luck-based inequalities of access to internships? 
4.2.1  The Compensatory Approach 
On a compensatory approach to luck egalitarian regulation, the way that the original 
distribution of benefits and burdens is produced is left unchanged.  The various forms 
of luck that currently influence internship distribution would continue to be permitted 
to play out and people would continue to be excluded from access to internships on the 
basis of demographic characteristics, networks, wealth, and ability.  However, any overall 
disadvantage that results would be compensated.  To be precise, any luck-based 
advantages and disadvantages accruing to people as a result of internship distribution 
(for example, any disadvantage resulting from missing out on an internship due to 
discrimination) would be summed with their other luck-based advantages and 
disadvantages, and any overall luck-based relative disadvantage would be offset through 
provision of the appropriate amount of money.  Similarly, any overall luck-based relative 
advantage would be taxed away.112 
                                              
112 I said in the introductory paragraphs of section 4.2 that I would treat deep feasibility as a 
constraint on the regulatory proposals I considered.  But there may be cases in which internship 
distribution results in an ‘off the chart’ and thus noncompensable deficit in advantage.  Imagine, 
for example, that as a direct result of racist bias influencing recruitment to competitive 
internships, someone is excluded from the only available route into her desired career, loses 
much of her self-respect and becomes inconsolably depressed.  On a welfarist approach to the 
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The standard luck egalitarian view is that the costs of providing such compensation 
should be covered by the state.  There is, however, a plausible reason to think that, in 
some cases, it is inappropriate for those costs to be socialized.  Steiner argues for a left-
libertarian view of distributive justice that is similar in many respects to the account of 
luck egalitarian distributive justice I favour.  Both accounts agree that people should be 
held responsible for the costs of their own choices, but relieved of responsibility for 
costs that accrue to them through no choice of their own.  As we saw in section 1.1.1, 
Steiner raises the important point that those costs are not always entirely unchosen: some 
are the direct result of choices made by a third party.  Thus, Steiner draws a distinction 
between two different sorts of cost that accrue to a person through no choice of her 
                                              
currency of egalitarian justice, there may be no amount of compensation that could enable her 
to successfully pursue other sources of welfare.  For example, Knight’s welfarist view takes self-
respect to be an element of advantage (Knight 2009a: 132).  If Roemer is correct in his assertion 
that ‘income can substitute for self-esteem, as inputs in a person’s production of welfare, to only 
a limited extent’ (and if self-respect and self-esteem are, here, synonymic) then it is possible that 
provision of financial compensation to the discriminatee may be insufficient to neutralize the 
disadvantage she faces (Roemer 1998: 61).  (I noted in section 2.3.1 that employing strategies of 
prevention – that is, levelling and direct structural regulation – might enable many such non-
compensable disadvantages to be avoided.)  Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to think there 
would be many cases in which disadvantage resulting from the distribution of internships could 
be compensated: if so the policy would be effective in reducing unjust inequalities, even if it could 
not, on its own, eliminate them entirely. 
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own: those that accrue to her through no choice of anyone’s and those that accrue to 
her a result of the choice or choices of a third party.  Once this distinction is 
acknowledged, it becomes clear that the standard luck egalitarian recommendation that 
society redress all costs accruing to a person through no choice of her own entails, in 
effect, alleviating responsibility for the costs of choice, where those costs fall on others.  
This is in tension with the luck egalitarian commitment to ‘the requirement that persons 
be held responsible for the adverse consequences of their own actions’ (Steiner 1998: 97, 
original emphasis).  Steiner suggests that proper consideration of this responsibilitarian 
commitment in fact motivates the position that when someone’s choice creates 
unchosen costs for another, the chooser (and not society) should be responsible for 
redressing those costs.  Society should redress only those costs accruing to individuals 
through no one’s choice.  He writes, ‘Society is not held responsible for the injuries that 
some of its members’ choices inflict on others’ (Steiner 1998: 109, original emphasis).  
Instead, regulatory arrangements should compel ‘harmers alone to bear the full costs of 
compensation’ that is provided to redress the costs to those they harm (Steiner 1998: 
103).  Steiner’s view is grounded in a left-libertarian theory of historic entitlement, but 
the central insight expressed above is at least compatible with the responsibilitarian 
concern at the core of luck egalitarian theory.  Indeed, it seems not merely to be 
compatible with but to follow from Dworkin’s insistence that ‘people pay the true costs 
of the lives they lead’ – the true social costs of their choices – that they should pay for 
the costs their choices impose on others (Dworkin 1981: 295).  Thus, the central luck 
egalitarian claim that people should be held responsible for the consequences of their 
choices might be clarified to specify that those consequences include not only costs that 
fall on themselves, but also those that fall on others.   
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If this point holds, it has implications for who should pay the costs of compensation for 
disadvantage that is unchosen by the disadvantaged person: namely, rather than paying 
all costs that accrue to individuals as a matter of luck (for them), a regulatory agency 
would pay only those that are as a result of no one’s choice, while enforcing payment of 
compensation from those whose choices creates costs for others to those others, to 
redress the costs.  What ramifications does this have for the discussion of internship 
regulation?  First, it raises the possibility that organizations may be responsible for the 
costs they impose on their interns.  The individuals who design internship schemes 
within an organization might be understood as agents of their principals, that is, of the 
shareholders of the organization.  On this reading, inasmuch as those individuals act 
with the authority delegated to them by shareholders, shareholders should be held liable 
for the costs their decisions impose on others.  It follows from this that, were ex post 
compensation to be provided to offset disadvantage resulting from, for example, 
discriminatory recruitment to an internship, the costs of that compensation would not 
be socialized but, rather, would fall on the organization that engaged in discriminatory 
practices.  A regulatory agency would enforce the transfer.  In other words, where people 
are disadvantaged through no choice of their own and as a direct result of choices made 
by organizations, those organizations may be held responsible for the costs of 
compensating that disadvantage.   
4.2.2  Levelling Approaches 
Alternatively, luck egalitarians might endorse regulatory action that prevents the unjust 
advantages and disadvantages that are a function of luck-based inequalities of access to 
internships from arising in the first place, by removing those inequalities of access.  On 
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a levelling approach, regulatory action would leave the structure of internship schemes 
intact, but attempt to level those luck-based background differences that, given the 
structure of internships, give rise to inequalities of access.   
How might levelling work as a response to inequalities of access to internships resulting 
from discrimination on the basis of demographic characteristics?  In short, it would level 
luck-based differences in demographic characteristics that are treated differently in 
recruitment.  But this seems deeply infeasible, at least in the cases of gender, ethnicity 
and sexuality.  Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, before rejecting it I will briefly 
outline what a levelling approach would seek to achieve.  For present purposes, 
discrimination is a function of how demographic characteristics are treated within 
processes of internship recruitment: different characteristics are treated differently (for 
example, cis female gender may be treated less favourably than cis male gender, and so 
on).  A levelling approach would act on individuals themselves to remove the differences 
that are taxonomized into categories of gender, categories of ethnicity, and categories of 
sexuality.  By removing those differences that are treated differently within recruitment 
processes, it would remove the bases on which discrimination operates.  Thus, as the 
relevant demographic characteristics would be held constant across individuals, there 
would be no basis on which those characteristics could delineate access to internships.  
However, as I stated in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, following Hamlin 
and Stemplowska (2012), if successful implementation of a proposal would require 
humans to transform into fundamentally different creatures, the proposal is deeply 
infeasible.  Humans exhibit diversity of physiological characteristics, which differences 
are taxonomized and treated differently by social structures, and are thereby translated 
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into inequalities.  But there seems no way of levelling those differences themselves, of 
ridding our bodies of the features that constitute our bodies and on which the categories 
of demographic characteristic are based.113  If it were somehow possible, we would no 
longer be the creatures we are.114  Given that responding to inequalities based on 
demographic characteristics or, more specifically, to those based on gender, ethnicity 
and sexuality, with levelling is deeply infeasible (and undesirable), we are left with a 
choice between compensation and direct structural regulation.  The case of disability, 
                                              
113 These personal characteristics – gender, ethnicity and sexuality – therefore differ from 
transferrable, fungible external assets in the sense that they cannot be given to or taken away 
from people.  And they differ from internal resources, or, cognitive and physical abilities: the 
development of cognitive abilities may be affected by provision of education resources, while 
physical abilities may be altered through provision of medical treatment.   
114 Moreover, it would certainly constitute a failure to ‘respect people in their differences’ – a 
hallmark of relational equality (Wolff 2009a: 113).  Indeed, levelling the relevant differences in 
demographic characteristics aims at removing differences that are crucial to how we understand 
ourselves and each other, and to the formation of our individual human identities.  Responding 
to, say, inequalities that track differences in sexuality by attempting to expunge diversity in 
sexuality, rather than by accepting that diversity and attempting to arrange society in such a way 
as to prevent the differences from being translated into distributive inequalities, strikes me as so 
gravely offensive to relational equality as to be unconscionable.  It seems, then, that the levelling 
approach to tackling inequalities based on demographic characteristics is both deeply infeasible 
and highly undesirable.   
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however, presents an exception.  As we saw in section 2.2.3, Wolff’s policies of ‘personal 
enhancement’ can act on the body to remove at least some forms of impairment (Wolff 
2009a: 124).  Thus, (partial) levelling to tackle some forms of impairment-related 
disadvantage, in the form of provision of medical treatment, does seem feasible.  
How would levelling the relevant luck-based differences in personal social networks 
work?  Again, I would suggest it is deeply infeasible to tackle network-based inequalities 
of access to internships by levelling networks, as long as the distributive mechanisms of 
internships remain unchanged.  In short, on a levelling approach, a regulatory agency 
would attempt to ensure that each person’s social network included the ‘right’ people: 
professional contacts in a position to gift an internship, elite contacts in a position to bid 
at closed internship auctions, people who can assert their nepotistic interest within 
competitions for internships, and people who ‘advertise’ closed competitive internships 
through word of mouth.  It is not easy to see what kinds of policy might achieve this, 
but perhaps policy might compel people to enter into ‘buddy schemes’, through which 
a regulatory agency would match young people with appropriate contacts and facilitate 
development of their relationships.  That might work to widen the pool of those who 
hear about (and can then compete for) closed competitive internships ‘advertised’ 
through word of mouth but, in relation to network-based inequalities of access to 
internships that are distributed by nepotism, closed auction and nepotistic competition, 
the levelling proposal is nonsensical – that is, illogical – on two counts.  The first is to 
do with the lack of fit between the number of aspiring interns and the number of 
available internships.  To ensure personal social networks did not delineate access, every 
aspiring intern would require to have appropriate contacts in their network.  But, in the 
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case of closed auctions for internships, the auctions are by nature exclusive and open 
only to a narrow pool of people.  And each bidder, if successful, can only give the 
internship to one person.  In the cases of nepotistic and nepotistic competitive 
internships, again, there are a limited number of suitably positioned professionals who 
are able to gift an internship or rig a competition.  In the absence of any changes to 
distributive mechanisms and as long as internships remain a scarce good, such that 
demand exceeds supply, it is logically impossible to ensure ‘who you know’ has no 
influence on their distribution.  The second logical fallacy of the levelling approach to 
tackling network-based inequalities applies to nepotistic internships and is to do with the 
nature of gifts.  In short, if a ‘gift’ is coerced, it is not a gift.  It is a coerced transaction.  
If professionals were required by law to form relationships with young people to whom 
they were obliged to offer internships, the distributive mechanism could no longer be 
categorized as ‘nepotism’ as I have specified that category.  Nepotism constitutes 
something like voluntarily showing favourable treatment to someone with whom one 
has a personal relationship, but bonds of affinity must be endorsed by the parties 
themselves: if the transaction is imposed by a regulatory agency, it no longer makes sense 
to characterize it as an instance of favouritism.  The levelling approach to tackling 
network-based inequalities of access to internships is therefore illogical and, as such, 
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deeply infeasible.115  Again, the remaining choice is between compensation and direct 
structural regulation. 
Tackling wealth-based inequalities by levelling luck-based differences in wealth seems 
more promising.  The idea here would be to ensure that everyone had sufficient wealth 
to be able to work as an unpaid intern and was able to bid on a level playing field for 
internships.  Wealth would still be treated as a necessary condition of access to unpaid 
internships but, as everyone would have enough wealth to cover living expenses, no one 
would be excluded on the basis of wealth.  With regard to auctioned internships, if there 
were no luck-based differences in the wealth people had at their disposal, they would be 
able to bid for internships on a level playing field and those bidders who were prepared 
to spend the most would win.  What specific regulatory actions would achieve this kind 
of levelling?  One option, which I discussed in section 2.2.3, would be to level luck-based 
differences in people’s personal financial resources by imposing a ban or a 100% tax on 
inherited and gifted wealth.  Drawing support from Van Parijs (1997), Otsuka (2002 and 
2004) and Lazenby (2010), I suggested in section 3.2.1.3 that such a ban could be justified 
on luck egalitarian grounds, even if it restricts other-affecting choice (that is, the choice 
to give gifts) and even if some degree of choice may sometimes (that is, in the cases of 
                                              
115 Even if levelling the relevant differences in personal social networks were possible, it would 
likely be highly undesirable: to permit a regulatory agency to regulate who we have relationships 
with would doubtless entail an unacceptable and, indeed, dystopian restriction on liberty – 
specifically that kind of liberty that Rawls terms ‘freedom of association’ (Rawls 1999: xii). 
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some recipients) influence the receipt of gifts.  On its own, however, the likely result of 
such a policy would be to further narrow wealth-based access to internships.  That is, 
fewer people would have access to auctioned and unpaid internships, as all those who 
rely on gifts of wealth to cover bidding and living expenses would no longer have 
recourse to such gifts and therefore would not have the wealth required to buy and 
undertake these types of internship.  Thus, to ensure that regulatory action to level wealth 
widens (rather than narrows) access to internships, a ban on gifts might be 
complemented by the provision of a substantial, universal, unconditional grant at the age 
of majority or a basic income.116  As long as the amount of money provided 
unconditionally to all individuals covered all necessary living expenses and set people on 
a level playing field at auction, no one would be excluded from auctioned and unpaid 
internships on the basis of wealth, which is to say that wealth-based inequalities of access 
to internships would be eliminated.   
However, consideration of two issues suggests that such action might be insufficient to 
meet the demands of luck egalitarian distributive justice.  The first issue is that if there 
are wider inequalities of opportunity to accrue wealth from other sources (for example, 
inequalities of opportunity for well-paid, entry-level jobs), then those with the best 
                                              
116 For further discussion of the unconditional grant see Ackerman and Alstott (1999) and 
Pateman (2003).  For further discussion of the basic income, see Van Parijs (1992 and 1995), 
Steiner (1998: 99, 106 and 2002: 189, 193), and Karl Widerquist et al. (2013), particularly those 
chapters contributed by Van Parijs and Brian Barry. 
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opportunities may be able to monopolize internship auctions.  That is, if some people 
are (as a matter of luck) better able than others to earn additional funds over and above 
those provided to all by a regulatory agency, they may use those additional funds to 
secure the winning bid at auction.  Moreover, if the argument I presented in section 3.2.2 
holds and wanting to undertake an internship can be conceived as a deeply held 
preference then, on the metaphysical approach to the distinction between luck and 
choice that I favour, it would be unjust to impose living and bidding expenses on interns 
themselves, at least if the correct metric of advantage is or includes welfare.  This is 
because, following Cohen’s (2004) understanding of responsibility for expensive 
preferences, interns should not be held responsible for meeting the relatively high cost 
of satisfying their preference to undertake internship work, as long as the relatively high 
cost is incidental to the preference and as long as forgoing satisfaction of that preference 
would entail ‘alienation from what is deep in them’ (Cohen 2004: 14).  A different sort 
of levelling policy to tackle wealth-based inequalities of access to internships is, however, 
available.  A regulatory agency might pursue more targeted adjustments to people’s 
financial resources to ensure that no one who wishes to undertake internship work is 
prevented from doing so by a luck-based lack of wealth.  If anyone lacked the required 
living or bidding expenses through no choice of their own, a regulatory agency might 
provide those expenses at the point of payment in the form of an ‘internship grant’, 
thereby enabling access to the internship.  This less thoroughgoing approach to levelling 
might be pursued in addition to or instead of the more thoroughgoing policies outlined 
above.  Either way, it would level the relevant differences in wealth, functioning to ensure 
no one was excluded from access to internships due to unchosen financial disadvantage.   
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With regard to inequalities of access to internships based on ability, a regulatory agency 
might attempt to level the relevant luck-based differences in ability by providing 
everyone with opportunities to develop the abilities that are selected for in internship 
distribution.  What sorts of policies might be implemented in pursuit of such a goal?  
Perhaps most obviously, educational reform might be implemented to require the 
education system (as far as possible) to enable individuals to develop the relevant 
abilities.  In other words, education policy might set out to counteract the inegalitarian 
influence of luck-based differences in native endowments and social circumstances on 
the development of ability.  Educational resources might be targeted to those whose 
abilities are relatively less developed due to their native endowments and socialization, 
to encourage further development of ability.  Indeed, Roemer (1998) suggests the 
possibility of a similar policy.  He argues that, in the absence of redistributive 
compensation:   
equality of opportunity for advantage, where advantage depends 
on income, would surely require spending educational resources 
on all children, and, indeed, spending more resources on children 
who, by virtue of their circumstances, were less efficient at 
transforming those resources into future economic productivity.  
(Roemer 1998: 54-55)117 
                                              
117 Roemer also notes, however, that where redistributive compensation is in place, educational 
resources might instead be targeted at those who are most efficient at transforming such 
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The idea here would be to ensure that no one was set at a disadvantage in the competition 
for internships due to having had worse opportunities than others to realize their 
potential.  If, due to disadvantageous circumstances, some faced greater difficulties than 
others in developing their abilities, their education would attempt to counterbalance the 
negative effect of those circumstances by providing ‘extra’ help.  In principle, any 
differentials in the relevant abilities would then be a function of people’s different 
choices.  (If, as I suggested in section 1.1.4, children do not make the sort of choices for 
which luck egalitarians are prepared to impose consequential responsibility, the 
education system should ensure all children have equal educational outcomes – or, 
equally valuable sets of abilities – as they reach their majority.  This would, I submit, go 
a considerable way to ensuring any subsequent ability differentials were a matter of 
choice.)  Of course, given no change in the distributive mechanism of competitively 
distributed internships, access would remain delineated by ability.  However, if the policy 
of educational reform were successful in ensuring that ability differentials were entirely 
a matter of choice, ability-based inequalities of outcome would be the result of choices 
against a background of equality of opportunity for ability.118   
                                              
resources into future productivity (that is, those with relatively advantageous native endowments 
and social circumstances).  The resulting luck-based inequalities might then be offset though 
compensation (Roemer 1998: 54). 
118 One concern here is that it may be deeply infeasible to ensure everyone has equal 
opportunities to develop ability.  To illustrate, consider the case of an individual with genetically 
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4.2.3  Direct Structural Regulatory Approaches 
Turning now to the final category of luck egalitarian regulatory strategy, what direct 
structural regulatory action to tackle inequalities based on demographic characteristics, 
personal social networks, wealth and ability might luck egalitarians endorse? 
I argued in section 2.2.4 that luck egalitarians might endorse a ban on discrimination in 
job recruitment to prevent inequalities of access to jobs based on demographic 
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and disability.  It follows that luck 
egalitarians might also recommend such a ban be applied to internship recruitment.  
                                              
determined multiple and profound learning disabilities that prevent her from developing the 
sorts of ability selected for in competitive internship distribution, no matter what level of 
educational resources are targeted toward her.  In Roemer’s terms, she might be described as 
‘extremely inefficient at transforming educational resources into future economic productivity’ 
(Roemer 1998: 54).  It might perhaps be thought that, in her case, successful implementation of 
levelling would require a fundamental change in who she is – that it would require her not to 
have a learning disability, in the absence of which she would no longer be herself (cf. Steiner 
2002: 187-188).  I would urge, however, that even if that were true, such that it is deeply 
infeasible to level all luck-based ability differentials, implementing educational reform along the 
lines indicated above would nonetheless be effective in improving the opportunities available 
to a great many people.  While ‘full’ levelling of ability may, in this regard, be deeply infeasible, 
‘partial’ levelling is certainly possible and, if successfully implemented, would at least render 
ability differentials less a matter of luck than they are at present. 
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Laws such as the Sex Discrimination Act (1975), the Race Relations Act (1976), the 
Disability Discrimination Act (2005) and the Equality Act (2010) have made 
discriminatory hiring practices illegal in the UK.  Roemer argues that precisely this kind 
of direct structural regulation should apply to competitive recruitment, proposing that 
‘the nondiscrimination principle be applied in the competition for specific positions in 
society’ (Roemer 1998: 87).119  We might plausibly think these ‘positions’, access to which 
should in Roemer’s view be non-discriminatory, include internships.  A progress report 
from the Panel on Fair Access to the Professions (2012) notes that, to enable internships 
to be directly regulated, they would first require a legal definition to bring them into the 
formal economy.  At that point, a regulatory agency could extend non-discrimination 
                                              
119 Roemer defines his version of the non-discrimination principle as follows: 
the nondiscrimination principle, states that, in the competition for 
positions in society, all individuals who possess the attributes relevant 
for the performance of the duties of the position in question be 
included in the pool of eligible candidates, and that an individual’s 
possible occupancy of the position be judged only with respect to those 
relevant attributes.  (Roemer 1998: 1) 
For further discussion of discrimination by luck egalitarians, see, for example, Knight (2013c) 
and Segall (2012b). 
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legislation to cover recruitment to internships as well as jobs.120  This non-discrimination 
legislation would include a requirement for organizations to make any adjustments 
required to ensure people with physical impairments that affect their mobility have 
access to their physical premises.  (The existing Disability Discrimination Act (2005) 
places a less exacting requirement on employers to make ‘reasonable’ adjustments to the 
physical premises of their organizations.)  In other words, direct structural regulation 
would target both the distributive mechanism of internships and the material space in 
which internship work is undertaken, to ensure no one was excluded from access in 
virtue of her gender, ethnicity, sexuality or disability.   
What kind of direct structural regulation might a regulatory agency implement in order 
to prevent network-based inequalities of access to internships?  Such regulation would 
directly target and impose legal requirements on the distributive mechanism of 
internship schemes.  Again, internships would be given a legal definition to bring them 
                                              
120 I specified above that throughout this discussion I would absent consideration of the 
difficulties a regulatory agency might face in achieving compliance with the spirit of the law and 
make the idealizing assumption that any such difficulties could be overcome.  However, in 
practice, as I emphasized in section 2.2.4, laws against discrimination may be insufficient to 
prevent the more or less unconscious biases of decision-makers from resulting in more or less 
unintentional discrimination in recruitment.  Thus, reform of sexist, racist, ableist, 
heteronormative and cisnormative social norms may be required before compliance with the 
spirit of the law is, in fact, possible. 
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into the formal economy, at which point legislation could be applied.  A legal ban on 
internship auctions – including closed internship auctions – would (in addition to 
rendering bidding expenses obsolete) remove inequalities of access to internships that 
are based on whether or not people’s social networks include elite contacts who are 
invited to the sorts of events at which closed internship auctions currently take place.  In 
addition to a ban on closed internship auctions, direct structural regulation to tackle 
network-based inequalities of access to internships would also include regulatory action 
imposing legal standards on internship distribution to prevent nepotistic gifts of 
internships and to prevent competitions from being rigged by nepotistic interest.  As 
anti-discrimination legislation makes it illegal to treat demographic characteristics (such 
as being cis male, white, straight, and so on) as ‘qualifications’ for a job, once internships 
are brought into the formal economy, anti-nepotism legislation might be drawn up to 
make it similarly illegal to treat ‘knowing the right person’ as such.  That is, the law might 
require intern recruitment to conform to certain standards or criteria prohibiting the 
distribution of internships by nepotism and nepotistic competition.  (I examine in more 
detail the precise form such criteria might take in section 4.2.4 below.)  Finally, legislation 
might be enacted that requires open advertisement of internship positions and thereby 
legally proscribes recruitment by word of mouth alone.  For example, a law might be 
introduced requiring that all internship positions are advertised on a freely accessible 
website such as the one run by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to 
which I drew attention in section 3.1.1.  Such a requirement need not prevent anyone 
from informing others of internship vacancies but, rather, would ensure that such 
informal messages were not the only means through which vacancies could be 
discovered.  As long as vacancies were visible to anyone looking for them (due to being 
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openly advertised on the internet), applications would not be restricted on the basis of 
potential applicant’s personal social networks.121 
What regulatory action to tackle wealth-based inequalities of access to internships might 
luck egalitarians recommend should be applied to the structure of internship schemes?  
Luck egalitarians might endorse regulatory action that directly targets the distributive 
mechanism and remuneration arrangements of internships to ensure that wealth no 
longer constitutes a precondition of access.  In terms of policies, this would entail a legal 
ban on the auctioning of internships and a legal requirement to pay interns at a rate that 
covers their living expenses.  Internships might be given a legal definition to bring them 
into the formal economy and to enable them to be directly regulated.  Were a legal ban 
on internship auctions then enacted, the effect would be to eliminate bidding expenses 
as a precondition of access to internships.  As internship bidding expenses would no 
longer arise, neither a regulatory agency nor interns themselves would be required to 
cover them.  In the case of a legal requirement to pay interns, interns’ living expenses 
would obviously still have to be met, but these would be covered by the organizations 
                                              
121 It might be thought that a requirement to advertise internship positions openly would be 
insufficient to prevent differences in networks and, more broadly, family background from 
influencing who applies to internships.  If so, to tackle that wider issue, a regulatory agency 
might also, perhaps in collaboration with organizations and educational institutions, engage in 
outreach work to encourage more children of non-professional parents to consider applying to 
internship work.   
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that benefit from interns’ work, rather than being provided by the state or paid by interns 
themselves.122  As long as interns were paid sufficiently well to cover their living 
expenses, the simultaneous implementation of these two policies would result in the 
removal of wealth-based inequalities of access to internships: no one would be excluded 
from taking up an internship on the basis of a lack of wealth.   
Finally, to ensure luck-based differences in ability are not transformed into unjust 
inequalities of outcome, regulatory action might be applied directly to the distributive 
mechanism of internships in order to prevent ability from counting for anything in the 
                                              
122 In fact, as I explain in section 4.3 below, National Minimum Wage legislation already applies 
to internships in the UK and organizations that use interns are thus legally obliged to pay them 
at least the National Minimum Wage.  Given that direct structural regulatory action to tackle 
wealth-based inequalities of access – in this case, a requirement to pay interns – should ensure 
that wealth is not a precondition of access, luck egalitarianism might recommend that the 
National Minimum Wage should be paid to interns, on the condition that such remuneration 
covers necessary living expenses.  If it does not, the direct structural regulatory action that luck 
egalitarianism might recommend would of course be a requirement to pay interns at a higher 
rate: a rate that does cover living expenses.  As a number of organizations (including the Living 
Wage Foundation, The Resolution Foundation and the Institute for Public Policy Research) 
have sought to demonstrate, there is evidence that throws into doubt the idea that the National 
Minimum Wage is always sufficient to cover living expenses, particularly in London where, as 
we saw in section 3.1.1, it is estimated over half of internships are located (see, for example, 
Jane Wills and Brian Linneker 2012, and Kayte Lawton and Matthew Pennycook 2013). 
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distributive process.  I suggest in the discussion below that there are, after all, strong 
grounds for permitting ability to influence the distribution of internships, but it would 
nonetheless be possible at least in principle to directly regulate internship distributive 
mechanisms to prevent ability from being treated as relevant to access.  Policy similar to 
the anti-discrimination policy outlined above might be drawn up and, in place of banning 
discrimination on the basis of characteristics such as gender and ethnicity, ban 
‘discrimination’ (or selection) on the basis of ability.  (Of course, distribution would then 
require to be based on some other attribute or attributes.  I discuss below what kinds of 
consideration in accordance with luck egalitarian values might instead be brought into 
play in internship distribution.) 
In sum, I hope to have shown that there is a range of regulatory actions luck egalitarians 
might endorse in response to unjust inequalities of outcome consequent on inequalities 
of access to internships.  I turn now to the question of the comparative desirability of 
the various alternatives. 
4.3  An Analysis of the Approaches 
Reaching an all things considered judgement regarding which action or combination of 
actions should be taken on the balance of reasons (absenting the sociological feasibility 
constraints I outlined in the introductory paragraphs of section 4.2) is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  Such an enterprise would require a determination of the demands of all 
relevant values and of how those demands should be balanced against each other, as well 
as of how well each possible set of regulatory actions would meet the properly balanced 
demands of all relevant values.  However, in what follows I seek to make some initiatory 
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contributions to that enterprise by exploring how a number of relational egalitarian 
concerns might tell in favour or against the alternative regulatory actions.  In particular, 
I draw on Schemmel’s (2011) work on domination and oppression, and Wolff’s (2009a 
and 2009b) work on marginalization, exclusion, snobbery, stigma and dignity.  On the 
basis of those limited considerations, I draw some tentative conclusions regarding the 
comparative desirability of the various regulatory options from a broadly egalitarian 
perspective (that is, from a perspective that views both relational and distributive equality 
as valuable).123   
4.3.1  The Desirability of Compensation 
Is it better to allow luck to play out in the distribution of internships (such that some 
people will be excluded from access to internships on the basis of factors that are, to 
some more or less significant degree, a matter of luck) and then implement a policy of 
redistributive compensation to redress overall advantage and disadvantage, or to take 
action against luck-based inequalities of access to internships? 
                                              
123 Of course, a range of other values (including, for example, liberty and economic efficiency) 
may bear on the judgement of which regulatory actions are most desirable all things considered, 
the implications of which I do not consider here.  Hence, my conclusions regarding the 
comparative desirability of the alternative regulatory approaches are tentative in the sense that 
consideration of the demands of other values may tell in favour of actions that seem undesirable 
in light of relational egalitarian concerns, or against actions that seem desirable in light of those 
concerns. 
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Before looking in more detail at how relational egalitarian concerns bear on the answer 
to that question, I first want to return to a point I raised in section 2.3.3 and in section 
4.1.3.  If that point has force, it tells against the compensatory approach to tackling 
inequalities of outcome consequent on internship distribution.  I suggested that, as luck 
egalitarianism is concerned with self-determination in the sense that it requires that how 
well people’s lives go (or, how advantaged they are) is matter of their own choice, it might 
also be concerned with people’s ability to be self-determining in the sense of choosing 
how their lives go (or, how they accrue advantage).  A luck egalitarian concern with self-
determination (broadly construed) might, then, motivate a position according to which 
access to goods that have a weighty influence on current outcomes and future 
opportunities and which are integral to people’s qualitative life plans should not be 
influenced by matters of luck.  The weightier the good, the weightier the reason of luck 
egalitarian distributive justice to ensure that access to that good is not delineated by luck.  
This is because, when people are excluded from access to such goods on the basis of 
luck, their self-determination (in the sense of choosing how their lives go) is 
compromised.  In the present context, we can recognize that people do not tend to aspire 
merely to, say, a particular level of income, but also to earn an income from particular 
sorts of work or work within particular sectors.  In many cases, entry to such work 
depends in large part on successful completion of a relevant internship.  As such, 
internships are weighty and important goods: they not only have a significant influence 
on current outcomes and future opportunities, but are also significant in the sense that 
they are integral to people’s qualitative life plans.   
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The compensatory approach denies people a crucial route of entry into the work they 
want on the basis of factors that are more or less matters of luck.  On that approach, 
people are prevented through no choice of their own from doing the work they aspire 
to do: as internships are a crucial route into employment in many professional sectors, 
denying people access to internships on the basis of, for example, their lack of 
connections or wealth limits their possible career choices.  If we care about enabling 
people to determine the course of their own lives – to choose how they accrue advantage, 
as well as how much advantage they accrue – there are reasons to prevent luck from 
influencing the original distribution of important goods such as internships.  In short, 
giving people access to internships may be better than denying them access and 
providing compensation: because internships have a weighty influence on life outcomes 
and future opportunities, and because they form part of people’s qualitative life plans, 
rendering access insensitive (or, less sensitive) to luck improves people’s opportunities 
for self-determination in the broader sense.  If this point has force, it tells against 
compensating internship-related injustice and in favour of regulation of that prevents 
luck-based differences in demographic characteristics, networks, wealth and abilities 
from having any inegalitarian influence on the distribution of internships.  That said, I 
acknowledge that staunch currency-monists may reject the notion that self-
determination, in any sense other than choosing how well life goes, is a relevant luck 
egalitarian concern.  On the currency-monist view, what matters to luck egalitarian 
distributive justice is that overall levels of advantage are luck-neutral and choice-
sensitive.  Hence, luck egalitarianism is (in itself) indifferent between the alternative 
regulatory strategies that would bring about just outcomes, as long as each is equally 
effective.  If that view is, after all, more plausible than the one I have suggested, then 
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luck egalitarianism provides no reason to prefer levelling or direct structural regulation 
over compensation as a response to internship-related injustice.  Even if it is not, I would 
not claim that the luck egalitarian concern with self-determination in the broader sense 
is weightier or lexically prior to all other considerations: luck equality is not the only value 
worth pursuing in our social arrangements and its demands may sometimes be trumped 
by the demands of other values.  Thus, whether or not luck egalitarianism (in itself) gives 
a reason to disprefer provision of compensation over instigation of more choice-
sensitive access to internships, consideration of other values is still required in order to 
reach an all things considered judgement of which regulatory actions should, on the 
balance of reason, be implemented.  Let us turn, then, to the value of relational equality. 
Relational equality, as we saw in section 2.3.5, is the value of equality as it applies to 
social relations.  Relational egalitarians hold that all people have, in a fundamental sense, 
equal status and should therefore view and treat each other as equals.  For Wolff, this 
involves (among other things) accepting people in their differences.  Wolff writes that a 
central concern of relational egalitarianism is that ‘if people are not accepted in their 
differences from each other they will be marginalized and excluded’ (Wolff 2009a: 122).  
Such marginalization and exclusion is incompatible with and hinders progression toward 
the relational egalitarian goal of ‘a society of equals’ (Wolff 2009a: 113).  This 
consideration should be brought to bear on regulatory design and, most obviously, tells 
against permitting recruitment to internships to discriminate against people on the basis 
of demographic characteristics.  As this is precisely what the compensatory approach 
entails, the value of relational equality thus seems to tell against that approach and in 
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favour of alternative strategies that would undermine discrimination.124  Discriminatory 
recruitment practices manifest a failure to accept people in their differences and function 
to exclude people from positions on the basis of differences in demographic 
characteristics – differences that relational equality urges us to accept.  For example, if 
discrimination in internship recruitment occurs on the basis of gender and ethnicity, this 
is a contributory factor in the marginalization and exclusion of women and people of 
colour, entailing that internships and the professions to which they lead will continue to 
be (or, will become) disproportionately dominated by white men.  Rather than treating 
people as equals, the compensatory approach ensures the door to the professions 
remains shut on those people who are (given the discrimination against them) most likely 
to also have been marginalized and excluded in other areas of social life.  That is, namely, 
women and minorities.  And it benefits those – namely, straight, white, able-bodied, cis 
men – most likely to have been the beneficiaries of inegalitarian relations.  Conversely, a 
regulatory agency that clearly prohibits such discrimination manifests authoritative 
condemnation of sexism, racism, ableism, homophobia and transphobia as unacceptable.  
If it is desirable for a regulatory agency to attempt to bring about a society of equals and 
                                              
124 That is, it seems to tell in favour of either levelling, or direct structural regulation, or a 
combination of the two.  In fact, as we saw above, levelling differences in gender, ethnicity and 
sexuality characteristics is deeply infeasible and, if it were possible, it would itself certainly be 
gravely offensive to the value of relational equality.  Of the two strategies of prevention, then, 
relational equality tells in favour of direct structural regulation to ban discrimination on the basis 
of gender, ethnicity and sexuality. 
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if non-discriminatory access to internships is more likely to contribute to the 
achievement of this goal than a regulatory approach that permits inequalities of outcome 
to arise as a result of discriminatory access to internships and then provides 
compensation to offset any overall outcome inequalities, there is a reason of relational 
equality that tells against redistributive compensation.   
For similar reasons, relational egalitarian concerns also seem to tell against permitting 
but compensating for inequalities of access to internships that track wealth and 
networks.  Such a response, again, marginalizes and excludes the less wealthy and the 
less ‘well-connected’, paying them off for their lack of access to the professions.  This 
kind of exclusion may also contribute to the maintenance of relations of dominance and 
oppression.  At the core of this insight is the fact that the distribution of wealth and 
connections is far from random (as well as far from chosen).  How wealthy and ‘well-
connected’ people in the UK currently are is, at least in large part, bound up with the 
UK’s pronounced social status hierarchy (that is, the British class system).  In traditional 
terms, those from working class backgrounds are less likely than those from middle class 
backgrounds to be wealthy and ‘well-connected’.  They are also the least likely, along 
with women and minorities, to have been the beneficiaries of relations of domination 
and oppression.  Another relevant consideration here is that internships provide 
important access routes into professions involving the exercise of considerable political 
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power and social influence: politics and the media.125  As a number of theorists have 
argued, when access to political power and social influence depends on wealth and 
having the right connections, we risk not only the corruption of democracy, but also the 
kind of domination and abuse of power that relational equality condemns.  Thus, where 
undertaking an internship provides an advantage in subsequent competitions for jobs 
that involve exercise of political power and social influence, there may be additional 
reasons of relational equality to ensure access is not delineated on the basis of wealth or 
personal networks.  Schemmel, for example, presents an argument according to which 
fair access to decision-making power is necessary ‘to avoid risk of domination’ 
(Schemmel 2011: 387).  In particular, access to positions in ‘in politics and the 
bureaucracy, in influential media, and in the economic sphere’ should not be delineated 
in the basis of wealth and personal networks (Schemmel 2011: 387).  Schemmel therefore 
advocates ‘stringent measures against nepotism and corruption’ to avert the emergence 
of ‘a body of privileged people in positions of power […] who are neither sincerely 
willing nor able to properly take into account the interests of the people affected by their 
                                              
125 As we saw in section 3.1.2, research suggests that around five out of every six new entrants 
into journalism undertook internship work before getting their first job in journalism.  The 
research also suggests that almost half of parliamentary interns receive no expenses, while 
around half of media internships are unpaid.  As the nepotistic distribution of internships tends 
to happen on an informal basis there is little hard evidence of it, but it does not seem entirely 
unlikely that nepotism might be a factor influencing internship distribution in Westminster and 
Fleet Street. 
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decisions’ (Schemmel 2011: 386, 387).  Michael Walzer proposes an alternative approach 
to justice according to which political ‘power and influence cannot be bought and sold’: 
the exchange of money for political power must be ‘blocked’ (Walzer 1983: 100).  With 
regard to nepotism in the political sphere, Walzer writes that state officials cannot ‘use 
their power to advance the interests of their families or distribute government offices to 
relatives or “cronies”’ (Walzer 1983: 283).  The wealthy and ‘well-connected’ must not 
dominate political power, as such dominance ‘makes for the dominance of people’ 
(Walzer 1983: 19).  Internships may not confer quite as much power and influence as 
top positions in government, the media and the economic sphere, but to the extent that 
they confer advantage in subsequent competitions for these top positions, the arguments 
Schemmel and Walzer raise against nepotism and plutocracy might be extended to 
motivate the choice of regulatory options that act to remove or reduce inequalities of 
access to internships on the basis of wealth and personal networks.  In other words, the 
arguments tell against leaving those inequalities of access intact, even if compensation is 
provided to offset the resulting inequalities of outcome.   
A final consideration here is that relational equality involves a strong ‘opposition to 
snobbery’ (Wolff 2009a: 122).  If it were the case that a disproportionate lack of women, 
minorities and people from working class backgrounds within those professions toward 
which internship work is a vital step contributed to circumstances conducive to the 
development or maintenance of snobbery or bias among professionals, that would 
provide another reason of relational equality against the compensatory option.  That is 
because, where alternative strategies seek to improve access to internships and, so, also 
to the professions among women, minorities and people from working class 
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backgrounds and might, perhaps, thereby result in or contribute to a disturbance of 
patterns of snobbery or bias, the compensatory approach simply pays them off for their 
exclusion and leaves circumstances in the professions undisturbed.  On the basis of these 
considerations, then, it does not seem desirable from a relational egalitarian perspective 
to respond to inequalities of access to internships based on demographic characteristics, 
wealth and personal social networks by leaving them in place and redressing overall 
inequalities of outcome through provision of ex post redistributive compensation.126 
4.3.2  The Desirability of Levelling and Direct Structural Regulation  
I demonstrated above that a number of relational egalitarian concerns tell against 
providing compensation in response to inequalities of outcome consequent on 
inequalities of access to internships based on demographic characteristics, networks and 
wealth, and in favour of removing those inequalities of access.  That is, they tell in favour 
of strategies of prevention.  We also saw above, however, that improving access to 
internships by levelling differences in both demographic characteristics (or, more 
precisely, gender, ethnicity and sexuality) and networks is (for different reasons) deeply 
infeasible.  If these arguments hold, consideration of the demands of relational equality 
suggest that a regulatory agency should directly regulate the structure of internships to 
prevent those demographic characteristics and networks from counting for anything in 
                                              
126 I examine the question of whether relational equality is compatible with distributing 
internships on the basis of ability in section 4.3.3 below. 
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distributive processes.  The direct structural regulatory actions I discussed above 
(namely, anti-discrimination legislation, a ban on auctions, and anti-nepotism legislation) 
work to ensure access to internships does not depend on having the ‘right’ demographic 
characteristics or connections.127  Thus, they work against the kind of marginalization, 
exclusion and snobbery Wolff (2099a and 2009b) condemns, and the kind of domination 
and oppression Schemmel (2011) is concerned to avoid.  Moreover, in more positive 
terms, they seem likely to serve progression toward a society of equals because they 
clearly signal acceptance of people in their differences.   
With regard to disability, however, we saw that (partial) levelling is also a feasible option, 
at least in those cases where medical treatment can be provided to remove impairment 
or reduce it to the point at which it is no longer disabling, given the structure of society.  
Thus, the regulatory options for tackling disability-related inequalities of access to 
internships include levelling (in the form of provision of medical treatment) and direct 
structural regulation (in the form of anti-discrimination legislation, including building 
regulations).  In section 2.3.5.1, I discussed at some length whether provision of medical 
treatment to remove or reduce impairment is compatible with the value of relational 
equality.  My discussion concluded that, although provision of medical treatment may 
not always constitute a failure to accept people in their differences, it may be harmful to 
                                              
127 As we saw, to ensure people with impaired mobility gain access to internships, anti-
discrimination legislation should include requirements for organizations’ physical premises to 
be accessible. 
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relational equality if it functions to undermine the status of people who remain 
disabled.128  Direct structural regulatory responses, on the other hand, seem far more 
promising.  Wolff argues that responding to disability-related disadvantage with 
structural change will often serve relational equality because: 
First, it is non-stigmatizing; individuals do not have to be 
identified in order to be helped.  Second, it is inclusive, welcoming 
people in their differences, rather than attempting to impose a 
single mould.  Third it benefits everyone by reducing risk.  (Wolff 
2009a: 135)129 
That said, as Wolff points out, the issue of stigma is not necessarily straightforward.  In 
particular, implementation of policies requiring organizations to make and pay for 
adjustments to their premises may induce a backlash effect: 
The costs of making material accommodations for disabled 
people, such as installing stair-lifts, very often fall on individuals 
or companies, rather than the tax payer.  Those who find 
                                              
128 See also Shakespeare (2006) and Wolff (2009a and 2009b). 
129 It reduces risk for everyone because any able-bodied person might, at some point, acquire a 
physical impairment.  A society that already limits the extent to which impairment translates 
into disability therefore reduces the risks of disadvantage faced by able-bodied people as well as 
those with physical impairments.   
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themselves out of pocket as a result may strongly resent those 
individuals for whose benefit the changes were made, and this 
could be evident through their behaviour.  (Wolff 2009b: 53) 
Thus, the direct structural regulatory action I have canvassed seems to carry the risk of 
undermining the status of disabled people, even if it is designed with the intention of 
promoting equality of status and of opportunity.  Now, it might be thought that this is a 
matter of non-compliance with the spirit of the regulation, which I said I would set to 
one side in this discussion.  But, in any case, I think there are options available that would 
reduce this risk.  I mentioned in section 2.2.4 that, where a regulatory agency imposes 
accessibility requirements on organizations’ premises, the costs of meeting those 
requirements might fall to the owners of the premises or they might be provided or at 
least subsidized by the state.  The question of who should meet the costs is complex: I 
suspect there are arguments that cut both ways and I do not attempt to determine the 
answer here.  But I think it can be said that, were the costs socialized, the risk of backlash 
would be reduced.  In sum, then, with regard to the case of disability, relational egalitarian 
concerns seem to tell against a compensatory approach.  Whether levelling in the form 
of provision of medical treatment is desirable or undesirable on relational egalitarian 
grounds seems much more ambiguous: undoubtedly, it reduces the disadvantage faced 
by those whose impairments it targets, but it fails to help and may even work to 
undermine the status of those who remain disabled.  Relational egalitarian concerns do, 
however, seem to tell in favour of applying anti-discrimination legislation to hiring 
processes and imposing accessibility requirements on physical premises, with the caveat 
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that a regulatory agency may be required to (partially) fund material adjustments in order 
to reduce the risk of backlash.   
With regard to tackling wealth-based inequalities of access to internships, both levelling 
action and direct structural regulatory action to remove those inequalities are deeply 
feasible.  So which is to be preferred?130  Is it better for a regulatory agency to foot the 
bill for living and bidding expenses, or for it to impose a requirement on organizations 
to pay their interns and ban internship auctions?  Before examining whether relational 
egalitarian concerns might favour one approach over the other, I want first to consider 
                                              
130 I suggested above that a regulatory agency might engage in thoroughgoing levelling by 
banning gifts and bequests and providing a universal grant or income, as well as paying 
internship expenses, or it might engage in less thoroughgoing levelling by paying expenses but 
otherwise leaving background inequalities of wealth as they are.  I suspect that the more 
thoroughgoing option would bring additional benefits to relational equality, particularly if, for 
example, some status inequality follows from wealth inequality.  However, given that the less 
thoroughgoing option would be effective in removing wealth-based inequalities of access to 
internships, such that implementation of the more thoroughgoing option is not strictly 
necessary in order to prevent wealth from delineating access to internships, I focus in what 
follows on the less thoroughgoing policy, on which a regulatory agency provides an ‘internship 
grant’ to fund the bidding and living expenses of interns who, through no choice of their own, 
cannot cover them themselves. 
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an argument from within egalitarian distributive justice that I think tells in favour of 
direct structural regulation in this case.   
In section 4.2.1, I discussed Steiner’s view that when a choice creates unchosen costs for 
some third party, the chooser (and not society) should be responsible for redressing 
those costs.  If that point holds, it has relevant implications for the present discussion.  
Consider that the costs of responding to wealth-based inequalities of access to 
internships should not fall on the state, inasmuch as they are a result of choices by 
decision-makers within an organization offering internships to withhold payment from 
interns (rather than paying them or not using them) and to auction internships (rather 
than distributing them in a way that does not track wealth).  When we compare levelling 
and direct structural regulatory responses to wealth-based inequalities of access in light 
of this consideration, the levelling option I considered above is shown to be an 
inappropriate response: it entails socialization of the costs of meeting living and bidding 
expenses.  Organizations would continue with impunity to make choices that impose 
significant costs on interns, without being held responsible for meeting the true social 
costs of those choices.  Society would effectively be subsidizing organizations’ costly 
choices.  Conversely, holding organizations responsible for the costs of their choices 
may suggest something like the direct structural regulatory action I outlined above.  
Instead of providing ex post compensation to those who they have chosen to exclude on 
the basis of wealth, organizations might instead be required to pay their interns a living 
wage to cover their living expenses and ensure no one is excluded on the basis of wealth.  
Requiring organizations to pay bidding costs does not quite amount to a ban on 
internship auctions.  Rather, it amounts to a ban on any internship auctions wherein 
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organizations do not pay living costs.  Instead of a ban per se, then, the appropriate direct 
structural regulatory action might be amended to a legal requirement that organizations 
pay bidding expenses.  The two policies seem likely, however, to have a similar effect: if 
organizations had to pay bidding costs, it seems doubtful they would see any point in 
continuing to auction internships.131  It seems, then, that the responsibilitarian 
component of luck egalitarian distributive justice may provide its own reason in favour 
of direct structural regulation to remove wealth-based inequalities of access to 
internships. 
Returning now to consideration of relational egalitarian concerns, how do those 
concerns bear on the choice between levelling and direct structural regulatory action in 
response to wealth-based inequalities of access to internships?  As either approach would 
                                              
131 It might be objected against this view that interns freely choose to undertake unpaid 
internship work or to buy internships at auction, and that the living and bidding costs they 
thereby accrue are therefore a matter of their own choices.  However, if the arguments I made 
in section 3.2.3 hold, that objection is not available, at least if welfare is or constitutes part of 
the metric of advantage.  The object of interns’ choices is not the expense attached to gaining 
access to an internship, but the internship itself or the job to which it is hoped the internship 
will lead.  With regard to those for whom undertaking internship work is a deeply held 
preference, such that to forgo it would entail ‘alienation from what is deep within them’ – for 
example, because it is a necessary step toward their desired career – it is therefore inappropriate 
to impose the unchosen and relatively high costs of satisfying that preference on the intern herself 
(Cohen 2004: 14).   
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be effective in removing inequalities of access that directly track wealth, neither entails 
excluding anyone from internship work on the basis that they lack wealth.  The relational 
egalitarian imperative to avoid engendering wealth-based marginalization and 
domination is, then, met equally well by both approaches.  But another relational 
egalitarian concern is to do with dignity or self-respect.  In particular, Wolff (1998 and 
2010) has argued that implementation of luck egalitarian regulation should avoid 
demeaning, shaming, humiliating or insulting individuals.  If the two approaches fare 
differently with respect to their effect on interns’ dignity, this concern would tell in 
favour of the approach that is least harmful (or, most beneficial) to interns’ dignity.  It is 
not clear to me that there would necessarily be any significant difference between the 
two approaches in this respect.  Nonetheless, perhaps it is the case (at least for some 
interns) that it would be less dignified or dignifying for interns to receive living expenses 
from a regulatory agency than for them to earn an income paid by the organizations for 
which they work, and that relational equality therefore favours direct structural 
regulation in this case.  On the other hand, if that were the case, a regulatory agency 
might take it into account when setting the level of payment it provides.  In other words, 
it might be possible to increase the level of payment to the point at which no relative 
dignitary harm ensues.132  Thus, on the (contested) assumption that there is such a point, 
                                              
132 For this to be effective, it would have to be the case that, although receiving payment from 
a regulatory agency is less dignified than receiving it from an employer, keeping the source of 
income constant it is more dignifying to receive more income than less.  As we saw in section 
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the relational egalitarian concern with dignity appears impartial between levelling and 
direct structural regulatory responses to wealth-based inequalities of access to 
internships.   
On the basis of the above considerations, then, although the value of relational equality 
does not seem to tell decisively in favour of or against either regulatory approach, there 
does appear to be a luck egalitarian presumption in favour of direct structural regulation 
to compel organizations to pay their interns and to ban internship auctions wherein 
organizations do not pay bidding expenses (or, to require organizations to pay any 
bidding expenses accrued through buying the internships they sell at auction). 
4.3.3  The Desirability of Regulatory Responses to Ability-Based Inequality 
I noted in the discussion of compensation in section 4.2.4.1 that I would return to the 
question of what relational egalitarian concerns might suggest regarding the comparative 
desirability of the various regulatory responses to inequalities resulting from ability-based 
inequalities of access to internships.  In short, I think relational equality tells in favour 
of a combination of regulatory actions, spanning all three of the categories of strategy.  
That is, compensation for ability-based inequality seems compatible with the demands 
of relational equality, on the condition that levelling and direct structural regulation are 
also in place.  Levelling and direct structural regulation should be implemented to reduce 
                                              
4.2.1, however, Roemer (1998:61) suggests this may not always be the case, which casts some 
doubt on the efficacy of such an approach. 
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inequalities of access to internships that track luck-based differences in ability, as far as 
possible and desirable on the balance of reasons, and (given that this would not entirely 
eradicate ability-based access inequalities) compensation should be provided to offset 
the remaining luck-based inequalities of outcome that are produced. 
Let us consider first whether relational equality would tell in favour of or against 
compensation for ability-based inequalities, were levelling and direct structural regulation 
not also in place.  Would provision of compensation to those who, as a matter of luck, 
lack the ability required to successfully complete an internship be harmful to relational 
equality?  Anderson raises an objection against compensation for lack of marketable 
talent on the basis that it would be insulting, humiliating and stigmatizing for recipients, 
and curtail progress toward a society of equals.  She imagines the sort of letter that might 
be sent to recipients of compensation to explain the reason for their entitlement: 
To the stupid and untalented:  Unfortunately, other people don’t 
value what little you have to offer in the system of production.  
Your talents are too meager to command much market value.  
Because of the misfortune that you were born so poorly endowed 
with talents, we productive ones will make it up to you: we’ll let 
you share in the bounty of what we have produced with our vastly 
superior and highly valued abilities.  (Anderson 1999: 305) 
Of course, the letter she imagines is indeed highly disrespectful.  But a luck egalitarian 
policy of compensation for ability-based inequalities produced by the labour market (that 
is, by job and internship distribution) need not be.  Consider this alternative letter: 
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‘As you know, our society arranges its labour market in a way that leads to people with 
certain abilities having access to a broader range of positions and higher wages than do 
others with other abilities.  Of course, we do not arrange things in this way because we 
think that anyone is superior to anyone else, or that particular abilities are superior to 
others, but because, for various reasons, that is the most beneficial way of arranging 
things we can currently think of.  That said, we recognize that these arrangements do 
result in some objectionable inequality.  Because it is unjust for anyone to be worse off 
than anyone else through no choice of their own, our society has also implemented a 
policy of redistribution to redress the unfair inequalities that are produced by our labour 
market.’133 
It is my view that, on two conditions, compensation accompanied by such a letter would 
not be insulting, humiliating or stigmatizing to recipients.  First, it must be true that any 
ability-based inequalities within the labour market are indeed justified on the balance of 
reasons.  Second, it must be true that a regulatory agency is doing as much as is possible 
and desirable on the balance of reasons to provide people with equal opportunities to 
develop advantaging abilities.   
Consider the second condition.  Assuming for now that some ability-based inequalities 
of access to advantaging positions in the labour market are justified on the balance of 
                                              
133 The idea that sending a letter along these lines would not offend the value of relational 
equality was suggested to me by Adam Swift in private correspondence.   
346 
 
reasons, very unequal opportunities to develop the relevant abilities will tend to result in 
those with lesser educational opportunities being excluded from those advantaging 
positions, while those with better educational opportunities come to dominate them.  
Currently, of course, the education system in the UK affords people extremely unequal 
opportunities to develop advantaging abilities: some are given excellent opportunities 
due to having parents who are willing and able to buy them high quality schooling, while 
others are given relatively limited educational opportunities due to happening to grow 
up in the catchment area of a poorly performing school, or happening to have parents 
who are not in a position to (or simply do not) aid their educational development.  In 
short, the system permits children’s educational opportunities – and, thus, their 
subsequent opportunities in the labour market – to be delineated according to 
differences in their parents’ wealth and abilities (or interests).  This raises concerns 
similar to those expressed by Schemmel and Walzer regarding the exclusion of people 
from less advantaged backgrounds from the professions and from positions of power in 
politics and the media, which exclusion, as Schemmel argues, contributes to the 
maintenance of harmful relations of domination.  Thus, the letter I suggested above 
would ring hollow in the absence of any attempt at educational reform to improve the 
educational opportunities of those from disadvantaged backgrounds and to thereby 
reduce the risk of exclusion and domination.  That some people will be excluded from 
certain advantaging positions within the labour market due to a lack of ability may be 
inevitable (in the sense of being justified and desirable on the balance of reasons), but it 
is not inevitable that, in general, the poorest educational opportunities are afforded to 
the least advantaged.  Affording equal respect to all thus seems to suggest that, if there 
must be ability-based inequalities of opportunity within the labour market, there must 
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also be efforts made to ensure that opportunities to develop the relevant abilities are 
equal.  Conversely, failure to make those efforts manifests a failure to respect all those 
whose labour market opportunities (and, thus, opportunities for self-determination) 
could otherwise have been significantly improved. 
Returning to the first condition, in order for compensation for ability-related 
disadvantage and the letter that accompanies it to be inoffensive to relational equality, it 
must be true that whatever ability-based inequalities of opportunity within the labour 
market we retain are justifiable to the recipient of compensation without offense to their 
dignity.  In order to be justifiable, they must (as the letter claims) actually be justified on 
the balance of reasons.  Are there good reasons to hire the most able workers and 
interns?  I would suggest that, with regard to jobs, less competent workers will, in general, 
work less efficiently than more competent workers.  As an important element of 
economic sustainability, efficiency is desirable, and this consideration therefore tells in 
favour of recruiting workers by ability.  Moreover, hiring by ability will also tend to 
promote the total level of welfare (or advantage) in a society.  For example, as a number 
of egalitarians, including Segall (2012a: 41) and Roemer (1998: 85), have observed, we 
want surgeons to be those who are most competent at surgery because we have a concern 
for the welfare of their patients.  Assuming that the relevant considerations (which 
include the above but also, perhaps, others) tell, on balance, in favour of hiring the most 
able workers, such hiring practices can be justified.  As such, compensation could be 
provided to those disadvantaged by hiring practices, along with a letter (perhaps 
explaining in detail the reasons for compensation), without any disrespect to recipients.   
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But what about internships?  Are there good reasons for internship recruitment to take 
account of ability?  First, because internships are valued by interns as a means of 
improving future opportunities for particular jobs and because jobs currently recruit by 
ability, internships would lose that aspect of their instrumental value if they were 
distributed to people who lack the potential to develop the abilities required to compete 
successfully for those particular jobs.  Second, it seems, at least at first glance, that if 
there are decisive reasons for workers to be competent (in order, among other things, to 
avoid inefficiency and to promote the absolute level of welfare), there are similar reasons 
for interns to be competent.  Interns contribute to the core work of the organization.  If 
it is desirable for that work to be done efficiently and for the welfare of those affected 
by it to be protected, there are reasons to hire interns by ability.  But the reasons seem 
less decisive than in the case of hiring workers.  That is because internships also involve 
elements of learning and training: opportunities are provided to interns to acquire and 
develop, throughout the duration of their internships, the abilities necessary to pursue a 
related career.  A ‘rule of thumb’ distinction drawn by Roemer is relevant here: 
I propose that the EOp [equality of opportunity] principle be 
applied when the advantage in question is the acquisition of an 
attribute required to compete for a position (a job or career).  But 
I propose that the nondiscrimination principle be applied in the 
competition for specific positions in society.  (Roemer 1998: 86-
87) 
Roemer suggests that hiring for jobs should accord with a principle of non-
discrimination.  That is, access to jobs should be insensitive to demographic 
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characteristics but, although ability can be a matter of luck to some degree, it should be 
taken into account in hiring decisions because there are good reasons (including the need 
to protect the welfare of those who are served and affected by workers) to try to ensure 
jobs are done competently.  But Roemer advocates a more thoroughgoing principle of 
equality of opportunity for training, where the purpose of such training is to aid 
development of abilities required to pursue a career.  That is, access to opportunities to 
develop the sorts of abilities that are selected for in job distribution should not be 
delineated by luck, as the benefits to both the individual and society of training tend to 
outweigh any ‘immediate social costs’ incurred as a result of ensuring luck-neutral access 
(Roemer 1998: 89).  Further, it may also be the case that, in general, performance in 
training is not so crucial to the welfare of others.  Internships, as we have seen, involve 
a mixture of both doing and learning: interns contribute to core work of organizations 
but there is also a focus on providing interns with training opportunities.  Thus, where 
it is important for that core work to be done at or above a certain level of competence, 
there is a reason to take ability into account in hiring interns.  But the fact that internships 
also provide opportunities to develop the abilities required to pursue a related career 
suggests room for a greater focus on potential to develop, throughout the course of the 
internship, the sorts of abilities that jobs select for.  Thus, it may not be the case that the 
most able should be selected for internships.  Instead, taking seriously the role internships 
play in training people for future careers, we might think internship work should be done 
sufficiently well by someone who is able to develop their abilities as they progress 
throughout the internship.  In other words, internship recruitment might select for 
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sufficient ability and potential to develop ability, with the level of sufficiency informed 
by consideration of how much ability is required, all things considered.134   
4.3.4  Toward a Regulatory Regime 
Thus far, then, the considerations I have examined suggest a regulatory regime involving: 
a requirement to advertise openly for applicants (and possibly also to engage in outreach 
work to widen the pool of applicants); a requirement to pay interns a living wage; a ban 
on closed internship auctions; either a ban on open internship auctions or a requirement 
that organizations pay all bidding expenses; a ban on discriminatory and nepotistic 
recruitment (including a requirement to ensure organizations’ premises are accessible); a 
requirement to recruit by sufficient ability and potential; reform of the education system; 
and compensation for any remaining ability-based inequalities of outcome.135  However, 
                                              
134 In other words, the level of ability required would be that at which there were, say, no 
unacceptable cost to efficiency or harm to the welfare of those affected by interns’ work.  The 
level of sufficiency – that is, the ‘cut-off point’ between sufficiently and insufficiently able that 
is actually employed in hiring decisions – may be somewhat arbitrary, but it would be informed 
by these fundamental considerations and acceptable at the level of regulation.  As Segall writes, 
we ‘may fuse arbitrary cut-offs with fundamental principles […] to form rules of regulations’ to 
employ in our social arrangements (Segall 2012a: 38). 
135 Two of these regulatory actions are quite wide-ranging in the sense that their implementation 
would not only affect access to internships: it would function to equalize opportunities for 
advantage in the sphere of employment more broadly.  Action to level ability would work to 
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even if such regulation were successfully implemented, internships would likely remain 
a scarce good.  Assuming that demand for internships among the sufficiently able 
outstrips supply, some additional basis on which to select interns from among 
sufficiently able applicants is required.  What criterion might luck egalitarians 
recommend?  I take inspiration here from Segall’s discussion of what he terms ‘justice 
in hiring’, in which he suggests a luck egalitarian criterion for job recruitment: ‘need’.  
Segall writes: 
very simply, luck egalitarian justice allocates jobs […] according to 
need.  (By ‘need’ I do not mean ‘need for the particular job,’ but 
rather the more general ‘being worse off.’)  (Segall 2012a: 39) 
I disagree with Segall’s account of ‘justice in hiring’ in several respects, but I agree that 
luck egalitarian distributive justice can motivate hiring (and hiring interns) on the basis 
of need.136  However, I would add the following clarification.  In order for the account 
                                              
reduce ability-based inequalities of access to jobs, while action to ensure buildings are accessible 
would work to reduce mobility-based inequalities of access to jobs (assuming that the buildings 
in which interns work also house non-intern workers).  It seems plausible, at least at first glance, 
that these considerations may further count in their favour.  That would be the case if it were 
desirable that ability-based and mobility-based inequalities of access to jobs are also tackled 
through educational reform and building accessibility requirements. 
136 The lines of disagreement are, briefly, as follows.  Segall is a currency-monist and disagrees 
that luck egalitarianism provides any reason for access to weighty goods such as jobs and 
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internships to be insensitive to luck.  On the currency-monist view, there is no luck egalitarian 
reason that tells against discrimination in recruitment as long as adequate compensation is 
provided.  Segall therefore advocates a non-discrimination clause, which he argues does not 
follow from luck egalitarian distributive justice but is, rather, part of a ‘prior’ account of what 
should not be done in hiring (Segall 2012a: 46).  Moreover, Segall’s currency-monism entails 
that jobs can be allocated to offset overall disadvantage: all jobs should be ranked according to 
their advantaging qualities, and the most advantaging jobs allocated to the most disadvantaged 
in society.  However, there are considerations additional to need that are relevant to hiring: 
Segall writes that relevant reasons to hire people ‘comprise qualifications but also efficiency, 
need, and social benefit’ (Segall 2012a: 47).  If jobs are allocated on these bases, he argues, justice 
in hiring is achieved.  That is, he claims his account of hiring is an account of ‘what justice, pure 
and simple, requires’ (Segall 2012a: 38).  On my view, jobs and internships are special to 
distributive justice in the sense that they are weighty goods with a significant influence on both 
current outcomes and future opportunities, and because they constitute important elements of 
people’s qualitative life plans.  The luck egalitarian concern with self-determination, on my view, 
provides a (defeasible) luck egalitarian reason that tells against discrimination in recruitment, 
which reason also tells against inequalities of access based on luck-based differences in wealth, 
networks and ability.  Given my concern with self-determination and my view that positions 
such as jobs and internships are special in this particular sense, I reject that jobs should be 
ranked and the most advantaging simply allocated to the least advantaged.  Such a practice would 
curtail people’s self-determination in the sense of choosing how their lives go: they would no 
longer choose which organizations to apply to work or intern for.  On my view, people should 
determine for themselves which organizations to apply to.  Under the regulatory regime I 
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to be genuinely luck egalitarian (rather than simply egalitarian), there must be reference 
to the extent to which being worse off is a matter of luck.  That is, the neediest should 
be understood as the worst off through no choice of her own.  Where need is understood in 
terms of being badly off, with no reference to luck or choice, recruiting according to 
need advantages the disadvantaged regardless of their history of luck and choice, and the 
criterion then serves equality rather than luck equality.  With that amendment, the 
criterion of need could work in combination with the criterion of sufficient ability to 
determine the selection of interns.  In other words, from among the applicants to an 
internship position, selectors should select for sufficient ability and potential, with the 
level of sufficiency being set at whatever point is desirable and justifiable on the balance 
of reasons.  Then, from among that subset of applicants, the neediest applicant should 
be selected.  Thus, the distribution of internships would function to offset unjust 
                                              
outlined above, the luck egalitarian criterion of need should, then, be employed to choose 
between (sufficiently able) applicants: people would choose which organizations to apply to, but 
applicants’ being badly off through no choice of their own would work to advantage them 
relative to (unjustly) better off applicants.  Finally, I do not view this account of internship hiring 
criteria, comprising need on the one hand and ability on the other (as far as ability is required 
on the balance of reasons, including reasons to do with efficiency, absolute levels of welfare, 
and perhaps other things, too) as an account of what egalitarian distributive justice ‘pure and 
simple’ requires.  In my view, need is the luck egalitarian criterion and the reasons for hiring on 
the basis of ability extend beyond reasons of justice.  Thus, the internship hiring criteria I 
suggested above respect the demands of a plurality of values and not only justice. 
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disadvantage, as far as that is compatible with the properly balanced demands of other 
relevant values.   
In sum, the regulatory regime I have outlined comprises a range of regulatory actions 
falling into the categories of redistributive compensation, levelling and direct structural 
regulation, and functions to prevent most forms of luck-based inequalities of access to 
internships.  Some ability-based inequalities of access – those that are justified on the 
balance of reasons – remain, and so levelling (in the form of educational reform) is 
implemented to ensure, as far as is possible and desirable all things considered, that any 
differences in ability are chosen.  Finally, compensation is provided to redress the 
inequalities of outcome resulting from inequalities of access to internships that track any 
remaining unchosen differences in ability.  Of course, while this regulatory regime is, I 
think, desirable on broadly egalitarian grounds, it may be subject to objections I have 
not examined here.  I do not claim to have provided an all things considered justification 
for it and so I acknowledge there may, after all, be weighty reasons that tell against its 
implementation.  But it nonetheless strikes me as an appealing response to the unjust 
inequalities produced by the distribution of internships and one that seems not unlikely 
to be justified on the balance of reasons.   
4.4  Internship Regulation in a Non-Ideal Society 
In this final section, I want to consider what regulatory action to tackle the unjust, luck-
based inequalities of outcome produced in and through the distribution of contemporary 
UK internships luck egalitarians might support here and now in the world exactly as we 
find it.  The discussion in the previous two sections absented consideration of a number 
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of sociological feasibility constraints in order to focus on the regulatory action luck 
egalitarians might recommend if it were given that their recommendations would be 
successfully implemented.  However, regardless of how attractive the picture of fairly 
regulated internship schemes was, it is unlikely – given the sociological feasibility 
constraints I absented – to become a reality any time soon.  In the meantime, internships 
continue to play a significant role in producing unjust outcomes, functioning to exclude 
many of those without wealth and connections from the careers they wish to pursue.  
But, although bona fide luck egalitarian regulation of internship schemes may not be a 
realistic option in the short term, there remains regulatory action that could well be 
pursued – and, indeed, is being called for by various groups and organizations – 
implementation of which would at least mitigate some internship-related distributive 
injustice.  In what follows, I enumerate a number of policies that have been 
recommended by groups and organizations with an interest in alleviating what they 
perceive to be the unfairness of contemporary UK internships.  My aim is not to provide 
any thoroughgoing philosophical justification for the policies but, rather, to draw 
attention to these calls for policies that would go some way to mitigating objectionable 
(and, of course, currently uncompensated) luck-based inequalities of access to 
internships.  If luck egalitarians care about tackling distributive injustice here and now, 
they have reason to endorse these calls to action.137 
                                              
137 I assume (except where otherwise stated) that implementation of the actions enumerated 
below would not hinder progression to an even more just state of affairs.  That is, I assume 
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Firstly, as a number of individuals and organizations (including the Panel on Fair Access 
to the Professions (PFAP), the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), the Low Pay 
Commission and government lawyers) have identified, when and because interns actively 
contribute to the core work of an organization, they are legally entitled to the National 
Minimum Wage (Milburn 2009, IPPR 2010, Low Pay Commission 2010, Malik and Ball 
2011).  As we saw in section 3.1.2, around half of all internships are unpaid, but (unless 
interns do nothing more than work shadowing, which as we also saw is not generally the 
case) organizations that fail to pay their interns are breaking the law.  Put differently, Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is failing to enforce existing legislation that, if 
properly enforced, would significantly reduce wealth-based inequalities of access to 
internships.  IPPR (2010) has called for HMRC to get on with enforcing the law and 
with prosecuting those who persist in breaking it.  Moreover, as we saw in section 3.1.2, 
the British government itself uses unpaid interns in parliament, constituency offices, and 
a range of publically funded institutions (Unite 2009).  As IPPR note, ‘Government has 
                                              
these actions to curtail injustice now would not render less feasible even greater abatement of 
injustice later.  Of course, social scientists, political scientists, legal scholars and economists 
might make tentative predictions regarding the possible wider consequences of these policies 
and counterfactual futures, but to prove or disprove my assumption would require a certainty 
about those consequences that I cannot claim to have.  I can acknowledge, however, that if 
there were indeed reason to think any of these policies would render even greater improvements 
in access to internships less likely in future, or work to undermine distributive justice in other 
ways, that should be balanced against the reasons to support them. 
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the power to phase out unpaid internships in all publicly-funded institutions – and it 
should get on with doing so’ (IPPR 2010: 11).  (The action IPPR has urged the 
government to take is not, then, a matter of creating new regulation, but of enforcing 
and complying with existing legislation.)  Further, IPPR have called for the Department 
of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) to proactively ensure clear, tailored legal 
guidance is provided to employers ‘particularly from trusted organizations within the 
sectors where interns are more common’ (IPPR 2010: 12).  In 2011, the Arts Council 
issued a very clear and informative guide to arts organizations, reminding them of their 
legal obligations to interns and providing advice on how to arrange high quality, paid 
internships.  BIS might take action to ensure similar sector-specific guides are issued 
across a range of different sectors.  If any employers fail to pay their interns due to 
ignorance – rather than willful disobedience – of the law, this action might well prompt 
them to provide remuneration.  Moreover, in the face of widespread noncompliance 
with National Minimum Wage legislation, a change in the law has been called for by 
Hazel Blears MP, as well as by the largest job-boards on the internet: Monster, 
Milkround, and Totaljobs.  A loophole in advertising legislation entails that, while unpaid 
internships are illegal, it is not illegal to advertise them.  Blears recently proposed a 
private bill to close the loophole, in order to stymie organizations’ attempts to attract 
people to unpaid internship positions and thereby encourage organizations to pay their 
interns (Shiv Malik 2012).138  Next, a 2012 progress report from PFAP issued calls for 
                                              
138 In fact, a ban on public advertisements for unpaid internships might carry a risk: it is possible 
that it would have the negative unintended consequence of causing employers to ‘advertise’ 
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internships to be given a legal definition to bring them into the formal economy and to 
formally distinguish them from volunteering and work experience.  Once they have such 
a definition, existing employment and equality legislation, including the Sex 
Discrimination Act (1975), the Race Relations Amendment Act (2000), the Disability 
Discrimination Act (2005) and the Equality Act (2010) could be applied to internship 
recruitment processes.  The report states: 
Given their centrality to young people’s career prospects, 
internships should no longer be treated as part of the informal 
economy.  They should be subject to similar rules to other parts 
of the labour market.  That means introducing proper, transparent 
and fair processes for selection (Milburn 2012: 5) 
Clearly, this would do nothing to rule out recruitment by ability (although, as suggested 
in section 4.2.4, this may be justified to some extent all things considered and would, I 
think, be justified if appropriate educational reform and compensation for unchosen 
ability-related inequality were forthcoming).  But it would prevent the distribution of 
internships by auction and nepotism, and would certainly make discrimination in intern 
                                              
unpaid internships through word of mouth, ensuring that, in addition to wealth, access to unpaid 
internships would depend on ‘who you know’.  Indeed, this was the reason Nick Clegg MP 
provided for his rejection of Blears’ proposal (Malik 2013c).  On the other hand, if, in addition 
to the loophole being closed, internships were brought into the formal economy, as suggested 
below, that undesirable consequence might be averted.   
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selection illegal.  Finally, once these regulatory actions have been undertaken, the next 
step, the PFAP and IPPR have argued, would be for governments to work to raise 
awareness of internships among a wider audience.  Formally open recruitment practices 
are likely to be insufficient to prevent family background from delineating who applies 
to internships.  Government might, then, fund or conduct outreach programmes with 
organizations, charities and the careers services of educational institutions, ‘to ensure 
that students from all backgrounds give due consideration to undertaking an internship’ 
(Milburn 2009: 108, see also IPPR 2010: 5).139 
The groups and organizations making these regulatory recommendations clearly judge 
the proposals to be both deeply and sociologically feasible in the sense that their 
implementation simply requires the government to decide to act on them.  Sociological 
feasibility is, of course, a matter to be determined by social and political scientists, 
                                              
139 IPPR have argued that the first priority should be to ensure internships are paid and that 
recruitment is open, before conducting extensive outreach:  
It would be incredibly difficult to embark on an outreach programme 
which got less affluent young people excited about internships – and 
then told them they would have to work for free, probably in London, 
for three, six or nine months and they might have to rely on personal 
contacts to even hear about vacancies.  So the priority should be for 
organizations to put in place a basic framework of paid internships 
backed up with an open recruitment process.  (IPPR 2010: 15) 
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economists and legal experts, rather than by philosophers.  But if it is the case that the 
experts at IPPR, BIS and PFAP are correct, then the only ‘constraint’ on implementation 
is a lack of political support and, in publishing their proposals, they seek to raise this 
support.  If the proposals were implemented, inequalities of access to internships based 
on luck-based differences in wealth and social networks, and perhaps also demographic 
characteristics, would be significantly reduced.  Of course, significant luck-based 
inequalities of access – particularly those based on ability – would persist.  Indeed, ability 
would likely become all the more pertinent (and wider reform of education systems 
would remain as desperately urgent as ever, if not more so).  Admittedly, then, the 
regulatory actions suggested above are insufficient to eradicate all unjust inequalities of 
outcome produced in and through the distribution of internships.  But if luck egalitarians 
are concerned with equality of opportunity here and now and if, in particular, they 
condemn the fact of people without wealth and connections being locked out of so many 
of the professions, they have reason to endorse these calls to action. 
Conclusion 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, I argued that all luck egalitarian regulatory action can be 
conceived as falling into three categories: redistributive compensation, levelling and 
direct structural regulation.  In chapter 3, I examined how inequalities of access to 
internships are delineated on the basis of several forms of luck: unchosen demographic 
characteristics, personal social networks, wealth and ability.  In this final chapter, I have 
attempted to demonstrate that luck egalitarian responses to contemporary injustice, 
including that which follows from the distribution of internships, are not exhausted by 
compensatory redistribution but may include a broad range of regulatory actions to 
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equalize or reduce luck-based inequalities of opportunity.  In particular, I hope to have 
illustrated how the pluralist approach to luck egalitarianism regulatory strategies might 
be employed to frame discussion of alternative responses to the injustice resulting from 
luck-based inequalities of access to internships (and, by implication, other important 
goods) and to have shown that consideration of weighty values other than distributive 
justice may sometimes suggest that levelling and direct regulatory responses should be 
pursued.  The ways in which contemporary injustice is produced are many and varied: 
the pluralist approach to the regulatory strategies of luck egalitarian distributive justice 
provides a useful and clear framework within which to identify and evaluate the many 
and varied ways in which we might respond.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
The central aim of this thesis has been to provide a contribution to our understanding 
of what kind of luck egalitarian distributive justice is worth pursuing, and how it can be 
pursued.  I first questioned how luck should be conceived within theories of distributive 
justice that condemn its inegalitarian influence on outcomes, arguing that the attributivist 
interpretation should be rejected.  I then turned to the question of how the inegalitarian 
influence of luck can be neutralized.  Discussion of regulation within much of the luck 
egalitarian literature to date focuses on redistributive compensation and lacks a clear 
framework for examining alternative regulatory strategies.  I hope to have presented a 
useful and conceptually clear framework that focuses attention on the full range of luck 
egalitarian regulatory strategies.  Further, I sought to demonstrate how that framework 
can be applied through an original case study of internships.  I hope to have shown both 
that internships have now become a significant factor in the production of distributive 
injustice in the UK and that luck egalitarians might endorse levelling and direct structural 
regulatory action to prevent that injustice from arising (at least to some degree), as well 
as compensation to redress any injustice that is not prevented.   
Thesis Summary 
In chapter 1, I offered a critique of the attributivist approach to drawing the distinction 
between luck and choice, arguing that the principle of consequential responsibility to 
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which that distinction gives substance should be rejected by luck egalitarians.  The 
attributivist approach holds that the principle consequential responsibility should reflect 
and be grounded in our ordinary moral experience and practice of assigning attributive 
responsibility (that is, of blaming, praising, and excusing a person for an action).  Further, 
it claims that our ordinary moral experience and practice of assigning attributive 
responsibility is best explained by Scanlon’s conception of attributive responsibility: we 
assign attributive responsibility for an action when it is appropriately responsive to 
reason and none of Scanlon’s three excusing conditions apply.  Thus, on that view, 
Scanlonian attributive responsibility is the necessary condition for consequential 
responsibility.  However, were it to be a sufficient condition, that would have 
unattractive implications in three respects (for reasons to do with socialization, unjust 
social norms, and reflectively endorsed expensive tastes).  Three additional excusing 
conditions for consequential responsibility are therefore included. 
I raised a number of objections against that view, which I hope constitute convincing 
grounds for its rejection.  First, I rejected the notion that there is such a thing as our 
ordinary moral experience of assigning attributive responsibility, which is sufficiently 
homogenous, coherent and stable to ground a principle of consequential responsibility 
and, accordingly, also the notion that it is Scanlonian.  Although philosophers’ claims 
regarding the content of ordinary moral experience and practice are essentially empirical 
claims, they are usually unaccompanied by any empirical evidence.  But in the absence 
of supporting evidence these claims are necessarily speculative rather than authoritative.  
In fact, the empirical evidence I examined suggested that people’s experiences and 
practices of assigning attributive responsibility are diverse: different people appear to 
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assign attributive responsibility on different bases and some appear, at least some of the 
time, to make incompatibilist (and thus non-Scanlonian) judgements.  Moreover, the 
ways in which individuals assign attributive responsibility appear to be internally 
incoherent: the same person can make compatibilist judgements at one time and 
incompatibilist judgements at another.  Next, I rejected the claim that Scanlonian 
attributive responsibility should ground the principle of consequential responsibility 
(whether or not it reflects ordinary moral experience of attributive responsibility).  I 
highlighted Scanlon’s own entreaties not to treat his conception of attributive 
responsibility as grounds for consequential responsibility and demonstrated the different 
moral roots of the two conceptions.  I also cited concerns raised in the wider literature 
that, given the weakness of Scanlon’s conditions of attributive responsibility, treating it 
as grounds for consequential responsibility would produce worrying results.  Finally, I 
rejected the claim that the principle of consequential responsibility should be continuous 
with ordinary moral experience of attributive responsibility whether or not it is 
Scanlonian.  If it is not Scanlonian, the continuity requirement risks predicating justice 
on moral experience and practice that may be mean-spirited, prejudicial, self-serving, or 
misinformed.  In any case, I share Cohen’s view that ordinary ways of thinking hold no 
justificatory power by virtue of being ordinary.  I also worry that the continuity 
requirement may constrain the radical capacity of theories of justice: it serves to entrench 
aspects of the moral status quo within theories that might instead play a role in 
informing, challenging and invigorating contemporary morality.  For all of these reasons, 
the attributivist approach to the distinction between luck and choice should be rejected. 
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I chapter 2, I attempted to outline and defend a conceptual framework for thinking about 
the different forms of luck egalitarian regulation.  I argued that those luck egalitarians 
and critics of luck egalitarianism who treat redistributive compensation as the primary 
or sole regulatory strategy of luck egalitarian distributive justice should recognize the 
availability and potential efficacy of additional strategies.  Redistributive compensation 
can be provided to offset unjust inequalities of outcome, but unjust outcomes that are a 
function of inequalities of opportunity might also be prevented or reduced by regulatory 
action that equalizes opportunities.  Furthermore, within more ideal theoretical 
discussions that assume equality of opportunity holds, the necessary implication is that 
regulation to equalize opportunities is in place.  Accordingly, I introduced two additional 
categories of luck egalitarian regulatory strategy: levelling and direct structural regulation.  
Following Wolff, I suggested that a person’s opportunities are a function of her personal 
resources and characteristics on the one hand and the social and material structures of 
society on the other.  Regulatory action to adjust opportunities can, therefore, target 
people’s resources and it can target structures.  Levelling regulatory action targets the 
resources with which people face their opportunities, adjusting them in order to alter the 
opportunities they afford, given the social and materials structures of society.  Direct 
structural regulation targets the social and material structures of society, adjusting them 
so that they offer more equal opportunities, given differences in people’s resources.   
This approach to the regulatory strategies of luck egalitarian distributive justice brings a 
number of benefits.  First, it is a useful framework for discussion of regulation, 
prompting consideration of the range of regulatory options and enabling clear 
distinctions to be drawn between the different targets and rationales of different 
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regulatory actions.  Further, employment of levelling and direct structural regulation in 
addition to redistributive compensation may help to reduce ‘off the chart’ deficits in 
advantage, thereby enhancing the feasibility of luck neutralization.  Relatedly, 
employment of all three strategies may increase the extent to which luck can be mitigated 
on the balance of reasons.  Luck egalitarian outcomes can only be pursued as far as is 
permitted in light of the properly balanced demands of all relevant values, but if those 
demands tell against provision of compensation, they may yet permit some degree of 
levelling or direct structural regulation.  The focus on prevention as well as redress of 
unjust outcomes also allows for – and, indeed, encourages – examination of how 
inequalities are produced.  This enables luck egalitarians to obviate the objection that 
their approach refrains from criticism of the distributive system and fails to address the 
causes of injustice.  The approach can also accommodate arguments that people should 
have more equal access to important social goods such as jobs, places on educational or 
training courses, and internships.  Finally, the pluralist approach emphasizes the social 
construction of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ luck.  Luck egalitarianism has been criticized for 
implying that inequalities that are a function of how socially designed social and material 
structures treat individuals’ circumstances are wholly serendipitous, but the approach I 
endorse has no such implication.  And, unlike much luck egalitarian theory, it emphasizes 
that essentialist evaluative judgements of attributes such as disability can and should be 
avoided: for the purposes of a theory of distributive justice, being disabled is a matter of 
luck, but it is not, in itself, good or bad.  Rather, it may have unjust (positive or negative) 
distributive consequences.  
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In chapter 3, I presented a luck egalitarian critique of internships in the UK.  Internships 
have, in recent years, become an increasingly prevalent precondition of access to 
employment within many professional sectors.  As such, inequalities of access to 
internships contribute to overall inequalities of opportunity for advantage and, so, are 
implicated in the production of unjust advantage and disadvantage.  I reviewed current 
data on internships in the UK to identify five types of distributive mechanism and 
suggested a typology of internships, distinguishing between different types according to 
their distributive mechanism and whether or not they are paid.  I then offered an analysis 
of how various forms of luck delineate access to the different types of internship.  I 
sought to demonstrate that differences in the levels of wealth that people have at their 
disposal delineate access to unpaid and auctioned internships.  Drawing support from 
the luck egalitarian literature on gifts and bequests, I then argued that those differences 
in wealth are, at least in large part, matters of luck and that auctioning internships and 
failing to provide interns with adequate remuneration thus functions to exclude many of 
those who are already disadvantaged through no choice of their own from an important 
route into the professions.  I also tried to show that differences in personal social 
networks (or ‘who you know’) delineate access to internships distributed by nepotism, 
nepotistic competition and closed auction, as well as those that are advertised through 
‘word of mouth’.  Again, I argued that ‘who you know’ is, in very large part, a matter of 
luck and that, although individuals may make choices to develop relationships, 
opportunity sets for developing advantageous relationships are far from equal.  Next, I 
noted that demographic characteristics – gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and disability – are 
paradigmatic forms of luck and argued that processes of competitive intern selection 
that discriminate against applicants on the basis of their demographic characteristics thus 
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function to exclude people through no choice of their own.  Finally, I examined how 
differences in ability delineate access to competitive internships and, drawing support 
from the wider literature, argued that, while individuals may sometimes make choices 
that affect the development of their abilities, stark inequalities of opportunity to develop 
ability entail that overall differences in ability are, in large part, matters of luck.  Thus, I 
concluded that access to all types of internships is unequal and delineated on the basis 
of various forms of luck, though access to some is more restricted than others.  This 
analysis provided the starting point for an examination of the various regulatory actions 
that might be undertaken in order to tackle the unjust inequalities of outcome produced 
in and through the distribution of contemporary internships.   
In the fourth and final chapter, I explored the various regulatory actions that luck 
egalitarians might endorse in response to internship-related injustice.  First, I examined 
what internships might look like in a society that is much more ideally just than our own, 
namely, one in which there are no inequalities of job-related benefits.  I asked whether, 
given job equality, internships would still have any valuable role to play and concluded 
that they would, argued the case for equality between interns and workers, and also 
suggested that there may be a (weak) case for minimizing luck-based inequalities of 
access to internships.  Next, I considered what regulatory action might be undertaken in 
response to inequalities of access to internships here and now, absent consideration of 
certain implementational feasibility constraints.  I framed the discussion within the 
pluralist approach to luck egalitarian regulatory strategies, considering in turn 
compensatory, levelling and direct structural regulatory responses, which I hope usefully 
demonstrated how the pluralist approach can be applied to address the causes of injustice 
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in contemporary life.  Reaching an all things considered judgement regarding which 
action or combination of actions should be taken on the balance of all relevant 
considerations was beyond the scope of my arguments, but I sought to make some 
initiatory contributions to that enterprise by exploring how the demands of relational 
equality tell in favour and against the alternative regulatory actions I canvassed.  On the 
basis of those considerations, I drew some tentative conclusions regarding the 
comparative desirability of the various regulatory options, outlining a regulatory regime 
that could be characterized as broadly egalitarian in the sense that it is desirable in light 
of both distributive and relational egalitarian concerns.  The regime I suggested included: 
a requirement that organizations advertise openly for applicants; a requirement that 
organizations pay interns a living wage; a ban on closed internship auctions; either a ban 
on open internship auctions or a requirement that organizations pay all bidding expenses; 
a ban on discriminatory and nepotistic recruitment; a requirement that organizations 
recruit by need, sufficient ability and potential; reform of the education system; and 
compensation for any remaining ability-based inequalities of outcome.  Finally, I 
reviewed the calls for various regulatory changes that have been voiced by a number of 
organizations that are currently campaigning for ‘fairer’ internships and argued that, 
inasmuch as these changes would mitigate the influence of luck on access to internships, 
luck egalitarians have reason to endorse the campaigns.  While it may seem that much 
of the luck egalitarian literature is disconnected from the struggles for justice taking place 
outside the academe, I hope to have demonstrated that at least some of it need not be.  
If luck egalitarians embrace the regulatory approach I have sought to defend, which both 
encourages critical examination of the ways in which unjust inequalities are produced 
and allows that systemic change may sometimes be appropriate, we may find ourselves 
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reconnecting with – and also, perhaps, able to make a contribution to – more of these 
active struggles.   
Further Philosophical Research on Internships 
I want to end by drawing attention to a number of issues that were, unfortunately, 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but which would, I think, present interesting avenues 
for further philosophical enquiry.  In particular, I would like to highlight that, as 
internships are now an established feature of working life but have yet to receive much 
critical attention, they afford various opportunities for further applied philosophical 
research.  In this thesis, I have considered issues to do with access to internships, but 
there are a number of other respects in which internships relate to key philosophical 
concerns.   
Internships and Exploitation 
The critique I presented in chapter 3 focused on luck-based inequalities of access to 
internships, but alternative approaches might have considered different objections to 
contemporary internships.  Perhaps most notably, there is certainly significant scope for 
further enquiry into the question of whether unpaid internships can be characterized as 
exploitative.  In addition to the objection that unpaid internships contribute to unfair 
inequalities of opportunity for professional employment, the objection that they are 
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exploitative is the most frequently raised in public discussions of internships.140  Given 
the voluminous philosophical literature on exploitation, research to determine whether 
unpaid internships are exploitative in any sense that matters to philosophers would 
certainly be interesting and, I think, worthwhile.  Of course, there are competing 
definitions of exploitation within the literature, but unpaid internships might be 
considered exploitative on at least some of these conceptions.  Roemer (1996), for 
example, proposes a view of capitalist exploitation that bears some of the hallmarks of 
luck egalitarianism. It might follow from this view that interns (as a group) are exploited 
by their employers (as a group) if interns would benefit and employers would suffer if 
ownership of the means of production were redistributed such that each person owned 
her per capita share (Roemer 1996: 97).  Some Marxist perspectives might also view the 
relationship between employers and unpaid interns working in the private sector as 
exploitative in the technical sense that the intern receives less value than she creates, with 
the remaining value going to employers (see Theodore Burczak 2001: 163, Stephen 
Resnick and Richard Wolff 1987: 167-168 and, for critical discussion, Cohen 1979 and 
1983).  Alternatively, other Marxist perspectives might hold that interns are de facto 
                                              
140 For example, Gus Baker, who co-founded the campaign group Intern Aware, has been cited 
in multiple articles in the Guardian arguing that companies that fail to pay interns are exploitative 
(see, for example, Malik 2013a, Malik 2013b, Owen Gibson and Peter Walker 2013).  Labour 
MP Hazel Blears agrees, stating in the House of Commons that unpaid internships are a ‘modern 
day scandal’ that enable ‘unscrupulous employers to exploit […] young people desperate to get 
a foothold on the career ladder’ (Libby Page 2012).   
372 
 
exploited if they expend in production more hours of labour than are embodied in the 
goods they can purchase with their income from internship work (for further discussion 
of this view, see Roemer 1996: chapter 4, and Wolff 1999).  Further, whether unpaid 
interns are harmed or benefited and whether they are coerced into internship work or 
enter into it voluntarily may also be relevant to the judgement of whether they are 
exploited.  On some views, the claim that an intern is exploited would require the intern 
to be harmed by the internship (Buchanan 1985: 87, Munzer 1990: 171), and on others 
it would require her to have been coerced to work as an intern (Jeffrey Reiman 1987: 3-
4, Nancy Holmstrom 1977: 357).  On some readings, then, it might be stretching the 
term beyond its proper limits to account unpaid internships exploitative, at least in the 
cases of those interns who are uncoerced, drawn from relatively advantaged backgrounds 
(or, in Marxist terms, the dominant class), financially supported by their wealthy families 
for the duration of the internship, and further advantaged in terms of their future career 
opportunities as a result of undertaking the internship.  Other views, however, allow that 
the exploited party may benefit (Andrew Levine 1988: 66-67), or that an exploitative 
relationship may be entered into voluntarily (Joel Feinberg 1988: 176-179).  Wertheimer 
proposes a liberal approach on which unpaid internships would, I think, count as 
exploitative: according to his approach, exploitation can be both mutually advantageous 
and mutually consensual, though he suggests that this sort of exploitation is less morally 
wrong than exploitation that is harmful to the exploited party, or coercive, or both 
(Wertheimer 1996; for discussion see Sample 2003).  Providing answers to the question 
of whether, on these (and other) perspectives, unpaid interns would be conceived as 
being exploited would constitute a significant project in itself.   
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Internships in the Charity Sector 
Furthermore, my initiatory contributions to the enterprise of determining a regulatory 
regime that would be desirable to implement on the balance of all relevant considerations 
might be extended through investigation of what the demands of other values imply for 
internship regulation.  Does the regulatory regime I suggested have unacceptable 
ramifications for the value of liberty, given that it constrains the freedom to arrange 
unpaid internships and to distribute internships in particular ways?  Would it be 
sufficiently economically efficient and sustainable?  Is the requirement that charities pay 
their interns a step too far?  In what remains, I outline just some of the issues that would 
be relevant to an investigation of the last of these questions.   
First, there are certainly issues of organizational ethics that might be explored.  Few 
would deny that many (or, at least, some) charities do extremely valuable work in a 
terribly unjust world.  Indeed, much charitable work involves not only protecting liberty 
and promoting community solidarity, but also mitigating the kind of unjust disadvantage 
luck egalitarians condemn.  But it might be argued that there is an objectionable kind of 
hypocrisy manifested by charities that claim to champion the causes of the disadvantaged 
while implicating themselves in the perpetuation of unchosen advantage and 
disadvantage.  Unite and Intern Aware, reporting on their research into unpaid 
internships within the charity sector, warn that the sector ‘puts itself at danger of looking 
hypocritical and juxtaposed: charities, which are perceived as leading in ethical activity, 
are actually exacerbating existing socio-economic inequalities’ (Gerada 2013: 8).  The 
research findings suggest that ‘unpaid internships are at odds with perceptions of the 
third sector being the ‘ethical sector’’ (Gerada 2013: 10).  In other words, respondents 
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tended to view charities that offer unpaid internships as pharisaic and lacking in probity, 
with some going so far as to explicitly claim that the practice is ‘inexcusable’ (Gerada 
2013: 10).  It does seem plausible that when these sorts of organizations publicly affirm 
the value of equality of opportunity but run internship schemes that directly undermine 
that value, they demonstrate, at best, a kind of cognitive dissonance and, at worst, a lack 
of integrity.  There is, then, a sense in which failing to pay interns is inconsistent with 
the values many charities espouse.   
Second, and perhaps more significantly, unpaid internships are widespread in the charity 
sector and this raises the unwelcome possibility that requiring charities to pay their 
interns might result in less of their much-needed work getting done.  Consider that, if a 
charity had to increase its staffing budget in order to pay its interns, this may reduce the 
budget available to fund its activities.  It might even be the case that luck egalitarianism 
itself provides a reason against requiring charities to pay interns if any improvements to 
equality of access to employment in the charity sector were accompanied by a sizable 
increase in unjust disadvantage following a contraction of charitable work.  The question 
arises, then, how these considerations should be balanced.  If the work of unpaid interns 
in the charity sector serves important values including liberty, community solidarity and 
even luck equality, but interns’ lack of remuneration also functions to undermine luck 
equality, how should this conflict of values be resolved?  Are there reasons to exempt 
(at least some) charities from the requirement to pay interns, and do they trump the luck 
egalitarian reason in favour of paying them?  Perhaps, however, much of the conflict 
might be avoided.  Is it the case that charities should re-address their fundraising 
strategies and attempt to raise the additional funds required to pay interns?  Alternatively, 
375 
 
should charities adjust their business models?  Many charities that currently use unpaid 
interns are very large, with turnovers in the millions of pounds and Chief Executives on 
six figure salaries (Gerada 2013).  Perhaps these charities should find the money to pay 
interns from within their staffing budgets, without increasing that budget and without 
reducing their work outputs, by adjusting their staff pay ratio.  In other words, is it the 
case that intern’s wages should be paid for by reducing the salaries of the most highly 
paid staff?  On the other hand, perhaps there is an argument that high levels of pay are 
required to incentivize certain staff to work productively in service of the values charities 
serve – even if, as Cohen (1991) argues, such incentives are not justifiable on grounds of 
justice.  (And even if Cohen’s critique of the Rawlsian notion that high levels of pay are 
required to incentivize productivity applies especially well in the charity sector, given 
charities’ reputations as supposedly ethical bodies.)  Moreover, while the option of 
adjusting pay ratios may be open to wealthier charities, it may be unavailable to charities 
with far smaller turnovers and staffing budgets, in which case the remuneration 
requirement may well result in less charitable work being achieved by these smaller 
charities.  But perhaps there is a further option: smaller charities might avoid lost 
working hours by successfully recruiting volunteers.  Would such an approach enable 
the conflict of values to be avoided?  First, some smaller charities may be unsuccessful 
in recruiting volunteers.  But also, and more importantly, given that volunteers by 
definition have no contractual obligations, charities would not be able to rely on 
volunteers to work set hours, to complete set tasks on deadline, or to contribute to their 
core work.  Thus, the imposition of a requirement on all charities to pay interns seems 
likely to come at a cost, resulting in less valuable work being accomplished by smaller 
charities at the very least.  If so, the question arises whether those costs are justified in 
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light of the properly balanced demands of all relevant values, or whether (some or all) 
charities should be exempt from the requirement to pay their interns.  Even if it is 
appropriate on the balance of reasons to impose a requirement to pay interns on 
wealthier charities, the argument may not extent to smaller charities.  There is, then, 
considerable scope for further analysis of the implications of the arguments I have 
presented throughout this thesis.  An applied philosophical investigation of the issues I 
have just raised would not only be intellectually interesting but might even hold practical 
significance if it were to shed much-needed light on the ongoing public debates over 
what should be done about unpaid internships in the charity sector.   
In this thesis, I have tried to show how the normative ideal of luck equality can be 
pursued in our social arrangements.  Ultimately, the work has been driven by a stubborn 
desire to work out how a better world might be brought about.  The world as we find it 
is brimming with injustice and if there is any hope that this injustice it may one day wane, 
it rests on a belief that the world can be changed.  Injustice will not atrophy: it must be 
fought.  And, while that fight cannot be directed by philosophical edict, philosophical 
ideas have a role to play in the struggles for a better world: they can inform, they can 
inspire, and they can help sustain the momentum that makes change possible.   
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